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The thesis sets forth a model relating political contention 
to technological development. The selective realisation of 
a technical potentiality is shown to have been determined 
by conflict and negotiation among shifting alliances of 
state and private-industrial entities, each attempting to 
impose its requirements upon an emergent technology and 
thereby to dictate the precise form and pace of technical 
development.
The 'cdurse of communications satellite development is 
examined during the technology's formative period from 
1961 to 1975--as the product of struggles over technolo- 
gical control. Negotiation centered upon control, and 
contending modes of technical development were promoted 
and opposed on the basis of their perceived consequences 
upon the distribution of effective control over the tech- 
nology.
The initial mode of satellite development lasted from 
1961 to 1971  and is characterised as pre-emptive underde- 
velopment; urgency and haste were combined with tight 
constraints on the qualitative breadth allowed to techno- 
logical articulation. Pre-emptive underdevelopment derived 
from an uneasy political accommodation struck among consti- 
tuencies dominant during this phases the U.S. government, 
American communications carrier industry and a Western 
European intergovernmental bloc. The reigning compromise 
was directed toward expediting satellite development suf- 
ficiently to forestall rival deployments without endanger- 
ing existing and anticipated interests in both satellite 
and competitive technologies. Technical development be- 
neath a minimum level risked undermining the regime of 
control by leaving open the possibility of rival satellite 
systems; but development beyond a maximum level would have 
harmed the outstanding industrial and political interests 
in whose defence control was sought, while subverting the 
control regime by widening the legitimate scope for multi- 
national participation in authority over the technology.
Pre-emptive underdevelopment, it is argued, was suc- 
ceeded largely by the products of its own success in meet- 
ing the policy requirements of initially dominant entities 
and in thus reducing the continued importance of satellite 
technology as a political arena and instrumentality. Re- 
straints upon development could therefore, in the post-1971 
period, be relaxed, while the growing demand for a wider 
array of satellite services encouraged emergence of a more 
intensive mode of technological development under the aus- 




Individual authorship is, in many respects, more convention 
than fact. A work such as this one  whatever its original 
component--remains basically a recounting and reinterpreta- 
tion of a history as shaped, experienced and recorded by 
others. More important, the conceptual priorities, hunches 
and analytical skills that the author brings to bear have 
been largely engendered and nourished by still others, 
leaving the individuality of the ultimate authorship further 
suspect.
This study dates back to a suggestion made to me in 
late 1969 by the late Stephen Hymer, who was then associate 
professor of economics at Yale and my senior year adviser. 
Hymer proposed that 1 examine international telecommunica- 
tions and broadcasting as both indices and instruments of 
American political and economic expansionism. I finished 
an essay on the subject the following spring, having bene- 
fited directly from his counsel and indirectly from the 
influence and guidance of professors Charles E. Lindblom 
and Susan Lepper.
Although I left the subject alone for the next four 
years, the influence of two people with whom 1 came in con- 
tact during that period is very much present in this work. 
The first was Professor Kostas Axelos of the University 
of Paris-I, whose lectures and writings afforded me access 
to some understanding of Hegelian dialectics; in the course 
of this study, that understanding became a principal theo- 
retical device for conceptualising the phased political 
and technological development of satellite technology.
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The second was Roger Farquhar, under whom I apprenticed as 
a newspaper reporter, and whose professionalism and passion 
for accuracy revitalised my regard for the troublesome and 
untidy domain of facts.
Throughout the five years I spend in London researching 
and writing this study, I benefited immeasurably from the 
counsel and encouragement of my supervisor at the London 
School of Economics, T. J. Nossiter. Dr. Nossiter attempted 
unceasingly--! might say, relentlessly to inspire in me an 
appreciation for the rigour and intellectual level to which 
academic endeavour should aspire. If I remain vaguely dis- 
satisfied with what I have now produced, this is largely 
due to the exacting standards he set. I owe him a lot, and 
if others detect genuine quality in this work I would a; k 
them to regard it as a token acknowledgement--though not 
repayment of that debt.
Edward Ploman, executive director of the International 
Broadcasting Institute, gave me indispensable assistance 
during the early stages of this study, suggesting courses 
to pursue and allowing me the use of his own and the IBI's 
extensive files and libraries ultimately saving me some 
months of tedious research time.
In addition to the IBI library, I also made considerable 
use of the LSE's Library of Politics and Economics, the 
University of London's Senate House Library, the library 
of the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, the British 
Library, the City University of London library, Yale 
University's Sterling Memorial Library, the Federal Commu- 
nications Commission's library and the Library of Congress.
-IV-
My research in the United States in spring 19?6 was 
partly funded "by a grant from the Central Research Fund of 
the University of London, for which I would like to express 
my'thanks.
Among the friends whose spiritual support was of great 
value I would mention Donna and Mark Geller, Brian and Molly 
0'Sullivan, Janet and Norman Warren, Mrs. Pam Saturninus 
and Leslie Sklair. To Barry King--as friend, colleague and 
confidant--and his wife Gerri a special note of gratitude is 
due. Zacharias G. Petrou was a continuing source of moral 
and intellectual comfort.
My parents started me out financially on this project 
and helped sustain me with their apparently unflagging con- 
fidence, in defiance of all indications that the thesis 
might outlast us all. Their expectations have been great, 
but BO has their faith in my ability to live up to them. 
Through this work I should like to express my deepest appre- 
ciation for both.
Gary Wasserman furnished me with a model of intellec- 
tual attainment which, try though I might, I was unable to 
ignore. His fraternal counsel and encouragement more than 
once saved this thesis from a premature burial.
Above all, I should like to acknowledge the roles played 
by Eva Wasserman, as wife to me, midwife to this work and 
sole material support to us all. As if that were not enough, 
she became a mother during the course of the present study 
--producing in a more shorter gestation period an incompara- 
bly finer work, our son Eric. It is to Eva, for everything, 
that the following is dedicated.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1. CONTROVERSIES INTRODUCED
Between 1965 and 1969 the world's first public communications system based 
upon earth satellites was put into global operation, providing broadband 
transmission facilities capable of conveying virtually any electrical 
media: telephone, telegraph, teletype, facsimile, high-speed data, radio 
and television. The project was an extraordinary one technically and org- 
anisationally. An advanced aerospace technology, barely out of its infancy, 
was formally entrusted to an international commercial organisation specially 
created to carry forth its development and application. Within a decade the 
organisation's membership grew from 17 to 91 nations; four generations of 
satellites had successively been deployed, and some ^0,000 voice-circuits of 
capacity were in place. From a single transatlantic pathway in 1965 the net- 
work expanded to 359 pathways worldwide by 1975- In a few years' time the 
capacity for interconnecting metropolitan regions of the world was increased
several-fold, while cheap high-quality links were for the first time made
(1) 
available to regions long reliant on antiquated and undependable services.
The project and the technology were hatched from a mould pre-formed by 
the political and industrial contradictions of the era. There were, as a
U.S. satellite official observed in 1966, "conflicts within conflicts within
(2) 
conflicts." The satellite systenrwas, at the same time, the product of
state policies explicitly aimed at sustaining national supremacy abroad, and 
of unparalleled international cooperation; of peaceful objectives whose real- 
isation entailed use of military hardware designed for massive destruction; 
of narrowly commercial calculation wedded to a mandate to serve on an equal
-2-
basis rich and poor areas of the world; of a new technology placed in 
the hands of the very industrial interests that stood to lose the most 
from its success; and of a communications device developed to dramatise 
global power, yet whose actual functioning could subvert that hegemony 
by interconnecting the powerless without obliging them to submit to the 
continuous mediation of the powerful.
Accordingly, the venture has been subject to contrasting judgements 
throughout its history. The first major step toward creating the global 
system was the establishment, by an act of the U.S. Congress in August 
1962, of the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), a private 
profit-seeking corporation whose ownership was divided between the 1 
American communications carrier industry and the general investing public, 
and which would serve as America's chosen vehicle in the commercial com- 
munications satellite field. "Congress", said President Kennedy when he 
signed the Comsat Act, "has taken a step of historic importance." A
leading Republican senator applauded "the first opportunity for us as a
(4) 
nation to extend our social structure into space." Among liberals the
combination of state initiative and private ownership was viewed as an 
ingenious approach to a host of social ills:
No idea has set some Congressional hearts throbbing more than 
the notion that 'Comsat-Type corporations' should be set up to 
solve a whole range of social problems...If such a Federally- 
organized and privately-financed enterprise can be set up to 
shoot satellites into orbit, why not a similar partnership for 
rebuilding the cities?*--7 '
Investors, inspired by talk of a future billion-dollar-a-year business, 
welcomed the new corporation warmly and the New York Stock Exchange 
for the first time approved a company's stock for listing before shares
had actually been issued. "Comsat ranks as the biggest publicly labeled
(7) 
speculation in Wall Street history", said The New York Times.
-3-
Opposition to the Comsat Act, however, had been intense from dis- 
sident Senate Democrats who denounced the alienation of a government- 
developed technology from the public domain and who saw anti-competitive
potential in the new corporation's ownership provisions. The bill was
/ o \
called "shocking and unconscionable" and a giveaway of our taxpayer- 
financed communications space satellites to a private monopoly." A 
filibuster on the Senate floor forced the bill's supporters to vote to
end debate - the first time cloture had been passed in 35 years. 
Former President Truman complained:
I don't think the President understands the bill. The damned 
Republicans and some Democrats are trying to give away public 
property. The public spent 25 or 30 billion dollars developing 
satellites and the communications system ought to be publicly 
owned. The Republicans will give away everything if you don't 
watch them.'-'''''1
The Act created "a unique corporation designed to do little more than
accommodate the established economic interests...a convenient institution- 
CIS) 
al mechanism for preserving institutional relationships."
Similarly contradictory observations were occasioned by the next 
stage in the satellite system's creation, the establishment in 196^- of the 
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat), negotiated 
among the U.S. and 17 mainly Western European countries. American officials 
acclaimed Intelsat as a "blueprint for modern communications", and "the
first truly international partnership of independent nations in a commercial
(13) venture." Intelsat was "an unprecedented commercial enterprise..."
Nowhere else can we find less developed countries introduced 
as members of a multinational activity having a substantial 
capital subscription, advanced technical operations, immed- , 
iate social, political and economic impact, and growing revenues.
President Johnson praised Intelsat as "quite simply a cooperative under- 
taking of many nations to finance an international communications system
(15) 
which is of advantage to all."
Foreign observers were less enthusiastic, and pointed to Comsat's 
status within the 196^ Intelsat arrangements - subject to re-negotiation
in 1969 - as majority stockholder, manager and U.S. representative. 
"To the critical eye", said a British UN official, "Comsat is Lord 
High Executioner and Lord High Everything Else." A French paper 
delivered at the 1968 UN space conference charged that the United 
States "is crushing with its technical and technological might the
European countries by creating monstrous satellites and earth satellites
(17) and imposing them upon all." A Soviet official stated that
In establishing the space communications system, the U.S. has 
practically ignored the UN and the ITU /International Telecom- 
munications Union/. Behind the backs of these organizations, 
it arranged with a small group of Western countries for the 
sharing out of the profits from the operation on American terms.
An Asian Intelsat staffmember described the interim organisation as a
(19) 
"North Atlantic club", and an official of the U.S. State Department
who helped negotiate the 196^ arrangements has written of "a failure of 
vision and purpose in United States policy", marked by "excessive uni- 
lateralism."
Of greater importance than these political controversies, however, 
has been disagreement over the ultimate success of the technological 
effort that the organisational arrangements were fashioned to sustain.
On the one hand was the achievement of a worldwide network which by mid-
(21)1975 comprised 88 ground stations in 6k countries served by an orb- 
iting constellation of five on-line and four reserve high-capacity sat-
(22) ellites. A Comsat executive has fairly asked whether "any new
technology has been brought to practical application in so many parts
(23) 
of the world so rapidly after its conception." Indeed, Intelsat's
inauguration of global satellite service in July 1969 came less than 12
years after the first artificial satellite was launched in October 1957; 
seven years after the first transatlantic telephone call via satellite; 
and six years after the first successful high-altitude geostationary 
satellite, the design which became the basis of the commercial network.
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Far lengthier delays between invention and widespread availability 
have been seen in much more trivial devices: 79 years for the fluor- 
escent lamp, 56 years for the gyrocompass, 27 years for the zip fastener,
(2*0 nine for the safety razor. The creation of a fully operational
international communications network on a global scale in less than a 
decade, incorporating a previously unproven and virtually unimagined tech- 
nology, can justly be termed remarkable.
On the other hand, as J. Halloran has written, "We need to bear in
mind the social costs that stem from restricted or inadequate exploita-
(25) tion of an innovation." Utilisation of the satellite system, for
example, has been dominated overwhelmingly by telephone traffic. In 1971,
the year when permanent organisational arrangements for Intelsat were
agreed after two years of negotiation, full-time leases of satellite
( O^ ^1
circuits for phone service accounted for 83 percent of usage, a fact
which led journalist B. Maddox to call Intelsat "the big telephone com-
(27) pany in the sky." With so-called record traffic-telegraph, teletype,
facsimile and data - comprising most of the remainder, one of the most 
spectacular potential uses of the network, live intercontinental tele- 
vision relay, has been relegated to tertiary importance - between two
(28) and five percent of Intelsat's circuit use and revenues. Although
TV relay on an intercontinental basis can only be accomplished via
satellite, and despite the fact that this capability was invoked frequently
(29) to enhance the attractiveness of the satellite project, television's
relative share of Intelsat circuits was by the early 1970s showing a 
consistent decline due to overall increases in the system's capacity, 
and consisted "primarily of international broadcasts of news events and
special programmes (e.g. visits among Heads of States, major space shots
(^1) and major sports events)", as Comsat's president wrote in 1975- " A
1969 European Broadcasting Union report complained of "limited availability 
and generally rather adverse conditions" faced by broadcasters wishing to
-6-
(32) use satellite circuits; ^ high tariffs, high minimum transmission
times, an unwillingness of some national telecommunications entities
to carry TV at all, a limited demand, and a general attitude on Intelsat's
part that TV relay is marginal and expendable have all been blamed for the
paucity of traffic.
(3*0 The "atmosphere of celebration" that has accompanied growth of
the satellite system has, however, been dampened by much more than the 
lack of TV traffic: larger dissatisfaction has derived from the belief 
in an epoch-making potentiality of the technology which, it is felt, has 
been largely neglected and under-explored by the most competent and best- 
endowed organisation available for the task. Technically, satellites are 
far more than what Fortune magazine called "the great cable in space", 
differing markedly from all preceding forms of electrical transmission, 
which are deployed as single-route links of fixed capacity, capable of 
connecting only two points directly or through elaborate switching 
equipment. In terms of capacity, coverage, capital and operating 
costs and flexibility satellites offer great advantages over rival tech- 
nologies. The Intelsat IV satellites deployed in the late 1960s provided - 
depending upon how many terminals were connected at once - between five 
and ten times the circuit capacity of the contemporary generation of 
undersea cables. Coverage is global, aside from polar regions, irres- 
pective of natural obstacles and topography. The cost of a three-sat- 
ellite worldwide capability was around 10 percent greater than that of a 
single transatlantic phone cable and, operationally, because the synchron- 
ous orbital band is located at the extremely high altitude of 23,^00 miles, 
much the greater part of the total distance travelled by any transmission 
is between earth and spacecraft: thus the cost of using satellite relays 
is virtually insensitive to terrestrial distances. Finally, satellites 
can handle a number of different routes simultaneously, re-allocating
-7-
capacity among various pathways according to their precise traffic 
requirements, and serving either point-to-point or point-to-multiple
points communication patterns. Circuits need not be assigned perm-
(37) 
anently to earth stations, and terminals can be mobile. "In short,
contrary to some representations, satellites are not 'just another
transmission medium 1 , but can substitute for both the transmission and
(38) the switching-routing facilities required in terrestrial networks"
(39) 
- not merely a cable,, but a "network in the sky."
With those capabilities, the possible applications of satellite 
systems are clearly not limited to duplicating the services provided 
since the mid-1950s by successive generations of undersea phone cables. 
Satellites can furnish domestic or regional service, substituting for 
extensive and costly terrestrial microwave or cable networks; they can 
broadcast to vast areas from a single transmitter to suitably augmented 
receivers, provide navigational guidance to ships and aeroplanes, and 
conduct precise surveys of agriculture and natural resource deposits.
It is then against this backdrop of great possibilities that much 
of the dissatisfaction with Intelsat has been voiced. In late 1969? 
while permanent organisational arrangements were being negotiated to 
succeed the 196^ interim agreements, a report by a 20th Century Fund- 
Carnegie Endowment conference urged Intelsat to expand its operational 
rubric to encompass a multiplicity of satellite applications: "An 
integrated and global system of satellite communications, taking into 
consideration the coordination of existing or projected systems, is most 
desirable as a means of assuring the best service with the greatest 
economy." The course Intelsat took can be charted from the account 
of a similar conference two years later, which reported
general dismay that this consortium of nearly 80 countries, the 
owner of the world's first global satellite system, should have 
adopted a structure through which it can become nothing more than 
an international telecommunications carrier...Intelsat was 
becoming a restricted commercial organization for conventional
communications
-8-
Intelsat had, in effect, formalised its specialisation "into the accepted 
and conventional role of an intercontinental carrier of voice and message
traffic", while "the future development of satellite communications will
(if 2) occur outside the framework of this consortium." The result was
deemed likely "to consign satellite communications to a global frame-
(if3) work much more diffuse and decentralized than it need have been."
Intelsat's renunciation of a wide-ranging monopoly over satellite 
applications has been defended as appropriate to satellite technology -
the development of focussed and hence localised beaming techniques having
(if if) 
rendered unnecessary supervision on a worldwide basis - and as a
prudent way to avoid creating unduly a centralised supra-national
(if 5) 
authority. But it has not hitherto been explained as a necessary
response to a developmental stalemate caused by unresolved political con- 
flicts internationally and within the United States, and a means thereby 
to unfreeze satellite development by liberalising the structure of con- 
trol over the field.
By the time permanent organisational arrangements for Intelsat were 
agreed in 1971 > satellite development had been skewed and stunted in the 
following respects: 1.) effective priority had gone to deployment of 
military communications systems and, in the public sphere, to establish- 
ment of facilities for the intercontinental relay of voice and record 
traffic; 2.) development of systems dedicated to regional - intra-continen 
tal - service had not occurred; 3-) use of satellites to replace dom- 
estic telecommunications infrastructure was largely unexploited; 
k.~) broadcasting via satellite either to intermediary ground transmitters 
or directly to receiving sets had not taken place on a significant scale; 
5.) specialised satellite systems (e.g. aviation guidance or maritime 
communications) had not been created outside the military.
None of these undeveloped or underdeveloped applications required 
significantly more sophisticated technology than was contemporaneously 
being deployed by Intelsat - and to the degree that work was going 
forth in those areas, it was almost entirely outside the Intelsat 
rubric. In October 1965 - six months after Intelsat's first space- 
craft, Early Bird, was put in service over the Atlantic - the launch 
of a second Soviet Molniya satellite assured nine hours daily domestic 
telecommunications between Moscow and Vladivostok; by 1972 the 
resulting Orbita network was providing TV coverage to a potential 
audience estimated at 65 percent of the Soviet population. Canada 
too embarked independently on creating a domestic satellite system in 
1967, and Telesat began full-time operations in December 1973- Canada's 
satellites were built by Hughes Aircraft, which had supplied all but one 
of Intelsat's satellite generations. Numerous proposals for domestic 
satellite service within the U.S. had been made starting in 1966, includ- 
ing systems for broadcast relay, high-speed data, cable TV interconnection, 
direct broadcast, and supplementary voice and record relay service. 
Technical feasibility was not at issue in the delays that kept satellites 
out of the U.S. until 197^+: it was accepted that the high-altitude geo- 
stationary satellite - with multiple-access capability, which had been 
developed by Hughes and used successfully by Intelsat, was a thoroughly 
practicable technology for any and all of the proposed services.
In short, the fact that a decade after satellites had demonstrated 
their usefulness they were being used primarily as a supplementary means 
of relaying intercontinental telephone calls suggests a distortion of 
technical potential - if not a "basic~raalocclusion between evident need 
and effective demand. For the first time the means of providing at low 
cost virtually all forms of mass media and telecommunication services - 
domestically, regionally or internationally - was available for global
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deployment. The profound bias toward serving metropolitan commercial 
and administrative activities which resulted is not explicable by the 
character or inherent limits of the technology itself. The explanation 
must be sought in the political and industrial interests whose collisions 
- and collusions - comprise the history of the technology's formative 
years.
2. AN OUTLINE OF THE SATELLITE SYSTEM'S POLITICAL HISTORY
For the United States internationally, the 19^2 creation of the Comsat 
Corporation marked, in retrospect, a mid-way point between Sputnik and 
Vietnam, combining elements of the post-Sputnik technological hysteria 
with an emergent awareness of the need to establish reliable links with 
areas at the margins of the American military and commercial periphery. 
The timing of President Kennedy's first formal announcement of an 
accelerated communications satellite programme is suggestive of the two 
themes, coming in May 1961, soon after the intelligence failure repres- 
ented by the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Soviet scientific achievement 
signalled by Yuri Gagarin's first orbital flight.
Both elements merge in what H. Schiller has termed "an inseparable 
(JfQ)
military connection" to early satellite activities, evident in the 
scientific and technical environment from which satellites emerged and 
in the applications for which they were most urgently required. The U.S. 
rocket programme had languished as a curious sidelight - to the advantage
of manned bombers - until H-bomb tests in 1952 and 195^+ proved light-
(50) 
weight thermonuclear warheads to be feasible. Moreover, under the
Kennedy Administration U.S. strategic policy was undergoing a fundamental
shift from the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of 'massive retaliation, no
(51) conventional wars' to one of 'flexible response, limited wars'. On
the one hand, this change entailed a considerable increase in the size and
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sophistication of the American nuclear arsenal, making both possible and 
desirable some indication of a corresponding U.S. resolve to share the 
fruits of modern war technology for peaceful purposes. On the other ' 
hand, the more finely controlled military capability required by the 
new doctrine would need much improved communications facilities: delays
of from 2k to 36 hours were, according to the Secretary of State, not
(52) unusual in attempts to reach diplomatic missions through existing channels.
A global satellite system would up-grade the "vital nerve system of 
our modern military establishment," consolidating control over remote 
operations; it would, along with the commitment to place a man on the 
moon (also announced in Kennedy's May 1961 statement), legitimate space 
activity in general and help secure international agreement on radio 
frequencies - required too for the military's programme - at a crucial 
September 1963 meeting in Geneva; and it would provide an American-led 
but nonetheless multinational project that was symbolically appealing to 
the 'non-committed' newly independent countries of the Third World, whose
importance was increasingly appreciated within the U.S. government, and
(5*0 
reassuring to America's allies. From these concerns, and from a desire
to recoup national prestige believed lost because of early Soviet space 
triumphs, derived a firm state policy supporting rapid and worldwide de- 
ployment of communications satellites.
It was not, however, the state's objectives that so inflamed passions 
in the Senate during the Comsat Act debates, but rather the terms of the 
new corporation's integration into the American communications carrier 
industry. The industry, led by its dominant member American Telephone & 
Telegraph (AT&T), had moved quickly and skillfully during 1961 to draft 
organisational proposals calling for private consortium ownership of the 
satellite system, hoping thereby to pre-empt the possibility of government 
ownership. Although the Act settled that issue, it left open the more 
dangerous possibility that the new corporation would develop into a fully
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independent and well-endowed competitor with exclusive rights to a low- 
cost alternative to the carriers' submarine cable holdings. Since 
cables were a more expensive and therefore - under U.S. regulatory 
practice - more profitable technology, their protection was a principal 
carrier concern. Furthermore, the unconditional success of satellite 
technology under Comsat's auspices would facilitate the corporation's expan- 
sion into the much richer domestic ocmmunications market. These consider- 
ations prompted a series of complex challenges to Comsat by the carrier 
industry between 1965 and 19711 which were adjudicated and largely sus- 
tained by the Federal Communications Commission. Recounted below in 
Part IV, the challenges effectively: forced Comsat to share ownership of 
U.S. earth stations with the carriers; prevented Comsat from selling its 
services to entities other than its carrier competitors; gave the carriers 
wide discretion over whether to channel traffic by satellite or through 
their own cables; adopted uniform overseas pricing policies, so that 
satellite economies were not reflected in lower relative tariffs; permitted 
new high-capacity cables to be built in the Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific; 
and denied Comsat a franchise on domestic satellite service. The net 
effect of these decisions was to constrict Comsat's operational autonomy 
to where it became virtually a. wholly dependent resource of the private 
carrier industry, and to restrain utilisation of the global satellite 
system by the biggest source of international telecommunications traffic, 
the United States.
For Comsat, this erosion domestically rebounded onto a deteriorating 
position internationally. From 1964- to 1971, while Intelsat functioned 
under interim arrangements, Comsat used its dominance in the consortium 
to force the pace of satellite development and deployment, both to secure 
its standing at home vis-a-vis its carrier rivals and to .justify its 
dominant Intelsat role in view of the forthcoming organisational re- 
negotiations, which would begin in 1969. Dissatisfaction on the part of
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European participants dated from the first set of negotiations in 1963- 
6^ when, notably, attempts to mandate an international spread of equip- 
ment procurement contracts were rejected by Comsat in favour of procur- 
ing solely on the basis of best price and quality a formula likely to 
assist American producers in extending their competitive advantages. 
Indeed the very dominance secured by the U.S. for Comsat served to 
dampen European enthusiasm for cooperation, encourage foreign collabor- 
ation with American carriers on new cable projects, and enhance the 
political and industrial allure of separate satellite development 
outside the Intelsat rubric. The U.S. government assisted Comsat by 
promulgating a 'single global system 1 policy, which justified blocking 
exports of potentially satellite-related hardware and data by American 
manufacturers and denying launcher services to independent satellite 
initiatives that might draw traffic from the Intelsat system,, Until 
Intelsat, however, officially determined just which applications its 
system would provide, this was applied to virtually all non-Intelsat 
systems. Thus with the Europeans resisting Comsat's efforts to expand 
Intelsat's competence into new satellite fields in order to avoid extend- 
ing American dominance into promising avenues for independent exploita- 
tion, and with the U.S. trying to block most satellite efforts outside 
Intelsat, the field was headed for stalemate.
The stakes of satellite availability were, however, being dramatic- 
ally widened by the enormous interest in the technology shown by Third 
World countries which, by the time the Intelsat re-negotiations opened 
in 1969, comprised more than half the organisation's membership. These 
countries, for the most part, supported substantial modifications in 
Intelsat's structure and procedures to create a wider spread of effective 
influence to be exercised. More important, they were impressed by the 
numerous as-yet undeveloped applications of satellite technology and
unwilling to let outstanding disputes among industrial countries restrain 
the technology's qualitative spread. For the U.S., the importance 
attached to the field had diminished in large measure because of the 
system's success in fulfilling the objectives originally associated with 
it: a Soviet system had not emerged to rival Intelsat, the network 
was providing the required services and was self-sustaining, and the 
project had enlisted global participation and some enthusiasm. Steps 
toward greater multilateral!sation were supported by Western European as 
well as Third World members, and relaxation of the 'single global system' 
claim would open up opportunities for American manufacturers   who had 
lost business because of export restrictions   as well as European firms.
Thus, in the permanent Intelsat arrangements concluded in May 1971, 
Comsat lost its comprehensive veto and had its vital managerial role 
made contractual and limited to technical and operational matters; a 
transition was begun toward an international secretariat for administrative 
and financial management; two plenary assemblies, one intergovernmental 
and the other consisting of nominated operating entities, were created. 
Most important, procedures were adopted to permit Intelsat members to 
build and operate domestic, regional and specialised satellite systems, 
either within or without Intelsat.
With this evident devolution of control came decompression and a 
surge of renewed efforts in the satellite field. In addition to the 
Canadian system, domestic satellites were deployed in the United States 
and Indonesia, a year-long experiment on direct satellite broadcast was 
conducted in India; planning continued on a European telecommunications 
satellite network, an Arab League system and similar in Japan, Brazil, 
and among France and francophone areas of Africa and the Americas. 
Separate international forums were established to negotiate development 
of an aeronautical guidance satellite system and a maritime communications
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network. Within Intelsat, large blocks of hitherto unused capacity
began being leased at promotional rates for bilateral and domestic
(56)
service. De-monopolisation in the satellite field has meant div- 
ersification and proliferation; de-monopolisation was premised on 
securing the main objectives for which control was sought, the fulfil- 
ment of which permitted relaxation of developmental restraints that had 
helped to sustain that control.
3. OTHER STUDIES OF THE SATELLITE SYSTEM CONSIDERED
Two preliminary points should be made on the secondary satellite liter- 
ature before examining the small number of full-length works on the 
subject that have appeared; first, they are the work of Americans; second, 
none has emerged from the research tradition of media studies. The 
present study is no exception to the first point, which is mentioned 
because the works taken collectively represent a minor cross-section of 
the contemporary range of American socio-political discourse - from tech- 
nocratic analysis and pluralism/incrementalism, to neo-populism and neo- 
irnperialism. What is impressive however is less the range than the 
overall lack of coherence: each treatment focusses on a single theme 
of a complicated history, developing it with a conceptual bigotry that 
makes difficult finding common ground on which to base dialogue. The 
point is not variety of interpretation, but widely divergent background 
assumptions as to the location of the satellite history's meaning - and 
therefore basic disagreement over sources and weights of social determin- 
ants, especially as concerns relations between state and private sectors.
As to the second observation, the satellite system's history fits 
poorly into the principal concerns of media studies because it requires 
consideration of an emergent, not a given, technological form and because 
that form has been defined as a telecommunications device, not a 'mass
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(57) medium'. With few exceptions •"' communications technologies are
treated in media studies not as social outcomes but as social inputs, 
and the precise forms in which technologies are deployed are implicitly 
regarded as necessary ones. Attention therefore centres on uses, con- 
tents and their determinants, yielding the "informational bias" ident-
/ £-0 \ 
ified by R. Houlton. The neglect of telecommunications in media
studies shows recent indications of remedy, basically because of an 
awareness that new transmission techniques, by extending broadband capab- 
ilities, provide means of conveyance which are technically indifferent as 
to which media are carried. Nevertheless, media studies have tended to 
regard telecommunications - in this sense, point-to-point techniques - 
as little more than precursors to the emergence of broadcasting.
The first social scientist to examine Comsat and Intelsat was 
H. Schiller, whose treatment forms part of a larger demonstration of 
the uses of communications control to extend and consolidate American 
global hegemony. The state component in the satellite history is there- 
fore emphasised, and Comsat is viewed essentially as a state instrument, 
albeit profitably owned and controlled by monopolistic communications 
carriers. Schiller's central problematic is that of imperialism and 
anti-imperialism, and he therefore ignores the long domestic industrial 
conflicts through which the private carriers imposed their requirements
on satellite development.
( 6?) 
In contrast, M. Kinsley's work is an expose of AT&T's efforts
to hinder full development of satellite technology and the FCC's failure 
adequately to protect the new technology, ultimately to the detriment of 
the 'public interest'. Although"that analysis coincides in important 
respects with the present work, there are equally important differences. 
First, Kinsley misconstrues the larger regulatory context within which 
the satellite history unfolded, a context marked by the FCC's growing
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activism and capacity to identify emergent communications requirements, 
ruling against AT&T where monopolistic inefficiencies were believed to 
endanger important elements of the national communications capability. 
AT&T, as we shall recount in Part IV, lost during this period monopolies 
over several sub-markets where protection from competition had either been 
enjoyed or was sought. Some attempt is therefore necessary to explain why 
its anti-satellite campaign should at the same time have been sustained. 
Second, Kinsley focusses on a single aspect of state behaviour in the 
communications field, the so-called regulatory, consisting of stabilising 
and protecting an existing configuration of private power. Reform of 
regulatory policy and procedure would presumably leave the state with no 
interest to defend but the public's; the state is therefore seen as a 
potentially neutral and ameliorative force, once freed from corrupting 
private influence. Finally and consequently, Kinsley's argument cannot 
engage the core of Schiller's thesis, that of central state leadership in 
establishing American dominion in the satellite field in support of expansion 
ist aims. Just as Kinsley's critique of "corporate Luddisrn" has no 
place in Schiller's work, so Kinsley's concluding endorsement of state 
satellite ownership ignores Schiller's contention that the state's deep 
and growing involvement in communications already was permitting an 
effectively centralised orchestration of action in support of imperialist 
objectives.
If Kinsley presumes the possibility of state benevolence, J. Galloway 
attempts to prove its reality. Galloway's treatment merges two 
strands of American political theory which ought to be distinguished: 
incrementalism and pluralism. Regarding the first, he seeks to demonstrate 
that state satellite policy evolved in an incrementally rational manner, 
achieving clarity and consistency in steps thanks to mutual adjustment 
by participants. Although it is true that the policy emerged somewhat
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gradually and that some measure of modification of positions occurred, 
the twin requirements of expeditious development and private ownership 
were non-negotiable; moreover, to accept the conclusion that the out- 
come was rational, incrementalism 1 s sole immanent criterion of ration- 
ality must be endorsed - agreemtnt among participants. Kinsley's 
account of a systematically emasculated technological potential can have 
no place in such a confined problematic and, in fact, Galloway notes 
the various anti-Comsat FCC decisions only in passing, finally making 
no attempt to determine how effectively the satellite system was used. 
The second strain, that the process was pluralistic, is also un- 
acceptable. Pluralism cannot be reduced to the number of formal entities 
apparently participating in a decision-making process. In the satellite 
case, access to that process was indeed categorically limited: the U.S. 
international carrier industry's 1961 self-selection as the private sec- 
tor's legitimate representative excluded the domestic carriers, aerospace 
industry, electronics manufacturers and broadcasters. Similarly the 1963- 
6k international negotiations involved a small number of industrial 
countries, notwithstanding the commitment to globalise the system. 
Furthermore, within those limited categories of participants effective 
power was widely unequal: one can for instance speak of nine U.S. inter- 
national carriers, but one must not thereby presume political equivalence 
between the U.S.-Liberia Radio Company and AT&T. Likewise, international 
negotiation among roughly equivalent powers is hardly likely to conclude 
by awarding one of them two-thirds of the votes on subsequent collective 
decisions. In sum, the satellite system emerged in our view from an 
accommodation between two monopolies, a state monopoly over rocket launchers 
and an AT&T monopoly over American telephone traffic. If there was a more 
general, pluralistic process of mutual adjustment, it was adjustment to 
this accommodation, not of it.
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Thus these three works represent three very different attempts to 
locate the determinants of satellite activities. Schiller finds that 
determination in an undifferentiated, state-directed U.S. expansionism, 
while Kinsley locates it in a process of domestic corporate manoeuvring 
and regulatory corruption. For Galloway, the satellite system arose 
from the formal decisions reached by various state agencies in perform- 
ing a legitimate role in overseeing formation of consensus among inter- 
ested entities, first within the U.S. and then internationally.
A fourth interpretation is offered by M. Snow, former Comsat econ- 
omist, in a study which stresses the importance to Intelsat of meeting 
various internal economic objectives - like full cost recovery - in order 
to become self-sustaining. The work's principal flaw is a technocra- 
tic bias whereby political decisions are treated as technical givens. 
While, for instance, adducing figures to indicate that only one-third 
of satellite system capacity was actually being utilised, he asserts that 
normal engineering prudence requires providing double the capacity which 
is normally used - thus ignoring the question of why new transatlantic 
cables were being fully loaded within days of opening. Snow's conclusion 
that cost-minimisation has been Intelsat's major detectable goal is 
unsatisfactorily reconciled with this overcapacity; the possibilities 
that Comsat was encouraging overinvestment in order to inflate its 
domestic rate base, was creating an in-house R8J3 capability out of pro- 
portion to the international system's requirements, and was using Intel- 
sat to test components that were more capacious, sophisticated and ex- 
pensive than international usage required - and were in fact destined 
for domestic service - are mentioned only in passing. Moreover, by 
raising internal economic objectives to the status of full-scale social 
determinants, Snow avoids analysing the conditions under which commer- 
cialisation - and with it, the obligation to compete with well-entrenched 
rivals for heavy-traffic markets - was deemed a desirable way to
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institutionalise the system.
That issue is addressed by the final work considered, in which 
J. Kildow explores the alleged irreconcilability of commercial operation 
and public service. The work trivialises this opposition, however, 
by focussing exclusively on Comsat's behaviour, which is indicted for 
being 'business-like 1 and hostile to the 'political' influences brought 
by European Intelsat members. To sustain the condemnation Kildow gravely 
distorts the determinants of commercialisation, Comsat's industrial auto- 
nomy and its actual conduct vis-a-vis its European partners. Comsat is 
said to have been free to determine the satellite system's operational 
philosophy - viz. commercial or public service - when in fact the corpora- 
tion was explicitly created by Congress as private and profit-seeking 
(see below Part II), expected to enter and compete within the existing 
international industry. Comsat's unsuccessful struggles with the ttS. 
communications industry, furthermore, formalised its role as a "carriers' 
carrier" which, like a gentleman's gentleman, made it dependent on its 
domestic bosses. This history is not mentioned, presumably because it 
undermines the portrayal of Comsat as a bullish and independent American 
profiteer. Lastly, the facile distinction between Comsat as commercial 
and the Europeans as political is misleading and finally empty. The 
commercial approach the U.S. favoured was a means to political control, 
since it justified translating Americans big share of international 
traffic into stockholdings and 'political' votes. The political approach 
of the Europeans was likewise directed at securing national commercial 
advantages: a 'political' formula requiring Intelsat to procure a 
percentage of its equipment in Europe would improve the export capability 
of aerospace forms there. Moreover, although Kildow apparently holds 
that an initial decision in favour of state ownership of Comsat would 
have obviated later difficulties, she does not suggest how; unless that was 
accompanied by a state take-over of the entire U.S. international
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communications industry, the remaining private companies would have been 
obliged to compete with a government-supported - and if operated as a 
'public service 1 a government-subsidised - satellite entity. And 
internationally, it is arguable that if Comsat had been state-run the con- 
cessions ultimately made at the Intelsat re-negotiations would have been 
unlikely. In the end, perhaps it was just as well that the U.S. could 
afford not to care about Comsat's fate.
There are, in conclusion, four principal elements to the history 
of the satellite system, all of which are considered by none of the full- 
length works. 1.) An initial phase of satellite activity, from 1961 to 
1971, yielded a technical outcome that was, paradoxically, both aggress- 
ively and urgently pursued and tightly restrained as to qualitative 
breadth of application. 2.) Even in the restricted form in which it 
was deployed, the technology itself necessarily drew an ever wider range 
of participants and thereby helped expand the variety of formative influ- 
ences upon its further development and application. 3«) The initial phase 
of satellite activity was succeeded by another, dating from 197''? during which 
qualitatively greater development has occurred within a de-monopolised, quasi- 
federal structure of control. *f.) Throughout, the U.S. government played 
a central role vis-a-vis satellite technology and private industry, as 
final guarantor of the technical adequacy of the national communications 
capability; the resulting form of satellite development cannot therefore 
be reduced to its compliance with private industrial objectives, and 
instead needs explanation in terms of negotiation between those objectives 
and the state's definition of national requirements.
In the next chapter, we shall put forth the theoretical framework 
that will inform this account of the history of satellite communications. 
Part II deals with the socio-political origins of the technology: 
Chapter Three with the evolution of U.S. government satellite policy and 
Chapter Four with the development of U.S. industrial policy, both through
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1961;the Fifth Chapter recounts the passage of the 1962 Comsat Act. 
In Part III, the 1963-6*+ negotiations through which the interim Intelsat 
was created are described and analysed; Chapter Six concerns their back- 
ground - European aerospace activities and U.S. views thereon; Chapter 
Seven recounts early transatlantic satellite negotiations and U.S. 
efforts to show unilateralist resolve; Chapter Eight ends treatment of 
the negotiations and offers conclusions. Part IV shifts attention to 
Comsat's 1965-?^ domestic industrial struggles; to set the scene, 
Chapter Nine provides an introduction and overview of the domestic setting, 
and Chapter Ten an analysis of the technical development of the satellite 
system; the next five chapters are accounts of Comsat's battles with the 
carrier industry before the FCC - Chapter 11 over U.S. earth stations, Chapter 
12 over which entities Comsat would be allowed to sell its services to, 
Chapter 13 over new submarine cables, and Chapter 14- over domestic satell- 
ite service. In Part V the focus is again international, and the 1969- 
71 Intelsat re-negotiations are examined. Chapters 15 and 16 examine the 
issues raised by efforts to expand Intelsat's operational competence, 
first in the context of transatlantic relations, then in the context of 
metropolitan-Third World relations. In Chapter 17 issues associated with 
re-organising Intelsat are analysed, and Chapter 18 provides an account 
of the negotiations themselves. Chapter 19 offers a brief description 
of the historical aftermath, and conclusions to the work.
CHAPTER TWO: THE FRAMEWORK
This chapter sets forth the theoretical perspective that will guide 
and inform this study, and the hypothetical model believed most approp- 
riate to the political history of satellite communications. The chapter 
consists of the following: First, the structural arena within which 
satellite-related determinations were made is described, with reference 
to a new category of social activity. Second, determinants relevant to 
this history and deriving from the fields of long-distance communications 
and of technological innovation are listed and illustrated. Third, a 
specific process of technological development and application is pro- 
posed to account for the operation of certain of those determinants in 
response to the advent of satellite technology. Fourth, qualitative 
changes in the character of satellite activity are traced to changes in 
the importance and structure of the technology's political control. 
Finally, a historical precedent to the satellite history is recounted.
1. STRUCTURE;_ THE MODE OF_TECHNOLOGICAL FORMATION
There is no readily available category of social activity or organis- 
ation to describe the dynamic area of convergence where the efforts of 
institutions and organisations to determine the development and applic- 
ation of a new technology meet. The nearest equivalent, the "innovating
agent" of innovation diffusion theory, implies efforts to encourage
(1)
the adoption of a given new technique. Furthermore, the innovation- 
adoption-diffusion schema shifts attention away from the active process 
of selection by which a 'given' technology is formed, toward the determ-
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inants of the acceptability of an innovation. Our interest, in the 
satellite case, is in the relationships between the particular form 
in which a technology is developed and deployed, and the political 
character of its ownership and control. For that we need not a schem- 
atic process but a structural arena in which the precise disposition of 
a technological potential is negotiated.
We propose to call this structure the mode of technological 
formation, defined as the location of the negotiated adaptation and 
application of a technological potential. By formation is meant the 
integrated process by which a. technical possibility is realised - includ- 
ing research and development and subsequent deployment - which is con- 
ceived as a sequence of search, selection and manipulation of design 
options to ensure a technical outcome that complies with predominant 
requirements. The mode of formation is the meeting-ground between 
aspects of ongoing social operations and political relations, and an 
emergent technology. This usage is informed by the Marxian tradition, 
a borrowing which is deliberate, since the central problematic in each 
is much the same - centering on the potential opposition between prod- 
uctive capabilities and the manner in which those capabilities are 
organised, applied and, when necessary, restrained. M. Godelier's 
description of the larger construct, the mode of production, is apposite:
A mode of production is the combination of two structures, 
irreducible to one another: the productive forces and the 
relations of production. The notion of productive forces 
designates the set of factors of production, resources, tools, 
men, characterising a determined society at a determined 
epoch which must be combined in a specific way to produce the 
material goods necessary to that society. The notion of 
relations of production designates the functions fulfilled 
by individuals and groups irTTfhe productive process and in 
the control of the factors of production.(2)
The principal theme of much of our analysis of satellite development 
likewise derives from an exploration of the formative transactions 
between Godelier's two structures: socio-political relations as 
fashioned within, and thereby constituent of the mode of formation, and
-2k-
the technological potential whose precise disposition is the raison 
d'etre for those relations. The inability of a quasi-monopolistic 
structure of political control to continue the constrained style of 
technological formation which derived from efforts to sustain that 
control, when the technology's own application had widened qualita- 
tively the range of vital interest in its further development, provoked 
in the satellite case a decisive transformation in the mode of formation 
itself.
To clarify the notion of the mode of formation, certain assumptions 
are necessary as to the socio-political response to the advent of a new 
technology.
2.1.i.) A technological potential emerges from, threatens to 
modify and is subject to modification by ongoing contention over dom- 
inance among social organisations. (Dominance is considered as a 
greater relative capability to prevail over rivals in efforts to con- 
trol and mobilise scarce resources in pursuit of independently selected 
objectives.) The precise expression to be permitted the technological 
potential may be at issue, to the degree that numerous applications 
and forms are equally feasible technically but respond to different 
areas of contention. Furthermore, the interest in a new technology 
may be only distantly related to the services it will ultimately provide: 
manufacturers, for instance, may be seeking to optimise conditions for 
supply of components, and prospective competitors to protect outstanding 
investments.
2.1.ii.) The new technological potential may implicate interests 
of numerous hitherto unrelated organisations, thus bringing them into 
direct relations with one another for the first time because of the 
recombination or rationalisation of activity its development and appli- 
cation appear to require. In this respect the technology can be viewed
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as a medium of social interaction, precipitating creation of a novel 
array of socio-political relations. Before the advent of satellites, 
for example, there was no reason to suppose relationships between 
European aerospace efforts and Third World telecommunications development.
2.1.iii.) Whatever the precise reasons for interest, the possible 
responses to a new technology's emergence can be depicted schematically 
from the interplay of two parameters: its anticipated instrumental 
role for an organisation, and the position taken in its regard by the 
organisation. Concerning the first, the question is whether emergence 
of the technology is viewed as providing an occasion to enhance signif- 
icantly the organisation's prospects, fortunes, relative advantage - in 
short, whether the technology promises to permit a more beneficial 
pursuit of interests. If so, the resulting response is offensive. If, 
however, the organisation is essentially compelled by emergence of the 
technology to try to preserve its existing interests in spite of the 
anticipated consequences of the technology, the response is defensive. 
As to the second parameter - the actual position taken regarding the 
technology - if its development, application, utilisation, in short its 
formation is favoured and assisted, the organisation's response is a 
positive one; but if the organisation acts to discourage, resist, 
suppress or restrain the technology's formation, the response is negative,
Using those parameters, four styles of response can be obtained:
offensive defensive
positive a.) classic inventor/ 
entrepreneur
b.) reluctant 
part ic ipat ion
negative c.) aggressive com- 
petition
d.) efforts to 
suppress
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To elaborate: (a;) describes a response where the new technology 
is, as in the case of the classic inventor/entrepreneur, seized upon as 
a means to improve substantially the pursuit of interests; the success 
of technological formation correlates strongly and positively with the 
agency's success, and aggressive efforts to assist the process are made; 
(b.).the defensive-positive case, which is of greatest relevance to 
the satellite history, is where formation is assisted as a means of 
preserving - with little prospect of improving - the entity's interests 
vis-a-vis rivals; few affirmative gains are anticipated, but failure 
to participate in and, to some degree, support formation may cede 
important advantages to potentially more enthusiastic competitors; 
(c.) in the offensive-negative case, there is both opposition to the new 
technology and a recognition that its introduction may provide opport- 
unities for gains, opportunities that may for instance involve aggres- 
sive promotion of existing alternatives; a degree of success for the 
new technology may therefore be useful in stimulating creation of new 
markets or outlets, which could thereupon be satisfied by established 
techniques; (d.) the defensive-negative instance is where the technology's 
advent is believed wholly inimical to the agency's current position 
and future prospects, prompting - for example - efforts to secure sup- 
pression through litigation or state intervention, predatory price-cutting 
or substitutes or attempts to cut off supply sources.
2.1.iv.) It is in the convergence, then, of perhaps otherwise 
unrelated struggles over dominance among and within those organisations 
whose interests are implicated in the technology's emergence that the 
politics of technological forma'tlcm is located. The new technology 
provides a novel arena to which contention is extended. Moreover, the 
subsequent pace and character of development and application is deter- 
mined by the relative success achieved by interested agencies in making
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technological formation serve their respective requirements for new 
political instruments - that is, new means to enable dominance in the 
fields where each normally figures to be sustained or revised.
2.1.v.) The site of this convergence is the mode of technological 
formation, a novel social structure created by responses to the new 
technology's emergence. In general, the mode of formation can be 
analysed as to (a.) its own internal structure of dominance - i.e. which 
participating agencies prevail in securing preferential access to and 
influence over authoritative decisions, (b.) the subsequent character 
of the technology's formation - the degree to which known design potent- 
ial is exploited, the pace and extent of deployment, and the extent to 
which the technology is, as deployed, utilised, and (c.) the relation- 
ships that obtain between those two spheres of socio-political dominance 
and technological development.
Thus the mode of formation represents the meeting-ground where 
existing organisations are drawn and manoeuvre for dominance in order 
to pursue or defend those of their interests which seem implicated in 
negotiations over the development and application of the new technology. 
We must now consider the determinants of those interests, two categories 
of which are pertinent to this study: determinants associated with long- 
distance communications requirements, and those related to the technol- 
ogical environment which is both the origin and destination of the new 
technology.
2. DETERMINANTS: LONG-DISTANCE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
It is our contention that certain political and functional requirements 
relating to long-distance communications systems, requirements whose 
fulfilment is normally a state responsibility, were stamped early and
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decisively upon the emergent technology of satellite communications, 
resulting in pre-definition of the technology's application which 
informed the initial phase of technological formation. Furthermore, 
as will be argued later, the satisfaction of those requirements enabled 
a relaxation of U.S. state concern with further satellite development, 
which was a pre-condition for liberalising technological control and 
permitting other applications to be pursued.
2.2.i.) The communications systems of interest here can be termed 
instrumental ones, as distinct from cultural or 'mass media' systems. 
The terminology is inexact, but the distinction is important. The 
notion of 'instrumental' seems appropriate because it implies the over- 
all functionality of such systems, replicating in their essentials 
the components of the Weinerian command-control model of communication:
the exercise of control - defined as "nothing but the sending of messages
(*0 
which effectively change the behaviour of the recipient" - requiring
input, output and feedback channels of largely equivalent design, 
capacity and reliability. The effectiveness of such systems is 
instrumental to the application of power, since
the power exercised from policy-making centers can only be as 
effective as the structure of communications between., the beha- 
vior-controlled and the policy-making power-holders.
The structural characteristics of instrumental systems, compared with 
cultural ones, include: linkages are point-to-point, not point-to- 
mult ipoint; channels are designed regularly to accommodate two-way 
message flows - essential for surveillance and feedback functions -
instead of one-way flows; similarly, terminals have technically reci-
(7) 
procal, rather than asymmetrical, opportunities to communicate ; and
access to such systems is typically restricted and definite, instead of 
diffused and indefinite as with cultural systems.
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2.2.ii.) The historical pattern has been that instrumental 
systems capable of rapid long-distance transmission have been created 
to satisfy new requirements occasioned by the geographical expansion or 
maintenance of extended military, administrative and commercial activ-
/ Q \
ities. Concerning pre-electrical systems, the work of F. Dvornik 
shows the deployment of rapid transmission networks - incorporating 
beacon relays, smoke signals, pigeon posts, postal roads staffed by
runners or horse relays, semaphores or voice relays - by the Assyrian,
(Q) Persian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Mongol, Arab and Muscovite empires.
Europe's first postmaster-general was appointed in 1500 in order to 
link the scattered Hapsburg possessions via royal correspondence,
and a high-speed optical telegraphy network created by Napoleon included
(11) by 1842 some 3 5 000 miles of semaphore relay towers.
Key to creation of such systems has been the clarification of need 
resulting from territorial expansion or consolidation of control over 
already extensive jurisdictions. The Roman Republic had, for instance,
no organised information service or system, and the Roman roads were
(12) constructed and the posts organised only under Augustus and the empire.
Likewise in the electrical era, despite the early development of under- 
sea telegraph cables in the United States in 18^2, the first American- 
owned transoceanic cable was not built until 1881, twenty-five years
(13) after the first British transatlantic line. British imperialism,
which for Hobson began as a conscious policy in 1870 and accelerated in
(1*f) terms of territorial acquisitions in the 1880s, was accompanied by
extensive and multiple cable layings to and across the Mediterranean,
Red Sea, Atlantic, Indian Oceariv~~ttre Asian mainland and later the Pacific.
Extensive American cable efforts coincided with commercial and political
f 1 (-\ \ 
rivalry with the British over Latin America in the late 1870s and
with territorial acquisitions in the Caribbean nnd Pacific due to the
(17) war with Spain. ''
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The requirements of commerce have «1.so occasioned new long- 
distance instrumental systems, once the emergence of money as a universal 
medium for transactions had furnished the basis for the concise messages 
such systems typically convey. Moreover, the incorporation of 
bigger segments of economies into stock exchanges, and the concomitant 
abstraction of resources and capital into exchangeable units subject to 
fluctuations in value, provided incentive to deploy signalling systems 
able quickly to transmit concise clues as to financial movements over
considerable distances. Optical telegraphy systems were created in
(19) England and the U.S. for such purposes in the early 19th Century,
and at least one major international wire service began by serving 
European financial markets in the "iSfjOs. The ability of radio to 
interconnect mobile or remote fixed points with little capital outlays 
made it suited for commercial and industrial uses by companies with
geographically dispersed productive, extractive or exploratory oper-
(21)
ations. Consequently, the overall relationship between long- 
distance communications facilities and efficient international commerce
(22) is clear, and has frequently been acknowledged.
2.2.iii) The general function of long-distance instrumental 
systems is to permit the effective and continuous direction of extensive 
military, administrative or commercial operations from a central locus 
of authority, while counteracting any otherwise consequent tendency 
toward attenuation of central power with increased distance - whether 
due to logistically necessary delegation, or to independent coordination 
among peripheral points. Accordingly, additional structural features 
can be identified in such systems: a.) they are coextensive with the 
geographical boundaries within which military dominance, political juris- 
diction or commercial priority is asserted; b.) they offer continuously
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available channels, availability and reliability being assured 
through deployment of redundant facilities and/or heterogeneous 
transmission modes; c.) their use for direct communication among 
peripheral points, unmediated by passage through the central mode, 
is either technically impossible or procedurally discouraged.
The notion of coextensiveness seems noncontroversial, and is 
supported by much of the historical data adduced above, where new 
facilities vere established to link recently acquired territory or to 
accommodate the flow of commercial traffic to regions where trade was 
deemed important and preferential access was sought. (And it should 
be noted that in the electrical era, the traffic borne by long-distance 
systems comprised no small commercial boon in itself.) The notion 
also implies, however, that aggregate traffic volumes may be a poor indica^ 
tion of the importance of having facilities to link certain regions: the 
military vulnerability of an area, for instance, or the extremity of 
circumstance under which a communications system would be used, may 
mean very low capacity facilities are sufficient and very few messages 
are actually transmitted. Thus the fire beacon relays of antiquity 
and, as a modern example, the U.S. military's plan for a 'last ditch'
satellite capability which, at a cost of several hundred million dollars,
(24) 
would furnish a global capacity of two voice circuits.
As means to assure reliability and continuous availability, deploy- 
ment of redundant facilities and hererogeneous transmission techniques 
is also evident in the historical record. Pre-electrical systems fre- 
quently incorporated combinations of techniques, according to Dvornik: 
fires at night, smoke signals during the day, and mounted relays at any 
times under the Assyrians; Muslim mideastern empires combined postal 
relays voice relays, beacon towers and pigeon posts; the Mongols used 
horses, beacons and runners. The different capabilities of the
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techniques provide further reason for heterogeneity, as this consid- 
eration of wireless vis-i-vis wired electrical communications suggests.
The radio supplements wire services by furnishing direct instan- 
taneous communication with points to which the construction of 
wire lines or the laying of cables would not be physically or 
economically feasible, and by providing alternative or additional 
facilities which may be used when wire facilities are interrupted 
or overloaded.(26)
Likewise, routing the same device redundantly to the same terminal ass- 
ures continuous availability, especially where physical connections are 
needed across regions outside the jurisdiction of the power responsible 
for the facility. Britain, for instance, had by 1902 five different 
cable routes to East Asia - two overland and three undersea - each 
composed of several discrete lines.
Efforts to prevent attenuation of central authority with increased 
distance have generally been implicit in the structural lay-out of 
instrumental systems, analogous to the converging spokes of a wheel - 
minus the rim. If intermarginal communication was deemed necessary and 
was physically possible, specific central authorisation was required. 
Thus in the Roman posts, authority to use the roads for messages to and 
from Rome was obtained more easily and at a lower level of officialdom
/ ^Q \
than was approval to communicate between other points.' J. Galtung
(29) has identified a "feudal interaction structure" characterised in
part by just this feature: subsidiary territories or states within an 
imperial structure drawn more closely and more directly to the centres 
of their respective imperiums than to one another and, moreover, are 
linked to one another largely by way of imperial centres irrespective 
of actual geographical proximity at the margins. In the electrical
era, cable routings and consequent pricing policies have sustained this
(31) 
selective isolation-integration.
2.2.iv.) Rivalry among nations seeking to extend military, admin- 
istrative or commercial activities geographically has found expression 
in competitive efforts to create new instrumental systems linking them
-33-
preferentialiy or exclusively to regions of interest.
Such competition has been especially clear in the electrical 
era: at first because of the high cost of cable systems, and later 
due to the need for international agreement on radio frequency assign- 
ments, occasionally intense rivalry has surrounded establishment of 
long-distance international systems. Anglo-American competition was
especially notable in Latin America between 1870 and 1900 and in
( 5?) 
regard to China and East Asia in the early 1900s. The British were
successful in securing monopoly concessions to the east coast of Latin 
America, forcing U.S. firms to build along the less lucrative west 
coast, and the British monopoly on the rich Brazilian market remained 
unbroken until 1920. American interest in supplying nationally- 
controlled cables to Latin America intensified in the 1890s, when U.S. 
policy took an increasingly interventionist turn - with the dispatch 
of naval forces in 1893 to defeat Brazilian rebels, a lengthy intervention 
from 189^-96 in a boundary dispute with Britain over conflicting territ- 
orial claims lodged by Venezuela and British Guiana , and the war 
with Spain over Cuba and Puerto Rico. In the Pacific, Britain and 
Denmark wrested monopoly concessions in China after the 1900 Boxer 
Rebellion and used them to get 75 percent of the shares in the first
.  . n _ American . , , . .  ._..,   n U.S. transpacific cable; interest in such a facility fol-
lowed annexation of Hawaii in 1898 and acquisition of the Philippines, 
Guam and other islands from Spain, along with commercial and political 
competition over trade concessions in China.
British world long-distance communications dominance - based 
upon undersea and overland telegraph cables - prompted early 
international efforts to prevent extension of that dominance into wire- 
less technology. A major reason behind the first international meeting
to deal with radio regulation, the 1903 Berlin Conference, was the
("57) threat of a global monopoly by the British Marconi interests ;
the resulting Protocol called for free competition in equipment supply 
and obliged signatories to interconnect facilities regardless of
/ -zQ \
ownership, which Marconi had hitherto refused to do. Neverthe- 
less, by 1912 Marconi held virtual monopolies on radio service in
(39) Britain, Italy, Canada and the United States, a situation which,
as will be described later in this chapter, prompted the U.S. govern- 
ment to cause the Radio Corporation of America (EGA) to be formed in 
1919.
2.2.v.) Eesponsibility for creating and operating long-distance 
instrumental systems is typically the state's, even when discharged 
through collaboration with private entities to which managerial and 
operational authority is delegated.
The notion of state responsibility is most controversial when 
applied to the electrical era and the United States. Although pre- 
electrical systems often were created and operated by central 
authorities with the essential collaboration of local interests, 
the centre's ultimate control was indisputable. In the electrical era, 
outside the United States communications, for the most part, "came to
be regarded as a monopolistic function of the state rather than a
(41) preserve for private business." By the end of the 19th Century,
an estimated 95 percent of the world's telegraphs - outside the U.S. -
(4 2) 
were in state hands. Even where formally supportive of private
communications carriers, state intervention evidently served to assure 
industry's faithful compliance with officially-determined policies. 
The United States, in the received wisdom, has been the great
exception, where communications services have depended upon private
(Mf) initiative and virtual autonomy vis-a-vis the state. Traditional
-35-
state policy is said to have consisted principally of R&D subsidies
to industry, government takeover of services under extraordinary
( 4^) 
circumstances and regulation of price and quality of services. J
In sum, the dynamic underlying development of communications in the 
U.S. is located in the private sector, with the state reactively 
providing assistance, and subsequently influencing service modalities. 
This formulation derives, in our view, from an inadequate conceptualis- 
ation of the state's role and a misreading of the pertinent historical 
record.
In general, the potential modes of state and industry behaviour 
in the communications sphere can be schematised as follows. The state 
is a.) an authoritative instance when it defines and promulgates 
'national interest' requirements and corresponding policies as to 
the technical adequacy of the country's communications capability; 
we shall return in a moment to this phase of activity, which is most 
important to our argument; b.) the state is an important customer 
of communications services when it elects to procure them from the 
private sector; and conversely c.) it is a major potential competitor 
with the private sector when it seeks to furnish itself with required 
services. Industry's role is similarly variegated: d.) private 
carriers function as an executive agency of the state when they comply 
with state-defined national requirements; e.) at the same time they are 
profit-seeking entities which cannot be indifferent to such requirements 
when satisfying them entails unprofitable activities; and f.) the 
private carriers are important industrial powers in their own right - 
as well as technically-qualifiea~resources - and therefore bring their 
particular interests to bear on the process by which the state identifies 
'national interest' requirements.
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It is the authoritative aspect of state behaviour (a.) which is 
most important to demonstrate in order to sustain in the American 
case the argument for ultimate state responsibility in the long- 
distance field introduced above (2.2.v.) The historical evidence 
bears out the following constituents of that element: state leader- 
ship in identifying technical requirements and specifying services 
necessary for their satisfaction; state anticipatory activities to pre- 
serve the conditions for eventual private industrial exploitation even 
when private capital is not yet forthcoming; conditional devolution 
of managerial/operational authority to the private sector, subject to 
assurances that state-defined requirements be met; and intervention
to cause private industrial reorganisations when believed neeessary
(ifQ) 
for the satisfaction of those requirements. Moreover, with the
U.S. government retaining, as of the mid-1960s, around 70 percent of 
the total usable domestic frequency spectrum for its own uses, ^ the 
potential scope permitted private exploitation was sharply limited from 
the outset. Indeed the historical pattern of development of the 
totality of communications services is more aptly formulated that the 
U.S. government has, in general, not provided those services which 
private firms were willing and able to furnish to the state's satisfac- 
tion and, in the main, that such services consisted of high-volume
commercial and non-sensitive governmental traffic - the latter bulking
(51) large and further increasing state leverage over the private carriers.
3. DETERMINANTS: THE TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSION
The second principal source of determinants are associated with the 
setting in which the new technology emerges and the specific charac- 
teristics of the technology itself. In the satellite case, the variety
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and importance of the technology's potential applications, and the 
possibility of its deployment under the auspices of international 
political - or domestic industrial - rivals, attracted wide-ranging 
attention and intense concern to questions of its disposition. 
Early determinations pre-defined the technology as a supplementary 
means of intercontinental telecommunications carriage and established 
 the requirement as virtually immediate. Both factors brought satell- 
ites in to conflict with industrial sunk costs in undersea cables. 
Once rival deployments had internationally and domestically been 
prevented, and outstanding investment in competitive plant protected, 
expanded application of an liberalised control over satellites was 
permissible.
2.3-i-) New technologies arise from a loosely coordinated 
search inspired by the agenda of requirements set, in this case, by 
the functional and political requirements associated above with the 
long-distance instrumental communications field. While 'accidental' 
discovery is not excluded, its importance is conceived as small when
compared with technical activities deliberately directed toward
(52) 
seeking, refining or re-adopting means to satisfy known requirements.'
The existing arsenal of knowledge is, in effect, surveyed and re- 
examined in light of new requirements: thus, pre-electrical signall- 
ing techniques known for centuries were deployed anew - and sometimes 
refined - by new empires. Similarly, the principle of electro- 
magnetic transmission was demonstrated well before its application to
v.+ (5*0
communications was sought.
2.3-ii.) Partly as a resuTt7 the technical environment within 
which a new technology - or innovation - appears is likely to be 
cluttered with means which to greater or lesser degrees are functional
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substitutes for the newcomer. Two causes of this clutter are note- 
worthy: non-obsolescence of existing techniques, and equivalent 
invention of new ones.
a.) "Rarely", as P. Cootner has written, "does a new technology 
make obsolescent all existing means of achieving a given end." 
In addition to straightforward competition with established tech- 
niques, the newcomer may displace older technologies from certain uses 
into new niches of limited but nonetheless definite usefulness. 
Or the new technology may force improvements in existing techniques 
to render the latter more competitive. "It was", for instance, "the
development of wireless that woke up the cable world from its somewhat
(57) 
somnolent condition", as a 1936 study observed.
b.) S. Gilfallan has observed the emergence of new techniques 
in"functional groups", a tendency he terms "equivalent invention":
/P/erceived needs are met by various unlike, as well as duplicate 
solutions, so that any great invention is simultaneously 
paralleled by other, often utterly dissimilar means for reaching 
the same end at the same time... Inventions may be seen as 
arriving in functional groups.(5o)
The notion implies that a prevailing interpretation of actual or anti- 
cipated need influences favourably technical activities directed
toward its satisfaction, activities that may have little in common
(59) 
aside from that "equifinality". Of course, there may also be
virtually identical inventions emerging simultaneously, as with the 
telephone; but the notion suggests common functionality to unlike 
innovations. R. Williams, similarly, has argued that domestic broad- 
cast reception arose within a constellation of inventions - e.g. 
family automobiles, lightweigh"t~pn~otographic equipment and various con' 
sumer durables - which together responded to a social requirement for 
"mobile privatisation", to domesticate or re-privatise a recently 
mobilised industrial population in the early 20th Century. In
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the long-distance communications field, the entire range of current 
broadband facilities - coaxial overland cable, transistorised under- 
sea cable, overland microwave relay and satellites - comprises a 
functional group made operational in the 15 years between 1950 and 1965; 
six years separated the first transatlantic phone cable in 1956 and the 
first satellite-relayed transatlantic phone call in 1962.
Two corollaries are important: first, chronological sequence 
is no sure guide to technical superiority; second, functional equival- 
ence is premised on accepted definitions of functional need. On the 
first, unlike the presumption implied in natural selection, in the 
technological realm posteriority does not entail superiority; the 
relative merits, for example of wired and wireless technology have 
been long debated, irrespective of the easy supposition that wireless as 
the later form was the better. As to the second, where new needs have 
yet to be clarified and sanctioned, the precise expression allowed a 
technical potential may be limited to those needs which are clear and 
accepted. One can, for example, identify a two-decade lead given 
point-to-point over broadcast applications of wireless technology - 
from around 1900 to 1920 - due to the importance accorded the former 
uses and the lack of precedence for the latter. The role, therefore, 
of the agenda of requirements mentioned above (2.3.i.) is central to 
the determination of which functions functional equivalence is eval- 
uated by.
2.3-iii) Three factors are especially significant in determining 
the interest and attention a new technology attracts from state and 
private organisations: its importance, its 'volatility' and the pre- 
sence of sunk costs in alternatives.
a.) In the communications field, innovations in transmission 
technologies are of crucial importance to the further development of 
technically subordinant representational modes (media) and discrete
linkages (channels). The means of conveyance set absolute limits 
to speed and capacity, thereby defining the technical possibilities 
of any systems incorporating them and, moreover, provoking changes 
in pre-existing media to enable these to benefit from the new trans- 
mission technology's capabilities. R. Houlton has, for example, 
charted the transformation of three independent communications ind- 
ustries - records, film and radio - into two interdependent dyads 
after the advent of television: "film becoming a largely dependent 
resource of TV, and records of radio. A cause of this transform- 
ation, we would argue, was the superiority of the electrical trans- 
mission technology around which radio and TV were constructed, when 
compared with the physical transport necessary for cinema films and 
records. Thus interest in transmission innovations is likely to be 
intense because of the modifications its introduction may precipitate 
in existing media.
b.) The volatility of a technology is the ease with which it can 
be developed and deployed, thus its capacity to proliferate under 
alternative auspices. Volatility is a determinant of the interest an 
innovation provokes to the degree that proljferative potential can be 
reduced by timely action. Within a private firm, for instance, a 
technical breakthrough whose parallel discovery by others is judged 
to be imminent will attract greater attention than one without that 
competitive dimension - especially if quick action would pre-empt 
rivals through patent claims. Similarly, Anglo-American competition 
over Latin American and transpacific cable concessions demonstrated an 
analogous concern with reducing Hie technology's volatility; and, if 
volatility has been adversely reduced, it is plausible for the loser 
to turn to a new technology, as the U.S. did with radio.
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c.) Finally, interest in an innovation is conditioned by the 
extent to which resources are already committed to a technology 
considered a. functional substitute (unless those resources can 
easily and equally beneficially be shifted to the newcomer.) For 
the most part, sunk costs discourage interest in the innovation: 
the French were slow to proceed with electrical telegraphy because 
of their investment in an optical signalling system, and the 
British were likewise averse to global wireless deployment due to 
their vast submarine cable network. Sunk costs may also, however, 
imply considerable interest in an innovation; through participation 
in its development, refinement and application its impact on outstand- 
ing investments could be controlled and mitigated.
k. PRE-EMPTIVE UNDERDEVELOPMMT INTRODUCED
We shall now describe the model of technological formation we believe 
appropriate to the satellite case, and then gather together the points 
made in the previous section which are relevant to its explication. 
In general terms, pre-emptive underdevelopment refers to the rapid, 
constrained formation of a technology in order to secure its control. 
As an overall socio-political response, pre-emptive underdevelopment 
is defensive-positive,directed toward preserving rather than imp- 
roving the pursuit of cominant interests through technological con- 
trol and requiring assistance to the process of technological forma- 
tion. The defensive orientation that predominates, however, suggests 
both goals for and constraints upon the process of formation, setting 
a permitted range of technological development: less than a minimum 
would endanger control by leaving too many avenues open to alternative 
efforts; more than a maximum would endanger the interests in whose
defence control is sought. The instrumentality of defence is pre- 
emption, or the.prior appropriation of a position in order to deny 
it to a rival. And since control is the central objective of 
technological formation, the composition of the mode of formation 
itself is likely to be restricted, tending to consortia or cartels.
Hypothetically, rapid and constrained technological formation 
in pursuit of control may derive from any of a number of conditions 
faced by dominant participants in a technological formation: if 
existing plant is to be amortised smoothly and the future possibility 
of intensive development of the new technology is to be retained; if 
the innovation is thought immature, but limited application will 
ensure rights to proceed more exhaustively in time; if resources are 
lacking for the moment, or if the technology's usefulness is deemed 
uncertain; if the innovation is to serve as an adjunct to a well- 
established production process, and its use is therefore constrained 
by the qualitative and quantitative requirements of that process; if 
a stalemate exists between supporters and opponents of the technology 
limited development is a useful compromise; if, to comply with state 
requirements or dramatise industrial prestige, a. degree of formation 
is desirable although wider application would harm outstanding 
interests.
In those circumstances, pre-emptive underdevelopment seems a 
useful way to characterise the likely response to the emergent 
technology. In the satellite case, it derived from the operation of 
the following communications - and technology-related determinants 
considered earlier. 1.) The'general requirement for improved long- 
distance instrumental facilities associated with geopolitical and 
commercial expansion or sonsolidation (2.2.ii.) was acknowledged by 
the U.Sc government at the outset. 2.) The structural features 
associated with such systems (2.2.i,iii) represented only a partial
expression of satellite technology's capabilities; hence a pot- 
ential for underdevelopment can be attributed to the technically 
limited objectives which formation was undertaken to fulfil. 
3.) Competition with a major international rival (2.2.iv.) prompted 
haste and urgency to create the system before similar facilities were 
created to link regions of common interest to the Soviet Union, 
^f.) The desirability of establishing heterogeneous transmission 
modes (2.2.iii.b.) meant state protection and encouragement of 
alternative technology - under-sea cables - and corresponding res- 
istance to allowing full expression to the cost advantages of 
satellites. 5-) Similarly, the principal international partners 
whose operational collaboration - in the interest of coextensiveness 
(2.2.iii.a.) - was initially deemed indispensable showed much the 
same concern for retaining a heterogeneous transmission capability. 
6.) The American government assigned immediate operational and manageriai 
responsibility for the system's U.S. component to a quasi-consortium 
of private carriers, subject to assurances that state-sanctioned 
requirements would be met (2.2.V.).
From the technological realm, the following determinants were 
important. 7.) Through government R&D, conducted mainly by the 
civilian space agency (NASA) and the Department of Defence (DOD), and 
through private R&D directed by or toward state requirements, a tech- 
nical orientation toward developing and refining communications 
satellite technology emerged in the late 1950s-early 1960s (3.3.1.) 
8.) The field to which initial satellite application was assigned 
was characterised by the non-obsolescence and increased viability of 
undersea cables (3.3.ii.a.) and indeed, in a larger sense, by equival- 
ent invention (3.3.ii.b.) in that both technologies can be considered 
as a functional group of contemporaneous emergence. 9.) Those two
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factors coincided in yielding substantial sunk costs (3-3»iii.c.) in 
cable technology, the protection and expansion of which promised 
considerable private benefits to the carrier industry. 10.) The 
potential importance of satellite technology - as a flexible, low- 
cost and high-capacity means of conveyance - was considered great 
and its possible applications many (3-3«iii.a.) It therefore threat- 
ened modifications in, for example: the technical basis and pricing 
structure of intercontinental communications; the political dominance 
within that industry of the private carriers, since cooperation of 
foreign ministries, aerospace firms, broadcasters and others would be 
required; similar transformations might be provoked within metropolitan 
domestic communications industries; and in the Third World satellites 
offered cheap substitutes for conventional telecommunications and 
broadcasting plant, reducing cost barriers to modernisation of those 
sectors. 1.) Finally, the volatility of satellite technology was a 
factor of critical importance (3-3-iii-b.) Pre-empting first a 
Soviet system and later European satellite efforts contributed to 
American urgency to deploy satellites; similarly, the U.S. carrier 
industry's wish to prevent widely-based trans-industrial ownership 
of the American satellite entity stimulated early industry mobilis- 
ation to draft and promulgate organisational proposals. On the other 
side, the desire to avoid reduction in technological volatility meant 
opposition to urgent formation when it would foreclose the possibilit- 
ies of rival deployments: such was true of the Senate critics of 
the 1962 Comsat Act, of European opposition to expansion of the U.S.- 
dominated system into regional, domestic and specialised applications, 
and of the U.S. carrier industry's militation against Comsat's entry 
into the domestic services market.
To sum up then, pre-emptive underdevelopment in the satellite 
case was a compromised process of technological formation, the 
result of a collision between urgency to secure control and a desire 
to restrain, contain and pre-define the likely impact of the tech- 
nology upon outstanding interests. Technological formation was 
both a means to technological control and a threat to the interests 
on whose behalf control was sought. The centrality of control as 
an objective and axis of contention meant that rivalry over tech- 
nological formation took the form of political controversy within 
the mode of formation: efforts to secure control entailed attempts 
to limit and concentrate the range of effective influence upon the 
technological process, even where the operational collaboration of 
relatively disenfranchised participants was essential.
5. PRE-EMPTIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT AS UNSTABLE
Pre-emptive underdevelopment is susceptible to transformation, in 
general terms, depending upon the success of its limited style of tech- 
nological formation in satisfying the objectives of dominant particip- 
ants - in pursuit of which control was sought - and in thereby 
changing the technical environment within which further determinations 
as to formation are made.
Considering separately the determinants of the pre-emptive thrust 
and of underdevelopment, the pre-emptive motivation is unstable 
because: a.) urgent requirements, once secured, lose their urgency; 
b.) while control remains as the main axis of contention, if the 
concerns which predominated in early determinations have been satis- 
fied the disposition of control may derive from the play of other
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concerns; c.) the technology's volatility may either remain un- 
changed or indeed have been enhanced owing to initial successes 
suggesting its wider usefulness and attractiveness. The restraints 
that produced underdevelopment may be relaxed because: d.) sunk 
costs in a functional substitute have been adequately protected - 
either because time has been won for their orderly amortisation or 
because long-term preservation has been authorised - so the defence 
of outstanding investments is no longer a concern; e.) the 
suitability of the technology to applications other than those for 
which it originally was created may be more apparent thanks to early, 
limited success; f.) the entitlement and capability of hitherto sub- 
ordinate participants either to pursue independently, or to compel 
the collective pursuit of, further technical applications may be 
enhanced by their initial roles in the mode of formation.
Pre-emptive underdevelopment may therefore eventuate as a prelim- 
inary and transitory technological formation - succeeded, in such a 
case, by its own successes in satisfying the objectives for which 
urgent and rapid formation was sought, incorporating in subordinate 
capacities otherwise rival interests and thus securing priority for 
dominant ones, and demonstrating the potential of the technology at 
issue. These successes may, as in the satellite case, provoke a
 
de-coupling of control of the technology from the array of political 
concerns that had inspired formation in the first place; that is, the 
future development and application of the technology is no longer 
tied to initial objectives because those goals had been met. The mode 
of formation that succeeds -pr exempt ive underdevelopment is not clearly 
determined by that de-coupling, but depends rather upon the structure 
of dominance prevailing among those interests to which control over 
the technology's formation now devolves. What is clear is that the
interests that constitute the successor mode of formation, and 
consequently the internal dominance which they negotiate, will be 
different from those which prevailed under pre-emptive underdevel- 
opment.
6. PRE-EMPTIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT SUPERSEDED
In the satellite case, de-coupling allowed a more liberalised 
regime to emerge, where suppressed or ignored technical applica- 
tions could be pursued by a wider array of national and industrial 
interests than had hitherto been influential in the mode of formation. 
The inauguration of this phase, after a decade of pre-emptive under- 
development, can be dated from 1971-72, when within the international 
consortium a transition toward substantive multinationalisation was 
begun, a comprehensive monopoly over the satellite field was officially 
renounced and, consequently, the U.S. effectively agreed to lend indis- 
pensable technical assistance to independent satellite projects; at 
the same time, in the United States the efforts of the Comsat Corpor- 
ation to secure a franchise on domestic services were defeated, and 
that field too was opened to wide-ranging industrial initiatives.
We propose to term the successor technological formation poly- 
centric maximisation, not perhaps the most elegant of terms, but 
one which nonetheless implies both devolution of effective control to 
a greater number and wider variety of interests, and an increased 
intensity of efforts to exploit technological potential. In comparison 
with its predecessor, the features of polycentric maximisation have 
been: 1.) an exanded range of technical applications, including not 
just intercontinental satellite relays, but domestic broadcasting and
telecommunications, regional telecommunications and specialised 
services -aeronautical guidance and maritime communications; 
2.) the absence of sunk costs in functional equivalents, since 
either no other available technologies could provide the services 
satellites were now being applied to furnish, or those who were 
undertaking satellite deployment had no outstanding reason to 
turn to the alternatives that did exist; 3.) widened substantive 
participation in the mode of formation, which henceforth comprised 
not only the original international organisation - whose internal 
procedures had in fact been liberalised - but independent co- 
operative endeavours fashioned to undertake specific projects as 
well; and k.) tolerance of independent deployment: the technology's 
volatility was viewed as a positive benefit, not a political obs- 
tacle to be overcome through rapid pre-emptive efforts, and technical 
coordination to avoid operational interference or unnecessary dup- 
lication was to be virtually the sole restriction on independent 
satellite activities.
7. PRE-EMPTIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT ILLUSTRATED: THE RCA CASE
An earlier instance from the electrical era which displays many of 
the same essential features of pre-emptive underdevelopment as does 
the satellite case involved the struggle for dominance in the long- 
distance radio field in the early 1920s between the U.S. government 
and the British-based Marconi interests. That history will now be 
outlined and significant parallels drawn.
Radio development had, as of the turn of the century, centered
/ £ o \
almost exclusively on maritime applications and, less exclusively, 
on the company Guglielmo Marconi had founded when he came to England
in 1896. Marconi interests - parent and subsidiary firms - had 
by 1912 virtual monopolies on wireless service in Italy, Canada, 
Britain and the U.S. Parallel development of land-based, fixed- 
point radio systems was, however, slower to emerge; Marconi's most 
ambitious plan, a chain of high-powered interconnecting the British 
Empire, was rejected or deferred several times during the period 
before the First World War, probably owing to concern for the 
viability of the undersea cable network.
In the United States meanwhile, notwithstanding the industrial 
dominance of the company Marconi established there in 1897, three 
countervailing developments - industrial, political and technological 
- were important. Industrially, a rival patent pool had emerged
around inventions developed, or in most cases acquired, by AT&T,
(71) Westinghouse, General Electric and United Fruit. Politically,
pressure for state intervention in the communications field was
growing: AT&T was moving to consolidate its internal phone monopoly
(72)
at the expense of independent operators, first regulatory legis- 
lation was passed in 1912 and, the same year, President Wilson was 
elected on a wave of reformism, his platform recommending state 
ownership of the entire electrical communications industry. Indeed
bills to carry out this pledge were introduced unsuccessfully in
(73) Congress in 1917 and 1919. Technologically, in 1915 a General
Electric (GE) engineer successfully demonstrated an important new 
device which helped produce a highly-concentrated, regular and far- 
more efficient use of electromagnetic energy - for the first time 
making possible reliable low-frequency transoceanic radio communication. 
British Marconi representatives witnessed GE's first tests of the 
Alexanderson alternator, and Marconi himself came almost at once to
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New York to negotiate purchase of 12 devices, for use by both
his British and American companies. Early negotiations found-
(?4) 
ered, however, and were not re-opened until after the war.
When the U.S. entered the war in 1917, the government seized
all commercially-operated radio stations, most of which were
(75) 
Marconi-owned. Moreover, the numerous pending patent disputes
between Marconi and the American firms - and among the latter as 
well - were ordered deferred, and manufacturers were expressly 
instructed to meet military specifications regardless of which 
patents were necessary. State supervision thus permitted,
according to E. Barnouw, "a vast coordinated development of radio
(78)
(77) technology", one which the Navy - principally responsible for
its conduct - was especially reluctant to surrender after the war, 
and which had made the government not just owner of virtually all
transmitters, but holder of numerous, possibly controlling patents
(79) 
resulting from devices developed during the war.
In 1919) British Marconi resumed negotiations with General 
Electric, this time in pursuit of exclusive rights to the Alexanderson 
alternator. The sale was nearly concluded when the U.S. government, 
concerned over indefinite loss of the device to American interests, 
intervened. Navy Department representatives visited GE to 
relay this concern, but the company's chairman pointed out that as a
manufacturer GE had little choice but to sell its products to the
( R 1 ^ 
highest bidder. The Navy lacked the Congressional authorisation
it wanted to buy and deploy the alternator itself, and the 
solution devised was to get "GE~T;o help create a new American-owned 
operating entity in the - at first primarily - long-distance radio
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field, which would be the alternator's customer and the repository 
of the various patents still held by the government and essential 
for long-range operations.
Thus in October 1919 the Radio Corporation of America was formed, 
with government representatives on its board of directors, limits on 
foreign stockholdings and the preponderance of its ownership vested
/ Q -7 \
in the four big pre-war holders of radio equipment patents. 
Faced with the American government's possession of its U.S. plant 
and with the government's evident disinclination to give those 
facilities back to a British company, Marconi sold its U.S. prop- 
erties and patents to EGA a month later.
Internationally, EGA quickly began work toward creating "an
/ Q {- \
American-dominated system of world communication", and by 1921 
had arranged with Marconi a cartel in regard to Latin American 
operations: a nine-member international committee, including German 
and French interests, would oversee Latin American projects, while
/ Q/- \
EGA retained final say. Those arrangements subsequently became 
part of what was essentially a two-way division of the world between
EGA and Marconi, in which potential markets and patent rights were
(8?) 
variously assigned.
At home, however, in spite of early success and some considerable 
government assistance, EGA soon encountered opposition from the tele-
/ QQ \
graph companies which owned the U.S. undersea cables. Eadio, 
having no need for physical connections among terminals, offered 
therefore substantial cost advantages and lower tariffs; with 
aroung 20 percent of transatlantic traffic routed by 1923 via wire- 
less, cable owners were forced to cut tariffs. Although rate
(91) 
equalisation was agreed the next year for Atlantic and Pacific routes/
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such a policy still - other factors being equal - could do no
(92) 
more than guarantee the cables half the traffic.
Other things, however, were not equal. Since radio carriers 
did not offer domestic service, they had only a small number of 
big city offices and transmission centres and were otherwise 
wholly reliant on the collection and distribution facilities of 
their cable-owning competitors, who applied discriminatory rates
and restrictions on access for messages bound for radio transmission
(9*0
overseas. Consequently, during BCA's first nine years of oper- 
ation the domestic telegraph firms handled 10 times more incoming as
outgoing radio messages, despite an overall equality in the two
(95) 
categories.
ECA's ultimate response was to expand its corporate operations 
into two areas unrelated to the national dominance in long-distance 
radio activities for which it was created: manufacture of receivers 
and network broadcasting. Through its National Broadcasting Com- 
pany subsidiary, EGA established two nationwide broadcast networks, 
one of which it was compelled by the government to sell in 19^1. 
The growing importance of its manufacturing operations was acknow- 
ledged in another anti-trust action in 1930, when the Justice 
Department ruled that RCA's inter-locking patent agreements with 
its corporate shareholders constituted an illegal restraint of trade 
in the radio equipment industry. GE and Westinghouse accordingly 
sold their holdings and withdrew from the EGA board.
8. COMPABISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Just as it was the reality of British dominance in the international
(97) 
cable field which prompted an American response in the radio
field, so it was the threat of a Soviet communications satellite
system - and the global dominance in the field that might sustain 
- which spurred U.S. satellite efforts in the early 1960s. Further- 
more, the following elements are present in both cases:
i.) a new transmission technology or device of commercial 
and military significance, made available due to conditions of 
intense international rivalries, and whose disposition was signif- 
icant in part owing to its putative value as a resource in those 
rivalries;
ii.) the innovation's formation was sought to prevent or 
mitigate the foreign domination of international communications 
which its deployment under alien auspices was believed to betoken;
iii.) U.S. state intervention to create a private consortium 
as a chosen vehicle for further development and application of the 
technology; in both instances the consortium - or quasi-consortium 
in fact - consisted of dominant institutions in the field whose 
hostility to the new entity might otherwise be expected; in both 
cases creation of the private consortium was acknowledged as an 
alternative to state ownership, and provision was made for govern- 
ment influence within the new organisation;
iv.) hostility and resistance to application of the new 
technology from domestic interests based upon an established 
alternative transmission mode - interests whose operational collab- 
oration was nevertheless necessary to the newcomer;
v.) state assistance was forthcoming, but only to the point 
where a margin of superiority or comparability with regard to 
international rivals was assured: expanded exploitation of the 
technology into new applications was not a state objective, whereas 
maintaining a heterogeneous national transmission capability was;
vi.) the new technology forced improvements - in capacity 
and tariffs - upon the old; telegraphic cables in the 1920s and 
telephonic cables in the 1960s both underwent significant technical 
advance;
vii.) internationally, separate zones of commercial exploit- 
ation were negotiated, a process quickly concluded in the radio 
case but, due to unequal technical capabilities, later to emerge 
with satellites;
viii.) domestic industrial opposition led to a search for new 
technological applications whose pursuit would not encounter that 
opposition;
ix.) the initial consortium features of the state's chosen 
corporate vehicle were eliminated, again at the state's insistence; 
full corporate independence thus was achieved after the original 
consortium had outlived its usefulness.
In both instances, the essential features of pre-emptive 
underdevelopment are present. Pre-emptive characteristics common 
to both include: state-inspired urgency accorded to efforts to 
secure control of a technology believed crucial to the desired 
national role in long-distance communications; and a recognition 
that the technology's volatility - or susceptibility to rival 
deployments - could be conditioned favourably by timely action. 
The technology's underdevelopment derived from: the state's interest 
in retaining a bi-modal national transmission plant, which implied 
support for industry's wishes to protect sunk costs in competitive 
plant. (In the satellite- ca-snr restraints on development derived 
as well from the desire of international collaborators to coordinate 
the timing of satellite activities with the development of related 
national industrial capabilities.) The technological formation's
-55-
instability is reflected in the modifications undergone in
(99) 
each case: new operational templates were devised, leading
to restructuring of the mode of formation to accommodate entities 
interested in pursuing the new applications - and resulting in 
the demise or revision of the domestic consortium/international 
cartel arrangements through which early formation was achieved. 
We shall now begin our history of satellite communications.
PART TWO
ORIGINS OP PRE-EMPTIVE UlTOEKDEVELOPMENT: 
Prom Sputnik to the Comsat Act of 1962
CHAPTER THREE: THE EMERGENCE OP U.S. GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS 
SATELLITE POLICY, 1957-61
1. OVERVIEW
Between October 1957, when the first Soviet Sputnik was launched, and 
July 1961, when President Kennedy formally announced his government's 
intention to see a worldwide communications satellite system created, 
the "broad lines of American state policy on public satellite services 
emerged. The policy had two main components: first, the rapid estab- 
lishment of the satellite system on a global scale offering opportuni- 
ties for participation and access, on non-discriminatory terms, to all 
interested countries was embraced as a national objective; second, the 
U.S. role in the project would be carried forth by a privately-owned, com- 
mercial institutional vehicle, whose operations would be expected to con- 
form to state policy guidelines, but which nevertheless would enter and 
compete within the existing international communications carrier industry.
The policy, as this chapter will show, was an attempt to respond to 
several areas of state political concern, both symbolic and substantive. 
(l.) From the international sphere of bipolar contestation with the So- 
viet Union came a requirement for dramatic and symbolically compelling 
initiatives incorporating impressive technological achievements which, 
it was hoped, would offset the gains in prestige won by Soviet space acti- 
vities and thereby allay doubts attributed to allies and 'non-committed' 
nations over America's global posture. The apparent vigour, moreover, 
of Soviet progress in space suggested urgency in U.S. programmes, if new 
and further damaging 'firsts' were to be avoided. (2.) The U.S. mili- 
tary and civilian space programmes, then in their infancy, had need of 
projects to legitimate space endeavour in general as peaceful and broadly 
beneficial, in order to open the way formally to civilian space explora- 
tion and extensive military applications. Private satellite ownership 
would help dramatise the project's separation from the military sphere 
and, again, urgency was retired in view of the need to secure interna- 
tional approval in 1963 of frequency assignments, upon which the entire 
U.S. space effort was thought to depend. (3.) With regard to state com- 
munications policy, the national overseas capability was judged inadequate
-58-
particularly to assure reliable linkages to remote areas, and generally 
to sustain a new strategic policy composed of a hierarchy of possible 
military responses and therefore premised on dependable communications 
for their orchestration. Satellites were viewed as desirable, perhaps 
essential, additions to the national capability. (4.) In domestic poli- 
tical terms, dramatic space initiatives would reassure the electorate 
of the new Kennedy Administration's dynamism and, if satisfactorily or- 
ganised, would also provide specific assurances to an uneasy business 
leadership of the good intentions of the Democratic government after 
eight years of Republican administration thereby helping secure support 
for expansionary fiscal policies about which corporate leaders were skep- 
tical.
Thus, emergent state policy was directed toward scoring a propaganda 
victory sufficient to eclipse Soviet space achievements, providing the 
state with an improved operational capacity and opening up the space field 
formally and durably for civilian and military applications while catering 
to domestic political pressures.
A number of subsidiary policy elements remained to be elaborated at 
the end of this period, among them the ownership of the American satel- 
lite entity, the precise terms of its operational integration into the 
rest of the carrier industry, and the specifics of its future accounta- 
bility to the state. These matters were addressed after the private com- 
munications industry began, in mid- to late-196l, to mobilise in order 
to insert its collective requirements into the policy-making process a 
history recounted in the next chapter. Industry's proposals were then 
modified and formalised through passage of the Communications Satellite 
Act in August 19^2, the subject of the succeeding chapter. Final resolu- 
tions came only after lengthy negotiations among the government, communi- 
cations carrier industry and the new Communications Satellite Corporation 
(Comsat), which lasted until 1974 and which are described in Part Pour of 
this study.
It is, however, our position that the two cornerstones upon which 
negotiation ensued speedy and worldwide deployment as the ultimate tech- 
nical goal, and private ownership and commercial operation as the twin 
principles of institutionalisation were deliberate state policies, for- 
mulated and articulated before the time when pressure from private indus-
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try began seriously to be mounted. Since both policy elements had enor- 
mously important consequences on the future of the satellite system in- 
spiring urgency into the process of technological formation, while sub- 
jecting the project to powerful influences from commercial and industrial 
interests and rivalries in the private sector their origin is of consi- 
derable importance. The notion that commercialisation and private owner- 
ship were early and abiding components of state policy, and not elements 
of a later accommodation forced upon the government by private industry, 
is not accepted by other commentators, whose views will be treated in this 
chapter's conclusions.
Nevertheless, in our view the key to the private ownership decision 
lay in the overall consistency between state objectives in the satellite 
field and devolution of control to the private sector, (l.) The peace- 
ful intentions and beneficial possibilities the satellite system was 
to dramatise in regard to space endeavour would be strengthened by its 
institutional separation not just from military but from governmental 
control as well. (2.) The project's utility as a Cold War propaganda 
resource would likewise be enhanced if the system was associated with 
private enterprise rather than the state. (3») More concretely, the 
urgency with which the state wanted the project imbued would be abetted 
if control was shared with those private entities whose technical assis- 
tance would, it was thought, be required, and into whose ongoing opera- 
tions satellite service would ultimately have to be integrated. (4.) 
And in the final analysis, formal private ownership would not prevent 
the state from ensurir. ~hat its diplomatic and operational requirements 
were met through satellite activities.
Accounting for that devolutionary movement is of particular impor- 
tance in that the history that concerns us is one of "a subordinate and 
vulnerable spinoff," as O.W. Riegel has written, from a technology that
has been overwhelmingly military in inspiration and application. In
(2)
terms of numbers, sizes and technical sophistication, ' "the importance
of communications satellites for peaceful purposes diminishes sharply in 
the perspective of the military occupation of space."^ It is then to 
the determinants of the first phase of that spinoff that we now turn.
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2. SPUTNIK AND ITS AFTERMATH
Until the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, the U.S. had virtually no 
space programme. Having emerged from the Second World War with an un- 
scathed  indeed an enhanced  industrial capability, a world monopoly over 
atomic weapons and the cream of Germany's arms scientists^ ', the U.S. 
had no compelling reason to develop the long-range missiles upon which
a space effort would be based. ' Thus American rocket development in 
the 1940s was derisory^ ' and it was only after the Soviet H-bomb detona-
tion in 1953 that the annual budget for long- and intermediate- range mis-
(l] sile work exceeded one million dollars. v ' Specifically scientific space-
related R&D was accordingly limited, and efforts were made to keep this 
separate from the military effort. Thus when President Elsenhower an- 
nounced in July 1955 that the U.S. would attempt to launch a small sci- 
entific satellite as part of the 1957 International Geophysical Year^ ' 
the task was assigned to the Wavy, whose principal launch vehicle, the
Viking missile, was unsuited to military ballistics, having been designed
(9) as a scientific test rocket, w/ The Army's Redstone and Jupiter boosters,
both considerably more powerful, were rejected in order to underscore the 
project's peaceful intent, and to placate certain military opinion opposed 
to seeing resources diverted to scientific work. ^ '
There had, withal, been forewarnings as to the impact a successful 
satellite launch might have. A 1946 RAND Corporation report had noted 
the "consternation and admiration" Americans would feel if another coun- 
try orbited a satellite first:
The achievement of a satellite craft by the United States would 
inflame the imagination of mankind, and would probably produce 
repercussions in the world comparable to the explosion of the 
atomic bomb.(ll)
Eisenhower had been told of the likelihood of a Soviet satellite in 1956 
but assessing that eventuality in primarily military terms had seen no rea- 
son for an American crash programme.^ ' He certainly did not expect what 
he later called the "wave of near-hysteria"^ ' provoked in the U.S. by 
the October 4, 1957 launch of a 184-pound satellite by the Soviet Union. 
Preceded by a first success-ful-Seviet ICBM test in August, Sputnik 
made an enormous impression on American  and world  public opinion, an 
impact intensified by the launch soon after of a second Sputnik with a
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dog aboard, the failure on the launch pad of the first American satellite 
attempt, and finally the comparative modesty of the U.S. success in late 
January 1958, when the grapefruit-sized Explorer I satellite was orbited. 
"A wave of mortification, anger and fresh determination swept the country," 
Secretary of State Dulles later wrote.^ -*' Editorials spoke of "today's 
scientific Pearl Harbor" and "our generation's stock market crash,"' 1 ' 
and Werner von Braun later recalled:
Overnight, it became popular to question the bulwarks of our 
society, our public education system, our industrial strength, 
international policy, defense strategy and forces, the capa/- 
bility of our science and technology. Even the moral fiber 
of our people carne under scathing examination. (17)
Abroad, Soviet space achievements had "shaken confidence in American 
scientific and military capabilities;" an 11-nation survey found that
the only event in recent history to match Sputnik in general public
( 18) 
awareness had been the A-bombings that ended the Second World War,
The White House and Congress moved quickly to mobilise a response,
and "an extensive revamping of the organization of science policy" en 
(19) sued. In November a special presidential advisor on science and
technology was named, and Senate majority leader L.yndon Johnson convened 
hearings on 'preparedness 1 that lasted until July 1958. Both the House 
and Senate created standing committees on science and astronautics, the 
State Department established a separate office on space, and the Depart- 
ment of Defence (DOD) set up an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 
to supervise military rocket and space projects. ARPA had also be- 
gun preliminary work on non-military applications when in July 1958 
Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which created
NASA to pursue civilian space applications previously under the nominal
(21) 
control of a White House aeronautics advisory council. '
3. DEFINING CIVILIAN A?rD MILITARY SPHEPJJS
The distinction between military and civilian space applications provided 
for in the 1958 NASA Act was imprecise, and the overall urgency with which 
space endeavour was approached insp-i-red both spheres indifferently. "Our 
space program," stated the U.S. Information Agency director,
may be considered as a measure of our vitality and our ability 
to compete with a formidable rival, and as a criterion of our
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aoility to maintain toohnoloric.al eminence v.-orthy of emulation 
by other people. (2?)
"During the earliest congressional hearings specifically devoted to satel- 
lite communications, in I larch 195^, officials faced intensive ruestioninrr 
as to who was ahead in space, to which the head of the Pentagon's AP.PA 
responded, in a way that reflected contemporary concerns: "I thinlc our 
posture for the future would be better if we erred on the si-Jo of runninr
scared [rather] than assunin? that we ore superior to the Ru-siaiis." ;/
(2/1")
'The committee's chairman v " concurred, "I don't believe in the space aye
( O!-^
there is any second place in a *-;ar betvreen two major powers."'*^ ' The 
strategic importance was believed to be clear and compelling since, as a 
senator later declared, "Space technology "ill eventually become the domi- 
nant factor in determining our national military strength. "Thcever con- 
trols space controls the world. "^u ' NASA's administrator, however, jus- 
tified the civilian space effort similarly:
If we permitted the Russian- to surpass us, eventuall  - we would 
almost certainly find ourselves on the receiving end of their 
advanced space technology, employed for military and economic 
aggression. (2?)
The interpsnetration of military and civilian objectives was reflected
too in the creation of a trhite House body the National Aeronautics and
fp;^
Space Council (NASC), chaired by the vies president "' to e::ercise uni- 
fied supervision over both phases of the national space effort, and in the 
HASA Act's stipulation that the agency make available to the Pentagon "dis- 
coveries that have military value or significance," a courtesy DO? was to
(-9)
return in the case of findings of interest to NASA. In tne communi- 
cations satellite field, for example, an assistant secretary of defence 
said of the civilian and military programmes, "They form parts of a total 
national communications satellite effort which are entirely complementary." 
\^/ Furthermore, although the Act declared "that it is the policy of the 
United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful.pur-
( "3,1^
poses for the benefit of all mankind," " > some considerable semantic con- 
tortions were required to identify NASA specifically with those peaceful 
purpose? without thereby indicting the military space effort as non-peaceful. (32) ' '
Notwithstanding such logical, operational and administrative ambiguities, 
NASA Act nonetheless formalised a division between military and civilian 
e endeavour, explicitly excluding from the new space agency's responsi- 
bilities work "associated "ith the development of weapons systems, military
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operations, or the defense."^''-'' Both to sustain thin distinction and to 
avoid duplicating R&D, differing fields of technical elaboration were as- 
signed to DOD and NASA. In regard to launchers, the pre-Sputnik tani ~.h- 
ment of military boosters was judged ill-conceived, since it had finally 
been a military rocket the Army's Jupiter that put the first U.S. satel- 
lite into orbit after the Navy's scientific launcher had failed; more- 
over, it was alleged that the military programme could have produced an 
American success some years earlier.^ *"' Although ITA3A would henceforth 
use military rockets as and when necessary, their designs typically pro- 
vided upper stages suited to relatively light payloads and capable of fol- 
lowing fairly simple trajectories; NASA would therefore have to develop 
its own boosters to sit atop the powerful military first stages and pro- 
vide the greater thrust and manoeuvrability needed for scientific pro-
( ^jects like geostationary satellites and manned orbital missions. v '
Accordingly, in late I960 NASA got its own rocket R3-D capability when
the Army's Redstone team, under von Braun, was transferred to the ci-
(36) 
vilian agency.
In regard to satellite payloads, the first NASA-DOD division of 
responsibilities was agreed in November 1958, giving NASA charge of 'pas- 
sive' satellites and the defence department responsibility for active 
ones. (Passive satellites have no on-board electrical components, and 
simply provide a surface against which radio signals are bounced; active
satellites receive, amplify and re-transmit signals.) The passive pro-
(37) gramme had some limited success under MSAV ', but encountered technical
disadvantages largely inherent in the concept; it was taken on for a 
time by the military in 196! and discontinued in 1963. The active 
satellite programme, primarily under the Army, meanwhile yielded Project 
Score in December 1958 which, although considered the first active commu- 
nications satellite, did little more than transmit Christmas greetings 
pre-recorded on the ground by President Eisenhower, and Courier IB in 
October I960, which received and re-transmitted messages beamed from 
earth, although these had to be taped for subsecruent relay. '
In August 1960 NASA reminded the defence department that their 195°
agreement had envisaged the possibility that the civilian space agency
( f>~\ \ 
might "at an appropriate time" wish to enter the active satellite fieldw ,
and the next month a coordinating board was established, co-chaired by
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representatives of DOD and NASA, to provide for continuing consultation 
between the two programmes and a more flexible division of labours than 
the active-passive split had permitted.^ ' Consequently, by 196! both 
the military and civilian programmes were directed toward development of 
active satellites: the Army, through its Advent Project, was working on 
high-altitude geostationary spacecraft, while NASA developed low-altitude 
random-orbiting satellites.^' The subsequent failure of Advent, growing 
doubts over the usefulness to the military of synchronous satellites, and 
NASA's interest in pursuing the geostationary design promoted by Hughes 
Aircraft,^ ' led to another reshuffling after the 1962 Comsat Act was 
passed, whereby DOD redirected its efforts to lower altitude satellites 
and NASA took on development of synchronous spacecraft, an effort that 
led via the 1963-64 Syncom project to the first operational commercial 
communications satellite, Early Bird in 1965.
In sum, as the 1960 presidential election approached a national com- 
mitment to wide-ranging, if as yet unfocussed, space endeavour had been 
made, prompted by the Sputnik launch and the serious challenge to U.S. 
technological self-image and strategic capability that the Soviet space 
achievements were interpreted as posing. As one Comsat official later 
reflected:
I've often thought what would've happened if we had put up the 
first satellite. I suppose the whole space programme would've 
languished for, who knows, another generation. (46)
4. THE K^TTTEOT .AK'IIIjISTRA^TONt^P'TE'.reD URGENCY
Space was a good issue for the Democrats in 1960, encapsulating both the 
national decline they sought to associate with the Elsenhower Administra- 
tion and the New Frontier of vigour and imagination they proposed to 
inaugurate. Sen. Kennedy campaigned hard on the fact that "the first 
canine passengers to outer space who safely returned were named Strelka 
and Belka, not Rover and Pido," and declared: "If the Soviet Union was 
first in outer space, that is the most serious defeat the United States 
has suffered in many many years." Emphasis was placed particularly on 
the symbolic damage done to U.S. global standing:
Because we failed to recognise the impact that being first in 
outer space would have, the impression began to move around the
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vrorld that the Soviet Union was on the march... that it wan 
moving and we are standing still. This is what we have to 
overcome, the psychological feeling in the world that the 
United States has reached maturity, that maybe our high noon 
has passed... and that now we are going into a long, slow af- 
ternoon. (47)
Kennedy's rhetorical insistence on the value of space endeavour to dra- 
matising national dynamism was echoed in the report he received shortly 
before his inauguration in January 1961 from an ad hoc group of acade- 
mics and defence e;cperts led "by Jerome Weisner, strategic analyst and 
later M.I.T. president, whom Kennedy had asked after his election to 
recommend directions the new administration should take in its science 
and space policies. The Weisner Report listed five reasons for U.S. 
space efforts  in addition to the need to develop intercontinental roc- 
kets  the first of which was prestige:
Space exploration and exploits have captured the imagination 
of the peoples of the world. During the next few years the 
prestige of the United States will in part be determined by 
the leadership we demonstrate in space activities. (A3)
The prestige rationale and its corollary  avoiding further Soviet damage 
to American vrorld standing  remained an enduring and popular theme 
in U.S. decisions on space activities, even where the actual threat of 
another Soviet 'first' was remote, as, arguably, in the case of commu- 
nications satellites.
Subsequent debate and discussion concerning communications satellites 
frequently referred to the impending prospect of a Soviet satellite system 
and to the harm America would there/upon suffer. As of August 19^1, during 
House space committee hearings, one congressman declared it "quite evident 
that Russia and China will have their own communications satellites pro- 
bably as soon as we do, give or take a year or two,"^ and the committee 
chairman observed: "I know of nothing that would be more disastrous to 
the United States and to the world in prestige at this time [sic]" than 
for the Soviets to do so before the U.S. ' Actual evidence of Soviet
intentions was, however, sparse and as a State Department official 
acknowledged in February 1962, "We know very little about Soviet progress 
in this field. "^ Moreover, wha.t_was known  or could reasonably be in- 
ferred _ as to Soviet satellite capabilities seems to have made serious 
competition with American efforts unlikely. First, the Soviets were not 
developing a geostationary launch ability and did not in fact put a satel-
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lite into synchronous orbit until 1974. Since that orbit is equatorial, 
achieving it was thought to require tropical or semi-tropical launch cites 
 which the Soviet Union lacked and the service that spacecraft can there- 
after provide would be poorest in the extreme latitudes where most of the 
U.S.S.R. lies. Although the practicability of synchronous satellites was 
not demonstrated until 1963 and their operational deployment not decided 
until 1964» "they were acknowledged during the Comsat Act debates (see Chap- 
ter Five) as ultimately the preferable design, and the absence of effort 
in that field argued against any putative Soviet intention to create a 
global satellite system. Second, the Soviets had relatively little inter- 
national communications traffic and correspondingly little incentive 
to improve facilities for its conveyance. The U.S., however, was the 
source or destination of traffic accounting for around 70 percent of in- 
ternational revenues, its exclusion, therefore, from an international 
satellite system would make the system's economic viability dubious and 
deprive potential participants of access to a major communicating partner. 
"Even though," a senator observed during satellite hearings in early 1962, 
"Russia put up a satellite system and offered it for less money, they 
would still only be able to serve a small portion of the world,"
To the degree, however, that the risk of real Soviet satellite compe- 
tition was acknowledged to be slight, the incentive to accelerate U.S. 
efforts was argued to be that much greater. A Senate staff report of Feb-
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5.». NEW CCVyCSmiS, NEW OBJECTIVES
Sputnik and its successors were believed "by some to have had special 
impact in the Third World, where the peoples of newly independent or 
'emerging' nations were thought particularly susceptible to identifying 
with the achievements of "'the backward Russians,'"^ ' The concern was 
growing increasingly intense because in the view of the U.S. government 
the issue was not so much foreign sentiment as the disposition of a poli- 
tical and military objective of incalculable importance. If communica- 
tions satellites could be used to help secure that objective, a global 
scope was required, regardless of the usefulness let alone indispensa- 
bility of the satellites themselves to those whom they were to impress.
In the defence department's internal history of the Vietnam involve- 
ment later called 'The Pentagon Papers' 196! is terrr.ed a "peculiarly 
difficult year" for the United States owing to "the generally aggressive 
and confident posture of the Russians...and the generally defensive posi- 
tion of the Americans,"^ a characterisation especially appropriate to 
the government's view of political tides in the Third World. On January 
6 the President-elect had received a copy of a speech by the Soviet Premier 
in which Khruschev had said that the "analysis of the world situation as 
it appeared at the beginning of the Sixties" suggested conditions that 
"greatly exceeded the boldest and most optimistic expectations." In par- 
ticular, the Soviet Union would accordingly display "a most favourable 
attitude" toward "wars of national liberation."^ ' To Kennedy, the speech 
"signalled the beginning of total conflict in the vital southern hemi- 
sphere,"^ ' as R. Aliano has written, and in his State of the Union ad- 
dress later in January the President adduced it as a restatement of the 
Soviet desire for world domination."
Kennedy's determination to meet this perceived threat in the Third 
World remained a theme of considerable importance in his government's 
foreign policy. The creation of the Pea.ce Corps and of an elite Army 
counter-insurgency force, the interventions in Laos and Vietnam, the 
'Alliance for Progress 1 in Latin America and diplomatic overtures to new 
African states, all suggested a general attentiveness to the Third World 
which contrasted sharply with the restrained interest of his predecessors 
in the White House Truman's Point Pour aid programme and intervention in 
Greece Elsenhower's flirtation with gunboat diplomacy in Lebanon. The 
conseoruent ill-preparedness and the stakes imputed to actions in the Third
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World were both dramatised in the humiliating U.S. -sponsored attempt to 
invade Cuba in April 196!. Coming just a week after the April 12 orbi- 
tal flight of Yuri Gagarin, as D. Halberstam has vrritten: "All of the 
setbacks [of 196l] would seem minor compared to the Bay of Pigs, which 
was a shattering event, both within the Administration and outside."' °' 
Nonetheless, for Kennedy the underdeveloped countries had truly become 
the cockpit of history. During his June 1961 trip to Paris he observed 
that because of the rebirth of Europe the principal theatre of conflict
had shifted to the Third World where the threat came "not from massive
f f.j\ 
land armies but from subversion, insurrection and despair." A year
later Kennedy similarly told a European statesman: "Today's struggle
does not lie [in Europe], but rather in Asia, Latin America and Africa."^ ^'
Both to wage that struggle more effectively, and to improve the 
credibility of the American nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, 
a larger transformation in U.S. strategic policy was called for. The 
Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation  "finite deterrence 
and no conventional war"  was believed insufficiently subtle to accom-
modate the variety of military contingencies the U.S. might now be re 
( 6Q 1) quired to address. In its stea;l emerged a policy supported for a
(70) decade or more by some academics  among them Weisner^   of flexible
(71) 
response: "assured superiority and limited war." The new policy
required, on the one hand, immediate steps to improve the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, believed to be "lagging," through increased spending and
(73) 
consolidated control within the military, ' On the other hand, the
need to prepare for non-nuclear conflicts meant strengthening conven- 
tional forces, not just for operations in the Third World but in Europe 
as well. To pressure the NATO allies into contributing more to the Euro- 
pean effort, a plan was devised to withdraw the Jupiter missiles Eisen- 
hower had installed in Italy and Turkey after Sputnik. This plan re- 
opened the lingering issue of deciding a formula to assure roles for 
America's allies in the control of the 'common' nuclear deterrent  and, 
by extension, in the development of their own advanced aerospace capa- 
bilities, an area of considerable co.nnequence later to the internation- 
alisation of the communications satellite system/
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6. COMMUNICATIONS; A COMON THREAD
If the United States were to pursue effectively the new policy directions 
suggested "by those wide-ranging revisions in its perceived political and 
strategic requirements, certain of its material capabilities would have 
to be improved. Prominent among these was its overseas communications com- 
plex. The gathering efforts to accelerate communications satellite develop- 
ment thus emerged from a larger reappraisal of the adequacy of the U.S. 
international communications capability, whose deficiencies were believed 
to demand urgent remedy and whose specific needs did not seem likely to be 
met through wider deployment of existing communications techniques.
In addition to the commercial facilities used for routine administra- 
tive traffic, the government's international communications plant as of
(JC\
the early 1960s consisted of undersea cables, tropospheric scatter^ ' and 
high-frequency radio. Cable and tropospheric scatter (or 'tropo') were 
considered reliable, but were available in only some two-thirds of the 
Northern Hemisphere and little of the Southern. ' Expansion was tech- 
nically conceivable but very expensive, and unlikely to be justified by 
the traffic volumes they would thereupon carry. Otherwise the government  
and military relied upon high-frequency radio, which suffered from limited 
bandwidths per circuit (hence useless for wideband uses like high-speed 
data transmission) and notorious susceptibility to interference from at- 
mospheric disturbances in "the capricious ionosphere," whose reflective 
properties are essential to propagating high-frequency radio waves over
long distances, but which is adversely affected by factors like a decrease
(77) in the occurrence of sunspots or by nuclear detonations. '
Consequently, the government's overseas capabilities were inadequate 
both for routine and emergency operations. Delays of from 24 to 36 hours 
were frequently encountered when contacting certain remote diplomatic posts 
(<") an<i in January 1962 Kennedy was told that it could take as much as 48
hours to communicate from Washington with some of the military units dis-
(jq\
persed around Europe. v ' In emergencies, as the head of the Defence Com- 
munications Agency later said:
[VJhenever we have any kind of a contingency operation, either 
diplomatic or diplomatic-military, we find that we have inade- 
quate communications if these fall within these areas that are 
not connected by cable and tropospheric scatter. (80)
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Work was beginning early in 1962 to improve the government's internal 
administration in the communications field and its technical facilities: 
in February the President created an Office of Telecommunications Manage- 
ment to coordinate policies and oversee the state system, and in March
an interim network of tropospheric scatter relays was established in Eu-
(81) 
rope. '
It was, however, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 that dra- 
matised most forcefully the overall problem and led to a consolidation 
of administrative control over the government's communications capability 
within the military. During the crisis the Soviets encountered lengthy 
delays in their cable connections to Washington, and at a particularly 
anxious moment the Americans learned that one of their U-2 reconnaissance 
planes whose flight was supposed to have been cancelled had gone off
/ Qr)\
course and was over Soviet territory.^ ' Moreover, as a House subcom- 
mittee report later concluded:
This crisis sharply revealed the inadequacy of governmental com- 
munications in carrying a heavy load of high priority traffic un- 
der emergency conditions. This serious problem served to under- 
score the knowledge that conventional high frequency radio could 
not be fully depended on and that normal communications methods 
for reaching remote spots around the globe were inadequate. (83)
In the aftermath of the crisis, a Security Council investigation was 
ordered and its findings prompted Kennedy to create in August 19&3 the 
National Communications System, under the defence secretary, to organise 
and manage the state's global network.*- '
Within that larger reappraisal culminating in the establishment of 
the NCS, communications satellites had figured as a highly promising 
means to supplement and extend the national overseas capability. The 
satellite's microwave beam is not subject to ionospheric disturbance;
/ Qc\
nor do nuclear explosions cause it serious interference.*- •*' Satel- 
lites could be used with mobile ground units that could be airlifted 
to wherever service was required. And since they would operate in the 
ultra-high frequency bands, they would not compete for spectrum space 
in the more congested lower frequencies.
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7. STATE REQ.UIREMEHTS VIS-A-VIS PUBLIC SATELLITE SERVICES
Although it was clear that the state had communications needs of its own 
that satellite deployment could fulfill, a closer look at the government's 
specific requirements indicates that many were unlikely to he met "by a 
communications system given over to public i.e. commercial operation and 
use. Assuring that creation of any such system would not abridge the govern- 
ment's right to establish other satellite networks precisely tailored to 
its needs became, therefore, an essential condition governing creation of 
a commercial system.
The exact relationship that the government and its traffic would have 
to the commercial satellite system was not fully addressed until 1964 and
/ Q^\
not finally settled until 196?. Pull-scale reliance on the system was, 
however, recognised as unlikely in 1961, as an assistant secretary of 
defence testified in September:
It is probable that for circuits to remote areas having limited 
commercial traffic, [the] Defense [Department] will have to rely 
upon its own systems and certainly it must provide its own sys- 
tems for mobile use. (88)
For its own purposes, the government's needs differed in at least four 
respects from those readily to be met by a commercial system: fully glo- 
bal service, separate earth station ownership, mobile capability and mea- 
sures to safeguard security and reliability. 1.) As noted, the military 
was intensely interested in improved links with hitherto under-served 
areas of the Third World, where traffic and accordingly commercial inte- 
rest was light. The military also needed better service to polar 
regions, since numerous important defence installations are located in 
the Arctic and high-frequency radio transmission in the higher latitudes 
is particularly prone to ionospheric disturbances. " ' 2.) The mili- 
tary preferred "wherever practicable" to own, operate and fully control 
its own earth stations, which was believed difficult to guarantee if 
they were parts of an international commercial endeavour.^ ' 3.) The
insistence upon a system able to communicate with small, mobile ground
(92) terminals was firm and frequently reiterated. V7 ' As another assistant
defence secretary said in 1964:
One of the essential elements of a military communications sys- 
tem, and I want to put this as clearly and as unmistakably as I 
~" can on the record, is the ability to take a ground station, put
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it in a C-130 airplane, ship it to country X in town Y [sic] 
and be able to communicate in the next half day with Washing- 
ton. (93)
Communicating with such units, however, equipped with necessarily small 
antennas, requires large amounts of satellite capacity to overcome the 
relative insensitivity of the ground apparatus. Whether commercial 
users would be willing to tolerate the pre-emption of satellite power 
and bandwidth that this, might entail was unclear» 4.) Similarly, the 
government had need of encryption and anti-jamming features to protect 
much of its traffic, techniques which require considerable bandwidth  
it was, for example estimated that the military would be able to derive
around one-tenth the channels that commercial users could obtain from
it fu 
(95)
the same spectrum space ^" 'and which migh rthermore mean extensive
modifications within the spacecraft itself.
Those problems were not necessarily insurmountable. The government 
might, for example, be entitled to supply its own compatible ground sta- 
tions for service to remote areas, tying in to a commercial space segment
ervit 
(97)
from wherever it wished.^" ' The government might also subsidise s ice
provided solely for its purposes, like that to low-traffic regions, 
And if the government were willing to finance spacecraft modifications 
and lease the specialised capacity thereby made available, the specific 
features the government required might too be provided. ' Nevertheless, 
the particular nature of the government's communications needs suggested 
strongly that whatever facilities were made available to it commercially 
would have at least to be supplemented.
At the.same time, however, the services the government could readily 
procure commercially were far from negligeable. Around 27 percent of
the state-controlled communications complex consolidated into the NGS
(99) 
consisted of circuits leased from the private carrier industry.w" An
improvement in commercial facilities would facilitate the flow of rou- 
tine administrative and diplomatic messages, and to underscore its own 
interest in such an outcome the Pentagon said in a September 196! policy 
statement:
It is in the interest of DOB 'that industry be encouraged in the 
development and establishment of^an^operational communications 
satellite system as rapidly as economically and technically 
feasible. (100)
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Hence, there were two certain points of contact "between the state's 
communications requirements and public satellite services: the early 
availability of a commercial system would mean improved facilities for 
non-sensitive government overseas traffic, but the state wished to re- 
serve the right to establish whatever other satellite systems it deemed 
necessary. Those two points were stressed by Secretary of Defence McNamara 
in Senate testimony shortly before the Comsat Act was passed/ 101 ' and 
they were contained in the President's July 196! policy statement a year 
before, when Kennedy said the government
would make use of the commercial system for general governmental 
purposes and establish separate communications satellite systems 
when required to meet unique Government needs which cannot, in 
the national interest, be met by the commercial system. (102)
That modest formulation did not, however, fully cover the potential use- 
fulness of a public satellite system to the U.S. government. The future 
of the government's own satellite plans, and indeed of the space pro- 
gramme altogether, was also believed to be at issue.
8. , INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL OF SPACE-RELATED FREQUENCIES NEEDED
In October 19^3 an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (EARC) was 
scheduled to be held in Geneva, under auspices of the International Tele- 
communications Union (ITU), to decide upon frequency assignments for space 
communications. Although the Soviets were thought, because of the size 
of their land mass, to be able to rely upon domestic frequencies in their 
space efforts/ ' for the United States:
The success, not only of the communications satellite project, 
but of all U.S. space programs will depend upon the agreements 
reached at this international conference. (104)
Without dedicated frequencies, American space activities would be subject 
to technical interference from other users and consequent international 
political discord as claims and counterclaims ensued. Moreover, the re- 
cent past' suggested that approval of U.S. requests was not likely to be 
automatic.
Prom August to December 1959 "th-6 World Administrative Radio Council 
(WARC) had taken initial action on space frequencies. Tho U.S. had been 
preparing for the WARC meeting since 1957, and of the 13 frequency bands 
subsequently registered for space research, ten were the direct results
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of American proposals. ' Due to opposition though from a number of 
smaller countries led by Israel and Prance which contended that too 
little was known as to the future needs of nations that^did not yet have 
launch capabilities, the assignments were made solely for experimental 
purposes and were furthermore to be reviewed by an extraordinary con- 
ference in four years' time.^ -*' The U.S. required firm frequency com- 
mitments for its various space projects including exclusive bands (not 
shared with terrestrial usage) for military satellite systems and be- 
gan formal preparations for the EARC in May 196l/ ' Although a Senate 
staff report subsequently observed, "Probably no more effective or early 
U.S. coordination of proposals for an international radio conference have 
[sic] ever been undertaken than that in preparation" for the EARC, ' 
final success would require "a clear exposition of the benefits to be 
realized from satellite communications services to all nations."^ '
Hence, there was a material reason for haste in planning for pub- 
lic satellite services, irrespective of the degree to which the ultimate 
system would be able to meet fully the state's instrumental communica- 
tions requirements. The chief of the State Department's telecommunica- 
tions division reminded House commerce committee members in July 196! 
that foreign countries had to be involved quickly in planning for the 
satellite system in order to avoid a repeat of the disinterest and hos- 
tility shown at the 1959 WARC.^ °' And as the chairman of the Senate 
communications subcommittee remarked during hearings the next month:
Needless to say that the country that is successful in placing 
an operable communications satellite into the air will be in a 
strong position to exercise leadership leading to the acceptance 
of technical requirements and to the arrangements during the 
1963 conference. (110)
That the public satellite services envisaged should, however, be pri- 
vately-owned and commercially-operated has not yet been explained.
9. DEVELOPMENT C? STATE COMMERCIAL SATELLITE POLICY
The government's commitment to creating a privately-owned satellite
system had clearly begun to ^merge jtoward^ the end of the Elsenhower 
Administration's tenure^ and was officially embraced during the first 
few months of President Kennedy's term. The earliest apparent reference
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to such a policy was an oblique one, contained in a September 1959 Bureau 
of the Budget statement:
It is the general policy of the administration that the Federal 
Government will not start or carry on any commercial-industry 
activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such 
product or service can be procured from private enterprise through 
ordinary business channels, (ill)
The statement was ambiguous insofar as it referred only to services re- 
quired by the government not, say, those furnished by the government 
to other users and was arguably premised on the existence of "ordinary" 
business channels, of which there were none in the satellite field. Not- 
withstanding, interest in communications satellites within the private 
carrier industry whose activities are described in the next chapter  
was becoming evident, and during the summer of I960 the State Department 
requested the carriers not to attempt to negotiate any satellite-related 
arrangements with foreign telecommunications entities until government 
policy had been further clarified.
Clarification of state intent ensued, notably through an October 1960 
speech by the head of NASA: "Traditionally," he said, "communications 
services in this country have been provided by privately-financed carriers 
competing with one another to serve the public interest under Federal con- 
trols and regulation;" furthermore, there was "no reason" to modify that 
policy when it came to communications relayed by satellite. Instead the 
government should promote and accelerate private efforts, making available 
the results of state-financed R&D and furnishing launch facilities on a 
cost-reimbursable basis. ' These views were reiterated by President 
Eisenhower in his December farewell address when the President declared: 
"[Tlhe government should aggressively encourage private enterprise in the 
establishment and operation of satellite relays for revenue-producing pur- 
poses." NASA, furthermore, was instructed to intensify its satellite 
R&D and to initiate a programme of active support to private industry. 
Accordingly, four days after the December 31 speech the White House asked 
for competitive proposals from industry for an experimental satellite 
communications system, and on January 19 the day before Kennedy's inau- 
guration_the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a licence to 
the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T) for a test satellite, finally 
launched in July 19^2 and named Telstar.^ ->'
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Although Kennedy "believed that the approach favoured "by Elsenhower 
of competitive bids would likely culminate in an AT&T satellite monopoly, 
and although the administration acknowledged that continuing state 
oversight would be necessary and wholly justified because of the satel- 
lite system's potential military uses, the need for "physical support" 
by the government in the form of launchers and the possibility that 
"extraordinary financial support" would also be required private owner- 
ship of the system was not in principle opposed: "A new area of indus- 
trial opportunity for civilian use," said the Weisner Report, "is nor- 
mally left by our Government to private enterprise."^ '' The adminis- 
tration's first action regarding public satellite services was therefore 
to help create conditions favourable to industry's activities.
On February 28, 196! a 'memorandum of understanding' was agreed by 
NASA and the PCC, setting forth their respective responsibilities within 
subsequent satellite efforts. ' The "earliest possible realization" 
of a "commercially operable" satellite system was pronounced an "urgent 
national objective."^ "'
In accordance with the traditional policy of conducting interna- 
tional communications services through private enterprise subject 
to government regulation, private enterprise should be encouraged 
to undertake development and utilization of satellite systems for 
public communications services.
NASA, which hitherto had principal responsibility for all civilian space 
applications under terms of its agreements with the Pentagon , would 
henceforth serve primarily as a technical resource of the gathering com- 
mercial effort. ' Wide-ranging authority to develop and implement 
policy, however, was given to the PCC; and since the PCC was a regula- 
tory and not normally an executive agency, a preferred form of commer- 
cial organisation was already implied: "the implementation and utiliza- 
tion of space telecommunications technology through the licensing and 
regulation of U.S. common carriers." It was not anticipated that a new 
entity would be needed, since the system's creation "may be accomplished 
through concerted action by existing agencies of Government and private 
enterprise," and it was not even clear that the necessary organisation 
could not be achieved administratively,_without specific legislation.^ ' 
We shall return in the next chapter to the PCC and how it carried out its 
new mandate.
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When Kennedy appeared before Congress on May 25, 196! to announce 
the American commitment to land a man on the moon by the end of the de- 
cade, he also requested an increased interim budget for NASA of $50m 
"to make the most of our present leadership by accelerating the use of 
space satellites for world-wide communications."^ ' Although the funds 
would be used to speed government satellite R&D, NASA's new administrator 
James Webb insisted that the space agency sought to involve private indus- 
try "in the most rapid and expeditious manner."'' ' In a June 15 letter 
to Vice President Johnson, chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Council (NASC), Kennedy directed the council to make the necessary studies 
and prepare policy drafts for creation of an operational system  while 
giving "particular attention to the [needs] of this hemisphere and nevrly 
developing nations throughout the world. "^ ^' A month later the NASC 
unanimously recommended that the system be privately owned, subject to 
the government's 1.) setting broad technical and operating standards, 
2.) providing launch services and 3.) regulating rates and service modali-
Kennedy's formal statement of communications satellite policy, released 
on July 24, emphasised speed and global deployment as objectives, and elabo- 
rated considerably upon the three conditions the NASC recommended be placed 
upon private industry's participation.
I am anxious that the development of this new technology to bring 
the farthest corner of the globe within reach by voice and visual 
communication, fairly and equitably available for use, proceed 
with all possible promptness. (126)
While "private ownership and operation of the U.S. portions of the system 
is favored," the following conditions would have to be met: the system was 
to be created as rapidly as possible; provision  through ownership or 
otherwise  would be made for foreign participation; access on equitable 
terms must be extended to all U.S. private participants; equipment pro- 
curement would be through competitive bidding; antitrust laws must be 
complied with; operating economies must be reflected in the tariffs 
charged to customers; and service was to be extended "even where indivi- 
dual portions of the coverage are not profitable."
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10. CONCLUSIONS; PRIVATE QI-rMERSHIP AMD. GOMERCIALISATIOIT
During the interdepartmental meetings to draft the President's July satel- 
lite policy statement, attempts were made Toy middle-level State Department 
officials to raise the possibility that ownership and operation of the U.S.
component of the global system might be retained by the government. The
(127") 
suggestions were summarily rejected, ' and by early August the head of
NASA described the state ownership option as follows:
Ho consideration has been given to that except as an alternative 
in the event a commercial system cannot be brought into being by 
private industry. (128)
As ife shall see in the next two chapters, however, government ownership 
did attract support in Congress, particularly as it became clear that the 
likely form private ownership would take would consist of a highly-concen- 
trated arrangement of control by potential competitors formulated by the 
carrier industry through the summer of 196! and not the broadly-based 
private ownership implied in Kennedy's statement. Nevertheless, as far as 
the Kennedy Administration was concerned, state ownership was officially
dead as a policy option by July 196! if indeed it had ever been thought
(129) politically practicable or desirable. x
It is true that the new administration had not been given an alto- 
gether clean slate as concerned satellite policy, since officials of the 
Elsenhower Administration and Elsenhower himself had endorsed a privately- 
owned satellite system and had opened discussions x^ith the carrier industry 
toward that end. Moreover, a definition that continued to be highly influ- 
ential in subsequent debate had successfully and virtually without challengi 
_-been introduced under the Republican administration: that satellite com- 
munications represented a communications, and not primarily a space, acti- 
vity and was therefore an appropriate sphere for private exploitation. The 
propriety of government ownership, on the other hand, required for its 
defence some demonstration of why the state should "get into the telecom- 
munications business."^
Furthermore, even without these precedents specific to the satellite 
field, the new administration had reasons of its own for seeking to reaf- 
firm arguably traditional patterns of state-private relations. The goal 
was to reassure an uneasy and mistrustful business community and thus to 
secure support for various measures about which private sector leadership
-79-
was skeptical. To deal with an economic recession dating from 1959, the 
White House was attempting to pursue expansionary fiscal policies; through- 
out 1961 the "battle was with the Treasury Department over an increased 
government deficit, a fight succeeded "by a similar struggle over a tax 
cut "both of which measures "business leaders "believed inflationary and ir- 
responsible.^ ' Other White House actions, though less generally im- 
portant, aggravated relations with corporate leadership and produced, "by 
the time the Gomsat Act was "before Congress, a very poor image for the 
President within the "business community.^ ' Schlesinger, for one, has 
placed the private ownership decision within the context of rapprochements 
to attempt to heal White House rifts with "business, noting that final pas- 
sage of the Comsat Act came shortly after the Treasury liberalised depre- 
ciation allowances and the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers 
had begun a series of briefings for business leaders:
By this action [liberalised allowances], along with Heller's good 
will missions, the enactment in October of the investment tax cre- 
dit and the President's decision regretted by some of his associ- 
ates to put the communications satellite system under private 
ownership, the administration sought once more to overcome the mis- 
trust of the business community, this time in order to win business 
support for tax reduction...(133)
Allowing for the implied displacement of Kennedy's decision to mid-1962, 
the passage nonetheless suggests the troubled context of relations with 
the private sector after eight years of benign Republican administra- 
tion into which a satellite ownership decision favourable to business 
might be expected to play.
Moreover, private ownership could be defended as more generally 
appropriate to the state's principal objectives in the satellite field 
than government ownership, in terms of symbolising peaceful intents, 
dramatising national leadership in the field, and securing the urgency 
with which the state sought to inspire the project. The 1958 creation 
of NASA would thereby emerge as a preliminary step toward separating en- 
tirely certain space applications from military influence or control; 
private ownership would be the ultimate guarantee of institutional inde- 
pendence, and a compelling argument for participation in the communica- 
tions system by 'neutral' or 'non-aligned 1 nations. At the same time, 
as a Senate staff report argued:
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The establishment of a communications satellite system will 
demonstrate to the world the vitality of the U.S. democratic 
system, in which private enterprise, in partnership with gov- 
ernment, can mobilize its resources in providing a global com- 
munications network which can be commercially profitable and 
at the same time serve as an international public service. (134)
Fortune magazine declared similarly that "if the industry can settle its 
differences and join in a cooperative effort its can provide an enduring 
example of the capabilities of free enterprise."^ Finally, although 
it was anticipated that service to light-traffic regions of the world 
might be commercially unattractive and subsidy might therefore be neces- 
sary, the speed and effectiveness with which the project was pursued 
was believed likely to be enhanced if private firms with demonstrated 
interest and technical capabilities (see Chapter Four) in the satellite 
field were fully involved. That urgency was, as we shall now see, used 
frequently to legitimate the precise form and industrial composition of 
the private oimership plan which was now beginning to emerge from dis- 
cussions convened in the spring by the FCC,
CHAPTER FOUR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
ON SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, 1959-61
1. OVERVIEW
Early private mobilisation in the satellite field, which began toward 
the end of the Eisenhower Administration and intensified soon after Ken- 
nedy took office, culminated in October 196! with the release of formal 
proposals calling for ownership and operation of the satellite system to 
be entrusted to a new private joint venture which would regroup the small 
number of firms providing international telecommunications services. The 
ownership plan was formulated with, and supported by the Federal Communi- 
cations Commission, under authority assigned to the FCC by its February 
1961 agreement with the civilian space agency NASA. The proposal never- 
theless ran counter to an emergent Administration policy favouring widely- 
based industrial ownership including domestic communications carriers,
%
electronics firms and aerospace manufacturers. Industry's plan subse- 
quently inspired Congressional legislative proposals and attempts at re- 
conciliation with the White House's approach, which comprised the history 
of the 1962 Comsat Act, recounted in the next chapter.
In this chapter we shall examine private satellite-related activi- 
ties through autumn 1961, when an ad hoc group of U.S. international car- 
riers, convened by the FCC after the President's July policy statement, 
released its organisational proposals. Three phases in the chronology 
can be distinguished: 1.) a period of uncoordinated manoeuvrings, from 
1959 to early 1961, when various firms acting as R&D or manufacturing 
contractors advanced their satellite capabilities and standing in the 
field through individual transactions with the government; this, in the 
absence of state policy on public satellite services and without any ef- 
fort to orchestrate collective industrial policy; 2.) a brief phase of 
rule-making, from late March to late May 1961, when the FCC formally in- 
vited participation from a wide range of industrial entities in the
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Commission's efforts to establish policy-making procedures, 3.) a deci- 
sive period beginning in late May and lasting through summer 1961, when 
private entities other than the international communications carriers were 
excluded from PCC-industry policy discussions, an exclusion that had fore- 
seeable consequences on the character of private satellite ownership sub- 
sequently proposed in October.
The chapter begins, however, with a consideration of two important 
areas of ambiguity the first commercial and the second technological  
relating to the degree and kind of interest industry had in the introduc- 
tion, of satellite communications. First, although there was ample evidence 
of growing commercial requirements for overseas circuits, there is little 
to suggest that satellites were viewed by the communications industry as 
uniquely or urgently needed to meet those requirement?-.. Second, satellite 
technology was itself far from ready for operational deployment: at least 
two fundamentally different designs were thought potentially usable, but 
neither had been proven experimentally or operationally and little was 
therefore known of economics or profitability. Hence, with the ultimate 
form, usefulness and revenue potential of satellite communications for the 
moment unknowable, industry's evidently keen interest in securing influen- 
tial roles in whatever decisions would be ma,de seems based in a desire to 
share in the technology's control, and therefore to be able to determine 
the directions its design and application should take. While industry's 
response to those other concerns was equivocal, its recipe for control 
was not.
2. _GROT-'TH OF_pVER5EAS CCMTERCIAL CffaTOFrGATIO^ PT^ITI T^_^?T3
The introduction of voice-capacity transoceanic cables in 195°" soon pro- 
voked increases in overall international traffic volumes, changes in the 
media composition of those volumes toward heavier telephone usage, and 
consequent shifts in dominance within the U.S. international communications 
industry away from record carriers and toward the single American voice 
carrier, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (AT&T). AT&T's 1956 cable to 
England was followed by similar over the next eight yaars to Hawaii, Prance, 
Puerto Rico, a second to England and a 1964 transpacific complex; Cable
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& Wireless built a cable in 196! to Canada and in 1963 from there to 
Australia and Hew Zealand, and was beginning work on a link from Aus- 
tralia to Hong Kong and Singapore, to be completed by 1967/ ' While 
U.S. overseas phone volumes, hitherto using high frequency radio links, 
had been increasing doubling between 1948 and 1954^ ' the first year 
of cable operation saw a 90 percent increase in transatlantic phone
traffic/ ' and by 1965 the total was nearly three times the pre-cable 
volume.
For AT&T, notwithstanding its approximately 83 percent share of the 
incomparably bigger U.S. domestic telephone market/-^' an expansion of 
international activities nevertheless promised to be lucrative. Thanks 
to its voice cables, AT&T's international revenues had increased seven- 
fold between 1947 and 1961, to nearly $42nO ' Furthermore, the anti- 
cipated shift in the composition of international traffic away from 
telegraph and record traffic to phone calls had not yet materialised: 
as of 1961, around 90 percent of American overseas traffic still con- 
sisted of telegraphy, in volume terms. In revenue terms, however, voice 
traffic already accounted for two-fifths of total international earnings. 
According to a I960 study undertaken for Lockheed Aircraft, by 1970 U.S. 
overseas phone traffic would comprise one-quarter of the country's inter- 
national traffic volume and one-half total overseas revenues. AT&T's 
monopoly over international phone calls would mean that the one-quarter 
of total overseas revenues deriving from telegrammes and the final quar- 
ter from teletype and data would be divided among the three principal
international record carriers: Western Union International and subsidi-
("71 
aries of RCA and ITT. VU
The Sixties were anticipated as the era of the telephone in interna- 
tional communications, and the demand for voice circuits appeared virtually
insatiable. Newly built transoceanic facilities were fully loaded with/ o\
traffic in from 90 to 150 days after completion/ ' As of 1961 industry's
forecasts were for 15 percent annual increases in traffic volume over at
(q\ 
least the next decade, ' which would soon outstrip existing capacities.
An ITT official said that another thousand transatlantic voice circuits 
would be needed by 1965 in addition to the 180 then in service; by 1970 
2,000 new circuits were required, and by 1980 between 4,000 and 6,000 new
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circuits in the Atlantic and Pacific regions the final projection 
"several thousand circuits above the present and expected cable capaci- 
ty."^ AT&T's forecasts were higher still, and the company believed 
the U.S. would be needing- 12,000 voice circuits worldwide by 1930.' ' 
Thus, on the one hand, the apparent need for satellite facilities 
from within the commercial sector seemed clear. "[ T-/]ithout communica- 
tions satellite technology," said the February IJbl NASA-PCC agreement, 
"the spectrum probably cannot support the very substantial increases in
capacity to satisfy new services...or to satisfy the anticipated expan-
(12} 
sion of ordinary types of services. " v ' The ITT official told the House
space committee in May that he had "little doubt" of the need for satel-
(l 7 )
lite circuits, and a government interagency group reported that month
that existing international channels to many areas would be saturated by 
1965 if satellites were not introduced.^ '
On the other hand, however, it was not just the anticipated increases 
in traffic volumes, but the likelihood that existing techniques could ac- 
commodate them that would be crucial in determining the ultimate require- 
ment for satellites. A 1975 retrospective from a top official of the FCC 
common carrier bureau made that point:
We had a situation in the United States where we had an existing 
good, efficient, low-cost international communications plant, and 
if we never had seen any satellites, we would have today a good, 
efficient, well-designed, well-planned system.. .AT&T would also 
have developed not merely its SG cable [an advanced generation], 
but eventually an SH, SI and SJ cable which would be capable of 
carrying television signals under the ocean. (15)
The carriers' projections of traffic and circuit requirements were disin- 
genuous to the degree that they implied a willingness necessarily to rely 
upon satellite facilities. In December 1963, for example, when AT&T an- 
nounced that if they were available the company would prefer using satel- 
lite to additional cable circuits in 1966-67, AT&T was in fact engaged in 
developing new 720-circuit transistorised cables with around ten times 
the capacity of existing cable designs/ "' In 1967, when AT&T's prefe- 
rence for satellite circuits was to take effect, the company was applying 
for new cable authorisations, warningjthat foreign interests would "move
/ -I r~l \
into the vacuum" if approvals were not given/ '' Indeed, in the first 
five years after operational satellite service commenced, undersea cable
( 1 Q."l 
mileage worldwide trebled/ '
Furthermore, even if cable construction and design had remained 
fixed, it is not clear that the kinds of capacity increments expected 
from satellites were warranted by the anticipated deficiencies in com- 
mercial facilities. While the private carrier industry forecast a re- 
quirement worldwide for 4,650 voice circuits by 1970, a. low-altitude com- 
munications satellite system consisting of perhaps 20 satellites and ?6 
earth stations would make 7,°00 circuits operational; a high-altitude
synchronous system would furnish up to 13,000 circuits or so one analyst
(19)predicted. v " As it happened, by early 1971 satellites with from 4,000
to 6,000 circuits each were being deployed for the global system, helping 
not to remedy circuit scarcity but to increase already grave overcapacity 
in the international network, as is discussed below in Part IV. Hence, 
even if industry projections were accurate, both the likelihood of con- 
tinued cable construction and improvement and the capability of satellites 
to provide channel capacities well in excess of those projections suggest 
that a direct connection between anticipated circuit scarcity and support 
for satellite development is a difficult one to establish.
3. _ THE ?TAT^ 0? THI] ART ATID ITS II'TDU^g^IAL PATHOIIo
The British science fiction writer Arthur C. Glarke is generally acknow- 
ledged as "the father of communications satellites" " owing to his 1945 
article in which he assembled two technical advances arising from the
Second World War German long-range rocketry and the British discovery
(21)
of microwave transmission to prophesy orbiting radio relays. Space- 
borne relays would enable the rich information-carrying ability of micro- 
waves to "be exploited, while their principal disadvantage the fact that 
they travel in straight lines and are unaffected by atmospheric layers
(and would therefore recmire 475~mil e high towers to be conducted across
(22}the Atlantic) would be overcome.- '"' The feasibility of the concept
would require not just continued work on missiles and miniaturised elec- 
trical components but also, as it happened, "fortuitous" developments in 
earth station technology largely derived in the late 1950s through work 
on radio astronomy and radar to provide ermipment capable of capturing
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and amplifying the extremely faint signals from a satellite.' 2 ^'
Although Clarke's contribution was received with "monumental indif- 
ference,"^'' and notwithstanding his prediction that satellite communi- 
cations was a half-century away, scientists in America particularly in 
AT&T's Bell Laboratories and at RCA had begun by the mid-1950s to look 
closely at the practicability of the concept, John Pierce, the Bell en- 
gineer considered one of the pioneers of satellite development, had not 
seen Clarke's piece when he gave his first lecture on the subject in 
1954: "For me, satellite communications was in the air. It was some- 
thing that should be looked into sooner or later."^ ' AT&T later claimed 
that as of 1962, out of a total of $1,400m spent on R&D since 1949, around 
$1,000m had gone to "fields closely pertinent to today's satellite commu- 
nications."^ ' AT&T's attention focussed on development of low altitude 
satellites, which not only seemed most feasible from the point of view of 
launcher capabilities, but obviated an important difficulty associated with 
higher altitude craft the time lag experienced between transmission and 
reception on the ground of a signal relayed by an extremely remote satel- 
lite. That delay, totalling a half second for each direction of a two- 
way communication, was believed to render high-altitude satellites un- 
suited to voice traffic.^ ''
AT&T's misgivings were not however shared by Hughes Aircraft, the 
company that must be accorded pride of place in the development of geo- 
stationary satellites. Hughes was one of the country's leading defence 
manufacturers and indeed the Air Force had in 1953 persuaded the com- 
pany's eccentric founder, Howard Hughes, to remove the firm from his di- 
rect control in order to stop the flight of talented technicians being
(2R)
driven away by intolerable managerial practices. By 1959 Hughes Air- 
craft was suffering from cancellation of some big military contracts, which 
had reduced .the company's backlog of orders from ^750  to ft?00n and left 
it with both the capability and incentive to look for new areas of tech- 
nical activity. Harold Rosen, a young engineer whose military intercep- 
tor project had been cancelled, and who later was credited with leading 
the Hughes effort to develop synchronous satellites, has recalled:
This was a time of rethinking for the company. And the Russians 
launching that Sputnik the previous year was a cause of rethinking 
on my part. We were just generally looking for any other way to 
apply our technology. Among other things we specialised in light- 
weight transmitters and receivers and antennas. (29)
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Rosen's own field of interest was controlling missiles in flight, and 
after he discovered a 1959 article "by Pierce and Rudolf Kompfner the 
inventor of the travelling wave tube he initiated a series of exchanges 
with Bell Labs. While "Kompfner and Pierce had made a tremendous con- 
tribution to communications," Rosen has said, "they were from a communi- 
cations house. Our aerospace experience could match the mechanics to 
the communications."^
The approach Hughes began to develop was conceptually simple and 
technically risky: a satellite placed in precise equatorial orbit at 
an altitude of 23,400 miles would have an orbital velocity equal to the 
earth's rotational speed, and would therefore remain stationary relative 
to the earth's surface. A number of immediate technical obstacles exis- 
ted: insufficiently powerful boosters to lift and position a payload 
one-tenth the distance to the moon, a need for precise station-keeping 
instruments to prevent the satellite from straying from its orbital slot, 
a requirement to stabilise the satellite's attitude to keep solar cells 
pointed toward the sun and antennas directed at the earth. Nevertheless 
Hughes later claimed that the company had an operable design by 1959 
but that it was unable in 1959 an(i 19^0 to interest either the Pentagon 
or NASA in its project. After deciding in March 1960 to invest money 
of its own in further synchronous satellite development, Hughes attempted 
unsuccessfully to interest AT&T, ITT and General Telephone & Electronics 
(GT&E), the country's biggest independent (non-AT&T) domestic phone sys- 
tem. Finally in October 196! GT&E signed a joint agreement with Hughes
( ^2)
to provide a modest $610,000 for further work. v '
Despite Hughes 1 optimism, and in spite of the inherent advantages 
promised by geostationary satellites, the first signs of the concept's 
practicability were inauspicious. A synchronous system would not require 
extensive tracking and telemetry equipment at each earth station, and a 
single antenna would suffice instead of the two or three each terminal 
would need to pick up and lock on to successive satellites. Hence a geo- 
stationary system was estimated by Hughes to cost $200m, as against more 
than $500m for a lower altitude system/ 3 ' Furthermore, if precise sta- 
bilisation could be achieved, greater effective radiating power could be 
obtained from the satellite; for the military, this would enable smaller 
ground stations to be used hence the coveted tactical capability and
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for commercial users, a greater number of channels could be derived from 
a given satellite output.^1 ^' Hughes was developing a method of spin 
stabilisation, whereby the satellite would be de-spun and rotate around 
an axis perpendicular to the orbital plane a notable departure from cur- 
rently tested techniques which relied on the faint differences in gravi- 
tational pull upon two ends of a perpendicular spacecraft/ -*' The Pen- 
tagon had been sufficiently impressed with the synchronous concept to con- 
tract in I960 with Lockheed Aircraft for an experimental geostationary 
system called Advent. It was found, however, that the project "was be- 
yond the state of the art," as the director of the Defence Communications 
Agency later acknowledged, "that we were trying to go too far, too fast." 
^ ' Advent was dropped in 1961, after $170m had been spent and no satel- 
lite had been launched, and principal work on geostationary satellites 
was thereafter based in NASA.^ '' In August 196! the space agency awarded 
Hughes a contract to build an experimental synchronous craft to be launched 
in late 1962, and called Syncom.
4. AT&T AND LOWER ALTITUDE SATELLITES
AT&T had in the meantime been attempting since 1959 to rally support for 
the subsynchronous design it favoured and for the company's suitability 
as institutional keeper of whatever satellite system might be established. 
AT&T (or Bell) first approached NASA in December 1959 with an offer to 
build, own and operate a commercial satellite system with $170m of its 
own funds. The offer was turned down, pending clarification of the rela- 
tionship a commercial system would have to the government's own space 
programmes. Bell then turned to the FCC and in July 1960 submitted 
a plan for a satellite network consisting of 50 satellites in 3,000-mile 
polar orbits, furnishing 600 voice circuits to 13 pairs of ground termi- 
nals. Costs, again estimated at $170m, were to be borne by AT&T a.nd its 
foreign correspondents under yet-to-be determined arrangements. That
proposal was still on file when Bell applied in October for authority
( 39) 
from the FCC to build and operate an experimental satellite. " With ,
a change in Administration imminent, AT&T stepped up its efforts to se- 
cure approval for at least the test satellite/ 4 ' requesting launch 
assistance for the experiment from the outgoing head of NASA in a letter
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in December, but receiving no reply. Nevertheless the PCC on January
19, 1961 issued Bell the experimental licence it sought for a low-altitude
satellite, subsequently launched in July 1962 as Telstar.
AT&T attempted to capitalise upon its Telstar plans by promoting at 
the same time its proposal for a global system consisting of up to 50 
random-orbiting satellites, and attempting to secure the contract for 
the next series of NASA experimental spacecraft. Bell's unilateral re- 
solve doubtless impressed legislators, and during Congressional hearings, 
in the spring of 196! company representatives insisted that it would con- 
tinue to spend the $15m allocated to Telstar irrespective of the final 
disposition of the satellite ownership question. ' AT&T claimed it 
already had put some $25m of its own funds into space R&D, eliciting 
admiring questions like this one from a senator:
But you have already put [the money] in with no prospect of re- 
turn, other than that you want this satellite to be launched so 
that you can improve the communications systems of the people 
of the world? (42)
Administration officials were likewise asked why the government should 
be involved at all in satellite communications, since AT&T was evidently 
willing to proceed with its "own" money^  to which it was replied 
that for a company like Bell its 'own 1 money was inevitably and virtu- 
ally automatically that of the public to which it furnished phone ser- 
vice.^ ' As far as NASA was concerned, the space agency seems to have 
been reluctant to prejudice the ownership discussions by collaborating 
unduly with AT&T's plans, and when the next major contract for an ex- 
perimental subsynchronous series was let in May, the award went to EGA 
and not AT&T partly in order to diversify the government's supply 
sources. (RCA's Relay satellite, launched in December 1962, turned out 
to be a considerably more successful craft than Telstar and set records 
for performance and durability. )^-?-> j^g^ <jid not in fact agree to launch 
Telstar for AT&T until shortly before Kennedy's July 196! policy statement, 
six months after Bell had secured PCC approval for the experiment, and 
NASA officials thereafter insisted that the agency's assistance would not 
provide AT&T with an advantage in any subsequent ownership decisions.^
Bell's advocacy of a low-altitude satellite system injected a tech- 
nological dimension into the debate over ownership. "AT&T," as one
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congressman observed,
has proposed a'low-random-orbit system which would require 
scores of satellites and ground stations in order to obtain 
worldwide coverage. This proposal is made at a time when 
there is general agreement on the ultimate desirability [of 
a synchronous system.] (47)
Representatives of EGA, ITT and GT&E indicated support for a geosta- 
tionary satellite system^ ' , where three satellites would in princi- 
ple be sufficient to furnish global coverage, and in spite of PCC tes- 
timony that the British were worried that high-altitude relays might 
impair communication between London and Australia , GT&E adduced 
studies indicating that time delays of up to two seconds were detected 
by only a small percentage of telephone users. ' The company further 
warned the FOG in a March 196! submission:
The system should not be planned on the basis of currently 
available hardware, nor should easiest, early technical choices 
be permitted to freeze a system concept which precludes or 
makes more difficult the adoption of a much more suitable sys- 
tem at a not much later date. (51)
Hughes Aircraft's chief scientist later asked similarly, "Which of us 
would have won?" if the Soviets created a low-cost geostationary system
after the U.S. had established a random-orbiting network whose high
(52") 
costs made it suited only to high-traffic areas of the world.
Doubts over low-altitude satellites reinforced skepticism as to 
AT&T's intentions in the field, and fears that Bell would use the domi- 
nant ownership role it sought in order to prevent introduction of geo- 
stationary technology and thereby retard development of the system. 
Said one senator:
AT&T wants these vested legal rights now...Then Howard Hughes 
can develop his high-altitude satellite, but he will have to 
deal with the corporation by way of the legal instrument which 
is to be created by the [then-pending] bill. (53)
Bell's preferred system was described as "a lot of junk" by one senator, 
who pointed out that since AT&T would likely be permitted to include its 
satellite investment in its rate base of used and usable facilities, the 
company would still earn a profit, so "they don't have anything to worry 
about."' Furthermore, the high~ccsts of a low-altitude system would 
pose a cost barrier to participation by smaller communications or aero- 
space companies, and it was noted that the single Andover ground station 
built by Bell for Telstar cost some $15m alone, suggesting probable AT&T
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dominance over the system's ground segment as well/"' And ir 
background was Bell's growing investment in undersea cables, which made 
imperative denying the company
the method by which the largest monopoly on earth could get con- 
trol of a potentially competitive system, and the means whereby 
this monopoly could frustrate or prevent the rapid development 
of the system in the event it could not obtain adequate control 
to suit its purposes. (56)
The principal argument in favour of proceeding with a lower alti- 
tude system was the belief in its earlier availability/57) Although 
Hughes representatives insisted that a commercially operable synchro- 
nous system could be in operation within 18 months/-^ ' NASA officials 
testified that it would be at least five years before geostationary 
satellites would be available.^ ?"' Thus, an EGA representative des- 
cribed the possible reason for creating a subsynchronous system as 
essentially non-commercial:
They are principally national prestige reasons. It is important 
for the United States at this juncture to move as quickly as 
possible to a satellite communications system for national pres- 
tige, and I would assume also for military purposes. (60)
An earlier RCA contribution recast the issue in terms of its impact upon 
private industry:
The ultimate advantages of a synchronous satellite system raise a 
practical economic question as to how much should be invested by 
industry in a low altitude commercial system primarily to gain a 
certain amount of time. This is further complicated by the fact 
that the pressures to pay a premium for time are based more on 
national, political and psychological factors than on commercial 
considerations. (6l)
Hence, the principal standard against which technical options would be 
assessed was the national policy of urgent deployment, T^hich ostensibly 
commercial activities i^rere to serve. The precise nature of industry's 
satellite requirements remained ambiguous, but were in the process of 
receiving some clarification as the result of discussions convened by 
the Federal Communications Commission.
5. THE FCG AND CARRIER INDUSTRY SATELLITE CONTROL
The FCC had already, by the beginning of 1961, been promoting a degree 
of space-related activity on the part of the communications carrier in- 
dustry ( ' and indeed by February the industrial climate was deemed 
sufficiently favourable for General Electric to establish a million- 
dollar subsidiary, ComSat Inc., and apply to the Commission for autho-
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risation to create  in cooperation with other interested companies  a 
global satellite system. ^ b ^' It was however the late February agreement 
between the PCC and NASA which legitimated more intensive Commission ef- 
forts to organise the carrier industry for entry into the satellite field, 
While we shall have occasion in the next chapter to recount some of the 
criticisms leveled at the FCC's qualifications to reflate* on a permanent 
"basis space communications, the most striking theme in the early history 
we are about to describe is the essentially symbiotic relationship that 
obtained "between the regulatory agency and the industry that was its pu- 
tative responsibility. This symbiosis pertained not, for the time being, 
to the particular privileges and immunities the PCC would later seek to 
secure for the carrier industry, but to the general appropriateness of 
that industry's central role  to the exclusion of other private claimants 
  in satellite development. Others objected, that airline development
might never have occurred had aviation technology been entrusted to rail-
( ft/i\ 
way owners. The FCC's insistence on the propriety of carrier satellite
control can, however, be in part attributed to the dependence of the Con- 
mission's own role in satellite development upon a dominant carrier indus- 
try role. There was, therefore, a fundamental identity of interest ex- 
pressed in the FCC's and carrier industry's efforts to confine industrial 
participation in the emerging system, since for both sides such exclusion 
would widen the opportunities for respective responsibilities to be exer-
On March 29, 1961, a month after signing the agreement with NASA, 
the FCC opened a docket  or formal inquiry and solicitation of views  on 
the technical, organisational and regulatory Questions pertaining to a 
worldwide satellite system. The Commission's notice of inquiry placed 
these issues within FCC jurisdiction, while acknowledging:
A serious problem is presented as to the manner in which such a 
system can be accommodated within the existing competitive frame- 
work of our international common carrier communications industry 
and vat hi n the antitrust laws. (66)
Among the 10 private respondent organisations, those with interna- 
tional common carrier operations or jsubsidiaries  AT&T, Western Union 
International (WUl), ITT, and RCA  recommended that ownership of the U.S. 
component of the satellite system be in the form of an unincorporated
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joint venture whose participation would Toe limited to international
(68) 
carriers. AT&T argued that satellite operation could best "be
handled if integrated into existing carrier activities, and that the 
model of ad hoc ownership arrangements negotiated for submarine cables 
was appropriate; therefore, "a separate satellite company is not neces- 
sary." ' The two manufacturers with no carrier operations which res- 
ponded, Lockheed Aircraft and General Electric, proposed creation of a 
new corporate entity to be owned by interested companies in the commu- 
nications and aerospace fields/ ' GE nominated its new subsidiary, 
ComSat Inc., as the basis of the new company, and suggested that par- 
ticipating firms be allowed to own no more than between five and ten
(71) percent each of the satellite company's total shares. ' GE admitted
its lack of communications.experience, but pointed out that since 1957
(72) it had produced 350 space vehicles^ ' and argued:
For the first time, a problem has emerged in the communications 
field which requires drawing heavily on the skills of two major 
industries. The space industry and the communications industry 
have to marry. (73)
Lockheed was ready for the ceremony, having by 196! helped build more 
than 85 percent of U.S. payloads successfully orbited;^ ' the company 
proposed a separate ownership consortium consisting of manufacturers
to co-own the satellite system along with a carrier operating consor-
(75) tium. As for GT&E, which with its subsidiary Hawaiian Telephone was
the only strictly domestic communications carrier to submit proposals 
to the docket, participation by all carriers international and domes- 
tic was favoured in the new joint venture, but manufacturers were to be
(76} excluded, as long as sufficient capital could be raised without them.^ '
GT&E's proposal would nevertheless expand the range of potential satel- 
lite system owners to include the 1,800 independent telephone companies
(77) in the U.S. that had no international operations.
In reply, AT&T argued that participation by the domestic carriers 
would be unwarranted since these firms had no experience in international 
arrangements and in handling overseas traffic; besides, GT&E had been 
the only respondent to favour their inclusion in ownership of the satel- 
lite system. More seriously, Bell_ cjiargedjthat participation by manu- 
facturing firms would be "contrary to the public interest" since those 
companies had no operating experience, and their involvement might hinder
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negotiation of arrangements with foreign operators. And notwithstanding 
the fact that only two manufacturers had submitted statements to the 
docket, AT&T contended that since around 60 major companies were then 
engaged in the production of missiles, satellites or related equipment, 
the GE formula "appears designed to vest control in the aerospace group" 
over the eventual organisational arrangements.^' '
The government's contribution to this FGC docket was a submission 
from the Department of Justice, which set forth four conditions deemed 
necessary to satisfy antitrust laws through satellite activities. First, 
"all interested communications common carriers" domestic and interna- 
tional should be permitted to own shares in the system. Second, all 
carriers should be provided access to the system on non-discriminatory 
terms regardless of whether they elected to invest in it. Third, "all 
interested parties engaged in the production and sale of communications 
and related equipment" should be eligible to buy shares in the system. 
Finally, all manufacturers should be given equitable opportunities to
bid on procurement contracts whether or not the companies had invested
(79) in the system. v ' The recommendations were attempts to obviate two
related monopolistic potentials: a restraint of trade in the provision 
of satellite services, which might result from concentrated ownership by 
companies owning competitive (cable) facilities, and which admitting 
domestic carriers was seen as preventing; and a restraint of trade in 
the supply of satellite-related equipment, deriving from the fact that 
RCA and AT&T the latter through its manufacturing subsidiary Western 
Electric, the country's eleventh biggest manufacturer were major elec- 
tronics suppliers, which might be forestalled by permitting investment 
by other manufacturers.
Nevertheless, the FCC regarded the Justice Department submission as 
legal advice and substantially ignored its provisions in the Commission's 
first report on the satellite system, issued on May 24. "Some form of 
joint venture by the international carriers is clearly indicated as best 
serving the public interest," the FCC concluded.
By reason of their experience jLn_and responsibility for furnish- 
ing international communications"services, the international car- 
riers are logically the ones best qualified to determine the na- 
ture and extent of the facilities best suited to their needs and 
those of their foreign correspondents, with whom they have long- 
standing and effective commercial relationships and who necessarily
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vjill have a substantial interest in the operations of any 
satellite system. (80)
To pursue further its preferred approach, the PCC called a meeting of 
the international carriers primarily^ ' AT&T, RCA, ITT and Western 
Union International (WUl) for June 5, a move which according to The 
New York Times "closed the door for the time being on participation by 
the aerospace and communications manufacturing industries." ' The 
conditions upon carrier activity set down at the meeting by the Commis- 
sion skirted the ownership issue and dealt only obliquely with the issues 
the Justice Department's position had attempted to address. All inter- 
national carriers, said the PCC, should be assured equitable access to 
and non-discriminatory use of the satellite system regardless of whether 
they purchased shares in it; no favouritism should be shown to manufac- 
turers which owned or were owned by carriers holding shares in the sys- 
tem. The PCC also said that opportunities for investment participation 
should be extended to foreign telecommunications entities, but that all
such entities that wished to use the system should be permitted access
(P>"\\ 
on equitable terms irrespective of their ownership shares. '
6. THE AD HOC CARRIERS COMMITTEE AND MOUNTING OPPOSITION
Notwithstanding the FCC's efforts, attempts, by the carriers to produce 
a unified and detailed proposal for organisation and ownership of the 
satellite system had hitherto been hindered by the fear that such dis- 
cussions among nominally competitive firms might represent prima facie 
evidence of conspiracy to violate antitrust laws. The PCC decided 
accordingly to organise formally the discussions under its aegis, and 
on July 25 the day after the President's policy statement issued an 
order to the international carriers to "organize promptly" in order "to
speed plans for their joint development, construction, ownership and(Pi c*'\ 
operation of a commercial satellite communications system."^ ' The
Commission voted unanimously to limit participation in the discussions 
to international carriers explicitly rejecting applications to parti- 
cipate by General Electric and GT&E and the first meeting of the new
(86^ 
Ad Hoc Carriers Committee took place on August 3.
A degree of opposition to the apparent direction of PCC policy was 
meanwhile beginning to emerge both within the Administration and, more
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vocally, in Congress. Dissatisfaction from within the government came 
principally from the Justice Department, whose ownership recommendations 
seemed in the process of "being ignored, "but whose criticisms appear none- 
theless to have been tempered by a desire not to impede industrial dis- 
cussions that might prove useful. At the FCC's June 5 carrier meeting, 
the Department's representative cautioned: "As the plan for joint action
is developed we urge that the Commission consider the desirability of ex-/ QJ\
panding the base of ownership of the...system."^ ' ' He was, however, un- 
willing to say whether that advice was based upon law or policy, suggesting 
it was both, and he added that it was still possible that the Department's 
antitrust division might approve even a restricted ownership plan, thus 
obviating the need for specific legislation.^ '
A similar ambiguity characterised congressional testimony by Justice 
Department officials in July and August. The chief of the antitrust divi- 
sion Lee Loevinger explained the rationale for widely based industrial 
ownership in a comment on AT&T's Telstar project: "There are more billions 
of public money invested in the development of that missile than AT&T will 
be paying millions for the specific costs" of using it. Loevinger 
described the Department's position on ownership, as submitted to the FCC 
in May, as "a little too doctrinaire," and suggested that provisions to 
prevent domination of the venture by any one company might suffice to 
satisfy antitrust laws. Asked whether the Ad Hoc Committee's compo- 
sition was prejudicial to ,the interests of domestic carriers and manufac- 
turers,, the antitrust chief replied, "Well, it certainly does not help
them," although: "I think that it does not preclude the adoption of a
(91)plan for a broader based ownership."V7 ' The legal situation might, how- 
ever, change if the Ad Hoc Committee became "the blueprint for a perma-
(92) 
nent consortium to operate a commercial system." v In House testimony
a fev; weeks later, Assistant Attorney General N. Katzenbach explained
that the Department was not "insisting" that its original ownership guide-
(93) lines be met, but was rather "urging" that they be adopted. w '
Both the head of NASA and the FCC chairman, under congressional 
questioning, staunchly defended the Ad Hoc Committee approach, although 
they did so in contradictory ways one claiming the group's composition 
was wise because it reflected the form in which the satellite system was 
likely to be organised, the other maintaining that the Committee's
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exclusiveness was momentarily prudent "but not necessarily related to 
the system's eventual ownership. According to NASA chief James Webb:
My own view is that you will get further if you begin to get 
the operating entity into a form where it can organize and 
be prepared to make the important decisions. (94)
For PCC Chairman Newton Minow, hox^rever, "nothing is foreclosed"^"-3 ' in 
regard to widening industrial participation, and manufacturers were kept 
out of the Ad Hoc Committee solely in order to expedite deliberations 
and to ensure a manageably small group.'° ' Minow did acknowledge though 
that only three manufacturers Lockheed, GE and GT&E, the last of which
was itself a domestic carrier had actually expressed interested in par 
(97)ticipating, w ' and the PCC chairman had trouble explaining why an inter- 
national carrier like the South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. could have been 
judged qualified to join in the discussions while firms with proven 
aerospace expertise like Lockheed, Westinghouse, Bendix, Hughes, GT&E 
and GE were not. Minow replied that the requirements of manufacturers 
would still be satisfied through rules guaranteeing procurement through 
competitive bidding, ' thereby ignoring the thrust of the question. 
The PCC further sought to allay fears that the Ad Hoc Committee 
would serve as a preliminary step toward AT&T domination of the satel- 
lite venture. Commissioner Craven testified in July, "I want to assure
this committee it is the absolute intention of the Commission to insure
(99) 
that there will be no dominance of any one party in a joint venture,"
adding:
We will not approve a plan where there is domination by AT&T. 
I know there are several ways in which a combine can be ope- 
rated without voting domination by the majority stockholder, 
(100)
a statement interesting for its implication that the PCC already was 
looking ahead to the probable distribution of satellite ownership. In 
all, the Commission was optimistic that events would continue to pro- 
ceed smoothly under its auspices, and consequently that an industrial 
organisation managed administratively rather than mandated legisla- 
tively would be sufficient to produce a satellite system.^
Notwithstanding those as sura-nines-,-the Commission's apparent deter- 
mination to rely upon a limited number of" private firms all arguably 
under the shadow of AT&T was giving rise to discontent on Capitol Hill.
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The desirability of authorising the government to develop and own for 
the foreseeable future, if not indefinitely the satellite system was 
raised several times during July and August; ' and on August 24 a 
group of 33 legislators, led by Senate Majority Whip Hubert Humphrey, 
sent a letter to the President urging a deferral of organisational de- 
cisions until after the system itself had become operational. The tech- 
nology, they wrote, was still untried and the system's ultimate design 
uncertain; technical development and refinement should therefore be 
kept separate from issues of ownership during an interim period, while 
satellite activities remained in government hands.
After such a system has become fully operational, but not until 
then, can decisions be intelligently made as to whether such a 
system should be publicly or privately owned and under what cir- 
cumstances. (103)
If however it was decided to continue trying to devise private organi- 
sational arrangements, the letter's signatories saw "no justification" 
for excluding aerospace and electronics companies; concern was expressed 
about the possible extension of AT&T's "monopoly position" into the new 
field.
Only by insisting upon the widest possible participation by all 
interested communications and aerospace manufacturers and opera- 
tors can there be any hope that such a monopoly can be forestalled... 
(104)
Similar views were expressed in the report of the House space committee, 
whose satellite hearings had lasted from May through August. "Government 
must retain maximum flexibility regarding the central question of owner- 
ship and operation of the system," the committee concluded. "No final 
decision should be made during the early stages of development which 
might'prejudice the public interest or U.S. international relations." 
The possible damage to foreign relations, interestingly, was associated 
with private satellite ownership: "Although profitable operation is a 
legitimate goal of the free enterprise system, the appearance of American 
exploitation simply for profits must be avoided..."^
The response to these concerns took the form of stressing the urgency 
of continued satellite activities and linking their success to swift re- 
solution of organisational matters; Industry had previously criticised 
suggestions that technical and organisational arrangements could be sepa- 
rated' in May a GT&E vice president had told the House space committee
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that "any delay in the resolution of the question of ownership...will 
substantially delay the establishment "by this country of a common car- 
rier satellite communications system and prejudice its leadership in 
this field."^ ' The connections between the two spheres remained, 
however, better asserted than explained. Formal creation of a private 
satellite entity, it was said, would provide a focal point for further 
R&D/ ' although there was little question that NASA would remain 
central to technical activities and the space agency's head insisted 
that such work would not be hindered by ownership indecisions. ' 
Firm ownership decisions were also claimed to be necessary to provide 
assurances abroad as to U.S. intentions in the satellite field, and 
ultimately to forestall development of other satellite systems^- ' 
—although the incompatibility of those objectives with continued state 
control was never elaborated. Nevertheless, the White House reply to 
the August 24 letter from legislators reiterated the belief in a close 
relationship between technical success and organisational resolution:
It is not possible, if we are to move swiftly, to delay deci- 
sions as to ownership and control under after the entire sys- 
tem becomes operational. The development of a fully operational 
system will probably require a decade or more...(ill)
The apparent illogic of insisting that provision be made immediately for 
ownership of a system that would not be fully operational for another 
decade seems explicable primarily in terms of a resolute and poorly 
differentiated urgency attached to virtually all aspects of the satel- 
lite issue an urgency moreover that could not help but work to the 
advantage of the most effectively mobilised private aspirants in the 
field.
7. THE INTERNATIONAL CARRIERS' PROPOSALS
On October 12 the Ad Hoc Carriers Committee issued its report, calling 
for creation of a non-profit satellite corporation to own and operate 
the U.S. portion of the international system. The new corporation would 
be owned exclusively by the U.S. international carriers; each company 
that bought shares would have two seats on its board of directors, the 
president of the United States would appoint three directors, and an
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additional director would represent those carriers which although using 
the system had not "bought, shares in it. The corporation's property would 
consist solely of the satellite system's space segment; carriers could 
build and operate, individually or jointly, earth stations for use with 
the space segment, or they could lease ground facilities. Little was said 
of the ultimate form the international system would take, except that it 
would be run according to principles of equitable access and non-discrimi- 
natory use for foreign participants, regardless of whether they purchased 
stock, and that the international system would be owned in undivided 
shares i.e. irrespective of which specific satellites a particular na- 
tion required, whatever shares it bought would represent parts of an aggre- 
gate total space segment investment. '
The provision that the new satellite corporation would be 'non-profit 1 
appears curious, but in fact had no substantive meaning because carrier 
investments in the company would, according to the recommendations, be 
eligible for inclusion in the carriers' respective rate bases. Hence 
satellite investments would be treated no differently from the companies' 
other holdings of 'used and usable' facilities, and would entitle the 
carriers to the same administered rate of return they were guaranteed on 
other assets; they could therefore adjust other international tariffs 
to ensure recovery of their satellite corporation outlays. As a Senate 
report observed:
If ownership of a 'common carriers' common carrier' were to be 
restricted to the using carriers the distinction between 'non- 
profit' and 'profit-seeking' would appear to be of little con- 
sequence. (113)
Moreover, the new satellite corporation would not in itself have to earn 
profits in order to make money for its owners nor would it even have to 
recover its costs, since the carriers' satellite holdings would be guar- 
anteed in any event.
Virtually risk-free investment was not the only inducement to car- 
rier financial participation in the satellite corporation, since the fu- 
ture business volume from satellite services was being forecast as con- 
siderable. Although General Electric had, when it was trying to inte- 
rest the FCC in its ComSat Inc...subsidiary,..predicted $30m per year in 
profits from satellite operations by 1970/ 4 ' the Ad Hoc Committee had 
heard testimony from a member of the National Academy of Science that
-101-
global satellites revenues might total $100, 000m annually by the 1970- 
75 period;^ ^' th<3 head of NASA likewise had spoken of fplOO,000 to
$200, 000m by 1980.
In spite of the apparent financial attractiveness of satellite in- 
vestment, the carriers did not immediately indicate great interest in 
putting money into their own plan. In the committee's report, AT&T 
pledged $65m, but only four of the other seven committed themselves to 
investing at all, and the total pledged by the carriers wa,s less than 
$78m. It was not yet known how much the system would cost, but estimates 
ranged from $4 5m to as much as $500m. ^ '' The carriers appear to have 
been unwilling to commit themselves further to the satellite venture un- 
til precise organisational arrangements were decided,^ ' and the con- 
sequences of a shortfall in capital subscription were not clear. The 
prospect might argue for elimination of any limits on the maximum holdings 
any one firm could purchase in the satellite corporation, thereby favour- 
ing further concentration of control; it might also suggest, however, 
that the ownership base should be widened  to admit investment from domes- 
tic carriers and manufacturers  to ensure that enough capital would be 
raised,^ ' Notwithstanding that ambiguity, the immediate tactical con- 
sequence was to retain for the carriers an important source of leverage 
over further determinations concerning satellite organisation.
The Ad Hoc Committee report attracted little response from industry, 
and only two companies filed formal replies with .the" FCC. GT&E, although 
generally favourable, reiterated its position that domestic carriers be 
permitted to co-own the new corporation; and, citing its own work on 
synchronous satellite components, the company urged that any final deci- 
sion on the system's design be deferred until more was known about high- 
altitude satellites. Hughes Aircraft opposed the main thrust of the re- 
port, and suggested that a new independent public stock company be formed 
instead 'of a carriers consortium. Both companies agreed that earth sta- 
tions and satellites should be owned by the same entity, rather than 
leaving to the carriers the construction and operation of the ground fa- 
cilities.^ ' Of apparent concern to GT&E and Hughes was the possibility 
that AT&T  and to a lesser degree RCA  might use its influence within the 
new corporation to favour manufacturing subsidiaries with contracts.
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In Congress and the Administration, the Ad Hoc Committee report 
confirmed and justified the opposition to allowing the PCC to handle 
satellite communications administratively through informal cooperation 
among the carriers. The monopoly subcommittee of the Senate small "busi- 
ness committee, which had already held hearings on antitrust aspects of 
satellite communications, re-opened hearings in early November; its 
chairman, Sen. Russell Long, denounced the carriers' plan as a disguise 
for AT&T domination and charged that the report "does not benefit the 
people. In fact it does just the opposite."^ ' The prestigious liber- 
al pressure group, Americans for Democratic Action, similarly declared 
the report "totally unacceptable" and announced support for government 
satellite ownership. *  *' During the hearings it became evident that 
the Kennedy Administration was not satisfied with the carriers' propo- 
sals; Justice Department antitrust chief Loevinger spok<5 of the need 
for a decision "at at least cabinet level" and since the report was 
"not adequate" in view of the Administration's preferred ownership 
approach, "legislation might be desirable."^ ' Although the PCC 
chairman tried to meet criticisms by announcing that the Commission 
was considering formation of an ad hoc manufacturers committee to sup- 
plement the carriers' position, the White House ordered the inter- 
departmental group under NASC Executive Secretary Edward Welsh which had 
prepared Kennedy's July policy statement to reconvene and draft legisla- 
tive proposals. In spite of an early and short-lived resurgence of inte- 
rest in the government ownership option on the part of Welsh and Justice 
Department representatives, the group's efforts soon became focussed on 
preparing a White House satellite bill to dilute carrier control through 
widely-based private ownership.^ '
Notwithstanding continued FCC support, the emergent shift in location 
of discussions to Congress obliged the carriers to seek their own channel 
into the legislative process, which they found in the person of Robert 
Kerr, chairman of the Senate space committee, a wealthy and powerful sena- 
tor who was a confidant of Vice President Johnson and a former business 
associate of NASA chief James Webb.J_ '' On November 28 Kerr announced 
he would file a bill providing for-private-satellite system ovmership when 
Congress reconvened in January. "Congress can," he said,
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by enacting legislation during 1962, set the stage for the first 
dramatic worldwide distribution of a consumer product directly 
resulting from the space research and development of U.S. scien- 
tists, engineers and technicians. (128)
Advance reports in the trade press suggested that Kerr's proposal "fol- 
lows closely" the lines of the Ad Hoc Carriers Committee recommendations. 
(129)
Meanwhile however reports circulated on the Administration's deter- 
mination to take policy and planning authority away from the PCC "by pro- 
posing its own legislation.^ ' In his State of the Union Message to 
Congress on January 11, 1962 the President said he would soon send a 
White House satellite bill to Capitol Hill, and on February 7 he did so.
Those two legislative initiatives, accompanied by an increasingly 
vocal opposition to the private satellite ownership proposed by both, 
provided the terms of the ensuing battle over the Communications Satel- 
lite Act of 1962.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The carrier industry moved skillfully under FCC auspices throughout 
to exploit the vagueness of the government's commitment reaffirmed by 
the Kennedy Administration to private satellite ownership. Industry 
successfully forced the pace of policy definition: the carriers were 
first to prepare a 'definite ownership plan, and first to have their po- 
sition translated into a legislative proposal. Moreover, the carriers' 
leading policy role reinforced the propriety of the central and exclu- 
sive organisational role they sought in the satellite communications 
system. Subsequent opposition to the carriers' plan from the White 
House and within Congress would therefore be obliged to acknowledge 
the success of carrier actions in pre-defining the scope permitted to 
further policy modifications and in pre-empting prerogatives notionally 
belonging to the state.
CHAPTER FIVE: PASSAGE OP THE 1962 COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE ACT
1.. OVERVIEW
The legislative battle over the Comsat Act was apparently a three-way 
contest among the carrier industry's congressional allies, the White 
House and dissident Democrats primarily in the Senate. Industry sup- 
porters favoured Sen. Robert Kerr's satellite "bill and creation of a 
satellite corporation wholly owned "by the carriers and operated subject 
to PCC regulation. The Administration bill provided for a corporation 
owned partly and perhaps predominantly by the carriers, but with some 
provision for non-industry investors and substantially stronger govern- 
ment oversight than allowed for in the Kerr bill. A small group of lib- 
eral Democrats opposed both private ownership schemes and wanted the 
government to establish its own satellite agency to develop, own and run 
the system. By late March 1962 however a compromise between the White 
House and Kerr versions was fashioned which retained for the carriers 
voting control over the new corporation while eliminating some of the 
more objectionable features of industry proposals. The government 
ownership faction was left to wage an increasingly isolated and finally 
unsuccessful struggle against what they considered a scandalous give- 
away of a publicly-developed and enormously valuable technology.
In the final analysis, negotiation over the bills was believed to 
concern ultimate control over the satellite system. The Administration's 
response to the Kerr version, which made clear that control would rest 
with the carrier industry subject only to PCC regulation of uncertain 
effectiveness, was three-fold: widening the base of industrial control 
by hinting at possible antitrust action if opportunities for co-ownership 
were not widened; making corresponding provision for representation of 
non-carrier interests on the new company's board of directors; and 
urging inclusion of a variety of governmental levers upon the corpora- 
tion's policy-making procedures NASA consent on technical matters, State 
Department supervision of international negotiations, and final presidential
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discretion over company actions believed to impinge upon state policies. 
Although the critique of carrier control advanced by Administration 
spokesmen to support their desire for greater safeguards than those con- 
tained in the Kerr bill coincided in important respects with the criticisms 
put forth by the government ownership faction in the Senate, the White 
House was restrained in part by a wish to improve its poor legislative 
record from developing the anti-carrier position to the point where the 
possibility of compromise would be harmed and the eventual passage of a 
satellite bill jeopardised. The field was regarded by July 1962 as offer- 
ing "one of the few remaining possibilities for an administration victory 
on Capitol Hill,"^ ' and legislative elections would be held in November. 
The July launch of AT&T's Telstar increased the impatience of some legis- 
lators with the Administration's efforts to introduce anti-carrier safe- 
guards, and raised the possibility that the propriety or necessity of
(2\
continued government involvement in the field might be questioned, v '
since business had demonstrated an independent capability..'. Furthermore, 
the White House had to consider the importance of Sen. Kerr, the car- 
riers' chief Senate ally, to the future of its legislative programme. 
As one senator later observed:
This was a Bob Kerr deal.,all the way. Bob ran some important com- 
mittees and Jack Kennedy couldn't afford to offend him if he ex- 
pected to get any Wew Frontier legislation through a Senate that 
was wobbly in the first place. The feeling at the time was that 
the President made a list of priorities and decided that satellites 
weren't as important as some other things, such as Medicare. (3)
The Administration therefore entered the legislative fray with signifi- 
cant disadvantages: its legislative ambitions obliged cooperation with 
Sen. Kerr and industry's other allies; its commitment to private owner- 
ship prevented use of the Senate dissidents as negotiating leverage 
against the pro-carrier forces by securing unified support for greater 
statutory safeguards; and its own insistence on urgent resolution of 
ownership issues implied compromise wherever necessary to ensure expedi- 
tion.
Industry showed few corresponding inhibitions. One congressman de- 
clared in March 1962 that "AT&T has been boldly picketing the halls of 
Congress advancing the argument that the communications companies should 
be the sole beneficiaries of the communications satellite system,"^ ' and 
a senator described in June "a lobbying activity the likes of which the
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Congress has never seen before."' Standing behind the carriers' 
efforts was a larger recognition within business leadership that a 
private ownership decision in regard to satellites could set a favour- 
able precedent for future private activities in space, as Business Week 
magazine observed:
The final decision on whether government or business shall ope- 
rate the communications system will set a pattern for future com- 
mercial space activities, such as freight shipment by rocket. (6)
The carriers were in this respect the vanguard for the private exploi- 
tation of a realm whose eventual economic potential was. incalculable.
What is, however, most striking in the legislative debates we shall 
now describe is the way in which formalistic conerns predominated: tech- 
nological control was accepted as reducible to ownership as, admittedly, 
conditioned by the various mechanisms for continuing state oversight that 
could formally be inserted into the new corporation. Scant attention was 
paid to the commercial context into which satellite operations would be 
introduced, where the new corporation's reliance on its carrier competi- 
tors would be so great that the precise internal arrangements adopted 
for the satellite company and the elaborate checks and balances among 
carrier interests, public shareholders' interests and governmental influ- 
ence would be of little consequence in comparison. The emphasis on or- 
ganisational subtleties served, in effect, to obscure the real problems 
posed by the satellite system's commercial operation amidst powerful rivals 
which would have the means and incentive to hinder its development, irres- 
pective of their presence on the satellite company's board of directors 
or the size of their shareholdings.
2. TEE KERR AND WHITE HOUSE SATELLITE BILLS
(7) 
There was, a Senate staff analysis found, "little substantial conflict"^
between the proposals of the Ad Hoc Carriers Committee and the satellite 
bill introduced in January 1962 by Sen. Robert Kerr. A closed corpora- 
tion, wholly owned by the carrier industry, would undertake U.S. commer- 
cial satellite development, serving exclusively as a "carriers' carrier" 
and leasing overseas circuits to the carriers for subsequent retailing to 
ultimate users. The Kerr bill introduced several changes, however, in
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regard to the new corporation's mode of financial operation, the extent 
of its properties, composition of its "board of directors and ownership. 
The company was to Toe profit-seeking in the Kerr version, although car- 
rier holdings would still be counted in their rate bases. It would also 
own and operate all U.S. earth facilities as well as an undefined por- 
tion of the international space segment, instead of leaving to individual 
carriers the American ground stations. There would "be no government- 
appointed directors sitting on its "board, as the carriers had proposed. 
And Kerr left to the PCC the task of deciding precisely which carriers 
would be entitled to co-own the corporation: the Ad Hoc Committee had 
recommended limiting ownership to those companies "authorized by the Com- 
mission to provide communications services by satellites" thus narrowing 
eligibility to satellite users, in practice the international carriers  
while the Kerr bill said only that the company's ovmers would be "U.S. 
communications common carriers who are determined by the Commission to 
be eligible to participate in such ownership." Kerr also detailed the 
means of financial participation, a single class of five thousand $100,000 
shares totalling $500m/ 8 '
A letter from the President accompanying the text of the White House 
bill stated that the satellite field "by nature, is essentially private
enterprise in character but of vital importance to both our national and
(9") international interests and policies." v To enable the government to
oversee its interests, the State Department was empowered to "conduct or 
supervise" negotiations with foreign countries, and the president was 
given wide powers to "plan, develop and supervise the execution of a 
national program" in the commercial satellite field.^ ' Like the Kerr 
bill, the Administration version would permit the new corporation to 
build, own and operate all U.S. earth facilities.
The main difference between the two bills lay in the degree of for- 
mal control the carrier industry would be entitled to exercise through 
ownership of shares in the new corporation. The White House bill sought 
to dilute carrier control by diversifying the sources of capital for the 
venture: 100,000 shares of Class A stock, at $1,000 each, would be sold 
as dividend-paying, voting shares to individuals or corporations; 10,000 
shares of Class B stock, providing neither dividends nor votes but eligible 
for inclusion in the rate bases of international carriers would be issued 
at a price to be determined later. ^ Il ' The introduction of two categories
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of stock seems to have "been a White House innovation, decided upon without
f ]_2^ 
consulting industry/ ' Assistant Attorney General Katzenbach explained:
The Administration is convinced that those who have paid the 
taxes should in all fairness have equal opportunities to in- 
vest in and profit from the system, and that the system should 
not "be turned over to a favored few. (13)
Nevertheless, it was considered likely that the carriers would still pre- 
dominate in the satellite corporation's ownership, since they would have 
exclusive access to the Class B stock and would not "be "barred from "buying 
Class A dividend-paying shares. Hence, said Katzenbach, "under these cir- 
cumstances the administration proposal would result in substantially the 
organizational form proposed by [the Kerr bill], and supported by the 
telephone companies."
Reaction from industry to the White House proposals was restrained. 
While AT&T President E.J. McNeely said the company was "pleased" with 
Kennedy's re-endorsement of private ownership, it remained nonetheless 
"hopeful" that the carriers would be permitted to build, own and operate 
earth stations for the system.^  ? ' Another Bell official however deplored 
the "proliferation of governmental supervision" contained in the Adminis- 
tration version, and said AT&T was fully confident that the government's 
legitimate interests could be protected by the PCC alone.^ '
Notwithstanding the similarities in the two versions due in part
to the fact that both were drafted within the Administration, suggesting
(17) 
that they reflected differences of opinion within the Executive Branchx '
—a concerted effort to reconcile discrepancies was required, especially 
since hearings on the Kerr bill were scheduled to begin on February 26. 
The trade press predicted "an ultimate combination of both in a way aimed
/ -, Q\
at satisfying the members of the Ad Hoc Committee,"^ ' Kerr agreed to 
co-sponsor the White House bill in return for having it assigned to the 
Senate space committee, which he chaired, thereby enabling Kerr to oversee 
consolidation of the two versions.
3. THE COMPROMISE BILL EMERGES
During hearings in early March the FCC led the attack on the White House 
bill reiterating support for the ownership provisions of the Kerr bill 
and terming the Administration version "impracticable." Commission
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Chairman Newton Minow argued that non-carrier investors would, unlike the 
carriers, seek to maximise immediate financial return from their satel- 
lite holdings and would therefore try to keep tariffs high to ensure div-
(19)idends.^ The Administration "bill would produce lower satellite utili- 
sation, whereas carrier ownership would "expedite maximum use of the sys- 
tem on a worldwide scale. "*  ' Minow did propose providing for "class" 
representation on the corporation's board for domestic communications 
carriers not, however, because their routine activities would be indis- 
pensable to ensure overseas service nationally, but because "it is con- 
ceivable that the system may eventually be used for domestic purposes."^1 ' 
The PCC also criticised provisions in both Unite House and Kerr bills to
give responsibility for earth stations to the satellite company, and asked
(22} 
for ownership of ground facilities to be left to FCG discretion. v '
Representatives.'.of AT&T and ITT agreed with the Commission position
on earth station ownership, and furthermore declared themselves opposed
(2V)
to sales of stock to the general investing public. ' An ITT vice presi- 
dent noted the high risk of satellite investment and the long delays con- 
sidered likely before dividends would be paid,^ ' and also argued that if 
the corporation owned properties abroad small investors might eventually
find themselves obliged to suffer losses from expropriation by nationalist
(2<\ 
regimes. Hughes Aircraft and NASA expressed support for integrated
ownership of space and earth facilities by the coruoration, in order to
(26} 
ensure coordinated technical development. ~ '
The Senate space committee was known to prefer its chairman's bill
(27) 
over that of the White House, ' and the so-called compromise version
approved unanimously by the committee on March 28 reflected the preference, 
although Administration representatives had participated in the final 
negotiations and said they were satisfied. Gone were the provision for 
non-voting carrier stock, the corporation's franchise over U.S. ground 
facilities and the enhanced presidential and State Departmert oversight. 
A single class of voting stock would be divided evenly between the car- 
riers and the general investing public; the carriers' holdings would not be 
included in their rate bases for international services, but the new cor- 
poration would be authorised to issue non-voting securities which, if pur- 
chased by carriers, would be eligible for rate base inclusion.^ (Pro- 
vision for these so-called Type II securities was intended to lower the
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cost of borrowing to the satellite corporation since, in principle, they 
could be offered even at a zero rate of return and still be financially 
attractive to the carriers, who could raise tariffs on other services to 
assure themselves the same return they were guaranteed on their other 
assets.)^ The price of the corporation's equity, which had not pre-
viously been fixed, was set at $100 per share and later cut to $20.
Provision for those Type II non-voting securities, likely to be of 
interest solely to the international carriers, is important because it 
offers a clue as to why the corporation's equity was not to be eligible 
for inclusion in the carriers' rate bases  as it had been in both the 
Kerr and White House bills. Kennedy had previously justified rate base 
inclusion as the principal advantage to be gained from permitting the 
carriers to co-own the satellite corporation at all: high initial costs 
could be dispersed over other carrier operations and customers of inter- 
national services could in effect be taxed through higher charges to com- 
pensate the carriers for early satellite losses. ' Kerr now explained 
that if the carriers could not count on an assured return from their
satellite stock, they would be obliged to "see to it that the corporation
(32) 
operates at a prof it. " v ' A more convincing explanation as to why the
carriers agreed  as the absence of industry protest suggests  to elimina- 
tion of a provision that was unquestionably to their advantage lies in 
creation of the Type II securities, favourable resolution of the earth 
station ownership question and the probability that the total cost of 
the space segment would be insufficient to require large-scale industry 
investment. The equity issue itself was believed by some to prove inade- 
quate to capitalising the corporation, partly because the venture's risks 
would discourage investors and partly because ultimate costs were unknown; 
consequently the non-voting securities offered to the carriers might end 
up comprising a predominant part of the company's capital. ^  *' Furthermore, 
the compromise bill stated that the FCC should "encourage" ownership and 
operation of UVS. by the international carriers; this was subsequently 
contested by Administration officials and changed to give the PCC discre- 
tion without implying legislative 'intent.^ ' For the moment however, 
since it was considered probable that foreign participants i-rould want 
opportunities to invest in the space segment  thus reducing the total 
American stake to perhaps "less than half," as an AT&T official predicted 
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support for carrier earth station ownership promised a considerably 
"bigger increment to the companies' rate bases than would be lost through 
excluding holdings in satellite corporation equity. (The ground facili- 
ties furthermore would entitle the carriers to operating revenues besides.)
The compromise version reinstituted government representation on the 
new company's board of directors as originally proposed by the Ad Hoc 
Committee report and dropped in the Kerr bill. The board would consist 
of three directors appointed by the president, six elected by non-carrier 
stockholders and six chosen by the carriers in proportion to their respec- 
tive holdings. This apparent plurality of constituencies was essential 
to the Administration's attempt to obviate antitrust problems, as a Jus- 
tice Department official testified in April:
.,.[w]hat we are doing is trying to achieve many of the benefits 
and objectives of competition by virtue of the automatic opera- 
tion of the company through its internal structure. And we be- 
lieve that automatic operation in general is to be preferred to 
an attempt to secure economic performance by Government regula- 
tion. (36)
Similarly, Attorney General Robert Kennedy explained that "the possibility 
of domination by this single large corporation [AT&T], through its supe- 
rior financial resources, is virtually inevitable unless we open the cor-
(37) 
poration to investment by the general public." v '
Aside from the reintroduction of presidential appointees on the cor- 
porate board, the compromise bill reduced the government's opportunities 
for overseeing company activities. In regard to international negotia- 
tions, instead of submitting to State Department supervision the corpora- 
tion would now have to inform the Department in advance of any such under- 
takings and receive advice. State Department officials had conceded that
f ^R) 
the pertinent section of the White House bill "could be revised,"^ and
the Senate space committee subsequently reported:
While it [the committee] recognized the essential role of the 
Department of State in matters affecting foreign policy, it 
felt the corporation's business negotiations with foreign en- 
tities, as such, are not in that category. (39)
Similarly, the president's power to provide "general supervision" over 
international negotiations was changed to "such supervision...as may be 
appropriate to assure that such relationships shall be consistent with 
the national interest and foreign policy..."^ 4° ; As to overall presidential
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authority over the corporation, while the White House bill empowered the 
president to "plan, develop and supervise" the national programme the com- 
pany was to serve, the compromise version amended this to "aid in the deve- 
lopment and foster the execution" of the policy.'41 )
Although AT&T spokesmen maintained the company still supported the Ad 
Hoc Committee's recommendations, Bell was said to be particularly pleased 
with two features of the Senate space committee's compromise version: the 
recognition of the adequacy of PCC regulation, as signalled by the weaken- 
ing of other governmental influences; and the decision not to assign 
earth station ownership exclusively to the new corporation. '
4. THE OPPOSITION CASE
While the mainstream of the legislative process continued through hearings 
on what was now called the 'amended Administration bill' in the House and 
Senate commerce committees, a small and colourful coalition of liberal 
Democrats informally led by Sen. Estes Kefauver^ ' had begun organising 
in the face of opposition from their party's leadership in the White House 
and Congress to block the existing proposals.^ ' Their aim was either 
to get their own legislation authorising state ownership of the satellite 
system passed, or to prevent congressional action from being taken in 
which case satellites would by default remain' in government hands for the 
time being. As the prospects for approval of state ownership became more 
remote, the dissidents pressed for eliminating carrier holdings in the 
satellite corporation; as that became increasingly unlikely, they urged 
enhanced provision for government oversight, and when that failed they 
resorted to filibuster to keep Congress from acting until they could mobi- 
lise greater public support behind their opposition.
Introduction of the White House bill had done little to mitigate the 
liberals' discontent with the Kerr version. "Two plans have been submit- 
ted to Congress which propose the establishment of a private monopoly," 
said Sen, Ralph Yarborough. "They differ somewhat in detail. They are 
essentially the same in the term oinHtimate consequences."^5 ' in late 
February Kefauver introduced his own bill to create a Communications Satel- 
lite Authority empowered to "acquire, own and operate as an agent of the
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United States Government" "both the American portion of the global space 
segment and all domestic ground facilities. The Authority would be run 
by a nine-member governing board: four named by the president among 
them representatives of the State Department, NASA and the FGC and five 
private citizens also appointed by the president but subject to Senate 
confirmation. The carriers would be nothing but customers of the Author- 
ity, and perhaps equipment suppliers. ' The set-up was likened to the 
Federal Reserve Board which, observed Sen. Long, had never "been accused 
of being socialistic as a group"^ 4 ''' and to the Tennessee Valley Author- 
ity (TVA), a successful New Deal project that had revitalised an impov- 
erished region of the southeastern U.S. "The interesting thing," said 
Sen. Morse,
is that the TVA's, and the McNary's and Dalles' and Grand Coulee's 
and all the great multiple-purpose dams that we have developed 
have been great incentives to the development of private enter- 
prise within the economic environment of those great publicly 
owned facilities. (48)
Since the government was in any event the "backbone" of the satellite
communications programme, according to Sen. Kefauver who adduced a (49) 
figure of $470m spent by the government since 1959 on related fields 
there was
no reason why we should hasten to open a Pandora's box of dif- 
ficulties by establishing a private monopoly which will merge 
competing enterprises under the domination of AT&T. (50)
Such an action would be "shocking and unconscionable," and would "con- 
stitute the biggest giveaway in the history of the United States," as
(51) Sen. Yarborough said. x '
The compromise bill only stiffened the resolve of the dissidents, 
since it was seen as essentially a reincarnation of the Ad Hoc Commit- 
tee's recommendations: voting weights would largely be determined by 
carrier usage, earth stations would probably be owned by the carriers,
central oversight power was to be vested in the FCC and supervision by
(52) 
the president and State Department would be curtailed. v Carrier
ownership participation had to be eliminated, the opposition claimed, 
and the Administration's attempt to reduce carrier control by widening 
the corporation's ownership base would do little more than make carrier 
domination more likely: "[T]he more widespread the ownership," said 
Sen. Morse, "the smaller percentage is necessary to dominate it. Only
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five percent would be needed."' 53 ' Interestingly, the possibility that 
the carriers would be able to exercise considerable control over the sys- 
tem without owning any stock was raised by Administration supporters of 
the compromise bill to argue for the unimportance of the concern over 
shareholdings. In a July letter to the Senate majority leader, Katzen- 
bach wrote of the carriers: "Either they will dominate the system through 
ownership...or under a government-owned system they will dominate it 
through contract," since they had the personnel, expertise, traffic and 
general capability to stamp their requirements on the system. ^^'
The record and inclinations of the FCC were subject to special vili- 
fication by the opposition, particularly since the adequacy of the Com- 
mission's regulation of the carrier industry was a cornerstone of the 
compromise bill. The FCC was blamed as "the originator of this whole 
idea of turning this matter of international satellite communications 
over to a monopolistic combine. "^^' Dallas Smythe, formerly FCC chief 
economist, testified before the Kefauver antitrust subcommittee:
...[The FCC] has been and is using its public role to foster the 
interests of the communications common carrier companies, especially 
those of the Bell System, in their efforts to obtain a private mono- 
poly... [A] shellgame is being played on the rest of the administra- 
tion, the Congress and the American public in which the alleged 
'regulation' which the FCC is said to practice on the companies is 
the shell beneath which lies private monopoly. (56)
The results of a 1959 House investigation of FCC regulation were recalled; 
the Commission had, by permitting AT&T an excessive rate of return on 
domestic telephone service, presided over Bell's accumulation of $985m 
in excess revenues over a seven-year period. The subcommittee reported 
that FCC actions "reflect a singular receptivity to the AT&T point of view 
and a patent indifference to the public interest."^-3 ' In the interna- 
tional field, the Commission was accused of acting as a manager rather
than a regulator;^ ' indeed it had never since its creation in 1934 held
(59)formal proceedings on international telephone rates. y/ As Rep. Celler,
who chaired the 1959 House investigation,- concluded: "It appears almost 
impossible to regulate AT&T on earth. We would need divine guidance to 
regulate AT&T if it is permitted to capture the space communications 
system."^ '
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If the PCC's record in its traditional role of regulating prices 
and quality of services inspired little confidence, its qualifications 
for overseeing the steady technical development of a new technology seemed 
poorer still. Administration officials acknowledged that the Commission 
had little experience in assuring equitable contracting practices, which 
promised to "be a sensitive area thanks to the extensive manufacturing ac- 
tivities of several carriers, most importantly AT&TV ' The PCC's per- 
formance as guarantor of technical progress seemed especially dubious 
since Commission representatives were unable to cite a single instance 
during the past 25 years when the FCC had compelled a carrier to intro- 
duce technical improvements or to abandon obsolete equipment.^ ' Some 
of the testimony given by Administration officials in support of widely 
based ownership of the satellite corporation appeared to reinforce the 
opposition's case against carrier-PCC control which the White House be- 
lieved the compromise bill would prevent, but which the opposition was 
convinced the bill would facilitate. Katzenbach, by then a deputy attor- 
ney general, declared that a corporation controlled by the carriers "una- 
voidably has the possible motivation to lag in development and actual use 
of means for making their present equipment obsolete."^ The specific 
subject of that warning was the undersea cables co-owned by the carriers, 
and while the FCC chairman acknowledged that cable owners might seek to 
protect their investments, he maintained that "the interesting situation 
here is that demand is rising_so rapidly that these [cable] facilities 
are overtaxed,"^ ' a contention echoed by industry representatives. 
Nonetheless, to the opponents of carrier control, permitting satellites 
to be included ivithin the existing communications industry was analogous 
to having defined aeroplanes as part of a transportation industry and
therefore allowing airline development to be undertaken by automobile
(66)
manufacturers.
5. FILIBUSTER AM) PASSAGE
If the supporters of government ownership did little else, they appear 
to have made criticism of the compromise bill more difficult to justify. 
The House commerce committee, reporting favourably on that bill on April 
19, concluded its report:
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If this instrumentality is not created at the earliest possible 
date, all planning for U.S. participation in the international 
system will have to "be done "by government agencies.,.[The car- 
riers] will "be prevented from cooperating effectively with each 
other and with the government agencies. (66)
The attempt to associate criticism of the "bill with implicit support for 
state ownership seems to have "been largely successful in the House, where 
the commerce committee made only two minor changes limiting carrier 
equity holdings to 50 percent of the total, which already was implied in 
the draft, and strengthening the instruction to the PCC to encourage 
earth station ownership "by the carriers. Two committee members dissented 
from the report^ ' but the bill as amended went to the floor of the House 
on May 2 and was passed the next day by a vote of 354 to nine. An amend- 
ment to delete the provision promoting carrier earth station ownership 
was defeated 116-33? the House version of Kefauver's government owner- 
ship bill lost by voice vote, and an amendment to require the corporation
to reimburse the government $471m for missile and satellite development
( 68") 
costs over a 10-year period beginning in 1969 was similarly defeated.^
In the Senate, the commerce committee reported out the compromise 
bill in late May with one significant amendment pertaining to earth sta- 
tion ownership. Katzenbach had testified that the Justice Department 
considered leaving the question of station ownership open as "indispen- 
sable," adding: "There is a real danger that ground stations if sepa- 
rately owned by the carriers may because of their high cost represent an 
obstacle to technical growth so as prematurely to freeze the type of sys- 
tem."^ ' PCC Chairman Minow and NASA Administrator Webb agreed, and 
in spite of objections from AT&T, ITT, Hawaiian Telephone and NASC Exe- 
cutive Secretary Welslr ' the FCC was authorised to assign earth station 
ownership to the satellite corporation or the carriers as it saw fit.
Senate opponents of the bill had been threatening since March to
(71) 
stage a filibuster to block final action. ' Their leverage was enhanced
by the fact that action on a critical bill to raise the ceiling on the 
government's borrowing was required before the fiscal year ended on June 
30, but although some members of the opposition were willing to use this 
deadline to their advantage_a majority was. not, and the filibuster did not 
begin until July 26. In the meantime the opposition received a set-back 
when AT&T's Telstar was successfully launched by NASA on July 9, which
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made a considerable impression at home and abroad and which, by bolstering 
AT&T's image, was termed in the trade press the satellite bill's "biggest 
booster:"' 72 '
.,.[T]he complete success of the Bell System's Telstar experiment, 
...and the tremendous public and press reaction, unquestionably 
have given the satellite communications legislation pending before 
the Senate a shot in the arm which it may have needed. (73)
The bill's opponents nevertheless began their extended debate, hoping to 
take advantage of what they believed to be lukewarm congressional support 
for the legislation and poor public awareness of the bill's implications. ' 
They also wanted further hearings to be held on the measure particularly 
regarding its foreign policy implications and after a week of filibuster 
the,Senate's leadership agreed on August 1 to refer the bill to the Senate 
foreign relations committee.
Administration ranks had, however, long since closed around a desire 
to have the bill enacted, and the opposition got little satisfaction from 
the eleventh-hour hearings. Attorney General Kennedy praised the legisla- 
tion, said that presidential authority over foreign relations would not be 
affected and denied any similarities between the bill and the Ad Hoc Commit- 
tee proposals that the Justice Department had condemned:
I am perfectly satisfied with this bill...We drew up this bill; 
this bill is perfectly satisfactory to us. I don't believe that 
AT&T dominates or controls the commercial satellite bill as it is 
presently constituted. (75)
The FCC's representative contended that "this legislation is necessary in
( 7f-i} 
order to help us maintain our present leadership."^ Secretary of State
Rusk said the measure contained ample provisions to safeguard foreign pol- 
icy interests and predicted that the new corporation would be "an effec- 
tive instrument for U.S. participation in a global communications satellite
(•7J\
corporation." v ' The State Department, Rusk said, had neither the exper- 
tise, personnel nor inclination to conduct the necessary negotiations it- 
self, and he assumed "that it will be in the elementary self-interest of 
both the corporation and the Government to work together harmoniously..." 
For "the Pentagon, defence secretary McWamara reiterated a two-fold wish 
to have the commercial system deployed as quickly as possible, and "to 
insure that the development of such a system would not preclude the deve-
(79) lopment of a military system." v
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The foreign relations committee referred the till back to the full 
Senate on August 10.-without amendment, and the next day a resolution was 
filed to impose a limit on subsequent debate. Although cloture had not 
been enacted in the Senate for 35 years, the resolution was passed by the 
necessary two-thirds majority and on August 17 the Communications Satellite 
Act was approved, 66-11.^ ' President Kennedy signed the measure into law 
on August 31, commenting:
The benefits which a satellite system should make possible within 
a few years will stem largely from a vastly increased capacity to 
exchange information cheaply and reliably with all parts of the 
world by telephone, telegraph, radio and television. The ultimate 
result will be to encourage and facilitate world trade, education, 
entertainment and new kinds of professional, political and personal 
discourse which are essential to healthy human relationships and 
international understanding. (8l)
6. THE COHSAT ACT OBSERVATIONS
Much was left unresolved by the Comsat Act: the question of who would 
own the U.S. earth stations was not settled for another four years; the 
Act did not specify which entities would be entitled to transact business 
with the Communications Satellite Corporation; the government's own right 
to lease capacity directly from Comsat was ambiguous; and Comsat 1 s role 
in providing domestic satellite services was not defined until 1971* It 
was also true that the state's ability to ensure on a routine basis the 
corporation's compliance with government policy or 'the public interest' 
was unclear: the creation of three positions on the corporation's board 
to be filled by the U.S. president has been described as a "venerable 
device" for countering criticisms that public domain was being given away 
to the private sector^ ' and the Attorney General made clear by October 
1962 that the presidential appointees would in any case have the same 
fiduciary obligations to the corporation as any other directors. ' In 
these respects the Act itself does seem to provide evidence of a congres- 
sional tendency to "go right on functioning as a political body seeking 
to bypass storm centers of controversy through the deliberate utilization 
of vagueness."^ ' 
      
The Act was, however, unambiguous as to a central commitment to en- 
trusting development of public satellite services to a profit-seeking
/ Q [-\
corporation that would operate within a commercial industry^ and it 
was, we would argue, that commitment to commercialisation rather than 
the particular ownership arrangements adopted which would have decisive
-119-
impact on the future of the satellite system.' ' Subsequent criticisms 
of Comsat's international counterpart Intelsat have contended that "the 
animus lucrandi cannot be the aim of a universal organisation dedicated 
to the welfare of humanity,"^- '' and that
Intelsat was "becoming a restricted commercial organisation for 
conventional communications traffic...Possibly the destiny of 
Intelsat had been determined from the start, in 1962, when the 
United States Congress put the responsibility for satellite deve- 
lopment into the hands of a private, profit-making corporation. (88)
It is not, however, clear to what degree a different decision as to the 
formal organisation of the American component of the satellite system 
would in the absence of a total reorganisation of the U.S. international 
communications industry have substantially affected the commercial basis 
on which satellite services were to be furnished. The American communi- 
cations industry would have to have been compelled to permit the creation 
of perhaps its most powerful competitor along non-commercial lines which 
presumably would have entailed state subsidies, either transferred from 
domestic telecommunications revenues or from general tax coffers t or 
sharply discriminatory pricing on overseas services to aid the spread of 
services to under-served, low traffic regions of the world. In the latte: 
case, prices on services among metropolitan regions would have to be 
raised to cover operating deficits in the Third World, thereby reducing 
the competitiveness of satellites vis-a-vis cables in the heavy traffic 
areas and making the need for subsidy that.much greater. In short, the 
problem of attempting to introduce a single non-commercial operator into 
a field of commercial companies would be great, quite irrespective of its 
internal institutional character.
The Comsat Act was intended to provide a framework for the accommo- 
dation of national policy to the requirements of private operation. Com- 
sat, as H. Levin has written,
was preferred to other options as a better way to reconcile 
speedy growth, wide diffusion, service to unprofitable areas, 
and private ownership. It was not expected to maximize each 
of these goals; it was always clear that some other option 
could promote one or more of them effectively. (89)
Resolution of the ownership question was of central importance to secur- 
ing industry collaboration," since the carriers were henceforth mandated
-120-
to continue a process of deciding the disposition of public satellite 
services, subject to assurances that the state's general policy require- 
ments would be met. The corporation was "believed to have sufficient 
independence from its competitors to ensure that satellite technology 
was developed quickly and efficiently; at the same time though Comsat's 
autonomy would not "be unconditional, and satellite operations would "be 
prevented from threatening the survival of undersea cables, about which 
the FCC was particularly concerned:
, ,.[l]f we try to establish a separate system by satellites in 
competition with existing things, I am quite certain that ulti- 
mately the existing means of communications which are going to 
be necessary are not going to be able to survive economically. (90)
In this respect, integrating satellite services into the commercial 
industry was a step toward ensuring the maintenance of a diversified 
national overseas transmission capability.
Where commercial conditions were believed likely to be inadequate 
to guaranteeing the satellite system's compliance with state requirements, 
additional safeguards were introduced to accompany the apparent devolu- 
tion of control to the private sector. Notwithstanding the efforts to 
eliminate provisions for government oversight, the president retained 
the power to coordinate the activities of the various federal agencies
with telecommunications responsibilities to ensure their cooperation in
(91} 
carrying out the policies set forth in the Act. w ' The Secretary of
State was also empowered to request the FCC to order Comsat to establish
(92) 
communications links between the U.S. and specified foreign points. w '
This provision implies that regardless of the system's private ownership 
and irrespective of the eventual degree of foreign participation, the 
satellite system was in the final analysis to be an American communica- 
tions resource. A 1963 Tfhite House directive stated:
It shall be the policy of the United States in time of war or 
national emergency, as proclaimed by the President, to have 
available to the government of the U.S. the total telecommuni- 
cations resources of the nation for utilization... (93)
7. THE COMSAT ACT AND PRE^fflPTI-^-UHBERIiEVELOPI.TMT; CONCLUSIONS
Two distinct sources of pre-emptive urgency  one state and the other pri 
vate  informed the early phase of technological formation culminating in
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the Comsat Act. For the state, asserting control over international 
satellite communications "before a rival Soviet system could be created 
was an enduring motivation behind satellite efforts. The state's ur- 
gency was not, it is true, reducible to that pre-emptive motive, since 
there were also instrumental communications requirements and an interna- 
tional deadline suggested "by the 1963 radio frequency conference which 
had to "be met. Nevertheless the government's satellite effort drew con- 
siderable energy from the vigour of the larger national space programme, 
in which regaining symbolic ground believed lost to the Soviets was a 
principal objective and the need to achieve an American 'first' beyond 
question. For the communications industry, the goal of establishing 
satellite communications as a legitimate area for private exploitation 
required early and sustained insistence that ownership issues be resolved 
and satellites be defined as the exclusive responsibility of what was in 
reality a small fragment of those industries whose practical cooperation 
would be essential to the satellite system. In all, the government's 
push for rapid satellite deployment coincided with the carriers' require- 
ment for an even more rapid resolution of organisational issues. Industry's 
success finally lay in having its particular objectives identified with 
the overall achievement of the state's satellite goals, so that deferring 
the ownership question was believed likely to endanger government objec- 
tives.
At the same time the possibility though not yet the certainty of 
technological underdevelopment was created. A process of technological 
definition1 beginning with the state's concern with impressing foreign 
publics and with improving its own overseas linkages, and continuing 
with the carriers' self-serving insistence on satellites as an interna- 
tional communications technique had commenced. The government's actual 
requirements as concerned the public satellite system were, as we have 
seen, relatively few: rapid deployment with special attention to low- 
traffic regions, and no interference with specialised governmental sys- 
tems. Beyond those, the degree of technological development achieved 
was implicitly to depend upon determinations within the private sector.
Here, there were two different schools of thought on satellite deve- 
lopment. The FCC and the carrier industry argued that satellites were
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no more than an alternative means of long-haul transmission; as the PCC 
reported in May 1961, "Communications via satellite will Toe a supplement 
to, rather than a substitute for, existing communication systems operated 
by the international common carriers..."^" ' The carriers likevri.se con- 
tended that satellites would be "natural extensions of present systems," 
"necessary extensions] of existing communication facilities,"^ ' and 
"another way to discharge [our] responsibility."^'' Industry's vievr 
was of a supplemental technology of real but limited usefulness which 
would improve, but need not otherwise alter, existing operations.
The alternative conception was that satellites offered, as RCA's 
board chairman David Sarnoff said, "a revolutionary possibility of global 
communications, the limits of which no man, in my judgment, is competent 
enough to place at the present time.'"' ' Sen. Kefauver declared:
Only the narrowest possible vievr would conceive of this satellite 
system as nothing more than a means of relaying long-distance com- 
munications. As we stand on the edge of this new technology only 
a complete lack of imagination could allow us to think of it as 
providing just another means of performing existing communications 
functions. (99)
If satellites were "a unique new development with unimaginable possibili- 
ties," it folloxied that "the communications companies' experience is of 
little significance in these areas,'" ' and satellites were "not just 
a simple extension of technology which they are currently using.'" 
The combination of technical novelty and unforeseeable social-consequences 
made space communications "too important to be left to the communications 
industry.'" '
The contending definitions of satellite technology as "revolutionary 
breakthrough" or "engineering application" as J. Galloway has characterised 
the dispute^ ' were clearly rooted in different political conceptions 
as to the appropriate means of institutionalising the satellite system. 
The victory of the carriers-PCC satellite formula therefore meant an en- 
dorsement for the Commission's belief "that the principal value of com- 
munications satellite systems is to provide long-distance communications, 
particularly for intercontinental use."^ 4 ' Along, then, with the suc- 
cess of the international carriers' efforts to secure exclusive statutory 
rights over satellite formation came the implication that the technology 
was primarily suited to a sphere of application which although satisfac- 
tory to the state might not begin to exhaust its wider potentiality.
PART THREE
INTERNATIONALISING THE SATELLITE SYSTEM 
U.S.-European negotiations, 1962-64
CHAPTER SIX: BACKGROUND TO THE CREATION OP THE INTERIM INTELSAT
The United States has provided the initiative, the technology, 
the manpower and the "bulk of the money on which Intelsat was 
"built. In 1964 we were able to negotiate a controlling position 
for the United States because we negotiated from strength. At 
that time it was necessary to negotiate with less than twenty 
nations. We achieved agreement on interim arrangements "by 
stressing the need to establish the system and get it going "be- 
fore debating the questions of permanent organizational structure.
- U.S. State Department' '
No international organisation has intervened to set right this 
pre-emption of the exploitation of space...A throw-back to 'un- 
equal treaties', these accords sanctify on the one hand an inter- 
national co-operation dominated by a private national corporation, 
and on the other the commercial exploitation of a public service.
(2)- French commentary^ '
1. OVERVIEW OF PART THREE
Pre-emptive underdevelopment, which we have proposed as the most appro- 
priate characterisation of the initial phase of commercial satellite 
activity, displays both aggressive and restrained features: techno- 
logical formation is undertaken urgently and effectively, ultimately 
however in order to sustain control over the technology rather than 
to exploit fully its known and technically feasible applications. The 
political dimension is therefore the primary focus of attention and con- 
testation; alternative or additional technical projects are evaluated 
for their likely utility as instruments of political advantage.
From this perspective, the principal significance of the interna- 
tional negotiations examined in the next three chapters which culmi- 
nated in the July 1964 creation of a temporary International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Consortium (_Int_elsat) lies in the way in which 
incentives to support intensive technological development were distri- 
buted among signatory countries. The agreements gave participants
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widely differing interests in the overall effectiveness of the organi- 
sational arrangements and in expanding or limiting the scope of collec- 
tive endeavours. This maldistribution of incentive was in large measure 
a result of the success of the American strategy of pre-empting the field 
of commercial satellite development and securing its institutionalisation 
under conspicuously American auspices: the U.S. chosen vehicle Comsat 
was majority shareholder and manager of the international system, and 
European proposals to mandate an international spread of procurement con- 
tracts were rejected, thus assuring dominance in the equipment supply 
market for American manufacturers, at least in the short term. Hence to 
an important degree the "better the system did, the more efficiently it 
operated and the quicker the spread of its services and the more appli- 
cations of satellite technology it undertook the worse off the non-U.S. 
participants would be: the international management entity they desired 
would be difficult to support on efficiency grounds, fields of indepen- 
dent aerospace development would be foreclosed and the American umbrella 
over commercial space activity would be broadened. Thus the Europeans 
turned down U.S. efforts to bind the 1964 signatories from undertaking 
satellite applications other than those the consortium might pursue col- 
lectively, providing an early indication that Intelsat's evolution into 
"an integrated and global system of satellite communications, taking into 
consideration the coordination of existing or projected systems" was un- 
likely. ^
Furthermore, since the agreed basis of Comsat f s dominance was not 
the stock of U.S. aerospace hardware and expertise which stood behind 
the Corporation, but rather the American share of international tele- 
communications traffic, the Intelsat arrangements sanctioned the process 
of technological definition that had begun in spring 196! when the U.S. 
carrier industry first put forth what became the dominant conception of 
satellite services as primarily a communications, not a space, activity. 
Just as that definition served the carriers politically in the U.S., so 
it was thought to serve the U.S. politically abroad, enabling the emer- 
gent structures of regional European aerospace endeavour to be ignored 
in favour of negotiating with national telecommunications entities, which 
were believed more amenable to operational business-like arrangements and
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less susceptible to the political concerns which inspired and informed 
space efforts. At 'the same time, however, the national posts and tele- 
communications entities (PTTs) would have little institutional interest 
in seeing satellites used to facilitate activities that were normally 
the responsibilities of quite distinct state organs or private companies 
 e.g. "broadcasting, aeronautical guidance, maritime communications. 
Hence the pattern whereby assuring narrow political control runs counter 
to intensive technological development was replicated: while the reli- 
ance on national shares of world telecommunications traffic guaranteed 
Comsat dominance within Intelsat, it also implied seeking collaboration 
of foreign PTTs with little interest in an expanded range of satellite 
applications.
Interest, then, in the overall success of the satellite system was 
maldistributed, as it were both quantitatively and qualitatively: quanti- 
tatively because rapid creation of the system, even if confined to con- 
ventional telecommunications traffic, promised greater benefits to Com- 
sat and the U.S. aerospace industry than it did the other signatories; 
qualitatively, in that the expansion of Intelsat out of this service 
base offered little but an extension of American dominance into attrac- 
tive areas of independent satellite development and was not, furthermore, 
in the institutional interests of the PTTs that constituted Intelsat's 
national representatives. Delaying the pace and restraining the scope 
of Intelsat activity would appear attractive political strategies for 
Comsat's foreign partners in the venture.
The process by which agreement was reached was determined largely 
by the weakness of the European negotiating position and by the limits 
on the strength of the American one. The Europeans' main leverage vjas 
non-cooperation, which would have deprived the satellite system access 
to the rich transatlantic telecommunications market and made a self- 
financing operation difficult to assure. The American response to Euro- 
pean reluctance was a display of unilateral resolution mounted by the 
U.S. government, AT&T and Comsat: the government, through the Defence 
Department, opened negotiations wirfehrComsat over the possibility of 
joining the proposed initial military satellite system to the commer- 
cial one, which would have assured Comsat an enormous amount of traffic;
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AT&T announced a preference for using satellite facilities in the At- 
lantic region as of 1966-67, implicitly threatening pomible disrup- 
tion of working relationships with European PTTs if they continued re- 
lying on cables; and. Gomsat contracted with Hushes Aircraft for an 
initial synchronous satellite, later launched as Early Bird. To a de- 
gree, each of the elements of that unilateralist display derived from 
domestic concerns. The Pentagon believed a joint satellite system would 
be cheaper, AT&T was interested in proving it" entitlement to a lar^c 
block of Gomsat shares (the disposition of which had not yet been decid- 
ed by the FCG), and Gomsat was under some pressure to reassure prospec- 
tive investors and to take over from NASA technical work of primary 
value to the commercial system* Nevertheless, the prospect confronting 
the Europeans as a result was of an operational satellite system, built 
by American contractors to Gomsat specifications, virtually born half- 
loaded with U.S, military traffic and with American private carriers 
eager to begin filling the remaining available circuit".
notwithstanding the unilateralist posturing, the United States had 
important technical, commercial and political reasons for seeking the 
collaboration of its main communicating partner?. Technically, at the 
time of the negotiations the number of possible participants ^as limited 
by the capabilities of the satellite? that were likely to be used. As 
Comsat stated in an August 1964 report to the UN General Assembly:
Use "' more than a small number of ground stations could...raise 
the cost of satellite-derived circuits to unacceptable levels. 
For this reason it is likely that the sp^cc serpent in its earlr' 
phase of operation will be used by a small number of ground sta- 
tions. (4)
The so-called multiple access problem thus reinforced the commercial 
impulse to seek access to the greatest international communications 
market. Furthermore, the U.5. remained concerned with promoting "the 
image of a technologically advanced, competent and dynamic "ocict.y with 
which other countries can increasingly identify their interests,"^- an 
image difficult to reconcile with a hasty and arrogant rejection of the 
evidently justifiable concerns of potential partners. Enlisting Euro- 
pean participation would help counter charges of American domination of 
the field, possibly encourage channeling of European asrocpace sf
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away from development of rival satellite systems/ ' and van support 
for U.S. frequency requests at the forthcoming EARC in 1963. Achieving 
those objectives without surrendering control of the satellite system 
was the task the Americans had set for themselves in the international 
negotiations.
2.__EARLY U.S. VIEWS OF INTERNATIONALSATELLITE ARMNGH4EHT5
Since the primary concerns debated during the legislative course of the 
Comsat Act had been the domestic issues raised by the Corporation's 
ownership and its likely relationship to the state, little attention was 
paid the eventual character of the international arrangements and the 
Act prescribes almost nothing. One section seems to leave open the pos- 
sibility of no substantive foreign participation, authorising Comsat to 
"plan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and operate itself or in con- 
junction with foreign governments or business entities a commercial com-
(7) 
munications satellite system." v ''
An important reason why the legislation was vague was that any at- 
tempt to anticipate or prescribe the international set-up was likely to 
have slowed the bill's passage. The New York Times later observed:
While there was always an underlying assumption that ownership 
of a global system could not be restricted to the American cor- 
poration, the possibility of international ownership was never' 
stressed for fear it would complicate Congressional acceptance 
of the legislation. (8)
The anti-Soviet impulse was one complicating feature. The House space 
committee's chairman declared at one point that the U.S. should set up 
the satellite system itself and only then deal with foreign participation. 
"We held our Army up on the Elbe while the Russians moved in and took
over," he said. "Are we going to hold our men back on this until the(o) 
Russians get a chance to mobilize their scientific groups?"^ There
was talk from industry about a "worldvri.de communications system that 
will link all the free world together,"^ ' and a House commerce commit- 
tee member ventured that he could "see no point in spending American 
dollars from American citizens for the purpose of providing better com- 
munications between Communist countries."^ Hence any substantive 
attempt to clarify the significance of the 'global' system would have 
invited similar comment and perhaps formal amendments which might 
have made international negotiations more difficult, particularly with
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1 non-aligned 1 nations.
To the degree -that legislative intent can be inferred, however, it 
seems to have ranged along a spectrum of unilateralism-multilateralism. 
The extreme multilateralist position foresaw a central organisational 
role either for the IBI or the ITU/ 2 ' Sen. Hubert Humphrey suggested:
The UN could "be given exclusive authority not only to license 
and regulate, "but also to tax this and other types of space 
traffic. Outer space belongs to no nation. It is international. 
(13)
Gomsat, presumably, would serve as promoter and technical guarantor of 
the project, which would otherwise invite international participation 
at foreign or aerospace ministry levels. At the other end of the spec- 
trum would be a 'global AT&T', where Comsat would establish and own the 
space segment, leasing circuits to foreign telecommunications entities; 
earth stations might either be owned by Gomsat or by individual coun- 
tries, but Comsat would set technical specifications for them in either
(15)event.^ ' It is likely that cong
ressional opinion tended to favour
the more unilateral options "anyone can ride, but it's our railroad"  
and it certainly
would be difficult to show that by the provision authorizing co- 
operation Congress intended to have the corporation participate 
in an international body in which the United States could be 
theoretically outvoted. (l6)
Indeed certain provisions of the Act for instance requiring PCC appro- 
val for Comsat's rate-making and investment decisions, or empowering the 
Secretary of State to order service to be established with specified 
foreign points would be impossible to square with the fully interna- 
tionalised approach.
On at least two levels contradictory foreign policy requirements 
were in play. In regard to operational control, the evident need for 
foreign ground stations had to be reconciled with the desire to have 
the satellite system serve as an American communications resource. And 
with respect to the national image the U.S. wanted to project through 
satellite activity, the wish to provide a demonstration of a national 
commitment to international technological cooperation had to be recon- 
ciled with the"desire for central American leadership in the project.
The plan proposed by the U.S. carrier industry during the pre-
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Comsat Act period seemed to offer a promising way to accommodate these 
divergent policy requirements by applying the model of international 
cable-owning arrangements to the satellite field. The accepted principle 
of ownership in proportion to usage would enable American international 
traffic weight to "be translated into voting control of the satellite sys- 
tem without any need to refer to the degree to which U.S. space techno- 
logy and launchers would be required as further justification for Ameri- 
can political dominance. The outcome would be the same, but the basis 
less contentious. Satellites, as the PCC common carrier bureau chief 
later explained, "could be integrated with the present network pretty
much relying upon the existing framework and conventions and business
(17}
relationships." v ' The system, furthermore, could be created through
a series of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and its main communi- 
cating partners.
Among government agencies, the FCC had however said little about 
the international arrangements it envisaged. The subject was omitted 
from the Commission's first report in May 1961, and at a June meeting 
tTith the international carriers the FCC chairman observed only that it 
was "essential for any joint venture to provide for ownership particiwa-( isV
tion and equitable access...by all interested foreign countries." 
The President's July policy statement had also mentioned investment 
opportunities for foreign participants, and State Department represen- 
tatives indicated that they viewed the cable analogy as appropriate
inasmuch as countries would share in control in proportion to their
(19) 
space segment investments. '
The State Department also, however, pointed out that satellites 
unlike cables were "multilateral in concept" and therefore raised "prob- 
lems which can be resolved only in the context of multilateral negoti- 
ations."^ ' Indeed simply transposing the cable model to the satellite 
field posed a number of practical difficulties: cables were owned as 
discrete linkages in shares determined by actual usage of the specific 
cable, so geographical location in effect held down the number of co- 
investors. With satellites though, since access could be had irrespec- 
tive of geography, a great many bilateral agreements not only between 
the U.S. and its foreign partners, but among the foreign entities too  
might be necessary, arguably requiring multilateral accords to ensure
that the bilateral agreements would be sufficiently uniform to guarantee
(21} 
operational continuity. v '
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The cable analogy also could not resolve satisfactorily the ques- 
tion of undivided space segment ownership, which the Ad Hoc Committee 
had recommended, and which would mean that co-owners were purchasing
shares in the entire space segment regardless of which satellites they
( 22}
were actually interested in using. ' Undivided ownership had "both
technical and political justification: technically, it would be parti- 
cularly suited to non-synchronous satellites, where users would not 
know which satellite or satellites they would require; politically, 
undivided shares would help maintain the integrity of the global system 
if synchronous satellites were used by discouraging *federalisation' 
by regional co-owners of a specific satellite.; it also would enable 
America's overall traffic preponderance to be translated into worldwide 
satellite control including spacecraft serving regions where actual 
U.S. traffic was relatively light.
So while the Comsat Act was not prescriptive and the concrete al- 
ternatives discussed during the legislative process vague, it is possible 
to get an indication of the international arrangements the U.S. favoured 
by examining the objectives they would be expected to serve or balance. 
The arrangements would have to facilitate creation of an operational
system as soon as possible without ignoring commercial considerations.
(23) 
They would "achieve broad and meaningful international cooperation''^
while sustaining American dominance in the field and without compro- 
mising expedition. They would help prevent "for political as well as 
economic and technical reasons, wasteful rivalries" independent sys- 
tems. . ' The model of conventional arrangements within the interna- 
tional carrier industry seemed to be useful for reconciling national 
dominance with international cooperation. It remained to be seen however 
how satisfactory this would be to the satellite system's other prospec- 
tive participants.
 3. EUROPEAN REGIONAL AEROSPACE ORGANISATION AND. U.S._ POLICY
The American aerospace mobilisat.ion__o_f jthe_late 1950s an<i early 1960s 
had been paralleled formally by several multilateral efforts within 
"Europe, notably the formation of a European Launcher Development
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Organisation (ELDO) , the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and 
several private industrial consortia. For the main participants  Great 
Britain, Prance, Germany, Italy and to a lesser extent Belgium, the Neth- 
erlands and Denmark  regionalism offered a means of matching the scale 
of resources available to the Soviets and Americans for aerospace R&D to 
stimulate industrial investment to meet internal requirements and compete 
for foreign sales. Although the efforts were ostensibly undertaken with 
a view toward peaceful space applications, suspicion remained that scien- 
tific and commercial objectives served largely to justify technical work 
that could not fail to find military uses. When, for example, the head 
of the European Preparatory Council for Space Research, an early coordi- 
nating body, was asked why regional launcher development work was not 
simply sponsored by NATO, he first replied that military and non-military 
space efforts needed to be carefully distinguished, but then added:
It does not mean at all that defence programmes have nothing to 
do with ELDO and ESRO...I think it can even be said that there 
would be very little scientific work in space without the exis- 
tence of the defence programmes. (25)
The potential emergence of a 'third force' in space, with consequences 
not just for competitive commercial efforts but more importantly  espe-
cially after the French announced in late i960 their intention to deve-/ pg\
lop an independent nuclear weapons capability "   for the future of the 
U.S. monopoly over anti-Soviet strategic forces, remained an active con- 
cern on both sides of the Atlantic.
American policy toward European regionalism in space fields was 
ambivalent. On the one hand, as an early 1962 Senate report stated, "A 
European cooperative space effort would have merit for the same reasons
that the Common Market and the European Centre for Nuclear Research have
(21} both political and economic merit. "v/ Regionalism was seen by some as
a modernising and moderating force, which would strengthen Europe vis-a-vis 
the Soviet "bloc, permit reductions in U.S. military spending on NATO, and 
make negotiations over transatlantic aerospace cooperation easier by trans- 
forming them into essentially bilateral discussions. Furthermore, even if
a pooling of resources made the "development of advanced weaponry more 
likely, it would also diffuse control among participants and thus moderate 
the more nationalistic propensities of certain countries, notably France.
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Hence in a later report by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
for instance, support for ELDO was explicitly declared as a vehicle for 
controlling the proliferation of rocket technology at national levels.' 28 ^
On the other hand, the policies of NASA and the State Department 
suggest an appreciation of the competitive threats posed Toy European 
regional collaboration. The space agency was careful to limit its assis- 
tance to areas "believed inapplicable to military uses, like cryogenic 
rocket fuels and certain low-grade guidance technology. The State De- 
partment stipulated furthermore that any help should be multilateral in 
destination, and should be limited to fields that either were of direct 
interest to the U.S. or promised to yield a net contribution to the over- 
all Western technological capability, '' a formulation which apparently 
envisaged an evolution of European efforts into an integral extension of 
American R&D resources.
The European position was less reluctant about pursuing work in 
evident competition with the U.S. A March 196! Anglo-French report on 
aerospace efforts stated: "If we have a technically competitive solu- 
tion it would be worthwhile developing it so that it would take its place 
at the appropriate time."^ ' This divergence in developmental objectives 
could assume greater importance in the context of a unified European 
front: the same strength the U.S. hoped to see deployed against the 
Soviets could be turned to forcing concessions from the Americans, and 
any attempts by the U.S. to restrain European aerospace development whe- 
ther for strategic or commercial reasons or both would become a challenge 
to a continental effort, unlikely to be absorbed in isolation by disparate 
national industries or aerospace ministries. The U.S. therefore recog- 
nised that the success of the global satellite system would depend in part 
on the ability of the U.S. to persuade the Europeans that it offered suf- 
ficient scope for their aerospace ambitions to be realised:
The high-cost, high-capacity U.S. communications satellite system 
would serve the communications needs of all nations in the fore- 
seeable future. Yet, unless the United States provides sufficiently 
attractive opportunities for foreign participation, competitive sys- 
tems may emerge. (31)
For the moment, however, there was little evidence of any European 
space achievements comparable to those of the Soviets and Americans. ELDO 
had developed out of the April I960 cancellation by the British government
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of their Blue Streak missile project, and subsequent efforts to salvage 
some of the £70m outlay by stimulating a cooperative rocket programme 
into which Blue Streak R&D could be channeled. The French expressed 
interest in designing and building a second stage rocket, with Blue 
Streak serving as the first stage of a bi-national launch vehicle. The 
two governments decided at the end of I960 to call a Europe-wide organi- 
sational meeting to consider wider collaboration, which was held in
( ^2.) Strasbourg in February 1961. v ' Encouraged by interest expressed, a
second conference was held in Lancaster House, London in November, at- 
tended by representatives of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, West 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, and 
observers from Canada, Greece and Turkey. Germany had meanwhile signed 
on to the bi-lateral project in July, after five months of hesitation 
while the U.S. attitude was guaged,^ ' and agreed to work on the rock- 
et's third stage. In April 1962 the ELDO Convention was signed by six 
of the Lancaster House conference's participants France, Britain, Ger- 
many, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy its Protocol stipulating a 
further national distribution of launcher E&D: satellite test payloads 
to be built by Italy, downrange ground guidance equipment by Belgium 
and long-range telemetry facilities by the Netherlands. ' Australia 
had meanwhile indicated that ELDO could use its firing range at Uoomera, 
although at least two years of preparation were anticipated before tests 
would be conducted there. ' The $200m estimated costs over the next 
five years would be borne principally by Germany (22 percent), France 
(24 percent) and Britain (39 percent).
In Britain concern was expressed that such an apparently vital 
field should be entrusted to a multinational effort, and when the Stras- 
bourg meeting was called Tory backbenchers complained that a strictly 
Commonwealth satellite system might earn as much as £450ni for Britain 
over the next two decades, while the European regional approach would 
do little but assure the Americans unrivalled aerospace superiority for 
years to come. The Commonwealth system alternative was promoted 
notably by elements of British industry which in February 196! organised 
the British Space Development Co., representing nine aerospace and elec- 
tronics firms and endowed with £20,000 in initial capitalisation to enable
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a united front to "be presented to the government. The company's first 
director put their case in glowing terms:
We who have formed this company "believe the money in space is 
more than any man ever dreamed of. It is colossal. We "believe 
the gentlemen adventurers of space have a much "bigger chance of 
vast wealth than ever did the adventurers of the Hudson's Bay 
Company or the East India Company. It is the real Eldorado of 
the future. It we are not in space, London ceases to "be the 
centre of the world as far as communications are concerned. (37)
Support for a Commonwealth system continued throughout the period of 
the interim Intelsat negotiations. In March 1963 a Commons resolution 
called upon the government to announce plans for such a system, and 
insisted the matter "be treated with urgency. The aviation minister 
responded obliquely: "We do not mean just to "buy time in any system."
/ -)Q\
^ ' The main direction of British -state and industrial efforts re- 
mained, however, European and the aerospace firm Hawker Siddeley was, 
\itith the French company SEREB, founder of Eurospace, an industrial 
association which grew to include 146 aerospace and electronics firms 
largely unified in support of a regional approach. Spa.ce activities 
were, according to Eurospace's first president, "a matter of survival" 
for Europe: "Unless the European countries wish to join the ranks of
the "backward and undeveloped countries within the next 50 years, they
(39)must take immediate steps to enter these new fields." v "
Along with ELDO was a second major multilateral intergovernmental 
effort in the field, the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO), 
which due to its focus upon R&D unrelated to missiles attracted wider 
European participation. ESRO developed from a preparatory study commis- 
sion formed in December 1960 to examine potential areas of collective 
research, ' and in February-March 19^2 a formal convention was nego- 
tiated. Initial signatories that June included the six ELDO members 
and Denmark, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. A total of $306m was to
be spent over the next eight years on a number of explicitly non-mili-j
tary scientific projects. While an obvious possible relationship be- 
tween ESRO and ELDO would make ESRO a customer for the other's launch 
vehicles, and although ESRO's convention authorises it to "procure 
launching vehicles and arrange for their-launching," nothing was for- 
mally stated as to the terms of coexistence between the two organisa-
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4. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE AEROSPACE FIELD
The salience and effectiveness of international space arrangements 
within Europe were less impressive than those between European and 
other nations and the United States. NASA had been the chief U.S. 
instrument of technical and political pioneering, and performed 
services indispensable to preparing the way for the commercial satel- 
lite system. A top space agency official later claimed that NASA had 
"stimulated a dozen countries to build ground stations to test commu- 
nications satellites, contributing directly to the establishment of 
Intelsat."^ ' Early NASA activities were such that by July 196! an 
FCC commissioner testified that Britain, France, Germany, Brazil and 
Japan already appeared interested in participating in the commercial 
system/ ' NASA encouraged the British and French governments to 
build their first satellite earth stations, at Goonhilly Downs and 
Pleumeur-Bodou respectively, in order to participate in AT&T's Telstar 
experiment. For its own Project Relay, the space agency negotiated 
agreements in February 196! with Brazil (in fact with ITT's subsidiary 
there) for operation of a transportable antenna near Rio de Janeira, 
and in April with Britain and France. Accordingly, by the time Relay
was launched in December 19^2 earth stations were under construction
(44)
'(45)
in Italy, Germany and Japan, ' and a total of 40 countries were par-
ticipating in NASA projects.
A considerable number of the projects that by 19&5 NASA had under- 
taken with 69 foreign countries had direct or indirect bearing on satel- 
lite communications. ' The agency had helped dramatise the techno- 
logy's potential uses through intercontinental TV relays: Relay I
handled 11 spot news telecasts, eight to Europe and three to Japan,
( 47)during the three-day period after President Kennedy's death;^ ' Bra- 
zil's participation in the Relay project made possible the first three- 
continent television hook-up/ ' NASA furthermore indicated who its 
heir apparent was in regard to satellite communications by inviting 
Comsat which had not yet launched a satellite of its own to coordinate 
international TV coverage of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics via NASA's Syncom 
III satellite/ 49 '
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Hence two distinct patterns of international aerospace coopera- 
tion were discernible, the one intra-European and the other consisting 
of bilateral arrangements with the U.S.; the degree to which space 
would offer opportunities for regional collaboration independent of 
American influence or reinforce existing transatlantic ties was 
controversial and negotiable. That uncertainty was in part an expres- 
sion of larger uncertainties within the 'Western alliance 1 : the even- 
tual impact of Gaullist foreign policies ("one Europe from the Atlantic 
to the Urals"), Britain's relationship to the Common Market, and the 
ultimate relationship of the U.S. to an apparently unifying European 
community. In August 1962 Prance rejected the nuclear test ban treaty 
concluded in July by Britain, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. French 
efforts to isolate Britain won unexpected assistance in the autumn 
ifhen the Kennedy Administration cancelled aid for the British Skybolt 
air-to-ground missile programme, which was to have been the basis for 
an independent U.K. nuclear deterrent. A Sunday Times (London) corres- 
pondent, reporting from the subsequent Kennedy-Macmillan meeting in 
Nassau in December, wrote of "resentment and suspicion of American in- 
tentions such as I have never experienced in all the Anglo-American con- 
ferences I have covered over the past 20 years."^ Proposals for a 
NATO multi-lateral nuclear force continued to be made through the spring 
of. 1963, partly to draw potential German support away from DeGaulle. 
France had, at the beginning of the year, declared its opposition to 
British membership of the European Economic Community and to its own 
further integration into NATO: the former was to prevent formation of 
"a colossal Atlantic community under American domination and control;" 
as for NATO "France intends to have her own national defence...In poli- 
tics and strategy, as in economics, monopoly naturally appears to him
(51) who enjoys it as the best possible system." v
Such then was the setting of suspicion amidst opportunities for 
practical cooperation, and of divergent pulls tovrard European and trans- 
atlantic integration, within which the negotiations on the formation of 
a global commercial satellite system, would take place.
CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH 1963
1. PRELIMINARY CONTACTS ANDCOMSAT'S ENTRY
The two-year process by which the interim Intelsat accords were nego- 
tiated "began soon after passage of the Comsat Act with a visit to Wash- 
ington in late October 1962 by representatives of the British Post Of- 
fice and Foreign Office and of the Canadian Transport and External Af- 
fairs ministries, who met with U.S. State Department and FCC officials 
to discuss satellite plans. The possibility of a Commonwealth satellite 
system seems to have figured in the talks, provoking the first formal 
declaration of American policy on the 'single global system.' The 
State Department reported afterwards that its representatives had empha- 
sized the desirability of a unit-ary network "as opposed to competing 
systems developed by different nations or regional groups."^ ' The 
U.S. position was that "with a single global system, there would be
avoidance of duplicate stations, avoidance of major t>roblems of inter 
( 2] 
ference, and more efficient use of the frequency spectrum, |A ' although
the degree to which unitary ownership was necessary to assure these 
largely technical objectives was not clear .A
The British and Canadian participants reportedly expressed interest 
in "participating fully" in the proposed system, and the British repre- 
sentatives offered to report on the discussions to a forthcoming meeting 
of the telecommunications committee of the European Conference of Posts 
and Telecommunications (known by its French initials CEPT) in Cologne 
in December. The State Department wanted to conduct the briefings it- 
self, and a team of U.S. diplomats held bilateral talks with PTT offi- 
cials in France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and the Scandinavian countries in preparation for the December meeting. 
The Americans returned believing that the European PTTs were anxious to 
join in the proposed system and wished to have significant roles in
-139-
determining its design, ownership, management and equipment procurement 
practices, ;
These early discussions involved officials of the State Department 
and the PCC, "out the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat) was 
meanwhile Toeing organised to the point where its own representatives 
could begin to take part. In mid-October 196? President Kennedy appointed
12 lawyers, bankers and industrialists to serve as temporary incorpora-
( 5) tors for Comsat; w ' Philip Graham, publisher of The Washington Post, was
selected as their chairman and on February 1, 1963 Comsat was formally 
created as a corporation. At the end of that month, two top appoint- 
ments were announced: Leo Welch, former chairman of the board of Stan- 
dard Oil of New Jersey, was named company chairman and chief executive 
officer, and Joseph Charyk, a former undersecretary of the Air Force, 
was appointed corporation president. '
The broad lines of Comsat's ownership were decided by the FCC on 
November 28, when the Commission ruled that all U.S. communications 
common carriers including in principle the 2,700 non-Bell domestic 
phone companies were eligible to purchase Comsat carrier stock. While 
this hotly contested legislative issue was apparently settled smoothly 
by administrative edict aside from a cautionary note from AT&T warning 
that shares would be oversubscribed the FCC decision went unopposed  
the Commission still retained authority to decide on the final appor- 
tionment of shares among those theoretically authorised carriers, and 
it would be the precise formula the FCC promulgated which would deter- 
mine whether the apparent expansion of Comsat's carrier ownership would
(7)be sustained in substance. ^ '
The Commission also was prodding Comsat's temporary incorporators 
to issue and sell the company's stock before they as presidential 
appointees vrould be obliged to take decisions that the FCC believed 
were the proper responsibility of duly elected officers. Approval from 
the Commission was necesnary before Comsat could raise temporary capi- 
tal until shares were sold, and on February 27 a $5m line of credit was 
authorised.' ' Although a loan of $1.9m to enable Comsat to operate 
was approved at the same time, the FCC soon made it clear that the cor- 
poration's obligation to secure authorisations on further loans would be.
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used as leverage to force the incorporators to sell shares and thereby 
incorporate the company fully. In July the FCC chairman wrote to 
Comsat Chairman Welch expressing the Commission's "concern" that no 
firm plans had "been made to issue stock, and reminding Welch that 
Congress had intended the numerous important decisions on technology 
and policy confronting the Corporation to "be taken "by representatives 
of its owners, not by presidential appointees. It was further implied 
that the FCC might, in the absence of definite moves toward incorpora- 
tion, find it difficult to approve any more loans to Comsat. "' Welch 
replied that "sound preparation" for a stock offering was being made, 
defended the need for the R&D contracts which Comsat had begun to let  
and which the FCC had particularly criticised and charged the Commis- 
sion with an "invasion of managerial functions of the corporation."^ ' 
Comsat's report to Congress in September stressed the need to settle 
such issues as frequency assignments, the attitudes of prospective 
foreign partners and the type of technical programme the Corporation 
would pursue before investors could be expected to buy shares. '
2. GOHSAT'S NEGOTIATING POSITION IS FOHKULATSD AND MODERATED
Comsat*s newly appointed officials were meanwhile formulating their 
own vievrs on international arrangements, which clashed with the State 
Department's preference for sharing ownership participation with 
foreign partners. Comsat Chairman Welch believed that leasing arrange- 
ments could be negotiated bilaterally by Comsat, and that the company
should retain exclusive ownership of the space segment if not of the
l-\2\ 
entire integrated system. v ' After they took office in February,
Welch and Charyk were briefed by State Department officials and in 
May and June presented the Corporation's position to PTT officials in 
France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Non-jay, Switzerland and Swe- 
den. Comsat also briefed Canadian representatives, and the Japanese 
Embassy requested its own session. Although the company "advised" the 
State Department of the results of these talks, the Department's own 
role in the emerging negotiations had not yet been clarified and Comsat 
appears to have been unwilling to concede a co-equal role to the pro- 
fessional diplomats.^ '
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Thankjs, however, to a combination of domestic and international 
pressures, Comsat's more extreme unilateralist position was by and large 
accepted as impracticable by the end of 1963.^ ^' Domestically, erosion 
of the position preferred by Welch began in June, when the President 
named an ad hoc communications satellite group, chaired jointly by Deputy 
Attorney Genera-1 Katzenbach and Jerome T:Ieisner, to coordinate government 
policy toward Comsat. The group supported the State Department's nego- 
tiating position, where ownership of the space segment would be held in 
undivided shares and some kind of multinational body where votes would 
be distributed according to investment would oversee the system. '
Although the government had no clear authority to dictate Comsat's 
negotiating position, the State Department made known it" opinion, first 
by distancing itself from Comsat's approach. Commenting on the Corpora- 
tion's draft negotiating principles in September, for example, the De- 
partment told the House commerce committee:
The principles will be presented as those developed by the Corpora- 
tion, and the reactions of the Europeans will be considered highly 
important in the formulation of the final Government positions on 
the same subjects. (16)
The State Department was, in effect, fashioning for itself a mediating 
position between Comsat's and that likely to be taken by prospective 
foreign participants. This effort did not endear the Department to Com- 
sat, for whom its loyalty was already suspect due to its brief advocacy 
of government satellite ownership, and Comsat believed not without jus- 
tice that the State Department was colluding with the Europeans to under- 
mine the company's position. A Department participant in these encoun- 
ters Abram Chayes, then legal adviser has acknowledged that an effort 
was made "to contrive repeatedly to expose the officers of the company 
to situations, meetings and conferences where they could experience, as 
uncomfortably as could be arranged, the international realities of the 
situation."' 17 ^
State Department collusion, however, i-ias not necessary to produce 
a near-failure for the U.S. at the Extraordinary Administrative Radio 
Conference (EARC) in Geneva that autumn, which appears to have driven 
home the point that some form of international power-sharing would be
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necessary for the satellite system's success. Comsat recognised that 
approval of American frequency requests was "of fundamental importance 
to the program of the Corporation,"^ ' as it reported to Congress in 
September, and the U.S. was represented by a 30-member delegation which 
included congressmen, PCC commissioners, officials of NASA, the Navy, 
State Department and Comsat. The conference lasted from October 7 to 
November 8, and the U.S. lost no opportunity to draw attention to the 
potential uses of satellite communications. The Americans were 
requesting a total of 2,725 megacycles (mcs) be set aside for space 
communications, most of which was to be shared with existing terrestrial 
services. Sharing would permit satellites to use lower frequency bands, 
offering better propagation features, but would require other countries 
to accept American assurances that joint usage would not interfere with 
existing operations. The U.S. also, with support from Britain, Prance 
and Canada, wanted two 50-racs bands to be reserved for the exclusive 
use of space communications services, and therefore exempt from certain 
technical criteria and coordinating procedures applied to shared usage. 
^ ' The reason for the requests for exclusive wavebands was initially
given as their value for civil mobile applications like maritime navi-
( 21)gationv ' but Comsat f s president later said that the proposals ori- 
ginated in the National Communications System, which was unwilling to 
agree to the need for international consent on military-related mobile 
terminal use.
The Soviets were asking for a total of 1,600 mcs of bandwidth to 
be reserved for space activities, opposed the U.S. request for exclu- 
sive frequencies and, most importantly, wanted whatever assignments the 
conference made qualified as temporary ones. The notion that the space 
assignments should be interim pending the decisions of another planning 
conference to be held later received support initially from the ITU's 
International Frequency Registration Board and from a number of smaller 
countries. The Israeli delegation introduced a resolution to that ef- 
fect which attracted considerable backing, to the dismay of the Americans. 
A Yugoslav delegate explained:
Except for a very limited number of countries which have the neces- 
sary means and economic power, the large majority of the countries 
of the world and especially the new or developing areas are not 
in a position either to make the necessary studies on the possi- 
bility of coexistence in the same frequency bands of space radio
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services and other very important radio services, or to make 
the studies and tests indispensable to decide on the manner in 
which their existing telecommunications networks could be inte- 
grated to telecommunication systems "by satellites. (23)
The Americans successfully persuaded the Israelis to withdraw their 
resolution, explaining among other things that its passage would endan- 
ger the commercial system in which Israel would "be welcome to partici- 
pate, and irorked out a compromise with the Soviets which later rein- 
forced the belief of some Americans that a Soviet satellite system was 
still likely/ 24^
As a result, a total of 2,800 mcs in "bandwidth was assigned to 
space communications, including the two exclusive "bands the U.S. mili- 
tary wanted and four other 500-mcs "bands contained in the original
American proposal, which were "believed sufficient for commercial satel-
(25') 
lite traffic until the 1975-80 period. v J) The overall proportion of
the international frequency spectrum assigned to space uses was raised
( 9fs\ 
from one to 15 percent of the entire allocated spectrum. '
U.S. officials applauded the outcome of the conference: President 
Kennedy on November 20 pronounced it "one of the most successful of its
kind in recent times," and said work could now proceed "to develop a
(27)
single global commercial space communications system." x ' The Ameri- 
can delegation chairman reported that "the overall objectives of the
United States were approved by the Conference, which adopted the major-
( PS^ 
ity of the U.S. proposals in substance."^ ' Comsat President Charyk
concluded, "There is now a basis...for investment based on some assu- 
rance.that the whole thing isn't going to be upset by another look at
(29) 
the matter in a few years." x
It also was true, however, that the conference "nearly got out of 
hand," as one U.S. diplomat put it/ ' since the success of the Soviet 
and Israeli proposal would have jeopardised not only Comsat's plans but 
the eventual deployment of the American military system as well. The 
belief, still entertained by Comsat f s leadership, that the commercial 
network could be presented to the world as a fait accompli which they 
would be fortunate to be invited.ts_use, received a set-back from the 
EARC. It was also-appearing"increasingly-untenable owing to the positions 
being developed by the system's prospective European participants.
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3. THE EUROPEAN POSITION HARDENS
The warm initial response the Americans believed they had received 
during the early round of post-Act briefings was meanwhile being trans- 
formed into a more cautious and, in the U.S. view, dilatory approach 
as the Europeans both broadened and deepened their participation in 
satellite negotiations first through multinational organisation at the 
PTT level and then through the involvement of foreign and aerospace 
ministries.
The first collective European response to the U.S. proposals had 
come at the December 1962 meeting in Cologne of the regional PTT asso- 
ciation's (CEPT) telecommunications committee, where an ad hoc group  
with representatives of Britain, Prance, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Swit- 
zerland and the Scandinavian countries was created to study the prob- 
lems of participation in the "single world network" of satellites.^ ' 
Establishment of the group was to a degree welcomed by the U.S.: Presi- 
dent Kennedy viewed it as a step forward in the discussions a-nd as a
prelude to formation of a European 'Comsat' that would be the "regional
f 32} participant in the global system."^ ' At the least, the move indicated
the seriousness with which the American proposals were being viewed; it 
also suggested a likely source of pressure upon the British to forego 
plans for a Commonwealth system since satellites were being transformed
into a 'European' issue, with corresponding pressures upon Britain to be
f V^
"a good European"^ '—and it was thought possible that regional mobili- 
sation would simplify transatlantic negotiations by shifting the burden 
of formulating common positions partly onto the Europeans.^ ' At the 
same time, however, the European group approach was acknowledged as a 
means to enhance the collective negotiating position, as a State Depart- 
ment participant later observed:
There were obvious difficulties from our side in negotiating with 
a group, and I think I can say we had no choice. The group approach 
was adopted very strongly by the West Europeans, and I think it is 
quite fair to say that they did this in order to increase their 
negotiating strength with us. (35)
Not only was the negotiating front broadened into a multilateral 
effort, but it was soon deepened too, as the political and industrial 
implications of the satellite project began to be appreciated and the 
limits to confining national representation to PTT officials recognised.
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The institutional containment upon which the first American approaches 
were premised was unlikely to endure, since it implicitly denied to the 
Europeans much the same concerns with national image, technical pres- 
tige and industrial advancement that had helped push the U.S. into space. 
The French were early to recognise a need to evaluate satellites politi- 
cally^ ' and after a first meeting of the CEPT's new satellite group in 
Paris in mid-March 1963, Prance called for an intergovernmental meeting 
in Paris in May; there delegations were led "by senior foreign ministry
officials, whose growing involvement in the satellite discussions was in
( 37)some cases resisted "by PTTs.^ ' At the Hay meeting two firm common prin- 
ciples were adopted: "group negotiation..., absolutely avoiding any bi- 
lateral contacts, and participation in the planning, ownership, direction
/ -sQ\
and furnishing of material to the global system."^ A second inter- 
governmental meeting was held in London in mid-July, where a new regional 
entity the European Conference on Satellite Communications (also known 
"by its French initials GETS) was created. The earlier CEPT ad hoc group
was accorded a role as adviser to the new GETS on technical and operational
( 79) 
matters, meaning in effect that the part to "be played by national
telecommunications operating entities was that of a consultative resource 
within a higher level political consideration of collective policy.
Preliminary transatlantic meetings continued through 1963. American 
representatives met with the GETS' steering committee in London in mid- 
October and in Bonn and London in November.^ ' At these talks, the 
U.S. proposed linking ownership shares to usage, possibly thereby cre- 
ating- different categories of membership in the system with various 
rights assigned to each;^ ' "they also announced a preference for dual 
agreements, one among nominated operating entities from participating 
countries and the other among the governments, and for a consortium joint 
venture arrangement in which Comsat would be operational manager instead 
of a new, formal international organisation. GETS members however wanted 
an enhanced governmental role in the arrangements, especially in regard 
to financing, which they wanted assigned to an intergovernmental commis- 
sion. Rather than the fixed investment quotas the U.S. proposed, GETS 
preferred periodic payments/ ^which"presumably would have given them 
continuing oversight and intermittent opportunities to influence the
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running of the system. At a GETS plenary session in Rome in late Novem- 
ber, a hardening of the European position was expressed in the decision 
to create a new regional organisation to represent Europe officially in 
the satellite system and to serve as a formal counterpart to Comsat. GETS 
would continue for the time "being to act in the place of this organisation, 
and would represent Europe at the first official negotiating session with 
the United States, scheduled for February 1964 in Rome.'^'
The American position too had been consolidated, with the more unac- 
ceptable elements of Comsat's initial approach eliminated. The U.S. con- 
tinued to insist upon a predominant role for the Corporation in the ar- 
rangements, including voting control and status as the system's adminis- 
trative, financial, technical and operational manager. Indeed Comsat 
would be the consortium's sole legal representative. In turn, however, 
the company had agreed to submit to State Department guidance if not 
supervision in the coming negotiations, and to the need for dual arrange- 
ments, which Comsat had felt would legitimate unwarranted government in- 
terference. Most important, it was agreed that foreign participants would 
be permitted to co-own the space segment, in yet to be determined shares.
4. THE AMERICAN UNILATERALIST DISPLAY: AT&T'S INTERVENTION
While the Europeans were clearly moving toward participating in the sys- 
tem, the pace at which the process was moving was not satisfactory to the 
Americans. A then-official of Swedish broadcasting has recalled "an 
extraordinary mixture of conventional, traditional attitudes, couple with 
a fear of and a wish to get into the new technology all in the midst of 
an all but total lack of institutional arrangements."^ ' Within GETS' 
there were disagreements over which countries should have their own earth 
stations and continuing friction between PTT and foreign ministry officials, 
the former eager to join in order to improve overseas linkages while the 
latter preferred to use the threat of non-cooperation to improve the col- 
lective bargaining position.^ -^ Furthermore, the Americans also sus- 
pected that the delays represented an effort to put off satellite deploy- 
ment until another generation of transatlantic cables was built/ and 
the operational need for satellites reduced accordingly. All in all, The 
-New York Times reported in November 1963 "growing indications that the
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negotiations may be even more difficult than had "been expected," noting 
in particular that Britain was "making moves that are being widely inter- 
preted as designed to stall inauguration of the commercial system."^ '
Then, however, came a series of actions by the Americans which seemed 
to comprise a demonstration of a national commitment to press ahead with 
creating the system irrespective of European reservations. In early Decem- 
ber AT&T announced through a letter from a company vice president to Cornsat 
Chairman Welch that it would rather use satellite circuits in the North 
Atlantic region as of 1966-67 than build further cables:
If suitable satellite circuits are available to meet our additional 
needs at that time in the Worth Atlantic, which is an area where 
high-capacity cables could be attractive, we would prefer, for di- 
versity reasons, to use satellite circuits instead of placing addi- 
tional cables. (48)
This apparent commitment is worth examining. The letter foresaw a need 
for both satellites and cables due to the expected increases in traffic 
and the desire for diversity in transmission modes. Bell's preference 
for satellite circuits would continue until the North Atlantic region 
had approximately equal numbers of cable and satellite circuits available, 
although AT&T was not committing itself to using equal numbers of each for 
its own needs.
Furthermore, AT&T was addressing itself only to "additional needs" 
in a single region, albeit a very important one. Nothing was said of the 
possibility of sharing out existing traffic levels between the two modes, 
and it could therefore be inferred that Bell was reserving the right to 
keep its cables fully loaded notwithstanding the number of satellite 
circuits remaining idle and channeling the overflow via satellite until 
such a time when available satellite circuits and cable circuits were 
equal. In discussing service between North and South America, AT&T fore- 
cast a requirement for 80 phone circuits by 1966 and said it might defer 
its current cable plans in favour of "using satellite facilities initial- 
ly, w.th cables possibly coming along later,"^
AT&T therefore was not promising to consider satellites as indefinite 
replacements for further undersea cables.
We expect to continue development of improved undersea cable sys- 
tems and undoubtedly other, organizations can be expected to do the 
same...The high capacity cable will have many important applications
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but vie see no basic reason why it should prevent satellite usage 
from reaching an economical and profitable level. (50)
Indeed during congressional hearings earlier in 1963 the author of the 
December letter, AT&T executive vice president J. Dingman, had reported 
that work had begun in 1962 on installing transistors instead of electron 
tubes in Bell's cables, and had predicted a 720-circuit transistorised 
cable by 1966/ 51^
Nevertheless the letter represented a signal to the Europeans that 
they would not be able to count on AT&T support in any attempt to deny 
satellites a niche within the international telecommunications industry. 
"We would," the letter had said, "take all reasonable steps to assist 
in obtaining this [satellite] agreement." The New York Times at least 
reported that Bell's apparent commitment was crucial to persuading the 
British to join fully with GETS in the negotiations:
This decision by AT&T long a commercial partner of the British 
Post Office in cable communications was believed to have had a 
direct influence in swinging Britain over to participation in 
the satellite system. (5?)
Just what lay behind Bell's timely declaration is not clear, inasmuch 
as there is no evidence that the government requested or otherwise pre- 
vailed upon the company to make the announcement. Three points seem, 
however, reasonable to surmise, related to Bell's cable ambitions, its 
desire to purchase a big share of Comsat stock and the possibility of 
congressional intervention. AT&T had at this time a request pending 
before the FGC for authorisation to build a fourth transatlantic cable 
and, as mentioned, the company was developing new high-capacity cables 
which it would naturally want permission to deploy. The Commission would 
very likely have found it difficult to issue cable authorisations if these 
would, in effect, be undermining the national policy in favour of rapid 
creation of a self-financing satellite system. AT&T's offer to share 
further traffic increases in the Atlantic with the satellite system would 
therefore blunt criticisms that new cablej would necessarily rob the space 
system of business. Also, the PCC had not yet decided on the precise dis- 
position of the 50 percent of Cornsat shares reserved to the carrier indus- 
try. In spite of indications that the Commission favoured in principle 
allowing purchases by the entire domestic and international carrier indus- 
try, AT&T still hoped to maximise its holdings and would seem poorly quali- 
fied to do so if the company seemed headed toward becoming Comsat's chief
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commercial competitor. Finally, there appears to have been some con- 
gressional concern pver AT&T's intentions: indeed, in spite of the 
December letter the chairman of the House commerce committee warned ear- 
ly in January that Congress "can act effectively and expeditiously" to 
protect the national interest.
It is my sincere hope that such action will not be necessary in 
order to bring about agreement on the part of the domestic groups 
who may have divergent interests with regard to the establishment 
of an early global satellite system. (53)
AT&T's declaration thus can be seen in part as an attempt to pre-empt 
a potentially embarrassing set of congressional hearings, which moreover 
might have succeeded in exacting a more rigourous pledge from the com- 
pany regarding satellite use than the letter in fact provided.
7. GOM5AT BEGINS LETTING SATELLITE CONTRACTS
A second source of pressure upon European in U.S. eyes recalcitrance 
lay in Comsat's growing technical activities. On December 22, 1963 the 
Corporation published a request for bids from contractors willing to pro- 
vide a worldwide "basic system" by 1967-68. At the time the request was
announced, various British and French telecommunications and aerospace
(<5/0
officials were in Washington for discussions with Comsat, so it can
safely be assumed that the point was taken: the United States did not 
intend to await the outcome of the international discussions before pro- 
ceeding with creation of the satellite network. Comsat asked 15 American 
aerospace firms to submit proposals for either a low-altitude random, a 
medium-altitude phased, or a high-altitude geostationary orbiting system. 
(A phased system would consist of multiple satellites passing at regular 
intervals.) The contract parameters IIBTQ softened for the synchronous 
option: this was to be ready for global deployment by 1968, while the 
non-sychronous systems had to be ready a year earlier;^ similarly, 
Comsat asked for satellites to have guaranteed useful 'lives' of five 
years, at a time when specialists in non-synchronous craft were promising 
ten years and Hughes was only willing to guarantee two to three.
Although Comsat had previously..voiced., its intention to launch a 
prototype satellite early in 1966 with full global operation to follow 
Jbhe next year, the December request for bids doubtless put this talk
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in a considerably more serious light. By the February deadline, Comsat 
had received five concrete proposals for systems of all three types,^ ' 
and on June 8, 1964 the Corporation informed the FGC that it had awarded 
five contracts: two to Hughes, totalling more than $17m for continued 
work on synchronous satellites; one to AT&T and one to RCA, each for 
more than a million dollars for random systems; and another jointly to
Space Technology Laboratories and ITT, for nearly Si.3m for a phased
(59) 
satellite system. xy/
Comsat also was proceeding with plans for an "early capability sys- 
tem," which it hoped to have operational by spring 1965. On January 21 
the Corporation asked NASA to agree in principle to launch an initial 
experimental/operational satellite to serve the Worth Atlantic, and on 
February 28 the space agency agreed.^ ' FCC approval was asked in early 
March for a prototype synchronous satellite to be launched in a year's 
time, a project distinct from the basic system. Comsat noted the success 
of the NASA Syncom satellites, built by Hughes, and said that the design 
of its proposed 'Early Bird 1 satellite was "derived primarily from that 
of the Syncom II satellite,"^ ' which had become the first successful 
geostationary satellite after its launch by NASA on July 26, 1963. The 
FCC approved Comsat's application in mid April, and within a week an $8m
contract had been signed with Hughes for a 240-circuit synchronous satel-
( 69^ lite.^ "' Comsat also was granted permission to modify AT&T's Telstar
earth station in Maine, and to make necessary arrangements for operations 
with British, French, German and Italian earth stations. '
The decision that Comsat should press ahead with firm plans for the 
satellite system, regardless of the international negotiations, was 
apparently reached with the full support of the State Department, now 
freed by the American success at the EARC from undue solicitude for 
foreign opinion. The Department soon made it clear that it regarded 
the tactic as a very fruitful one, as this extract from April 1964 House 
testimony by its legal adviser shows:
We have made it clear...to the foreign governments that the time- 
table was set by the Corporation's program and that the foreign 
governments and entities by failure to agree would not delay the 
Corporation's program.
British interests and other European interests had thought at one 
point, that by delaying this and deferring this, they could get in 
with...another generation of cables and put this whole thing off...
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It was the fact that the Corporation was able to mount a pro- 
gram for Early Bird which would supply this North Atlantic ca- 
pability in 1965, and the Department and AT&T backed them up 
on it, that broke the resistance of these certain European 
countries and resulted in what we regard as a highly favorable 
climate for cooperative participation in an early system. (65)
The message therefore was: "We were going to have that thing up and we 
were going to be using it, and if anybody else wanted to get on board 
they could, but if not, we would see them later."' '
Comsat's position that, as its president put it, "we do not in- 
tend to let [the international] discussions delay our plans to establish
f £j\
a global satellite system as soon as feasible,"^ ' must also however be 
understood in its domestic context  of congressional pressure on the 
Corporation for it to assume certain technical responsibilities, of the 
forthcoming sale of Comsat stock and, arguably, of a corporate interest 
in asserting a degree of independence from AT&T. NASA had beenadrawing 
considerable criticism in Congress for continuing to conduct R&D be- 
lieved to be of principal benefit to Comsat. The space agency's expla- 
nation was equivocal, and although officials testified in early
that none of their projects were specifically intended as assistance
( fiS^ 
to Comsat,^ ' they also acknowledged that without NASA's continued
work on satellite communications creation of the commercial system 
would probably be delayed  an admission that prompted one senator to 
complain that it had been precisely because of his belief that "private 
indtistry would have more flexibility, greater speed, more initiative, 
greater risk-taking" that he had voted for the Comsat Act in the first 
place. ' Similar questions of the propriety of apparent NASA assis- 
tance to a private company were raised during hearings on Comsat in 
March 1963 and on NASA's own appropriations in March 1964.
Comsat also had its prospective domestic investors to consider 
since, as mentioned, its temporary incorporators were under pressure 
from the FCC to issue and sell the company's stock. It presumably would 
furthermore be valuable in the international negotiations if Comsat had 
at -its disposal the full $200m it was authorised to raise  enough, it 
was thought, to create the space-segment alone if needs be  and some 
firm indication of the company's technical direction would be desirable 
before Comsat went to the capital market, especially if the 'public' 
shares were to be fully subscribed.
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As it turned out, Comsat had no trouble selling its stock. The 
five million shares reserved for the carriers were fully subscribed by 
May 27. A total of 163 communications carriers had asked FCC authorisa- 
tion to purchase more than 6.5 million shares in all, AT&T alone reques- 
ting 4.25 million. The Commission's distribution formula set aside, 
notably, nearly 2.9 million for Bell, thereby assuring the company three 
seats on Gomsat's board and just under 29 percent of its total stock; 
1.85 million shares went to ITT, which got one seat on the board; 350,000 
shares went to GT&E and 250,000 to RCA. And despite warnings in the com- 
pany's Prospectus, issued by its incorporators on June 4, that "No divi-
f 7ildends will be paid on the common stock for an indeterminate period," v ' 
the public shares were readily sold as well. On May 14 the governors 
of the Wew York Stock Exchange approved Comsat's stock for listing be- 
fore it was actually listed, an unprecedented action explained by the
president of the stock exchange by reference to Comsat's creation by
(12] Congress as "an instrument of national policy." v ' That confidence
contributed to a rapid oversubscription of shares in what The Mew York 
Times called the biggest underwriting of its kind since Pord Motor Com- 
pany had gone public in 195&; within minutes Comsat's share price rose
from $20 to $2", later settling to $21.50 by week's end indeed the price
(73)
went as high as $70 by December.^ ~ ' Public holdings x-rere widely dis- 
persed, since by the end of 1964 more than half those investors o'-Tied 
10 shares or fewer, and 95 percent 50 or fewer; nearly 12 percent of 
all accounts were held for minors, suggesting Comsat's attraction as a 
growth stock enabling "a starry-eyed role as owners of a piece of the 
first private business in space," as one account described participants 
at Comsat's first stockholders' meeting. '
Finally, Comsat's apparent haste in taking on technical activities 
and letting H&D and equipment contracts may also be explained by a desire 
to push ahead with synchronous satellite technology, notwithstanding 
AT&T's continued preference for a random orbiting system. Abram Chayes 
has suggested' that the Early Bird decision and the contracts for the 
basic system were "dominated by the AT&T problem:"
Once you had Comsat set up as a new group...they had two choices. 
One was to become an appendage of an appendage of AT&T. And one 
was to have at least some independent, substantial role, position, 
prestige in the international communications arena. If you took
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that AT&T bid...then AT&T dominated you: they had all the traf- 
fic, they had all the hardware, they had two sources of public 
shareholders. There was nothing then that Comsat would be but a 
messenger boy for AT&T. As it was AT&T had a lot of whip hand 
over [ComsatJ. But if they took the AT&T hardware, they would 
have been dead. (75)
Although Bell Labs' satellite pioneer John Pierce later acknowledged that 
"the success of Syncom makes one wonder why anyone was ever interested in 
low-altitude satellites,"^ ' AT&T had nevertheless been preparing a fall- 
back position around the issue of rapid deployment: a company vice presi- 
dent testified in Congress that he foresaw Comsat's establishing an ini- 
tial random system by 1966-67, and only in time replacing it with synchro- 
nous satellites. "It will be very unusual," he said, "if the ideal sys- 
tem will be the first one."^ ' Comsat's contracting suggested a rejec- 
tion of Bell's prediction.
8. COMSAT AMD THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT DISCUSS A JOINT SYSTEM
The third component of what was in effect a U.S. demonstration of its 
intention to proceed with development of the satellite system without 
the Europeans, if necessary, pertained to a joint civil-military network. 
In an October 11, 1963 letter to Comsat President Charyk, Secretary of 
Defence McNamara asked whether the Corporation might be interested in 
providing specially tailored telecommunications services to the Pentagon. 
^ ' The Department of Defence (DOD) had just completed the 'project 
definition phase' of a military satellite system that would consist of
around 60 spacecraft in medium-altitude random orbits, to be built at a
(79;cost of $50-60m by Philco's Space Technology Labs.^ ^ J It will be re- 
called that during the Comsat Act debates DOD officials had consistently 
said that a separate military system would be necessary a view endorsed 
by industry^- '—and again in April 1963 Gen. Alfred Starbird, director
of the Defence Communications Agency, told a House subcommittee that the
( p~\ \
military would be needing its own system as soon as possible.
Nevertheless, DOD had now decided to pursue the possibility of 
creating at least its initial-sys-tem-jointly with Comsat's commercial 
network and in January 1964 the Defence Communications Agency (DCA) 
set up an interagency group to study the feasibility of sharing certain
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satellite components with commercial users. Interest at first focussed 
on the satellite's transponders, which, are the basic units of its relay 
equipment, each consisting of a discrete bank of carrier wave transmitters 
xiMch are in turn used to derive actual circuits. Since the interagency 
group determined that it would be technically impossible to share trans- 
ponders with public users, attention shifted to the possibility of de- 
signing the satellite to house separate transponders designated for mili- 
tary and commercial uses. '
The scheme seems in retrospect obviously doomed, but through the 
winter and spring of 1964 a succession of DOD witnesses appeared before 
the House military operations subcommittee to contradict one another and 
exasperate subcommittee members and staff on the possibility of a joint 
project with Comsat. In February McNamara told another committee that 
DOD's requirements might be met through Comsat's systenr ' but in March 
Harold Brown, then Pentagon director of research and engineering, testi- 
fied that DOD would insist upon a lower altitude preferably random  
system, since geostationary satellites were considered vulnerable and 
susceptible to tampering from the ground; their potential usefulness 
was confined to heavy traffic regions, which would also require non- 
synchronous satellite coverage. Hence at the same time Comsat was 
headed toward approving a geostationary system, DOD was saying that such 
a system would by definition be unsuitable.
Both sides nevertheless showed keen interest in working out an accom- 
modation of some kind. In March Comsat's president confirmed that tenta- 
tively at least the company preferred a synchronous system, but indicated 
that since it also wanted to lay hold of the high volume of DOD traffic 
a combination of synchronous and non-synchronous satellites might be pos- 
sible. ' DOD. for its part, was willing to make its design specifica-/ a/-\
tions "definitely softer and easier," according to one witness,^ for 
a joint system than those it had insisted upon when plans for an exclusive 
military system were developed 18 months earlier.
There appear to have been two main reasons why the Pentagon sought a 
merged satellite system cost savings and international politics. First, 
it was claimed that such a system would cost DOD less, although just how 
much less was unclear. Assistant defence secretary Dr. Eugene Fubini said
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that the Pentagon would finally pay around one-sixth of what itn ox-m.
( S7^ 
system would cost/- ' "but that estimate was scrutinised and challenged
"by Wilbur Pritchard, a satellite expert then with the Air Force's 'think 
tank 1 Aerospace Corporation and later with Comsat, who said that a 'gain 
factor' of three was more likely than six, since the Pentagon would not 
want to operate its facilities at the lower shared commercial frequen- 
cies and would therefore lose carrying capacity "by functioning in the 
higher exclusive "bandwidths where attenuation of signals was greater/ '
The second reason for pursuing a joint system, according to Dr. 
FuMni,
is that it seems to us that if we could prove "by this agreement 
that it is indeed possible to make a single communications satel- 
lite system work for as different a set of purposes as the commer- 
cial purposes and the defense purposes, it would be, I think, unmis- 
takably proven and almost beyond doubt that the idea of the Communi- 
cations Satellite Act for a single worldwide system open to all may 
be indeed even more feasible than our fondest hopes could lead us 
to believe. (89)
DOD, in other words, was willing to modify its requirements in order to 
contribute to a national demonstration of the practicability of a single 
global system deployed under nominally commercial auspices. And, in fact, 
the U.S. would show that even without international agreement it could 
finance and use at least half the proposed capacity of the system, since 
the Pentagon was considering utilising one of the two transponders aboard 
each of the first-generation satellites.
If the proposal impressed the Europeans, however, it also infuriated 
them. In early March Comsat officials Welch and Charyk, along with DOD 
representatives, visited Britain, France, Italy and Germany to brief them 
on the status of Comsat-Pentagon discussions/ ' There could be no doubt 
that the scheme, in the State Department's view, "adds an additional com- 
plication into the arrangements that are projected for foreign participa- 
tion:"^ ' DOD after all wanted two entirely separate transponders in 
each satellite, a random orbiting system, and the right to use spare capa- 
city from the commercial transponder as and when needed; furthermore, the 
foreign partners would not be allowed to bid on any contracts to equip the 
Pentagon's half  of each satellite.^' _And^ any international role in run- 
ning the satellite system could not extend to authority over DOD earth 
stations their necessity, location, technical compatibility with the rest
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of the network, or their design specifications. ' Charyk later said:
Basically what the Department of Defense sought was for us to 
attempt to negotiate with the other countries an arrangement 
whereby although the other countries were going to put up 40 
percent of the money that they would have no say whatsoever 
in the design of half of the satellite. (94)
By mid-May "distinct conflict" with the Europeans on the issue of 
ground station control was reported, and a basic "incompatibility" was 
recognised between the joint system scheme and the commercial negotia- 
tions; it was later said that the changes in the latter which the Pen- 
tagon wanted would have "gravely endangered" success of the discussions. 
While the State Department thought the joint scheme impossible to negoti- 
ate  it would have "cut the international participation so thin that no- 
body would have bought it"^ '  and consequently feared that the proposal
would delay creation of the commercial system, 7 ' the House military opera-
tions subcommittee was afraid the commercial negotiations would delay es-
(98) tablishment of the military system. '
Finally, after a meeting in the White House on July 8, the State 
Department summarised its objections to the plan, writing James O'Connell, 
White House director of telecommunications management: "Many countries 
would find it impossible politically to participate in a system one part 
of which would be reserved for U.S. National Communications System use."' 
^-^' Accordingly a week later McNamara announced "much to my regret" that 
DOD would resume work on its own satellite system  having lost, it was 
later estimated, between 12 and 18 months because of the discussions with 
Comsat^ '  due to unresolved questions of security, technical compati- 
bility and diplomatic necessity.^ ' Comsat, however, was still unwilling 
to forego the estimated $25m in annual revenues the Pentagon would have 
been furnishing, ' and at the final plenary session of the commercial 
negotiations Corporation Chairman Welch delivered a general statement to 
the effect that the satellite system would be available to serve the unique 
governmental requirements of any participating country.
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE 1964 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED AND ANALYSED
1. THE DYNAMIC SHIFTS
With necessary frequency allocations secured, the American carriers ap- 
parently committed to using satellite circuits, Comsat beginning to let 
satellite construction contracts and the Pentagon interested in leasing 
perhaps half the system's capacity, the pressure at the beginning of 1964 
was certainly on the Europeans.
The first real indication that the U.S. strategy might be working 
came in January, during a meeting in Karlsruhe, West Germany of the ad 
hoc satellite group established by the European Conference of Posts and 
Telecommunications (CEPT). Great Britain officially announced that it 
would join in the European multilateral effort, and became the first 
country to offer an actual capital contribution, tentatively 10 percent 
of the total. ' Postmaster General Reginald Bevins explained, in a 
February speech in London, that Comsat 1 s projections of 1966 for creation 
of the initial global system were "some years earlier than we have hitherto 
thought likely." He further cautioned, however:
Whatever form our participation takes it will obviously cost money 
and we should commit ourselves only if we can secure satisfactory 
terms which give us a real chance to influence the design and char- 
acter of the ownership and opportunities to participate in develop- 
ment studies and, in due course, in the provision of material. (2)
The CEPT ad hoc group had reported favourably on the U.S. proposals to 
the European Conference on Satellite Communications (GETS) after the 
Karlsruhe meeting, and indicated that the group's members wanted to 
join in creating the early capability satellite system.^
These sessions were, however, preliminaries to the meeting scheduled 
for February 10 in Rome, which was the first formal negotiating session 
between Americans and Europeans described in the trade press as "a fork 
in the road."^ ' As set forth in this meeting, the main U.S. proposals 
on international arrangements were that Comsat should serve as the sys- 
tem's manager, and that ownership should be shared among participants in
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proportion to their anticipated usage. ' A total of 120 officials 
from 17 European countries and Canada, plus observers from Australia"and 
the Vatican, met for three days with representatives of Comsat, the PCC 
and the State Department. A communique" issued February 12 indicated two 
main areas of agreement: Comsat would be the system's manager, and the 
system would be directed by a steering committee of representatives from 
the major national users of international telecommunications channels. ' 
The Europeans had thus largely surrendered their initial preference for 
a multinational organisation consisting of a general conference which 
would exercise ultimate authority and where each member country would 
have one vote , a governing board and an international technical and 
administrative secretariat. They were instead moving toward acceptance 
of the U.S. proposal for a two-tiered structure a governing body with
restricted membership and weighted voting, and a manager within a joint
(1} 
venture that in itself would have no independent legal identity. v/
There still remained the question of how the shares in the venture 
would be allocated. The United States had been aware that the offer of 
ownership participation might help draw the French and British away from 
attempting to protect their cable investments. ' Now, however, not 
only was the increasingly likely prospect of the satellite system be- 
ginning to take its intended effect in, apparently, influencing European
( 9) 
attitudes on cable construction/ ' but GETS members were interested in
putting up more money for the satellite system than the U.S. believed 
them entitled to. ' At one point the Swiss delegation, perhaps face- 
tiously, suggested that Switzerland pay the entire $200m cost of the 
project, since it would be less than the Swiss government's annual com- 
munications budget. ' For their part, the Americans could afford to 
hold back in the face of apparent GETS eagerness, and after the Rome 
meeting Comsat's president said "we are completely flexible" as to 
whether foreign participants invested in or simply used the satellites. 
( 12' The U.S. position in favour of weighted voting had been accepted 
by the Europeans, who were now trying to maximise their investments and 
thus their voting weights.^ '
Notwithstanding the issues that remained, it was clear that the 
dynamic in the negotiations had shifted, and press reports suggested that
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raost of the 17 GETS members were now eager to sign an agreement "as 
soon as possible in order to gain an early say in the development and 
management" of the system.' 14' "They know," Chayes said,
that every day that passes, we are making more decisions, we are 
learning more, we are foreclosing other options about the ulti- 
mate characteristics of the system. (15)
The U.S. delegation meanwhile held talks in early March with Japanese 
and Australian officials; both countries report 
about participating and investing'in the system.
2._VOTING PROCEDURES AND DURATION OP AGREEMENTS
edly were enthusiastic
(16)
At the next full U.S.-GETS negotiating session in London from April 6 to 
8, the issues of precise voting weights, dual agreements and duration of 
the organisational arrangements were addressed. With regard to voting, 
the Europeans wanted a limit placed on the number of votes any one member 
of the governing body could cast preferably a maximum of three or four 
votes out of the projected total of 12 regardless of the member's in- 
vestment shares. The Americans insisted upon a strictly proportional 
translation of shares into votes, but accepted that some check would be 
needed on Comsat's ability to out-vote unilaterally all its partners on 
the basis of the 60 percent shareholding it was then proposing for itself. 
Discussion therefore centred on adopting a two-thirds majority rule for 
major issues, which would oblige Comsat to enlist the support of at least
one of its partners on the board to sustain its proposals although leav-
(17) ing unchanged U.S. veto power. '
The American proposal that there be two agreements, one intergovern- 
mental and the other among nominated operating entities from each coun- 
try, ran into heavy opposition at this session. The notion originated 
with the U.S. government, not Comsat, and was seen as a way of further 
defining the state's relationship to the private entity. The govern- 
ment would be able to circumvent the treaty-making process which would 
require Senate ratification and which would have been more or less com- 
pulsory had the government been taking_on jfinancial obligation and 
would in a general sense be able to distance itself from commercial 
satellite operations/ 1 ' "It was," according to a State Department
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official, "an effort to try to define a whole area in which the con- 
cerns were predominantly if not exclusively those of Comsat Corporation."
(19)
v " The governmental representatives of the GETS members, however un- 
like the PTT officials found the arrangement hard to accept, since they 
were as governments being asked to undertake firm commitments with a pri- 
vate U.S. corporation. Finally at a mid-June meeting, the nominal head 
of the American delegation Ambassador David Bruce delivered a strongly 
worded statement threatening to "break off further discussions unless the 
notion of dual agreements was accepted, and it was. '
It was during the early April sessions in London that the GETS members 
introduced their most important counter-proposal to the American package 
introduced in February in Rome, that concerning the duration of the ar- 
rangements then being negotiated. The Europeans were in effect willing 
to defer, but not surrender, their preference for a new international en- 
tity, with multinationalised management and a general assembly of all 
participants. They therefore proposed making the arrangements interim 
ones, to be re-negotiated in as little as three years, to coincide with 
Comsat's current estimates of when the global system would be operational. 
Since it was also foreseen that membership,in the system would meanwhile 
be growing, some modification of the agreements seemed desirable in order 
to offer equitable or at least acceptable terms to new participants.
The Americans however wanted the interim period made as long as possible,
(21") preferring 10 years from the entry-into-force of the arrangements.
Two further issues, both of which continued to have considerable 
impact upon Intelsat during its interim period, were introduced at this 
time: the nature of the 'single global system' and procurement policies. 
The U.S. wanted to insert binding language in the agreements to obligate 
signatories to adhere to the single global system concept, and therefore 
to refrain from creating their own national or regional satellite networks. 
GETS members, however, supported a French proposal that participants re- 
tain the right to create additional systems "if required to meet unique
(22) governmental needs or if otherwise required in the national interest," v
language strikingly similar to that contained in the Comsat Act. The 
Europeans also were not satisfied with the American position on procure- 
ment that contracts for equipment should be awarded solely according to the 
competitive criteria of quality, price and time and conditions of delivery.
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This conflicted with a GETS desire for a statutory guarantee that con- 
tracts would "be distributed among signatories in approximate proportion 
to the investment shares each held in the joint venture  the principle 
of juste retour adhered to by ELDO, notably.
Nevertheless, the negotiations seemed to be moving toward a smooth
conclusion. The British raised the amount they were willing to contri-
(23) bute to £15m, v reiterating their rationale in remarks to the Commons
by the Postmaster-General:
The Government's view is that the only way of preventing an 
American monopoly in this sphere is to join a partnership with 
the United States and other countries and so secure the right 
to influence the course of events. (24)
An additional £1.5m would be spent on modifying the Goonhilly earth sta- 
tion to enable it to work with the Early Bird satellite.
3. THE SOVIET INTERLUDE
Transatlantic meetings continued, notably including a gathering of 13 
countries in Montreal at the end of April, where a set of ITU 1962 pro- 
jections of estimated world traffic shares for 1968 were used to deter- 
mine an investment participation formula that would reflect anticipated 
satellite usage. ^ ' Significantly, it was decided that traffic between 
geographically separated territories under single national jurisdictions 
was for investment purposes to be considered as international. This 
included, at the time, traffic between East and West Pakistan and, more 
to the point, between the continental United States and Hawaii. On May 
25 a full session was reconvened in London to compare drafts prepared 
by both sides and attempt to agree on language. Negotiations resumed 
in London on June 13, only to recess two days later to allow U.S. repre- 
sentatives to meet with Soviet officials in Geneva.
This brief and inconclusive encounter grew out of a history of: mutual 
overtures dating from President Kennedy's January 196! State of the Union 
Message to Congress, when he said: "This administration intends to explore
promptly all possible areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union and other
~ (27) 
nations to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. " v " The
-162-
theme was repeated in the President's address to the UN General Assembly 
in September, and after the orbital mission of U.S. astronaut John Glenn 
in February 1962 telegrammes were exchanged between Kennedy and Khruschev, 
followed by more detailed letters in which the Soviet premier suggested 
that priority be given to cooperative work on space communications. ' 
Between March and June 1962 a total of 10 days of meetings were held in 
Geneva among American and Soviet space officials, and it was decided that 
"separate but coordinated" work would be conducted on meteorological satel- 
lites, mapping the earth's magnetic fields and experimental satellite com-
( 29) implications. ' In a December report to the UN Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, although only passive satellite experiments were 
listed scheduled to begin in August 1963 with the Echo II spacecraft  
both sides promised "to give further consideration to the possibility 
of joint cooperation" in active satellite development as well. '
The Soviets nevertheless ignored a December 1963 invitation from the 
U.S. to join in the commercial negotiations until the following March, 
when they requested the meeting with U.S. officials in Geneva, timed to 
coincide with a forthcoming session of the UN space committee. The
resulting two-day encounter was, however, little more than a "pro forma
(32} 
exercise," v ' and a joint communique" issued on June 16 described an
"exchange of opinions," the conventional description of unproductive 
diplomatic talks. ' The Soviets spoke about their space programme and 
indicated that they chose to regard the U.S. satellite scheme as equally 
experimental, while expressing hope that further cooperation might be 
possible at some unspecified point in the future. '
It could hardly be surprising, however, that the Soviets showed 
little interest in joining the commercial negotiations. They could not 
have been unaware of the strident Cold War rhetoric that had accompanied 
passage of the Comsat Act. Furthermore, as early as March 1962 the So- 
viet Union had announced its conviction that only states and not private 
companies or profit-seeking consortia should be permitted to engage in 
space activities. ' They also objected to what they saw as a deliberate 
American policy of bypassing the rTff~and the UN both of whose claims to 
authority over an international space effort were at least arguable and 
to the U.S. preference for weighted voting/ ' which suggested that the 
Americans were arranging "with a small group of Western countries for the
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sharing out of the profits from the operation of the system on American
(37) terms." Indeed if the criterion for determining investment shares
were strictly applied, the Soviets would have ended up with fewer votes 
within the consortium than Switzerland, due to the low volume of Soviet
/ -,0\
international traffic.^ ' Hence both the institutional form and commer- 
cial basis adopted for the venture appear to explain the Soviet reluctance
(39} to participate, '
Whether Soviet participation was however many the apparent invi- 
tations actually in the interests of the U.S. is quite another matter. 
Attempts to tailor ownership quotas to reflect likely Soviet technolo- 
gical contributions would undoubtedly have opened a number of issues 
safely settled by reliance on national traffic volumes. The Soviets 
also would have found a Comsat veto if, that is, they had consented 
to deal with a private American company unacceptable, and the U.S. 
might consequently have had to bear the political costs of forcing a 
Soviet withdrawal from negotiations in which they were already engaged. 
Soviet interest, furthermore, came extremely late in the discussions, 
when little but details remained to be settled. Their actual partici- 
pation, in the view of one American negotiator, "would have been a disas- 
ter," probably delaying for months conclusion of the accords and perhaps 
endangering the outcome altogether.
4. THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED
When the discussions reconvened after the Americans returned from Geneva, 
investment quotas and the duration of the arrangements were agreed. Com- 
sat was to get just over 61 percent of the venture's stock and, more im- 
portant, prevailed on the question of which participants would be obliged 
to surrender parts of their holdings to accommodate new members who might 
wish to invest. Comsat had insisted on a pro rata arrangement, while the 
GETS members had sought a guarantee that, up to a point, all the re-distri- 
bution of holdings would be at Comsat's expense. A 1969 deadline was de- 
cided as the maximum duration of the arrangements before a conference of 
all participants would be called to consider a permanent organisational 
structure. This represented a compromise of the U.S. position in favour
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of a 10-year interim period, tut still seemed to promise Oomsat at 
least a full year's experience in managing the global satellite system.
The Americans held fast to the essentials of their procurement 
policy, Taut they acceded to the proviso that where bids were comparable 
in terms of price, quality and delivery conditions, the manager should 
try to ensure that contracts were awarded with consideration given to 
national stockholdings.
Conferees agreed to meet again in Washington on July 17 to resolve 
the final areas of disagreement: the exact, voting procedures the gov- 
erning board would follow, and the fate of the U.S. attempt to impose a 
ban on creation of other satellite systems. The Europeans were to hold 
among them 18 votes on the Interim Communications Satellite Committee, 
the system's governing body, and wanted major issues to require the votes 
of Comsat and at least 15 of the 18; the U.S. insisted that two votes 
in addition to Comsat's should be sufficient. ' It was not until July 
23, the day before the agreements were initialled, that the American 
position was accepted: on significant questions such as the choice of 
space segment design, major budget decisions, launching programme, appro- 
val of investment quotas Comsat 61 percent of the votes on the commit- 
tee would have to be augmented by another 12.5 percent, meaning at least 
the votes of Britain (8.4 percent) and one other member.
On the question of the integrity of the 'single global system', am- 
biguity remained until conclusion of the agreements and indeed was little 
diminished even then. The GETS bloc continued to insist upon the position 
advanced at the London meeting in April: that nothing in the accords could 
stop signatories from creating additional systems as they saw fit. In 
Washington in July the U.S. delegation proposed a new paragraph barring 
participation in "any commercial communications satellite system other 
than the single global system which is the subject of this Agreement," 
while adding:
Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the creation of additional 
communications satellite systems if required to meet the unique gov- 
ernmental needs of any of the Parties... (44)
The French delegation, however, objected to this addition, and after assu- 
rances from Italian representatives that all parties understood and would 
adhere to the single system concept which remained formally in the Preamble 
to the accords the U.S. withdrew its proposal.
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5. AMERICAN DOMINANCE RINGTIONAL OR POLITICAL?
Under the interim agreements, initialled in Washington on July 24, 1964, 
the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (intelsat) was 
created as an unincorporated joint venture under the general direction of 
an Interim Communications Satellite Committee (ICSC), composed of repre- 
sentatives of those participating countries whose investment in the sys- 
tem's space segment came to 1.5 percent or more of the total capital outlay. 
Membership was to "be restricted to members of the ITU, which at the time 
excluded mainland China, North Korea and North Vietnam. Comsat was named 
operational, financial, technical and administrative manager of the con- 
sortium, as well as the venture's sole legal personality authorised to 
contract and carry out other legal transactions on its "behalf and was 
majority stockholder and U.S. representative on the ICSC. Comsat's initial 
61 percent holding could not fall "below $0.6 percent under the interim 
agreements; 17 percent of Intelsat shares were reserved for signatories 
"beyond the original 19*
The collective dominance of the original signatories would remain 
unshaken throughout the interim period, since no provision was made to 
re-compute shareholdings on the basis of changes in national percentages 
of world traffic occasioned by, say, the introduction of satellite ser- 
vice or the advent of new services made available for the first time by 
satellites. As a Comsat official later acknowledged:
The traffic data incorporated an inherent bias in favor of countries 
with cable interests and tended to penalize users which had no sub- 
marine cable facilities to provide basic data, irrespective of their 
subsequent actual use of Intelsat satellite facilities to meet inter- 
national telecommunications requirements. Frequently, these are 
developing countries. (46)
The agreements stipulated, however, that within a year after global ser- 
vice was operationalised, or in any event by January 1, 19^9» "the ICSC 
was to issue a report to all participating governments on its recommenda- 
tions on permanent organisational arrangements. The report was to con- 
sider, among other things, "whether the interim arrangements should be 
continued on a permanent basis or whether-a permanent international admin- 
istrative and technical staff should be established.^
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The terras offered to and finally accepted by the Europeans were 
clearly far from generous, and there is much to Schiller's acerbic ob- 
servation:
The problem for the American side was to establish an interna^- 
tional commercial communications system that would satisfy the 
Europeans sufficiently to enlist their membership and support 
as customers and participants, while at the same time it pre- 
vented their interfering with American control. (47)
A sharply limited degree of power sharing seemed to be provided for, at 
least among the small number of major communicating countries, but the 
role of further members was to be held to a minimum compatible with the 
system's functioning.^ ' Even for the original members, their statutory 
role was that of minority participants on the ICSG, "a steering group for 
a number of joint venturers" with "no legal personality as such."^ '
The significance of this unquestionable American dominance under the 
interim arrangements has been variously assigned, and there are two prin- 
cipal interpretations that deserve examination and, in our view, rejec- 
tion: that the dominance was functionally required and therefore appro- 
priate, and that the dominance signalled a victory of commercial over 
political forces and was therefore inappropriate.
The main line of American legitimation has been that U.S. control 
was suited to the prevailing distribution of technical competence and 
ultimately to the functions the satellite organisation was to perform. 
A 1963 RAND Corporation consideration of non-U.S. participation noted 
the strong interest the Europeans had in developing space technology but 
concluded:
Even if, in the long nan, other nations could make a useful techno- 
logical contribution to the satellite system, we feel that their 
voices in decisions relating to research and development of the 
first system should be kept to a minimum; otherwise there will 
be a risk that the inauguration of the system will be delayed. (50)
Here, the presumed absence of R&D capabilities in Europe is adduced as 
reason to reduce foreign influence over decisions made in regard to the 
early system. Whether the gap in aerospace development between the U.S. 
in Europe is supposed to mean that the Europeans were not capable of 
participating more fully in decision-making, or that they did not deserve 
to do so, is not clear.
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That ambiguity poses no problem to the functions-related justifi- 
cation for the agreements, however, since it is the substantive admis- 
sion of a multiplicity of perspectives that is believed to threaten the 
system's success:
The fast-moving world of communications satellite technology is 
not compatible with the slow process of political accommodation 
necessary for action to be taken by most of the international 
agencies with which Intelsat is frequently compared. (51)
R. Colino, the head of Comsat's international arrangements division, has 
similarly contrasted the European "organisation-oriented" approach with
( CO*)
the pragmatic American "agreement-oriented" one, w ~' arguing that the 
U.S. desire to assign priority to streamlined direction, unhindered by 
competing nationalistic policy tendencies, was destined to yield a more 
effective system. Real internationalisation was best relegated to broad 
regulatory arrangements: "[Ajgreement on principles, adherence to such 
principles, and development of cooperative arrangements with respect to 
specific functional problems should provide the requisite order."^ '
Consequently, the reasoning goes, practically all the features of 
the 1964 agreements that might be criticised as glaringly advantageous 
to Comsat and the U.S. if not humiliating for their foreign partners  
can be justified by their indispensability to assuring rapid and effec- 
tive satellite deployment and operation. Comsat's positions as manager 
and majority stockholder were due to its technical expertise and its 
custody of U.S. overseas telecommunications traffic. If the system were 
to be created quickly, there could be no place for policies that would 
deliberately and because of abstract principles channel equipment con- 
tracts to European firms that might then only have to be brought up to 
date on research already performed in the U.S. "The goal iras fundamen- 
tally incompatible with notions of artificial allocation of contracts 
and procurement activities to nurture or subsidize foreign industries," 
Colino has written.^ ' The interim agreements therefore were determined 
by functional requirements of satellite activity, and "political considera- 
tions, while present, did not significantly affect the outcome."^-? ' The 
formation of Intelsat, as E. McWhinrrey has concluded, "was a functions- 
based decision in direct response to perceived scientific-technical exi- 
gencies."^
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There are two major defects to this line of legitimation: first, 
the very definition of functional efficiency and its subsequent conse- 
cration as an overriding objective were expressions of American national 
policy, not self-evident global requirements; second, the various spe- 
cific modalities of American dominance had only a specious relationship 
to this objective. Concerning the first point, it is clear that the firm 
commitment to the earliest practicable realisation of the satellite pro- 
ject was an American policy goal. The history of early international 
negotiations and of the pivotal role played by the U.S. display of poten- 
tial unilateralism suggests strongly that the Europeans fully associated 
themselves with this objective only when it became evident that efforts 
to delay satellite development would either be futile or would incur unac- 
ceptable costs. The functional requisites that are held to have deter- 
mined the negotiations' outcome were assigned considerably lower priority 
by the Europeans, who initially attached greater importance to the fate 
of cable holdings, the possibility of independent satellite work and the 
desire to secure development of their own aerospace industries. So even 
if one accepts the defence of the accords as funotionally appropriate to 
the expeditious development of the satellite system, it is nevertheless 
necessary to locate that objective within a conspicuously American set 
of policy priorities. Indeed, any desire for expedition on the part of 
the Europeans was aimed primarily at the United States, since rapid ac- 
cession to American desires was a means of blunting the edge of U.S. 
pre-emption of the field.
Second, even given the priority assigned to functional efficiency, 
it is necessary to question seriously the degree to which the precise 
elements of American dominance formalised in the agreements materially 
related to that objective. Comsat's nomination of itself as the system's 
manager is an excellent case in point. The Corporation was actually in 
a barely post-embryonic state, its technical staff sparse and its proven 
competence utterly nil;^ ' it had never launched a satellite and never 
leased an overseas telecommunications circuit. That Comsat should have 
been proposed as uniquely qualified to manage the satellite system de- 
fining technical options, programme choices, tariff policy and all the 
rest is difficult indeed to explain by the Americans' purported functions-
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orientation. Comsat's value was exclusively as a gatekeeper to the 
essential stores of U.S. aerospace expertise, rocket launchers and 
overseas telecommunications traffic. The argument for its unique qual- 
ifications rests on the tacit promise that these resources would "be made 
readily available to the global system if Comsat were manager and on 
the equally tacit threat that the U.S. would lock up its treasures if 
the Europeans balked at the terms of admission. So the logic is circu- 
lar: having decided that Comsat's managership was non-negotiable and 
that the system's access to American resources depended on its accep-' 
tance, compliance became in fact functionally necessary.
It was furthermore implied that Comsat should get the managerial 
job because a single national entity could carry out the responsibilities 
more efficiently than an international staff recruited expressly for the 
purpose. The Americans rejected the latter option on grounds that such 
a set-up would introduce particularistic national policy goals deep into 
the scientific and technical interstices of the project, making more dif- 
ficult the definition of collective objectives. There is, however, a 
decided ambiguity to this proposition. Either, on the one hand, the man- 
ager's bailiwick is properly apolitical: if so it does not seem unreal- 
istic to believe possible the formation of an international staff with 
an active and primary allegiance to their common employer and with ap- 
propriate extra-territorial incentives like those enjoyed by UN employees 
to ensure loyalty. While participants could be expected to retain spe- 
cial sensitivities to the concerns of their homelands, such a plurality 
of experience might enrich and improve the effectiveness of the overall 
managerial effort. If, on the other hand, it is being suggested that 
politics could not be kept from colouring supposedly technical judgments, 
then the U.S. insistence on Comsat as sole manager was not a way of 
banishing politics writ large, but simply a means of pre-selecting which 
politics would intrude on managerial tasks.
Thus, it is very difficult indeed to defend or explain the American 
insistence on Comsat's managership through reference either to the com- 
pany's inherent qualifications -or~to-the argument that its serving in 
that capacity would keep 'polities' out of Intelsat. Since the issue 
of management should provide the clearest demonstration of the functions
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orientation that American dominance is alleged to have sustained, it
seems necessary to look further for the explanation of the character
of technological control thus created.
5.,._BusnrEss AND
A somewhat different interpretation is that the interim Intelsat accord n 
signalled a victory of commercialisation over political control. Schiller 
at points seems to subscribe to this notion; although he clearly locates 
Intelsat's formation within the context of state-directed American expan- 
sionism, he nevertheless attributes its "retrograde structure" to the deter- 
mining role assigned to "market considerations emphasizing capital contri-
butions, volume of international convviuni cations, and expectations of p^o-
'57)
fitability." Chayes too, since leaving the State Department, has
tended to favour this line, as when he blames Kennedy's preference for 
private ownership for ultimately creating a situation --/here "U.S. foreign
policy objectives and perceptions would be filtered through a private(c-.3> 
entity with divergent goals and perspectives." Pirnilarly, Kildow has
written:
Two often opposing forces attempted to guide U.S. corrj-nunicat^ ons 
policy: the foreign policy  makers, whose principal concerns were 
political; Cornsat, whose corporate interests placed efficiency as 
its number one priority. (59)
The Corporation "pursued a narrow, single-purpose objective  to establish 
the single global system by the most efficient means possible and with( ro)
the least possible interference. " v '
The argument becomes very close to that associated above with the 
mainstream American legitimation, except that in this variant tho con- 
cern with speed and efficiency is both criticised and identified as a 
goal particular to Comsat. In a perverse way, hovr.ver-, Comsat's own 
position is endorsed: that there existed a trade-off between economic 
efficiency and widely-based international participation in exercising 
effective control over the project. Hence the same objections raised 
above to the functions-orientation defence apply equally here, and the 
problem lies in. explaining the purported trade-off. Either the non- 
American participants were ill-qualified to exercise influence upon
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collective decisions meaning that they could not field technicians suf- 
ficiently skilled to participate in scientific and engineering R&D and 
to help advise the various national political representatives or the 
reason for the trade-off lies in the absence of consensus over policy 
and the corresponding need to prevent dissension from actually having 
impact on collective activities. The former proposition of a lack of 
technically qualified staff in Europe seems unquestionably false, es- 
pecially considering the extent of the British and French international 
communications networks and the vigour of European electronics industries. 
The latter possibility, that consensus was or might be lacking, simply 
leads back again to the conclusion was not between efficiency for profit 
and politically satisfactory due process, but between two different modes 
of political operation. By limiting the roles to be played by those who 
held, or who might in the future hold, differing views, the organisation's 
overall efficiency defined in terms of its ability to carry out American 
satellite policy was believed improved.
It appears, therefore, better to formulate the supposed conflict 
between politics and commerce as a contest between two sets of inter- 
penetrated commercial and political objectives. The Europeans did not 
seem to have any illusions as to the separability of the realms, and were 
well aware that improving the political terms of their Intelsat partici- 
pation would bring commercial and industrial awards through greater shares 
of the system's revenues, enhanced aerospace capabilities and improved 
export prospects. For the Americans, Comsat's dominance in the interim 
accords was not pursued in spite of official government policy it was 
official government policy, executed through a private corporate vehicle. 
The props with which Comsat swayed the negotiations through a demonstra- 
tion of unilateral determination were each assembled with state assistance: 
the spectre of congressional hearings and the FCC's denial of Comsat shares 
in the case of AT&T's declaration that it would use satellite circuits; 
the Pentagon proposing a joint system to Comsat; State Department support 
for the early satellite contracts let by Comsat. Comsat's commercial domi- 
nation, in the interests of efficiency and rapid deployment, was an expres- 
sion of the highest levels of government satellite policy. To claim 
otherwise is to mistake relatively minor friction between the State
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Department and Comsat over negotiating strategy for a miniature coup 
d'e'tat in which fundamental state policy was re-directed by an infant 
company with no assets other than $5m in credit conditional on govern- 
ment approval. It is also to overlook entirely the unremitting and in- 
dispensable assistance provided by NASA to Comsat in the latter's alleged 
subversion of state policy; the space agency spent nearly $270m on com- 
munications satellite R&D between fiscal I960 and 1964, more than half 
after Comsat was created^ '—and NASA was committed to furnishing laun- 
cher services to Comsat at prices that would not reflect the costs of 
developing the rockets thus used/ ' The fact that the interim Intelsat 
accords could specifically envisage "an experimental and operational phase 
in which it is proposed to use one or more satellites to be placed in 
synchronous orbit in 1965"^ ' is almost entirely attributable to NASA's 
satellite R&D/ ' a fact which decisively contradicts the notion that 
Comsat imposed a self-generated set of uniquely commercial objectives 
upon an unwilling, 'politically' predisposed American government.
7. THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Of greater interest, for our purposes, than the dominating role the U.S. 
secured for itself in the interim negotiations were the conditions placed 
upon unilateral action by the obligations of even formal international 
cooperation. If the United States had managed to enlist the major com- 
municating nations of the world and the 1964 signatories accounted for 
some 90 percent of world international telephone traffic^ ' it had also 
recruited a set of countries by and large keenly aware of much the same 
political rewards promised by aerospace endeavour as the U.S. had acknow- 
ledged when the Comsat Act was developed and enacted. For them, an en- 
hanced global communications capability was the icing on the cake. The 
underlying prize was access to hardware, expertise and funds, and the 
prospect of accelerated national or regional space efforts that would 
engender far-reaching scientific and technical research, while spilling 
over into the military realm by improving the infrastructure upon which 
a modern strategic capability could be sustained.
From the perspective of these goals, it would seem that Intelsat's
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overall success in fulfilling its constitutional American objectives 
would bring non-U.S. participants as many problems as rewards. Expedi- 
tious development would mean that increasingly sophisticated components 
of the space segment would be deployed during a period when European 
voting strength was low; even urgent injections of funds into European 
aerospace industries would be unlikely to produce results quickly enough 
to permit them to compete successfully with their American commercial 
rivals, particularly since the competence of the latter would be con- 
tinuing to grow thanks in part to Intelsat procurement contracts. Europe 
would in effect be re-directing some of its own funds into the already 
dominant U.S. aerospace industry. Similarly, to the degree that rapid 
deployment and efficient operation strengthened Comsat's case for its 
own qualifications as the system's manager, Intelsat's success would 
pose obstacles to the European goal of an internationalised managerial 
entity. And, the U.S. objective of a single integrated global system, 
which in time might encompass an array of national, regional and domes- 
tic telecommunications .services as well as various specialised applica- 
tions e.g. maritime and aviation services threatened to channel some 
very attractive lines of aerospace work through Intelsat's organisa- 
tional circuitry. The American position that "the rationale and 
purpose of Intelsat dictate that it respond and provide all types of 
services which are possible by means of communications satellites,"^ 
might even include a specifically European facility. So Intelsat f s 
success considered in terms of the goals of fast and efficient deploy- 
ment and an expanding organisational competence would likely prove a 
mixed curse for the Europeans.
Whatever the lack of consensus over objectives, however, the ques- 
tion remained as to how effectively contrasting goals could ever be 
pursued or dominant goals frustrated considering the limits to real 
power sharing incorporated into the agreements: did not Comsat's 
dominance preclude material restraints upon U.S. discretion in deter- 
mining the character and pace of satellite deployment? The short answer 
would have to be no. If the creation of_the ICSC did anything, it estab- 
lished a structure of accountability for Comsat meaning, as Gouldner
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has defined the term, that Corasat could be constrained to reveal what 
it has done and justify why it has done so.^ "^ while this is far from 
requiring Comsat to secure a consensus, let alone a majority, from its 
fellow ICSG members and additional Intelsat participants would not even 
be admitted to this body it is also far from a framework for unbridled 
unilateralism. The votes of at least two other ICSC members would be 
necessary for major actions, and Comsat f s future as Intelsat manager 
would presumably be at stake if and whenever it was obliged to rely on 
even this statutory minimum. Thus some concern with mobilising a more 
generalised mandate would have to inform Comsat 1 s actions, and efforts 
to appease, cajole or otherwise rally support would be a practical neces- 
sity.
Moreover, and in the long term of greater importance, the basis of 
American dominance had been formalised in a quantitative manner, trans- 
formed into component questions of degree whose values could themselves 
be further transformed. As P. Batailler has observed:
The requirements inherent in all public services will not lend 
themselves for long to an orientation so fundamentally non- 
egalitarian. In effect, the framework exists to assure the 
victory of the majoritarian principle, which alone conforms to 
international law. (68)
Comsat was first among equals, but the basis of its primacy was not im- 
mutable: its financial participation, and voting strength, was due to 
fall during the interim arrangements from nearly two-thirds to just over 
half. While advantageous to Comsat in 1964» the notion of tying finan- 
cial participation to system usage might not prove to be the same boon 
as the system developed, and as countries that were unable to divide 
their international traffic between cables and satellites began using 
satellite circuits, thus increasing their traffic shares and, in prin- 
ciple, their voting strengths.
Hence, the justification of American satellite policy by the effi- 
ciency it promised suggested an interesting problematic for the continu- 
ance of U.S. Intelsat dominance. For it would seem that the very suc- 
cess of the satellite system in achieving global service and attracting 
worldwide membership would create conditions inimical to American domi- 
nance, or at least to the form of that dominance written into the interim 
arrangements. The precedent for widely-based ownership participation had 
been established, and the 17 percent of Intelsat stock reserved for fur- 
ther members would not go very far; likewise, the rule that a 1.5 percent
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shareholding was needed to qualify for representation on the governing 
"board stood a poor chance of withstanding the pressure of perhaps dozens 
of new members. Also, as manager Comsat would undoubtedly be faced with 
demands that it admit and integrate technical cadres seconded from new 
members, whose adherence to the satellite system might well have "been 
partly motivated by a desire to provide advanced technical training to 
talented engineers. Whether a process of informal internationalisation 
would be compatible with a unitary, nationally-based manager was a ques- 
tion that could only be answered in time. It would seem nevertheless 
that Comsat would be running grave risks to its own position within In- 
telsat to the very degree that it succeeded in pushing through its ag- 
gressive programme of satellite deployment, over whatever objections 
or obstacles its initial partners in the venture might raise.
PART FOUR
DOMESTICATING THE SATELLITE:
Comsat, the U.S. carrier industry and the state, 1965-74
CHAPTER NINE: OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND TO U.S. SATELLITE CONTROVERSIES
1. THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE DOMESTIC STRUGGLES
In spite of the contention of one study that Comsat's "commercial strengths 
were dependent on its retention of a leadership position in Intelsat,"' 1 ' 
the fact was that Comsat's dominance within Intelsat could guarantee a 
successful future neither for itself nor for the satellite system that it 
managed and largely owned. The amount of money Comsat could expect to
make from international operations as such was modest: its management
( 2^fee from Intelsat was $150,000 per year/ ' the tariffs it could charge
for leasing satellite circuits to American carriers would depend largely 
on the size of its investment in facilities within the United States, and 
the return on its initially commanding share of Intelsat stock would be 
determined by the cost of the space segment and by the profitability of 
the operation itself and seemed likely moreover to be diluted by the 
number of nations that joined the venture. Indeed the synchronous satel- 
lite system turned out considerably less hungry for capital than had been 
expected, and Comsat earned until 1970 more money from temporary cash 
investments than from satellite operations. Comsat therefore sought 
to expand its satellite-related investments, both to utilise its substan- 
tial surplus capital and to justify a large proportion of the revenues 
from users of satellite circuits. For Intelsat too, the viability of 
the satellite system and its prospects for continuance beyond the interim 
period required tapping into the huge volume of American overseas traffic 
 and therefore diverting it from competing undersea cables. In large 
measure then the immediate future of communications satellites would be 
determined in the United States by the battles for commercial success 
forming between satellite technology's institutional custodian Comsat 
and its carrier industry rivals.
In the next six chapters -thesis-domestic struggles will be examined 
and their role in shaping, carrying forth and finally exhausting the 
possibilities of the style of technological formation we have termed
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pre-emptive underdevelopment will "be assessed. (An analogous process 
paralleling those domestic events internationally is the subject of 
Part Five.) The domestic section "begins with two preliminary chapters. 
In the present one, an overview to Part Four is presented and "background 
provided concerning the U.S. industrial and regulatory setting into which 
satellites were introduced. A context of turmoil in the communications 
industry occasioned "by the advent and growing importance of teleprocessing 
and specialised forms of communications hardware and services is described, 
not only to make comprehensible the legal and institutional framework for 
subsequent discussion, but also to combat the notion that there was some- 
thing automatic and inevitable in the way that the existing structure of 
industrial dominance was sustained by the state in the satellite case by 
showing important instances of highly discretionary and anti-monopolistic 
state intervention contemporaneous with the satellite decisions.^- ' Then 
in Chapter 10, the development and use of the Intelsat system is des- 
cribed and analysed, with special attention paid to the determinants of 
underutilisation, a critical index of the technology's underdevelopment.
The four major struggles pitting Comsat against the U.S. carrier 
industry are then examined. The first three in order of presentation, 
not necessarily chronological occurrence concerned the terms upon which 
international satellite services were to be integrated into the American 
communications industry: first, who would own and operate the Intelsat 
earth stations and related ground facilities within the U.S.; second, 
with whom would Comsat be permitted to conduct business directly; third, 
should continued construction of undersea cables to the detriment of 
satellites be permitted and, as a corollary, should satellites be allowed 
to compete directly with and perhaps attract traffic from the cable net- 
work. The cumulative effect of the outcome of these struggles was a de 
facto merger of satellites with the rest of the carrier industry accom- 
panied, paradoxically, by a formal divestiture of Comsat stock held by 
the carriers, such that by 1974 virtually all the carriers 1 satellite 
holdings had been sold.'^) The fourth struggle concerned the creation of 
domestic satellite services, and adjudication of the conflicting claims 
of Comsat and the carriers to authorisation to enter the home satellite 
market.
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At stake in all of the first three conflicts were Comsat's oppor- 
tunities for commerce and investment and, consequently, the satellite sys- 
tem's possibilities for self-financing growth, reduced tariffs as scalar 
economies were realised and qualitative expansion of services. Neverthe- 
less, each pertained to a distinct structural level within the overall pro- 
cess of accommodation to and by the new technology: the earth station de- 
cisions to Comsat's independent power vis-a-vis the carriers, Comsat's per- 
mitted sphere of commercial transaction to the relationship between the 
satellite system and the U.S. government, and the cable decisions to tech- 
nological dominance within the carrier industry.
1.) In the earth station ownership decisions the structure of insti- 
tutional dominance within the U.S. international carrier industry was at 
issue. The questions were: how would control over satellite facilities 
be organised and distributed among the existing private carriers? would 
additional leverage over Comsat be given to its carrier rivals among whom 
AT&T, ITT and GT&E already sat on Comsat's board through ownership parti- 
cipation in domestic earth stations? would the pattern of consortium forma- 
tion under AT&T dominance be re-applied and the role properly attributable 
to Comsat further diminished? and of greatest importance, would Comsat be 
provided a technical beachhead from which to mount future incursions into 
domestic telecommunications markets? Thus the conflict over ground station 
ownership was internal to the carrier industry, and subject to PCC jurisdic- 
tion.
2.) In contrast, the second area of contention was essentially between 
the private communications industry and the state. The Apollo, 'Authorised 
User 1 and '30-Circuits' cases each ultimately raised the question of whe- 
ther Comsat would serve primarily as a dependent resource of the carrier 
industry or of the state. All three involved not, as some accounts have 
stated, Comsat's right to transact directly with private users of satellite 
circuits without dealing through the carriers/ ' but rather the conditions 
under which the government could use the satellite system. Since the PCC 
was not empowered to regulate state communications, the dispute could not 
be settled by Commission edict; - the-FCC instead served as the carriers' 
emissary, encouraging them in effect to buy off the state with offers of
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substantial rate reductions on a. wide range of services in exchange for 
the state's foreswearing its intention to deal directly with Comsat for 
satellite circuits.
3.) The cable authorisations involved a third structural level, of 
technological dominance within the international carrier industry. Comsat 
was virtually alone in opposing new cables; within the U.S. the govern- 
ment for reasons of diversification and the carriers for reasons of profit 
were agreed that more cables would be desirable, and European consent mo- 
tivated partly by similar considerations of technical diversity, partly 
by a desire to put pressure on Comsat in the forthcoming Intelsat renego- 
tiations and partly as a hedge against Intelsat's possible disintegration  
reinforced that domestic entente. Comsat's basis for contesting the cable 
approvals was its confidence that intensive satellite use would be cheaper 
and no less reliable, a contention that was not so much refuted as ignored 
in favour of a policy of inter-modal diversity, notwithstanding the arguably 
unnecessary costs the policy would impose on users. To sustain a parallel 
development policy where one technology would depend for customers on its 
competitor's owners, however, the FCC tried with little success to adminis- 
ter traffic quotas instead of letting the relative costs of each mode be 
reflected in the tariffs its users paid. Although the alternatives were 
either allowing satellites to undersell cables and quite possibly force the 
latter out of business, or letting the cable-owning carriers use their con- 
trol over overseas routing to starve the satellite system of traffic, the 
FCC by setting uniform rates reflecting composite industry investment used 
satellite economies to reduce cable tariffs, thus subsidising the ineffi- 
ciency of the one at the expense of the other.
Hence the earth station ownership decisions, by forcing Comsat to 
share ground facilities with the carriers, extended the form of consortium 
control already present in Comsat's boardroom and parcelled out the com- 
pany's investment opportunities, thereby reducing Comsat's independent 
strength vis-a-vis the rest of the carrier industry. The second set of 
cases eliminated the state as a source of extraordinary patronage and in- 
stalled Comsat as a wholly dependent component of a private industry, there- 
by nullifying the practical significance of the popular but ambiguous notion 
that the Corporation was a public-private hybrid, subject to state supervision
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and protection. The reconciliation of cables with satellites expressed 
and confirmed on a technological level the structure of industrial domi- 
nance implied "by the earth station decisions.
The resolution of these issues, which made of satellites a vassalage 
within an industrial fiefdom obligating Comsat in effect to provide the 
carriers with services while leaving it dependent upon their largely dis- 
cretionary custom "bears a curious relationship to the 1962 Comsat Act. 
What seems clear is that the law did little more than set off a battle- 
field, formalising not a body of prescriptions but an array of possibili- 
ties whose realisation could not but be the result of further, extended 
and intensified conflict. It authorised the FCC to award earth station
ownership to Comsat or the other carriers "without preference to either,"
(1)\'' empowered Comsat to lease circuits to "authorized users, including
/ o\
the United States government"  leaving specific authorisations to the 
FCC and made no attempt to address the overriding question of whether 
the creation of a separate satellite corporation implied provision for 
substantive competition between Comsat and its rivals.
In each of those areas, though, wherever the options existed to en- 
courage Comsat 1 s evolution either toward a fully competitive entity or 
toward a quasi-governmental ".agency, these possibilities were rejected. 
The result was a situation very similar to that originally sought by the 
international carriers and the FCC a satellite operation wholly internal 
to the existing communications companies and supposedly turned down by 
the White House and Congress through the Act: the costs of rival techno- 
logies were averaged out and concealed, and relative economies would not 
be allowed to determine respective rates of development or even usage. 
The international carrier industry and Comsat would be treated as a uni- 
tary entity, even though the actual burdens of what for a truly merged 
entity would be internal adjustments to policy and opportunity were in- 
stead borne unequally by the separate companies concerned.
Finally, dangling over all of these struggles over international 
satellite service was the biggest plum of all the domestic satellite 
market, whose final disposition would, we would argue, depend in good 
measure on limiting Comsat's technical and commercial activities and 
deepening its rival carriers' involvement in international satellite 
operations. With Comsat's corporate independence made all but nominal,
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any claim it might make to exclusive technical competence compromised by 
its forced collaboration with the carriers, and its lack of experience en- 
sured by FCC decisions in providing through-service directly to domestic 
customers, Comsat could plausibly be denied the franchise it sought on do- 
mestic satellite services. The way was therefore clear to opening and li- 
beralising that field, permitting the carriers especially AT&T, the domi- 
nant international and domestic entity to extend their national operations
into space as and when they saw fit.
(7s.'] 
Hence, the principal significance of the major carrier holdingsv ' ' of
Comsat stock seems to lie in their desire to establish the legitimacy of 
their involvement in the satellite field, with a particular view to domes- 
tic operations. It has been suggested that share ownership enabled Comsat's 
managerial independence and corporate security to be seriously compromised 
by the three carriers AT&T, ITT and GT&E present on its board.*- a' It is 
notable, however, that Comsat at least strenuously denied this when in 1972, 
with only AT&T remaining, the FCC suggested that Bell's continued represen- 
tation would prejudice the two companies' competitiveness in the domestic(Q-\
satellite field. V7 ' Indeed if Comsat had been restrained by boardroom sub- 
version it is hard to see how the Corporation's bitter and extended con- 
flicts with carriers would ever have come about. Contemporary reports sug- 
gest that the common practice was for the carrier directors to abstain from 
voting or to leave board meetings when their loyalties were clearly divid- 
ed, ' and in any event the carriers' half-ownerships in ground stations 
gave them a more powerful hold over Comsat than did the 40 percent they 
wielded on the Corporation's board. ' Similarly, any access to internal 
Comsat plans the carriers may have had did not prevent Comsat in 1966 from 
secretly concluding an agreement to lease satellite circuits directly to 
the Pentagon, which cost the carriers millions in rate reductions to undo. 
In sum, our view is that carrier interest in Comsat stock declined apace 
with a recognition that the holdings could do no more to improve their
earnings from international satellite operations or to enhance their en-
(12) 
titlements to participate in domestic satellite activities. Thus,
while apparently contradictory, Comsat's formal independence from and sub- 
stantive merger with the carrier industry both reflected the carriers' 
success in subduing the independent threat the Corporation posed.
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2. THE ROLE OF THE STATE: REGULATION
While the state's authority to adjudicate the Comsat-carrier disputes was 
clear, the role it would play was not. Ultimately the state had four dis- 
tinct areas of interest, and corresponding modes of intervention, in the 
struggles: 1.) as promotor and "benefactor of satellite technology, 2.) 
as a customer of satellite services, 3.) as regulator of the carrier in- 
dustry, and 4.) as final guarantor of the technical adequacy of the na- 
tional communications capability.
The first two roles can be summarised briefly. It is clear that the 
Kennedy and Johnson governments had committed the state to promoting satel- 
lites, at least internationally, and to providing whatever technical and 
operational assistance that would be required and appropriate to Comsat's 
status as a private commercial entity. The commitment seems to have been 
unconditional: there was, for instance, no mention in the 1962 Act of the 
possibility that satellite communications might prove impracticable or too 
costly. The combined desires to pre-empt the Soviets and to have satellites 
available for state communications produced an insistence that they be 
built, launched and used almost regardless of the disinclinations of the 
communications industry. The state particularly the Department of De- 
fence (Don) and NASA was also interested in becoming an important cus- 
tomer of satellite circuits, and would therefore support policies that 
would result in lower tariffs and increased efficiency, such as might for 
example derive from unifying responsibility for both space and ground seg- 
ments of the system under Comsat. Taken together these promotional and 
instrumental aspects of state satellite interest would seem to cast the 
state in the role of Comsat's ally in the company's struggles which to a 
degree it was.
Through its regulatory conduct, however, the state also contributed 
to Comsat's most serious difficulties. The central principle with which 
Comsat was obliged to contend was rate base regulation, whereby a carrier's 
total revenues were determined by the value of its outstanding investment 
in used and usable facilities, plus an administered rate of return. Rate 
base regulation aims to stimulate administratively behaviour believed to 
characterise a firm subject to competition by attaching the twin tendencies
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to which an unregulated monopoly is thought prone: depressing output 
and inflating priced ' In fact, by guaranteeing the monopolist a 
fixed return on investment, rate base regulation directly affects only 
one distortion the output restraint while treating price levels as 
wholly dependent variables; the firm is encouraged to invest and ex- 
pand its facilities and is permitted to adjust its prices on services to 
support such expansion. As a result since the sole production factor 
considered is fixed plant and the actual production function through 
which the value of equipment is realised is ignored rate base regula- 
tion reverses the presumed sequence of micro-economic determination. 
Instead of running from effective demand for services as offered at 
specific prices, through the efficiency of a firm's resource utilisa- 
tion, and finally to the determination of investment profitability, in 
the regulated firm profitability functions as a given, efficiency is 
not formally considered, and demand is defined or acknowledged as 
largely insensitive to price levels. Output is priced directly accor- 
ding to investment decisions through translation of the latter into 
'revenue requirements', which are fixed not by demand for services 
or productive efficiency but by the prevailing rate of interest on the 
money market. Furthermore, if the firm's total revenues do not rise 
enough to support a new investment, prices can be raised on services 
unrelated to the new facilities to maintain the authorised rate of 
return while the public is, in effect, made to suffer from the indis- 
pensability of the existing services as expressed in their demand in- 
elasticity.
Perhaps paradoxically, the advantage of rate base regulation as a 
policy derives from the fact that specific costs are ignored. Since 
certain basic facilities are indivisible and are used to sustain many 
different services intercity broadband cables, for example disaggre- 
gating and assigning costs appropriate to each service may be very dif- 
ficult/ 1^' Also, it may be desirable to offer certain services like 
local telephone service at uniform tariffs regardless of which specific 
equipment has to be used. Furthermore,-rate base regulation may encour- 
age certain kinds of innovation by guaranteeing that the outlay will be 
recovered on new facilities'-regardless of their operational success.
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Likewise, the acceptability of innovations may "be enhanced because their 
costs are averaged in with the outstanding costs of existing plant. If 
the new facilities are more expensive, the difference is distributed among 
a number of services, resulting in mild overall price rises instead of 
sharp localised ones which might hinder the innovation's acceptance; if 
the new plant is cheaper, the innovating firm is assured that the cost 
savings will not prevent the orderly amortisation of current facilities. *' 
Savings, like excess costs, are diffused.
The practical problems of surveillance and inspection in administer- 
ing the scheme have long been acknowledged,^ ' and the FCC has frequently 
and, it would appear, quite correctly been criticised for devoting inade-
quate staff and insufficient attention to an independent appraisal of in 
(17} dustry's investments and consequent pricing policies. ' Although in
principle the Commission has followed a "used and useful" guideline in 
deciding whether plant may be included in a carrier's rate base, in fact 
no carrier had ever had obsolescent facilities disallowed in the 35 years
of federal regulation up to the Comsat Act debates. No formal inquiry
(19) 
on domestic telephone rates had been conducted since 1938, ' and the
overall price of international phone service had not been reduced since 
1946, in spite of the introduction of three transatlantic cables and enor- 
mous increases in traffic volumes. The FCC had normally negotiated 
informally with the carriers over rates, and as a 196! RAND Corporation 
memo concluded:
Under present-day domestic regulatory policies and practices, only 
a tenuous relationship exists between rates charged for particular 
services and costs incurred in performing those services. (21)
Even if- adequately administered, however, rate base regulation would 
still give rise to at least four sets of problems: 1.) a general tendency 
to overinvest, 2.) favouritism to expansion by established firms into se- 
condary markets, 3.) the 'cream- skimming* and 'competitive necessity' con- 
troversies, and 4.) a systematic preference for costlier capital alterna- 
tives. The first two difficulties are treated in the 1962 Averch-Johnson 
critique,' 22' where it was noted that the regulated firm would tend to 
utilise more capital goods than was socially optimal, since it would have 
no compelling reason to equate the marginal rates at which various produc- 
tion factors were utilised to the actual ratio of factor costs; the two
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authors also argued that the regulated firm would have an incentive to 
expand into other regulated markets even if it would "be obliged to operate 
there at a long-term loss, since expansion would automatically "be rewarded 
regardless of whether competitors were in fact lower-cost producers. ' 
Furthermore, since rate base regulation seeks to avoid the problem 
of assigning specific costs where plant is used for different services, 
the problem of 'cream skimming' arises where a new entrant is alleged 
to seek to draw off revenues from services hitherto offered at prices 
admitted to be well in excess of roughly disaggregated costs, but where 
the surplus is said to enable overall revenue requirements to be met while 
other necessary services are offered at prices below costs. The problem 
of determining which service is the cream and which the skimmed milk may 
however be insoluble, ' and the right to enter secondary markets may 
therefore be settled with reference not to costs at all, but rather to 
the demand elasticities of various services what the market will bear. 
The FCG has thus accepted the principle of 'competitive necessity' in 
permitting regulated carriers to reduce prices on services exposed to 
competition, in effect allowing them to assign costs so as to justify 
pricing those services at lower levels than they otherwise would do. 
This solution essentially cuts the principal carrier in on its own cream 
and causes distributive damage to the consumer, whose general services 
will be more expensive to the degree that they bear a bigger share of 
costs common to services subjected to competition. And the new entrant
is obliged to compare his costs not to the costs borne by the established
(25) firm but to the rates it is permitted to set. ' Entrenched companies
therefore are not only entitled to use their reputations in marketing and 
their existing plant in producing, but can juggle costs to undercut oppo- 
sition and claim to be performing a public service to boot.
Finally, as is implicit in the overinvestment criticism, rate base 
regulation not only encourages capital intensive solutions but tends to 
favour the more expensive fixed plant alternatives, a consideration of 
special relevance to the satellite-cable controversies. Part of the re- 
luctance to use satellites subs-equ-eatly attributed to the carriers has 
been blamed on the Comsat Act's having forbidden them from including 
satellite holdings in their rate bases/ 2 ' The contention re-surfaced
-187-
when the carriers were arguing for ownership of the domestic earth 
stations, which they claimed would give them a greater incentive to 
use and encourage expansion of satellite services. The logic of rate 
"base regulation, however, dictates that inducements are identical only 
where capital costs are equal, and that to the degree that satellites
were less expensive than cables the former would be less attractive and
(27) less remunerative, ' even if the carriers owned both.
3. GOMSAT AND RATE BASE REGULATION
Comsat argued that rate base regulation was inappropriate to satellite 
technology, and was suited to the long-term amortisation of high-cost, 
low-capacity facilities not to a technology which provided ever-increas- 
ing capacity at very little rise in per unit costs. Since total capital 
outlay would increase much slower than the value of services thus offered, 
"Our economic success," as a company financial officer said in a 1967 
speech, "would...be in inverse proportion to our technical success."^ 
Comsat tried unsuccessfully to persuade the PCC that the time had come 
to modify regulatory practice so that the company's operations would be 
treated more equitably, and argued for application of "an operating ratio, 
return margin rule" like that used as a pricing yardstick for interstate 
transport carriers: some operating ratio, perhaps the 93 percent used 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, would be used to determine what
proportion of total revenues should be attributed to costs; earnings
(29)
would, thereby be pegged to business volume and not to capital outlay. ''
More conventionally, Comsat contended that because of the unusual risks 
involved in the satellite system it was entitled to a higher rate of 
return on its fixed plant than was applied to other carriers an argu- 
ment formally rejected by the PCC when it finally ruled on the matter 
in December 1975, but effectively sustained since the Commission did not 
make its decision retroactive, leaving Comsat with an 18 percent return 
on investment for the preceding period, as against 10.8 percent for the 
other carriers. _ ..   ....
Nevertheless, the fact that it was subject to regulation by the size 
of its rate base made Comsat extremely vulnerable from the outset, since 
its business volume and its investments had to expand apace to do the
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company any good: if Gomsat were permitted to expand its rate base 
through, say, investing in domestic adjuncts to its international plant, 
but was unable to attract a proportionate increase in traffic, its tariffs 
would have to remain high because the return on the new investments would 
be coming from a static business volume and further traffic growth would 
be inhibited accordingly; if however Comsat's rate base were, in effect, 
frozen or prevented from expanding as rapidly as its traffic grew, the 
company would in principle be obliged to cut its tariffs so as not to 
exceed its permitted rate of return, whatever that turned out to be. 
Comsat's prospects therefore required parallel expansion of rate base 
and traffic, thus permitting a gradual reduction in tariffs, which in 
turn would stimulate more custom and justify still more investment to 
accommodate it.
The carriers' opportunities were equally clear. If they succeeded 
in securing a share in Comsat's intended rate base through earth sta- 
tion ownership Gomsat's net revenues would suffer regardless of traffic 
volume. And if traffic growth were inhibited by diverting a portion onto 
cables Comsat's investment plans xrould be difficult to justify before 
the FCC and, even if permitted, would likely result in higher tariffs 
and further depressed business levels. Furthermore, since Comsat had 
so many technical and operational matters of its own to address quickly  
e.g. the choice of a space segment, refinement of multiple access tech- 
niques, demonstrating the public acceptability of satellite-relayed phone 
conversations its opponents need not even be successful to do Comsat 
harm, since the duration itself of adversary proceedings might make firm 
planning difficult and produce delays in the company's deployment schedule. 
Comsat's only real weapon was the technology with which it was entrusted: 
if satellites could be quickly shown to be cheap, reliable and versatile 
the national commitment contained in the Comsat Act might be sustained 
and broadened to permit the technology's intensive exploitation. Denying 
or frustrating Comsat's requirements could, however, make impossible its 
use of even this relatively feeble weapon.
In spite of the advantages regulatory policies would seem to give the 
carriers, the state's role was not necessarily limited to administering 
those policies. The overriding question was whether Comsat's plans accorded
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with the state's definition of the national communications capability's 
technical adequacy.
5. THE ROLE OF TUB STATE; OVERALL E
Although rate base regulation tends inherently to favour the protection 
and stabilisation of an existing industrial structure  as well as its 
incorporation of new markets into a 'universal services' monopoly  the 
state's willingness to sustain those tendencies appeared increasingly 
during the 1960s to depend upon its evaluation of the consequences upon 
the technical adequacy of the national communications plant. In at least 
three instances  broadband home-destined cable, specialised long-distance 
facilities for teleprocessing, and specialised terminal devices  the state 
demonstrated a capability for recognising emergent recmirements, defying 
the wishes of the dominant force in the communications industry, AT&T, 
and ratifying a "segmentation process"^ ' whereby those high-growth 
areas were spun off from the Bell monopoly and opened up to substantive 
competition. In a fourth instance, concerning merger of the U.S. inter- 
national carriers, the state's preference for a merged entity was made 
clear, but decisive action was not taken.
None of these cases put at risk control of the basic national tele- 
phone industry, which accounted for 85 to 90 percent of AT&T's revenues. 
Switching facilities and local loops  which connect callers to their 
nearest switching centres  comprised between them around 60 percent of 
the Bell System's costs, and were not under challenge; and although 
terminal equipment, constituting 23 percent of Bell's domestic rate base, 
was theoretically at issue, the monopoly's practice of issuing 'free' 
phones to subscribers was likely to prevent serious erosion of its cur- 
rent position there. ^ ' Nevertheless the sectors involved were among 
the fastest growing in the telecommunications industry, which itself led 
the U.S. economy in annual investment in new capital goods and was growing 
at double the rate of the GMP/ ' and they would not be surrendered 
readily.
Home broadband cable; The so-called cable television industry was 
growing at around 25 percent yearly as of the mid-1960s, and the number 
of homes connected to broadband cables rose from 450,000 in 1958 to six
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million by late 1971.' AT&T had, in principle, been prevented from 
entering the field,by a. consent agreement signed with the Justice Depart- 
ment in 1956, which settled an antitrust suit begun in 1949 to force Bell 
to divest itself of Western Electric; Bell kept its manufacturing subsi- 
diary, but agreed not to enter non-common carrier communications markets 
(those where the operator is permitted discretion over the messages car- 
ried, like broadcasting), which included broadband cable then used almost 
exclusively to convey TV signals to areas out of reach of airborne trans- 
mission. ' The increasing popularity and declining cost of cable sys- 
tems however threatened Bell's hitherto near-monopoly over communications 
wires into American homes, a threat all the more potent due to the enor- 
mous capacities of the newer cables: sufficient as of 1971 to carry 50
(W} TV channels, or 100,000 voice circuits. w/ Hence, as one FCC commissioner
concluded: "If a real broadband network is ever constructed its operators 
could virtually provide conventional voice telephone service for nothing."^- '
Although that possibility was remote and would moreover make cables 
a common carrier service, open to legitimate Bell participation AT&T was 
nevertheless trying during the 1960s to circumvent its formal exclusion 
from the field. Its regional phone companies refused or delayed permis- 
sion to cable firms seeking to use rights-of-way onto private properties 
which had previously been granted to Bell for phone lines. The Bell com- 
panies would instead propose to the cable firms that they request Bell 
to supply them with the cables, in which case AT&T would retain title to 
the facilities, secure leasing revenues and expand its rate base without 
formally operating the cables. In some instances the local cable company 
was part-owned by the resident Bell subsidiary. Thus denied access to 
potential customers, aggrieved cable firms appealed to the FCC and in 
February 1970 the Commission ruled that 'lease-backs' to cable companies 
part-owned by Bell were illegal, and that phone companies had to offer
use of their rights-of-way to cable owners without undue delay and at rea-
(39) 
sonable rates. '
Specialised common carriers; The fastest growing sector of the 
communications industry consisted of interconnections for computer sys- 
tems, . and- the number of telecommunications-bafsed computers increased 
six-fold between 1963 and 1966. It was estimated in 1968 that half of 
all U.S. computers would require telecommunications links within ten 
years, and a total of five million time-shared terminals was forecast 
for 1980/ 40)
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In spite of rising demand, AT&T's capability and willingness to 
capture the teleprocessing market were as restrained as its insistence 
on monopolising it was vociferous. Technically, Bell's extensive phone 
network offered neither the variety of transmission speeds, the rapidity 
of connections nor the maximum error rates the newer computer systems 
required. Compounding those technical limitations was AT&T's policy  
unchanged until 1969 forbidding small users to pool private lines and 
insisting upon one- and three-minute minimum usage periods, which made 
the company's facilities unreasonably expensive for many users. '
Although the PCC had earlier upheld AT&T in protecting the unity 
of the national network from proposals for specialised intercity micro- 
wave systems sustaining Bell's right to refuse to interconnect such 
facilities with its owrr ' the Commission was unwilling to affirm the 
need for monopoly when it came to computer linkages, thereby obliging 
Bell to undertake pre-emptive manoeuvres of its own. In I960 the PCC 
ruled that users could create their own private microwave systems for 
their own use, and in 1966 virtually unlimited time-sharing of such 
private lines was authorised, which extended access by small users. 
AT&T had meanwhile begun introducing data transmission services at sus- 
piciously competitive rates, taking advantage of regulatory difficulties 
in assigning costs among different services using common plant; Bell 
filed rates on Telpak service broadband intercity in 1960 which con- 
tained discounts of from 50 to 85 percent off the normal tariffs for 
equivalent voice circuits, an offering intended for computer customers. '
Three years later however Microwave Communications Inc. (MCI) pro- 
posed to create a microwave system between St. Louis and Chicago pri- 
marily to serve the teleprocessing market. Because MCI would not itself 
be a user of the facilities, but was instead proposing a specialised 
common carrier system, the case was destined to be a watershed. AT&T 
contested the application strenuously, pointing out that MCI was not 
seeking to duplicate the full range of Bell services and wanted only 
to provide high-volume, lucrative service among a small number of points 
with facilities tailored to the requirements of a small number of users. 
Bell's complaints of 'cream-skimming' were however undermined by revela- 
tions that its own Telpak pricing policies had been achieving essentially 
the same thing it was accusing MCI of proposing: AT&T had priced its
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Telpak services, where competition was feared, to provide a rate of re- 
turn one-thirtieth of that derived from non-competitive services  thereby 
shifting an unwarranted cost burden onto the general public  and in 1964 
the FOG ruled two of the Telpak rates illegal and requested further infor- 
mation to continue studying the other two.^)
Finally in 1969 the Commission approved by a 4-3 vote, MCI 1 s applica- 
tion, and the specialised common carrier industry was born. Applications 
soon began to be made not only for other leased line carrier services, but 
for full-fledged intercity switched networks as well to parallel for the 
teleprocessing industry the services Bell provided for phone customers.^6 )
Terminal equipment; Early in the 1960s AT&T forbade an inventor 
named Thomas Carter to secure access to the public phone network for a 
device that enabled two-way mobile radios to interconnect by way of Bell's 
system. The so-called Carterfone case went to the FCC and became a test 
of the AT&T monopoly over equipment on the customer's end of the telephone 
line; at issue not only was Carter's invention, but the whole gamut of 
tape recorded answering devices, private switchboards, extensive intra- 
office mini-networks, fancy telephones and other terminal paraphernalia 
which Bell had hitherto refused to interconnect as 'foreign attachments,' 
The threat was compounded by the fact that suppliers wanted actually to 
sell their equipment to customers, so that Western Electric stood to lose 
manufacturing contracts with its parent firm, and AT&T's own rate base 
would be threatened with relative shrinkage.
Nevertheless in 1968 the FCC ruled in Carter's favour, ordering Bell 
to interconnect foreign attachments owned and supplied by customers. Bell 
was empowered to reqruire special adaptors to be leased from its companies 
to ensure technical compatibility and, it was argued, might eventually 
benefit from the additional traffic that availability of the various ter- 
minal devices could generate. Opening to competition, however, a market 
estimated to be worth as much as a billion dollars a year in sales could 
hardly be considered a gain for '
Merger of U.S. international carriers; The desirability of merging 
the various American carriers providing overseas communications services 
has been debated repeatedly since at Ieast"1929 and supported primarily 
as a means to ensure the viability of a' technically diversified capability
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the components of which would otherwise be competitively owned.*- ' At- 
tention until the mid-1950s focussed on the rivalry between telegraph 
cables and long-distance radio, where the latter enjoyed a cost advantage 
but was hampered by having to rely on cable-owning firms for assembling 
and delivering messages. After AT&T introduced undersea phone-capacity 
cables, concern shifted to the prospects of survival of the so-called 
record carriers, and their merger was endorsed as a way to enable them 
to afford to build similar cables whose capacity was sufficient to handle 
voice and record traffic.^ 4"' Instead the PCC ruled that the record car- 
riers must be permitted to co own future transatlantic voice capacity 
cables.
The advent of satellites restored the merger debate to its original 
technological reference, and it was argued that cable-satellite rivalry 
would never be resolved rationally until the decisions on deployment of 
each transmission mode were made by a unified company. President Johnson 
said in a 19&7 policy statement that divided ownership put the U.S. "in 
a relatively poor bargaining position"^ ' vis-&-vis foreign Intelsat 
members-, and that it "has resulted in the construction and maintenance
of expensive, duplicating communications facilities which increase opera-
(52)
ting costs and result in higher rates for the user." Johnson's ap- 
pointed task force on communications policy recommended merger in late 
1968,^ ' but the proposal got no further than it had in the past.
The merger case differs from the preceding three because AT&T's po- 
sition was in effect endorsed Bell opposed merger since it stood to lose 
lucrative assets and growth prospects to the unified entity and not defied. 
It also differs formally, in that merger could not be effected administra- 
tively but would require possibly controversial congressional action to 
amend the 1934 Communications Act, which specifically outlawed merger un- 
less the PCC determined that competition would not be diminished. ^^' 
Above all, however, the case differs because it involved rationalisation 
to eliminate waste, not reorganisation to guarantee adequacy. In the lat- 
ter respect, the Comsat Act which denied the carriers uninhibited control 
of satellites represents the instance in the international communications 
field most fully comparable to the cable TV, specialised carrier and termi- 
nal devices cases domestically: in all four the state either defined or 
ratified basic service requirements and insisted they be met notwithstand- 
ing the wishes of the dominant force in the private communications indus- 
try, AT&T, thereby acknowledging that to sustain AT&T's position might
-194-
jeopardise fulfillment of needs which the state considered pressing or 
legitimate. What is of special interest then, in the chapters on U.S. 
satellite controversies which follow, is why the state's definition of 
need did not entail /blocking the carrier industry's efforts to weaken 
Comsat and thereby restrain the development of satellite technology.
First, however, an account of the technical evolution of the Intel 
sat system is provided, with special attention paid to the causes and 
consequences of underutilisation and overcapacity. This treatment 
sketches the framework within which the American satellite controver- 
sies were enacted, and which they helped to shape.
CHAPTER TEN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OP THE SATELLITE 
SYSTEM
1. OVERVIEW
Intelsat's first satellite, Early Bird, was launched into synchronous or- 
bit over the Atlantic on April 6, 1965. Although it was quickly found to 
be functioning near-perfectly, half of the satellite's design capacity of 
240 voice circuits was intentionally blocked out, since there were no 
earth stations yet in the Southern Hemisphere and its feeble 31 watts of 
power could thereby be used to increase the effective strength of the re- 
maining circuits for the four existing ground terminals in the U.S., Bri- 
tain, Prance and Italy.^ ' Because of a lack of traffic, Early Bird was 
operated 16 hours a day, and because it did not offer round-the-clock 
service the U.S. Department of Defence potentially an important customer- 
did not use it. Eleven months after its launch only 75 of its transatlan- 
tic circuits were regularly used, prompting one newspaper to ask, "Was
(o\ 
Early Bird too early?" v '
Nevertheless the satellite signalled the start of a period of swift 
and extensive growth in the availability of satellite services, and of 
rapid technical refinement. In the less than six years that followed  
through 1971 Intelsat's membership increased from 38 to 82 countries. 
Prom the original total of four earth stations in as many countries and 
a single transatlantic communications pathway, the system grew to com- 
prise 63 ground antennas at 52 stations in 39 countries, and offered 
200 different pathways. Prom a single 240-circuit satellite, the 
space segment consisted by 1971 of four on-line spacecraft with a total 
capacity of 9,000 circuits, and two other satellites with 1,400 circuits
serving as orbiting spares and three further satellites, each with a
' (4) 5,000-circuit capacity, were scheduled for service within the next year. '
In this chapter the technical-development of the Intelsat system 
through its first four generations of"spacecraft deployed between 1965 
and 1975 is examined. The hardware that was developed and selected 
for use is analysed in order to identify the service priorities that 
underlay and were expressed in apparently technical determinations.
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Intelsat 1 s initial concern, we conclude, was in operationalising a tech- 
nology suited to the requirements of heavy traffic metropolitan regions; 
only later were technical features of particular benefit to users with 
low and intermittent capacity requirements introduced. The advent of the 
latter capability was a response to the success of cable competition in 
the Atlantic and Pacific, space segment overcapacity and the growth of 
Intelsat membership among Third World countries.
Next the questions posed by underutilisation and overcapacity which 
together comprise the quantitative side of underdevelopment are addressed. 
It is found that the satellite system was far from fully loaded during 
this period, and we conclude that the relatively low levels of use resul- 
ted from the conjuncture of: state policies compelling parallel develop- 
ment of cables and satellites in heavy traffic regions; organisation of 
the satellite system as a commercial enterprise, obliged to compete for 
traffic where its technological rival was strongest; the central role 
in Intelsat played by Comsat which, as a regulated U.S. carrier, was sub- 
ject to systematic incentives to overinvest; and the technical monopoly 
held by American manufacturers, whose outstanding interest in eventually 
serving high-technology domestic markets makes it practically impossible 
to determine with precision whether an appropriate level of technology 
was deployed internationally.
Finally, we argue that whatever its causes, underutilisation became 
a powerful reason to diversify and make more widely attractive Intelsat's 
service offerings in order to earn revenues from otherwise empty cir- 
cuits. Hence, in the post-1971 period Intelsat spacecraft came available 
for domestic uses, use of smaller and cheaper earth stations was pro- 
moted, and members were permitted to lease at quasi-concessionary rates 
large blocks of satellite capacity which had hitherto been priced pro- 
hibitively. On this technological level, therefore, the products indeed 
the waste products of underdevelopment were transformed into the infra- 
structure of a more universalised and more thoroughly developed satellite 
communications capability.
2. THE. SYSTEM'S TECHNICAL ELABORATION
The principal aims toward which development of Intelsat's space segment
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was directed were initially to establish the suitability of satellites 
as reliable instruments of intercontinental point-to-point transmission, 
and subsequently to permit economies of scale from satellite operations 
to be exploited. These objectives required determining the suitability 
of synchronous satellites, and then improving the space segment to pro- 
vide greater communications capacity at declining per circuit costs. The 
overall technical achievement represented by Intelsat's first four space- 
craft generations -is summarised below.
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Suitability of geostationary satellites; The immediate technical 
success of Early Bird enabled Comsat in May 19&5 "to narrow the possible 
design options on the 'early capability system' to either a. phased or a
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synchronous space segment.^' The sole remaining reservation concerning 
a geostationary system was the acceptability of the unavoidable time delay 
and the adequacy of techniques to suppress the echo a speaker may hear from 
his own utterances after a half-second lapse. Tests conducted through 1965, 
however, suggested that AT&T's continued insistence that phone customers 
would not tolerate these drawbacks was without basis. ' Meanwhile, during 
the summer of 1965 Comsat concluded an agreement with NASA to provide 
synchronous satellites for the Apollo programme; but since it was NASA 
that had specifically requested such a space segment, and since the ser- 
vices required were not primarily voice traffic, the arrangement was 
not a firm indication of Comsat f s own commitment to the design. In late 
February 1966 Comsat finally informed the PCC that "the quality of 
telephone communication via satellites in the synchronous configuration 
has been demonstrated to be clearly satisfactory," and requested authori- 
sation to build six such satellites for launch beginning in 1968. Approved 
by the FCC in June 1966, those satellites subsequently became the Intelsat
III series Intelsat I consisting of Early Bird, and the Us the space-
(7} craft intended primarily for NASA's use. '
Increased capacities; Communications capacity, according to the 
principle known as Hartley's Law, is a function of power and bandwidth: 
higher power levels permit more usable circuits to be derived from a 
given bandwidth, while increasing the bandwidth size per circuit permits
/ n\
lower power levels to sustain the same capacity. Initial efforts by 
Inte],sat were premised on limited on-board power, and sought to raise 
capacity through use of wider bandwidths. The Intelsat Us, three of 
which were orbited between January and September 1967, used more than 2jjr 
times the bandwidth of Early Bird, enabling them to offer twice the 
geographical coverage, to communicate with mobile ground and shipboard 
terminals equipped rath relatively inefficient antennas, and to serve 
several pairs of stations simultaneously thus inaugurating multiple 
access service.^ '
The Intelsat Ills represented an attempt to increase the effective 
radiating power of the spacecraft by replacing the on-board antenna 
design of the first two satellite generations where the antennas rotated
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with the satellite hull, spilling around 96 percent of signal strength 
into space  with a 'despun' antenna which turned in a direction con- 
trary to that of the satellite tody and thus remained pointed toward earth. 
The III series, "built not "by Hughes as had Early Bird and the Us but "by 
TRW Laboratories, was put into service between December 1968 and January 
1970, and it was one of them that was re-positioned over the Indian Ocean 
on July 1, 1969 to complete Intelsat's global coverage. Although a mixed 
success three failures in eight launches they nevertheless proved the 
practicality of the 'earth coverage 1 antennas. '
With the Intelsat IV series, antenna directivity was improved drama- 
tically through incorporation of two pairs of antennas: two global cover- 
age beams and two steerable spot beams, the latter to concentrate signal 
power with precision to meet heavy traffic requirements of limited areas. 
The importance of this directivity introduced by the IVs the first of 
which was put-', over the Atlantic in January 1971 was manifold, permitting 
simultaneous re-use of the same bandwidths by different antennas on the 
same satellite and thereby increasing capacity, enabling either more cir- 
cuits to be derived by existing ground stations or smaller ground sta- 
tions to be used, and increasing the number of satellites that could be
(12) positioned in adjacent orbital slots without mutual interference.
Multiple access techniques; The multiple access problem or the 
loss of capacity with increases in the number of earth stations using 
a satellite at the same time remained through the 1960s among the "most 
notable" technical difficulties, ' The technique used was based upon 
earth.stations' picking out the transmission destined for each by detec- 
ting differences in frequencies (frequency-division-multiple-access or 
RDM), which required 'buffering* to be inserted between carrier waves  
which wasted bandwidth and which obliged on-board amplifiers to be ope- 
rated at less than full strength which wasted power. Consequently, 
although a single Intelsat IV transponder could supply as many as 900 
voice circuits between two terminals, if five terminals were served 
capacity fell to 420 circuits and if 14 were served, 336 circuits. FDMA 
furthermore required fixed, pre-assigned frequencies for each earth sta- 
tion, which were standardised so that the smallest bandwidth a station 
could have was the equivalent of 24 voice circuits. Stations only paid, 
however, for circuits actually used, so a good deal of capacity was being
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tied up uselessly and without remuneration to Intelsat.
Although Comsat had begun work on a method of assigning capacity on 
demand in 1965, the proliferation of satellite services to light traffic 
regions of the Third World made the need imperative: traffic projections 
for the Atlantic region which included large parts of Africa and South 
America forecast that by 1973 some 213 different pathways would "be re- 
quired, 75 percent of which would need fewer than the 24-circuit minimum 
capacity provided "by PDMA. The successor technique, SPADE (Single-channel- 
per-carrier Pulse-code-modulation multiple-Access Demand-assigned Equip- 
ment), was finally made available in late 1971, and permitted an effec- 
tive capacity of 800 circuits for each Intelsat IV transponder to be 
maintained, regardless of the number of stations using it at once. By 
early 1974 fourteen Intelsat Atlantic region members had installed SPADE 
and 10 more were expected by year's end. ^ '
Decline in tariffs; The fall in per unit space segment costs pro- 
duced by these technical advances and noted in Table I above was re- 
flected in steadily declining charges on satellite use. In the first 
five years after global service was introduced in 1969, tariffs were 
reduced an average of more than 14 percent per year, or 45 percent up to 
1974» Unit prices the monthly lease of a voice-equivalent 'half-circuit', 
from earth station to satellite or from satellite to earth station fell 
from $2,667 in 1965 to $705 in early 1975. Nevertheless between 1969 
and 1974 Intelsat revenues more than doubled, due to a nearly four-fold 
increase in the number of circuits leased. Satellite-relayed telephone 
traffic was by the early 1970s increasing by 15-20 percent annually, and 
was expected to double every five years.
>- 
3., THE UMDERUTILISATION PROBLEM
However impressive, those figures are not by themselves sufficient to 
decide a controversy over the degree to which satellite facilities were 
underutilised during Intelsat's first decade. Utilisation is, in our 
view, a critical indicator of the system's overall success and of the 
wisdom with which technical components were selected for incorporation, 
implicating questions of appropriate technological levels, overinvestment,
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adequacy of service offerings, cable competition, pricing policy and 
demand elasticity, and earth station design.
Evidence of underutilisation; Commentaries are not agreed on the 
fact of underutilisation, in part because data are adduced selectively 
if not capriciously by both sides. S. Levy denies the problem's exis- 
tence by asserting that by the early 1970s some 95 percent of the sys- 
tem's capacity was being leased full-time/ ' when in fact 95 percent 
of what satellite service there was consisted of full-time leases which 
says nothing about the proportion of total capacity this use comprised 
Kinsley, on the other hand, writes:
Comsat faces the problem that most of its available satellite 
circuits have been unused. In 1974 Comsat was leasing barely 
3,000 circuits, three-fifths the capacity of a single Intelsat 
IV satellite, even though the corporation had several satellites 
of all four generations in orbit. (18)
In fact, Comsat's circuit leases represented only 31 percent of Intel- 
sat 's total leases for that year, and did not include rental of a full 
satellite transponder rated at 900 circuits. Furthermore, the number 
of usable satellites was rather less than implied, since all four space- 
craft of Intelsat's first two generations had exhausted their fuel sup- 
plies and though orbiting were useless, and three of the remaining eight
(19) 
satellites were spares approaching the end of their useful lives.
In spite of assurances from some Intelsat officials that underuti- 
lisation did not exist, however, other studies have confirmed Kins-
(21} ley's basic position. v . -Any attempt to determine their accuracy is
complicated by the variability of satellite capacities, and by the 
practical requirement that Intelsat deploy considerable spare capacity. 
Fluctuations in satellite capacities with different patterns of use can 
however be provided for by employing average capacity figures, as we have 
done in Table II below. We have also eliminated from consideration satel 
lites that were either classified as back-up facilities or had out-lived
their nominal life expectancies, so as not to penalise Intelsat for at-
(22) 
tempting to ensure continuity of service.
Nevertheless, as the table suggests, it is difficult to defend as 
desirable or optimal the levels~of"utilisation registered by Intelsat 
during its first 11 years of service. Our calculations indicate an
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Table lit Worldwide international satellite usage, 1965-75
1. 2. 3.
year available equivalent % increase
space seg- full-time from pre-
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Averages - 84.2 33.2 35.0
(a.)
v ' Estimated, in voice circuits as of December 31, from data in
Communications Satellite Corporation, Annual Report to the President 
and the Congress, 1966-75, "Status of satellites in the global sys- 
tem" annual summaries.
^ ' 1974 Comsat Annual Report, pp. 3-4? 1975 Comsat Annual Report, 
pp. 4-5. Figures are adjusted to include use of non-standard earth 
stations.
'°' Pull-time circuit leases are normally estimated as 95 percent of 
total system usage. Column 5 therefore provides Column 4 figures as 
divided by 0.95.
This figure includes 1200 circuits from the Intelsat III-P2 satel- 
lite, which began operations in the Atlantic on December 24 » 1968. If 
that spacecraft is excluded, total available space segment capacity 
falls to 960 voice circuits and leases to 498, resulting in a Column 
4 percentage of 51.8 and a Column 5 percentage of 54.5. (See 1968 
Comsat Annual Report, pp. 36-39*)
( e) Source is R. Parthasarathy, "Commercial satellite communications," 
Paper delivered to 13th Space Congress, Coca Beach, Florida, April 8, 
1976. Figure 2A.
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average utilisation of around 35 percent of available space segment capa- 
city, ranging from a high of nearly 58 percent in 1967, when the system 
comprised only four 240-circuit satellites, to a low of less than 19 per- 
cent after deployment of the high-capacity Intelsat TVs had commenced in 
1972, more than doubling the number of available circuits.
Direct impact of cables on satellite use: At least two studies have 
linked the low level of satellite utilisation to the space system's coexis- 
tence with the undersea cable network, the first to justify satellite over- 
capacity as necessary to provide back-up circuits in the event of cable 
breakdowns, the second the condemn satellite traffic levels as the result 
of self-seeking traffic diversions by cable-owners. Although Snow adduces
utilisation figures similar to our own yielding a 1965-74 average of around
(23") 34.3 percent of capacityv ' he argues that "most of the deviation...can
be confidently attributed to back-up capacity for use during satellite (or 
cable) failure," since "common engineering practice" required furnishing 
capacity double the level of normal anticipated traffic. ' Even if the 
latter assertion is true, however, overcapacity on the order of 30 percent 
still remains to be explained. Concerning the need for back-up capacity, 
it would appear that emergency requirements were accommodated easily with 
modest numbers of spare circuits; the category of temporary service, which 
includes TV relay as well as cable restoration, required for instance an 
average of 32 circuits per day worldwide in 1969 and 81 per day in 1974 
out of global satellite capacities of 4,300 and 20,000 circuits respective 
(05} ly. Satellite back-up capacity was provided by designated in-orbit
spares, which were excluded from our estimates of space segment circuits. 
There seems therefore little reason to accept Snow's assurance that the 
excess capacity simply reflected sound planning and was not excess at all.
Kinsley, on the other side, contends that underutilisation directly 
resulted from the continued construction and preferential use of submarine 
cables, which both deprived the satellite system of traffic and kept per 
circuit satellite rates high, further dampening business growth.^ Al- 
though the argument as to the cable-owning carriers' strategy seems sound, 
the linear connection between cabJLe^cpnstruction and satellite underutili- 
sation is difficult to draw, since the hypothesis implies that use should 
be at its lowest where cable competition was most intense in the Atlantic.
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In fact, as Table III shows, utilisation was highest in the Atlantic and 
lowest in the Indian Ocean region, large sections of which like the In- 
dian Ocean itself have no undersea phone cables at all. The declines 
in Pacific region satellites in 1974 and 1975 were due not to cables, but 
to competition from U.S. domestic satellites and loss of Hawaii-mainland 
traffic/ 27 ^
Cables and higher satellite tariffs; It has also been argued that 
cables indirectly depressed satellite traffic levels by needlessly in- 
flating the overall rate base for international services and thus pre- 
venting satellite charges from falling to a level adequate to support a 
primarily satellite-based capability.'1 ' There are two problems with 
this position: first, space segment charges are only a relatively minor 
component of the overall tariffs levied on satellite usep 2^' second, tele- 
communications demand is generally considered fairly insensitive to price 
fluctuations.*- ' Hence, even if Intelsat was enabled to reduce its space 
segment charges as a result of greatly increased traffic loads, the reduc- 
tions would make relatively little difference to the overall prices to 
the customer of satellite service; and even if those final prices came 
down proportionately, the impact on traffic levels would not be great-  
unless of course satellites were permitted to undersell cables, which is 
not the question here.
The preceding discussion of the direct and indirect effects of cables 
upon satellites is not, however, meant to exonerate cables from contribu- 
ting to satellite underutilisation. Directly and immediately, virtually 
all cable traffic was potential satellite traffic, while because of the 
higher costs and greater threshold traffic requirements of cables, the 
reverse was not the case. If, as we saw, Atlantic satellites were not as 
underutilised as those in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, this is due 
not to the benighancy of the numerous cables linking North America, Europe 
and the Caribbean, but to the overall vigour of regional service require- 
ments. Similarly, the contention that demand for overseas circuits is 
largely insensitive to price and therefore that cable construction did 
not restrain growth of aggregate international traffic by adding needless 
costs implies at the same -time that financial penalties were being imposed 
on those who could not afford not to pay what was demanded. Cable construc- 
tion compelled payment of subsidy from countries which benefited not at all
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Table III: Percentage of available capacity utilised, and rates of in-
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from availability of the alternative technology, first "because Intelsat 
applied uniform satellite rates worldwide in order to encourage the spread 
of services to light traffic areas whose space segment costs were partly 
paid "by surplus revenues from metropolitan regions, and second "because 
even non-cable-owning countries would be obliged to pay satellite charges 
to communicate with cable-owning countries which reflected the latter 1 s 
overall outlay on cables.
Cables and the spread of satellite services; That subsidy was the 
displaced cost burden of a policy of 'parallel development' of satellites 
and cables, a policy premised on a definition of satellite technology as 
an alternative mode of point-to-point intercontinental service made domi- 
nant by the satellite venture's senior partners and suited to their re- 
quirements for technically diversified overseas capabilities.
Efforts to enforce satellite-cable parity in metropolitan regions and 
therefore to keep satellite traffic levels from harming cable viability 
suggested strongly, however, that the most promising fields for satellite 
service would be those unsuited to cable exploitation: geographically to 
areas with insufficient traffic to warrant undersea links or with traffic 
patterns too dispersed to be served economically by fixed-point facilities, 
and in terms of kinds of services toward those which cables could not pro- 
vide. ' Inaugration of SPADE multiple access service, introduction of 
promotional rates for leases of bulk satellite capacity for domestic tele- 
communications and bilateral television exchanges, and tolerance for small- 
er and cheaper earth stations represented attempts to diversify Intelsat's 






















suggests the continued predominance of the Atlantic region in Intelsat 
usage through 1975, several qualifications must be noted: much of South
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America and Africa is served by Atlantic region spacecraft; the usage 
figures from which the percentages are derived include only leases of 
circuits, not of bulk capacity used, for example, for domestic telecom- 
munications by Algeria and for regular TV exchanges between Spain and 
Mexico; and the proportions conceal the absolute increases in use of 
the space segment, which itself expanded nearly five-fold in capacity 
between 1969 and 1975. While the considerable increase in the propor- 
tion of total satellite usage attributable to the Indian Ocean region 
has been largely at the expense of the Pacific region probably re- 
flecting in part increasing traffic between East and Southeast Asia and 
Europe as against transpacific traffic the overall percentage increases 
in circuit leases in both Indian and Pacific regions was through 1975 
greater than that registered in the Atlantic, as Table II indicates. 
Hence the impact of severe transatlantic cable competition seems not 
to have been wholly disadvantageous to the satellite system, since it 
encouraged geographical and service diversification.
Earth station delays; A final determinant of satellite underutili- 
sation seems to have been slippage in the anticipated availability of 
ground stations, which deprived the system of traffic the space segment 
was being deployed to accommodate. As Table IV shows, Comsat's 1967 
estimates of the opening dates of the 61 new terminals expected by 1972 
turned out to be not especially accurate.
Table IV: Accuracy of earth station availability forecasts, 1967 























Sources: Forecasts fram Sumsat Corporation, Annual Report to 
the President and the Congress, 1967, pp. 27-30. Data on ac- 
curacy from Annual Reports. 1972, pp. 94-5? 1974, PP. 22-6; 
1975, PP« 34-5» and from Comsat Corporation, "Pocket guide to 
the global satellite system," April 1975» PP. 22-6.
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Less than half the 1967 estimates forecast the correct year of earth 
station operation, and more than a third were wrong by two years or 
more all having erred on the side of -underestimating the length of time 
construction would take. Where underutilisation was most severe, in the 
Indian Ocean region, forecasts were least accurate.
It is difficult to determine the reasons for this apparent delay in 
earth station availability, in part because their rapid establishment pro- 
bably offered more widespread political and commercial rewards than any 
other feature of the satellite system. The U.S. government encouraged
ground station construction abroad through NASA, the Pentagon and the
f->2} 
official and quasi-official foreign aid apparatus, ' to help carry out
President Johnson's 1967 policy statement that "satellite ground stations 
should be an essential part of the infrastructure of developing nations." 
^ ' Comsat offered technical assistance and conducted feasibility stu- 
dies to enable national telecommunications entities to evaluate the pro- 
posals of manufacturers who, as one Comsat official put it, "were on them 
like fleas,"^ ' attracted to an export market estimated in 1966 to be 
worth from $300m to $500m by the end of the decade.^' Although that 
estimate turned out to be high, by mid-1970 worldwide investment in ground 
stations was nevertheless said to be between $250m and $350m, around twice 
the $>135m cumulative outlay on the Intelsat space segmentp a "conser- 
vative" estimate by the State Department that year put the American-supplied
(37) total of earth station goods and services at half the worldwide outlay. v '
Abroad, among potential rival suppliers Britain offered the most ag- 
gressive competition for construction and technical assistance contracts. 
The head of Post Office external telecommunications told a Commons commit- 
tee in 1966:
Our own view is that there really is an opening for Britain in the 
export market for earth stations, because in our view, and I really 
do think it is a correct view, we are probably ahead of the world, 
including the United States, in the design of earth stations at the 
moment. (38)
Standard'Telephone & Cable albeit an ITT subsidiary became the world's
(39) biggest supplier of ground station equipment, and Cable & Wireless
built earth stations in Bahrein, Hong Kong, Ascension Island, Jamaica 
and, in partnership with the three-nation communications entity, in
For countries purchasing earth stations, they proved by and
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large to be good investments, providing "significant return" within two 
to three years of operations^ ' and in some cases generating surplus
revenues through high tariffs for domestic telecommunications expan-
  (42) 
sion. v '
Nevertheless, delays may have been the result of any or all of the 
following: opposition within Comsat's board to the company's providing 
foreign assistance; politically-inspired opposition abroad to the ex- 
tension of Intelsat services; uncertainty over the future of Intelsat; 
and, simply, unrealistic expectations as to the speed of earth station 
completion. Although Kinsley quotes a former Comsat employee that car- 
rier board members "often refused" permission for technical and finan- 
cial aid, because the proliferation of ground stations might harm cable 
holdings, ' this seems unlikely to have had much impact cable and 
satellite rivalry was of little importance in the Third World, where 
technical assistance would be required; and Comsat's usual service was 
to steer foreign entities toward U.S. manufacturers, among idiom its 
carrier owners figured prominently.^ ' Political opposition abroad 
to Intelsat expansion similarly appears to have been confined to the 
French; France cables et radio, the firm which operates alone or in 
partnership the national communications systems of certain nations of 
francophone Africa is said to have been slow to develop external links 
that might have prejudiced French plans for its own satellite network. '
Of greater importance, however, were probably uncertainties as to 
Intelsat's prospects for surviving the forthcoming transition into a 
permanent enterprise. As is discussed in Part Five/ ' construction 
of earth stations and addition of antennas accelerated after the 1971 
definitive arrangements were concluded, and after the range of services 
offered by Intelsat was widened, making material investment in satellite 
communications less risky and more attractive. Finally, it is true that 
unavoidable problems in assuring timely delivery of supplies and re- 
cruiting sufficiently skilled workers inherent in introducing and assem- 
bling highly sophisticated components in underdeveloped societies may not 
have been fully appreciated by Comsat when its earth station forecasts 
were made. Whether or not the company had an interest in encouraging 
overly optimistic projections, and in deployment of an overly sophisti- 
cated and capacious satellite system, is the issue we shall now address.
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4. OVERCAPACITY
Even if restraints on traffic growth related to cable construction and use 
and to tardy earth station proliferation contributed to satellite underuti- 
lisation, it may also be possible that discrepancies between traffic and 
capacity resulted from a systematic oversupply of satellite circuits, at- 
tributable to efforts by Comsat to inflate its rate base and to test out 
overly sophisticated space segment components intended ultimately for 
U.S. domestic applications.
In Comsat's defence, two preliminary observations are appropriate as 
to the sources of its traffic forecasts and its selection of basic earth 
segment and space segment configuration. First, Comsat was largely ob- 
liged to depend on the projections provided by the U.S. carriers whose 
relations with foreign entities were presumed to be close and whose know- 
ledge of trends within the domestic market was supposed to be accurate  
in order to forecast levels of international traffic. In retrospect, 
however, carrier predictions appear to have borne a suspicious relation- 
ship to the companies' own satellite ambitions forecasts were higher 
when satellite control was sought, and lower after Comsat was created 
and cable protection emerged as a more attractive policy than satellite 
use/ 47 )
Second, Comsat selected a system configuration combining relatively 
small satellites and costly earth stations when, in principle because 
Intelsat owned only the space segment and Comsat owned initially 60 per- 
cent of Intelsat the company's rate base ivould have benefited from de- 
ploying bigger and more expensive satellites to operate with smaller 
ground stations. More powerful spacecraft and the boosters to put 
them in orbit were available, "' but Intelsat kept to this basic design 
and although substandard ground stations were tolerated their operators 
were made to pay premiums for taking up a greater share of satellite capa- 
city to derive usable circuits/-3 ' It was true that Comsat might expect 
to compensate itself at home through ownership of a half-dozen U.S. earth 
stations at $5m each for the investment opportunities abroad surrendered 
through selection of the cheaper space segment. More important, however, 
seems to have been concern with the system's overall reliability and a 
desire to keep the irreparable satellites as simple as possible, as Comsat 
stated in a 1964 submission to the UN General Assembly:
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As reliability is the controlling factor in establishing a com- 
munications satellite system, it is likely that the major elec- 
tronic components of the satellites in the early system will be 
relatively simple. It follows that the associated ground equip- 
ment will probably carry the burden of any complexity involved. 
(51)
In effect, Comsat recognised that simply applying its investment ambi- 
tions to fundamental system choices might jeopardise the entire project.
Notwithstanding those two extenuating factors, there were indica- 
tions that Comsat's plans for the global system were more ambitious  
requiring higher technology, higher costs, more satellites and greater 
capacity than others believed necessary, and concern that more capacity 
was being operationalised than could readily be used accompanied vir- 
tually every decision taken on successive satellite generations (with 
the exception of Early Bird, which was in any case partly experimental.)
Intelsat I; Although Early Bird, whose approval was expedited to 
hasten conclusion of the 1964 international negotiations, did not attract 
sufficient traffic to exhaust even its low capacity, Comsat attempted to 
rally support within Intelsat*s governing board, the ICSC, for a second 
satellite of identical design to permit transatlantic television relay
without the need to pre-empt telephone circuits. European ICSC members
(52) opposed the project as unnecessary and expensive, and Comsat relented. v
Intelsat II; Because of the central and direct role played by the 
U.S. government in creating and using the Intelsat II series, concern 
over the adequacy of commercial demand for satellite services was muted, 
notwithstanding the insufficient numbers of ground stations available 
to use satellite capacity in excess of state requirements. NASA and 
the Defence Communications Agency between them accounted for more than 
60 percent of the circuits leased in 1967 on the three Us then in ser- 
vice.^ ' Nevertheless the European ICSC members objected to an early 
launch of the first Intelsat II, to be placed over the Pacific, since as 
of late 1966 the only commercial earth station operating in the region 
was in Japan and a severe shortage of customers was anticipated.^ 
Thanks to the launch failure of the first II in October 1966, the satel- 
lites were first made operational in January 196?; even so, aside from 
the substandard-size terminal in Japan and two American earth stations 
in Washington State and Hawaii, satellite service in the region relied
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entirely on mobile terminals furnished by NASA and the Defence Department 
in the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. ^'
Intelsat III; Late in 1965 Comsat opened negotiations with TRW Aero- 
space over construction of a satellite ssries to be interposed between the 
Us and the high-capacity multipurpose satellites that would officially 
inaugurate the global system.^-3 ' Controversy ensued over the timing of 
and need for an expanded interim satellite capability. Hughes Aircraft 
objected strenuously to the $40m deal before the FCC, claiming that its 
multipurpose satellites could be ready by 1969 and that an interim gene- 
ration was unnecessary. In May 1966 Comsat countered that the TRW satel- 
lites would be an "appropriate transition" and would assure global cove- 
rage by mid-1968. Although the Corporation had said the previous December 
that the Hughes 1 satellites would be put into operation beginning in 1969- 
70, Comsat now claimed that they would not be needed until 1972 which, in 
spite of Hughes 1 assurances was, it said, a more likely target date for 
their availability. In the interim, a system that combined the Us with 
the TRW spacecraft would provide the required capacity with four fewer
satellites than if additional Intelsat Us were deployed until the Hughes 1
(51} satellites were ready*
Although the Europeans were reportedly reluctant to approve the TRW 
contract in hopes, according to one account, of deferring additional 
satellite approvals until after Intelsat renegotiations and thereby to
"provide a delay during which Europe could advance its own communications
( Sfi^
satellite programs"  Comsat won ICSC approval notwithstanding in Feb- 
ruary 1966, before the PCC had been asked for its authorisation. The 
PCC Iras not convinced that Hughes 1 objections were unfounded, and was 
uneasy about approving what might be a needless outlay; but the Commis- 
sion was even more unwilling to block, as a domestic U.S. agency, a nomi- 
nally international initiative, and reluctantly gave its approval in June, 
^ ' stating:
While certain Questions respecting the economic aspects of the pro- 
posal have not been resolved at this time, the Commission, upon con- 
sideration of the foreign policy considerations called to its atten- 
tion by the Department of State, should act promptly in this matter... 
(60)
Comsat was, however, instructed to return for specific PCC authorisation 
before actually using any of the TRW satellites henceforth the Intelsat
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IIIs and the PCC added the unusual proviso that Comsat would not neces- 
sarily "be permitted to include the Ills in its rate "base simply because 
the Commission had approved construction and purchase.
Intelsat IV; Suspicions of.unnecessarily expensive and hasty invest- 
ment were strengthened when in November 1967 Comsat asked for PCC approval 
to contract with H-ughes for the multi-purpose Intelsat IVs. Comsat modi- 
fied for a second time its forecasts as to the satellites' availability 
dates, alluding to recent studies that "effectively dispelled" its pre- 
vious doubts and claiming that the spacecraft would and could be ready 
by late 1969 as Hughes had said a year-and-a-half before although Com- 
sat contended that 1970 was a more reasonable target. The Corporation 
said that an Intelsat IV would be needed over the Atlantic by 1969, but 
the step-up in scheduling was viewed as in part a response to the then- 
pending carrier application to construct a fifth transatlantic cable/ "' 
and thus as an attempt to assure the PCC that the satellite system could 
handle anticipated traffic growth unassisted.
The need to accelerate deployment of the IVs was challenged within
the ICSC, where some members believed Comsat's real interest was in testing' £-)\
a satellite suitable for U.S. domestic deployment. Indeed Comsat 1 s 
original request for bids issued in late December 19&5 had specified, for 
instance, that the spacecraft should have a "nationwide or international" 
television distribution capability."^ ' Two other possibilities for 
meeting international traffic requirements were considered: first, since 
Comsat held options on 18 more Intelsat Ills, some ICSC members believed 
further deployment of the TRW satellites would be adequate to meet Intelsat 
needs through 1975;^ ' second the Ills could be up-graded to 2,000 cir- 
cuits through adding a directed antenna array to maximise capacity between 
Europe and North America, where traffic growth was greatest. The Intelsat 
IH-jrs, as they were called, would be ready for service by mid-1969, thus
assuring" service continuity at lower cost until the IVs "were operational-
  * (66) ised. v '
Comsat prevailed within the ICSC, but the actual procurement of the 
IVs suggests that Comsat was in-faei-keeping one eye on the U.S. domestic 
market while ostensibly dealing on Intelsat's behalf. In September 1968  
before the first successul Intelsat III launch Comsat ordered four IVs 
from Hughes for $72m.^ ' Although it was anticipated that at least eight 
of the satellites would ultimately be needed, Comsat justified ordering
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only four by saying it wanted to retain the possibility of buying a dif- 
ferent satellite from Lockheed. Comsat allowed Hughes 1 original price 
bids to expire xd.thout taking up the options it held, and then opened 
negotiations not with Lockheed but with Hughes for a modified 'Intelsat 
IVg-* spacecraft, the design of which was said to be remarkably approp- 
riate to the domestic satellite proposals Comsat was then floating.*- ' 
The ICSC rejected purchase of the IV-gs, however, and Comsat was obliged 
to order four more IVs from Hughes in late 1969 at prices higher than 
those of the original options Comsat had let lapse. "'
After the first Intelsat IV was launched in January 1971, Comsat 
continued to press for deployment of a higher-capacity intermediate 
satellite series derived from the IV design. In late 1972 Comsat finally 
signed a contract with Hughes for the Intelsat IV-As, which would be 
equipped with 20 transponders as against the IVs' 12 and would provide 
around two-thirds greater capacity. Intended for service in late 1975? 
the IV-As also incorporated advanced antenna directivity features and an 
ability to re-use frequencies through extremely narrox-j beam separation, 
which would double the range of frequency suitable for simultaneous use. 
^ ' Such features were also present in the design of the four domestic
satellites which Comsat ordered from Hughes through a $65.9m contract
(71)
signed in September 1973.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental determinant of the chronic discrepancy between satellite 
system capacity and utilisation was the system's orientation toward the 
requirements of heavy-traffic metropolitan regions. That orientation re- 
sulted from the conjuncture of state policies favouring diversified na- 
tional overseas capabilities, the system's commercialisation which simi- 
larly encouraged pursuit of the most available sources of traffic and 
Comsat's dominance, which both enabled its particular objectives to be 
transposed onto Intelsat activities and justified opposition to satellite 
system expansion on grounds of political inequities. To a greater or 
lesser degree, these three determinants are present in each of the five 
factors immediately responsible for the capacity-usage discrepancy: cable
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competition, the technical relationship "between earth and space segments, 
the rapid succession of satellite generations, an outstanding interest 
in metropolitan domestic satellite applications and, arguably, defence 
of the 'single global system 1 policy.
Cables: Cable construction and use appear to have aggravated both 
underutilisation and overcapacity of the satellite system, by diverting 
potential traffic and perhaps providing a pre-emptive reason for rushing 
deployment of the high-capacity Intelsat IVs. While continued cable buil- 
ding unquestionably served the 'parallel development' policies of the
(12]
metropolitan countries, ' the satellite system's vulnerability to cable
competition was premised on the commercial necessity to attract some of 
the heavy-volume traffic flows, instead of establishing a base of opera- 
tions within hitherto deprived regions. Comsat stood particularly to gain 
from success in battling the cables, since reduced cable expenditures 
would diminish the U.S. international carriers' rate bases and entitle 
them to smaller shares of satellite operating revenues.
Earth-space segment configuration! Increases in the effective radi- 
ating power of successive satellite generations, achieved through higher 
ravr power outputs and focussed on-board antennas, were potentially of 
benefit to big and small users, depending upon the constitution of the 
earth segment: larger and more expensive ground stations would trans- 
late improvements in satellite power and hence capacity into a greater
number of usable circuits, while smaller earth stations would enable
(73)fewer circuits to be derived but at lower capital costs. ' Intelsat
opted for the bigger end of the range of antenna sizes, making 85 feet 
the standard diameter and from $3m to $6m the usual ground station cost. ' 
The decision affected both overcapacity and underutilisation. Capacity 
was obviously higher in the technical sense that the ratings of satellite 
circuits were premised on use of the more efficient 85-foot antennas; 
less efficient antennas would necessarily have meant that satellite cir- 
cuit capacities would be lower. In regard to utilisation, although an- 
tenna costs comprised only around 30 percent of total ground station/ 7C-\ _ -   
construction costs, UJ' it is nevertheless likely that the increment
discouraged prolferation of satellite services, as one Intelsat official 
acknowledged in this 1976 passage:
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While the growth in the number of standard earth stations has 
been impressive, there are indications that Intelsat has yet 
to cater to a large number of countries or areas with rela- 
tively small traffic potential who find the [standard ground] 
station too expensive. (76)
The extent of interest in cheaper ground stations which Third World 
Intelsat members sought for domestic purposes was reflected in 41 appli- 
cations between 1974 and 1976 for approval of substandard antennas, 33 
for domestic applications. Intelsat formulated a second antenna stan- 
dard 36-foot diameter and as a result, whereas at the end of 1974 only 
seven of the satellite system's 104 antennas were non-standard, by 1976 
some 57 hitherto non-standard antennas were forecast for "the immediate 
future."' 77 )
Nevertheless, users of smaller antennas were charged penalty factors
( 78^ for the greater amounts of satellite capacity they required,^ ' which
meant in effect that additional payment was exacted in defence of a tech- 
nical standard that had produced a large amount of excess capacity. For 
metropolitan Intelsat members, however, the original earth station stan- 
dard had established the reliability of satellite communications when 
the space segment was considered the more doubtful element; higher 
terrestrial costs could, furthermore, be readily amortised against a 
greater traffic volume. Comsat's own interest in bigger earth stations 
was, as mentioned, dubious, although the undivided ownership, the company 
sought of U.S. ground facilities would have more than offset the rate 
base loss represented by a somewhat cheaper, internationally-owned space 
segment.
The pace of satellite deployment: It is indeed difficult to see why 
a 5,000-olrcuit satellite should have been deployed to provide service to 
a region that had hardly made a dent in the 1,200-circuit capacity of its 
existing satellite. The quick succession of satellite generations, how- 
ever, assured metropolitan regions the continuity of coverage upon which 
they insisted and was, moreover, generally geared to anticipated circuit 
requirements in the North Atlantic. Comsat's rate base certainly bene- 
fited, and European ICSC members at least believed that the company's 
prospects in the Intelsat re-negotiations would be improved to the degree 
that its qualifications in managing an advanced, high-capacity network
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were established.
Domestic applications! It is impossible to determine the truth in 
contemporary suspicions that Comsat was deliberately manipulating speci- 
fications for Intelsat spacecraft in order to test out components ulti- 
mately destined for U.S. domestic uses/ ' In any event Comsat would 
not have been the sole ICSC member to benefit from such activities: In- 
telsat IV procurement was distributed internationally much more widely 
than its predecessors' the British Aerospace Corporation for instance
/ o-i \
assembled an entire IV in Bristol 
 and the persistent interest in 
European regional and domestic satellite development paralleled Comsat 1 s 
in the American market. ' Thus, what is noteworthy is the very impos- 
sibility of determining how appropriate the Intelsat IVs and IV-As were 
to wider international requirements, so skewed was the system to serving 
heavy volume users.
Overcapacity and the single global system; Although there is no evi- 
dence to suggest that this was a determinant of overcapacity, the large 
amounts of excess satellite capacity nevertheless provided Intelsat with 
the means to discourage, through promotional pricing of surplus, creation 
of rival satellite systems. After the Intelsat permanent arrangements 
were concluded in 1971, bulk satellite capacity whole and half-transpon- 
ders were made available for long-term lease at rates considerably less 
than were justified by the numbers of voice-circuits the capacity could 
have yielded/ ' Brazil, the first country to take advantage of the 
offer for domestic uses, had previously been actively seeking assistance 
and advice on establishing a satellite system of its own, as had Algeria, 
which subsequently created a domestic network of ground stations to ope- 
rate with Intelsat spacecraft. In explaining the cut-rate lease to Al- 
geria, the ICSC finance committee stated in September 1973:
It seemed reasonable...to expect that by this means traffic could 
be attracted to, or retained by, the Intelsat system on a scale 
which would'improve the financial position of Intelsat as a whole 
and effect a reduction in the space segment cost for each user 
in the whole system. (84)
Pricing policy thus took on a pre-emptive cast, made possible precisely 
because of overcapacity. Addition of new ground antennas enabled coun- 
tries as separated as Nigeria and Malaysia to gain access to most gravely
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underused satellites in the system—in the Indian Ocean region—for 
domestic purposes; indeed "by mid-1976, of 11 bulk leases of capacity 
which were either in service or had "been approved by Intelsat's gover­ 
ning board, seven involved use of spacecraft in that region. ' The 
ready availability of large amounts of capacity, coupled with the will­ 
ingness to offer them cheaply, stood as a persuasive argument against 
creation of separate satellite systems.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: U.S. EARTH STATIONS—CARTEL REAFFIRMED
1. OVERVIEW;
The conflict over ownership and control of the U.S. Intelsat ground 
stations took nearly two-and-a-half years to resolve. In August 1964, 
soon after the interim Intelsat accords were concluded, Corasat asked 
the FCC for sole authorisation to own and operate the first three Amer­ 
ican ground stations and related facilities. In May 1965, a month after 
Early Bird was launched, the Commission agreed under a two-year interim 
policy. Nineteen months later, however, the FCC in December 1966 revised 
that ruling to provide for consortium ownership: Comsat would own half 
of each station and the other half would "be divided among authorised U.S. 
international carriers. Although the last decision was formally an interim 
one as well, it was still in force a decade later and had "been applied to 
subsequent earth station dispositions.
A great deal was believed to be at stake in the earth station con­ 
troversies. "It is on the outcome of this legal conflict," wrote one 
journalist, "that Comsat's fortunes principally depend, and perhaps also 
the concept of a single comprehensive global communications system."^ ' 
Although Comsat supplied technical and political arguments to support 
its bid for exclusive ownership, the company's economic position was of 
greatest importance, Comsat initially contended that the multiple access 
problem required restrictions on the number of domestic earth stations— 
and thus ruled out simply opening the field to whichever carriers wanted
to build their own stations—and that a single repository of integrated
( 2 ) technical responsibility was appropriate to the unproven technology. v '
Later the company also argued that most of the operational problems Early 
Bird had encountered were due not to the satellite or earth station, but 
to interconnections with the national grid,_, and that Comsat should be 
empowered to assure comprehensive through-service.^ In all, earth sta­ 
tion ownership was technically "vital" to the Corporation's programme, as
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Comsat's president stated in a January 1966 Senate appearance:
It is there where satellite power is converted into channels of 
communications, and, hence, it is there where the real exploita­ 
tion of satellite technology for communications purposes takes 
place. Only "by integrating all the essential elements of the 
system can one hope to derive and demonstrate the full economic 
and technical "benefits of this new technology. (4)
Politically too, Comsat maintained that its congressional mandate and 
Intelsat responsibilities required it to hold exclusive control over 
the U.S. portions of overseas satellite links so that it could compel 
adherence to Intelsat standards and service requirements, and thereby 
represent itself as a fully authoritative entity. '
Economically, ground facilities were "both the most promising are 
for Comsat to expand its rate base and, as Business Week observed, "the 
cash registers of a satellite communications system."^ ' On the first 
count, the $50m that Comsat sought to invest in the first set of U.S. 
earth stations would comprise around half of its total rate base; a 
50-50 oxvnership split with the carriers would therefore reduce its an­ 
ticipated revenues by one-quarter, irrespective of traffic growth. Loss 
of the ground stations would harm Comsat more than it would aid its ri­ 
vals, since the same $50m would constitute only eight percent of their
(7}combined international rate bases. ' Carrier ownership or co-ownership
would, however, reduce Comsat 1 s chances of closing the gap between its 
charges to the carriers and their charges to ultimate users of satellite 
circuits by strengthening the justification for substantial carrier 'mid­ 
dleman' cuts of total revenues; even if Comsat's prices fell, the ulti­ 
mate costs to satellite users need not be reduced as quickly and reliably 
to the degree that carrier earth station investment entitled them to set 
charges that reflected not just that investment but parallel holdings in 
cables as well.
On the second point, Comsat's control of ground facilities would 
put it in an excellent position from which to develop a technical capa­ 
bility to serve customers directly with international and, in time, do­ 
mestic satellite circuits. Exclusive authorisation might also enable 
the company to secure a dynamic advantage in earth station technology, 
perhaps the pivotal technical field in the emerging struggle over who 
would handle internal satellite operations.
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The carriers argued that Comsat earth station control would, "by 
enabling the company to offer services directly to the public, preju­ 
dice future decisions as to who the 'authorised users' of satellite 
circuits would be f and permit Comsat to stifle competition by shutting 
the carriers out of any meaningful role in overseas satellite service. ' 
The real threat was to the record carriers—Western Union International 
(WUl) and the subsidiaries of EGA and ITT—since if Comsat owned and 
operated the earth stations and through-links to the domestic network, 
and AT&T controlled the national grid, they would have virtually no op­ 
portunity to handle traffic and claim revenues, apart from minor collec­ 
tion and distribution functions at final terminal points. AT&T's posi­ 
tion was determined less by solicitude for its fellow carriers than by 
fear of the precedent a Comsat franchise might set, possibly an important 
step toward expanded domestic operations and securing recognition as a 
national 'chosen instrument' in space communications—which might in 
time strike at the heart of Bell's monopoly, the domestic long lines. 
AT&T had also to consider the future of its submarine cables—ownership 
of which was now shared with the record carriers. The carriers would 
be better able to exert leverage over the totality of Comsat's activi­ 
ties if they held a veto over earth station decisions than they had al-
(9) ready thanks to their seats on Comsat's board of directors.
2. THE FIRST EARTH STATION OWNERSHIP DECISION
On August 14, 1964 Comsat asked the PCC for exclusive authorisation to 
own and operate the first three U.S. ground stations, tentatively to 
be located in the northeast for transatlantic service, the northwest for 
the Pacific region and the southeast for Latin America. Although Comsat 
at first based its application on the "multiple access problem," urging 
the Commission to limit the proliferation of earth stations by putting 
Comsat in charge, subsequent submissions through the autumn argued: 
1.) exclusive ownership would enable Comsat to control the quality and 
volume of satellite traffic;" 2.) the main improvements in satellite 
system capacity would derive from advances in terrestrial equipment, and 
Comsat must be able to pursue and exploit these; 3.) Comsat had no con­ 
flicting interest in other means of communication, so its dedication to
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satellite use was unambiguous; 4.) carrier participation in earth 
station ownership would result in compromises over design and operating 
policy which "would almost certainly hinder prompt and effective action;"
5.) because Comsat owned no domestic facilities it would better 
be able to assure non-discriminatory access to the system by all U.S. 
users, thereby eliminating an anti-competitive potential of carrier own­ 
ership; 6.) because Comsat had no manufacturing operations of its own, 
it enjoyed "freedom from built-in biases in favor of «in-house' products 
and technology;"^- ' 7.) finally, the "status and effectiveness" of 
Comsat internationally would be harmed if it were denied exclusive own­ 
ership: "...[T]he corporation would be the only [intelsat] member with
(12\ 
no responsibility for the terminal stations in its country."^ '
Comsat's contentions were rejected and its application opposed by 
the rest of the communications industry. AT&T, with support from GT&E's 
Hawaiian Telephone and the U.S. Independent Telephone Association (rep­ 
resenting a number of non-Bell domestic carriers), proposed that Comsat 
be given 50 percent ownerships of domestic earth stations and be named 
as manager for planning, designing, building and operating the facili­ 
ties. The other 50 percent would be divided among carriers to be selec­ 
ted by the FCC in proportions to be decided. ITT and the American Com­ 
munications Association (representing the smaller non-Bell carriers) 
wanted individual earth station applications to be treated separately 
and ownership awarded to those carriers likely to make most use of a 
particular facility. EGA and Western Union International (WUl) sup­ 
ported Comsat ownership for a strictly limited period, with holdings 
later transferred to a carrier consortium—apart from stock the car­ 
riers elected not to buy, for which Comsat would be eligible. WUI 
charged that Comsat ownership—if coupled with the right to serve cus­ 
tomers directly—would very likely force the record carriers out of 
business. '
In its First Report and Order on earth station ownership in May 
1965, the FCC sustained COmsat's position: "The most important consi­ 
deration" was the system's operational^^availability at "the earliest
practicable date." Hence "time pressure" was the "basic reason for
(14) our interim policy:" v
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In sum, we "believe it is essential that, to the extent possible, 
diffusion of.responsibility, with the risks of delays or compro­ 
mises which could adversely affect the efficiency of not only the 
earth stations in the Unites States but also of the system as a 
whole, must be avoided. (15)
The PCC rejected the carriers 1 argument that their presence within earth 
station supervisory bodies would enable them to share expertise with 
Comsat, and said their seats on Comsat's board should suffice.' ' "The 
need for centralized administrative control and close technical coordi­ 
nation between the earth station and space segment programs" was of
(n}paramount importance. '
The decision, by a 5-2 vote/ ' applied only to the first three 
U.S. ground stations, which by now were planned for the northeastern and 
northwestern parts of the continental United States and for Hawaii, since 
it was not expected that Latin American earth stations would soon be ope— 
rational, while NASA's Apollo programme would quickly require service in 
the Pacific. Disposition of the southeastern U.S. earth station was there­ 
fore left open. Surprisingly, however, Comsat was also given ownership 
and control of the facilities through which traffic between earth stations 
and so-called gateway points—where overseas-bound messages were gathered 
to and from the domestic network—flowed; included were cable and micro­ 
wave facilities between the usual points where international traffic was 
processed, multiplexing (channel-deriving) equipment for processing mes­ 
sages for satellite transmission, and the links between earth station and
(19) the nearest points of interface with the domestic grid. x
3. CARRIER MILITATION CONTINUES
Comsat naturally welcomed the FCC decision which, the company's chairman 
said, "strengthens the corporation nationally and internationally."^ 
Preliminary work began on establishing stations in Washington State and 
Hawaii, and in July Comsat requested approval to purchase from AT&T the 
earth station in Andover, Maine that had been used for Telstar and Early 
Bird/ ' The facts that the.Commission's ruling had been interim—pending
better information from operationa]~experrence—and that a decision on
(22) the fourth U.S. station in the southeast was awaited^ ' gave Comsat ;
incentive to fulfill its responsibilities well and quickly.
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Those same provisos, however, also meant that the issue was still 
negotiable and the carriers continued to criticise Comsat's activities. 
RCA and ITT accused Comsat in September of trying to expand into domes­ 
tic common carriage under the protection of the interim policy. RCA 
charged:
A review of developments thus far reveals an evolving pattern 
in which Comsat apparently seeks to exert its direction and 
control over all phases of satellite communications,(23)
which would not have been far from the FCC's intentions. ITT predicted 
the demise of the record carriers and warned that such an eventuality 
would ultimately work to AT&T's advantage and could only be avoided by 
permitting the record carriers to merge. ' Without earth station 
participation, ITT said,
The traffic could be carried by the domestic carriers to the 
gateway interface and interchanged with Comsat without the need 
for the provision of facilities and services by the international 
carrier. (25)
While ITT attacked what seemed to be the rationalising and cost-reducing 
consequences of the PCC decision, AT&T maintained the set-up was techni­ 
cally irrational. In September, when Bell joined with the three record 
carriers in asking the Commission to turn down Comsat's applications to 
proceed with the Washington State and Hawaii earth stations, AT&T des­ 
cribed the operational consequences of the interim policy upon the An- 
dover earth station as follows: traffic had first to be brought to 
New York, the gateway point nearest Andover; it was gathered in Bell's 
plant and relayed to Comsat's interface centre for reprocessing and 
multiplexing; the traffic was then routed back to Bell's long lines 
office and sent over its cables to Andover. Thus, it was alleged, not 
only did the interim decision reduce the carriers' control over over­ 
seas routing—or, presumably, their freedom not to use satellites—but 
it also encouraged duplicate terrestrial facilities.
Alarmed by the vigourous opposition to the two western earth sta­ 
tions, the PCC convened an 'interface conference' of Comsat and the 
carriers on September 9. Bell reiterated that the interfaces between 
domestic network and satellite system should be defined as being at 
the actual earth station sites, and that Comsat's ownership rights 
should accordingly be confined. At issue were some considerable trans­ 
mission facilities —some 300 miles from New York to Andover, perhaps
-225-
600 miles from San Francisco to the Brewster Plats, Washington earth 
station—ownership of which would mean rate base and revenues. Bell, 
however, was unable to offer estimates of savings if the waste it asso­ 
ciated with Comsat's title to those connections were eliminated, and
could not say whether backhauling would be necessary for record as well
(27) 
as voice traffic.
Although nothing was decided at the conference, it v;as growing 
clear that the FCC's first earth station decision had offered a poli­ 
tical solution which, though responsive to the fundamental urgency 
which informed satellite determinations, was unacceptable to important 
participants in the technological formation process. Carrier opposi­ 
tion—for instance to Comsat's proceeding with the Pacific region sta­ 
tions—was threatening to hold back the very developments which the 
carriers' exclusion was intended to expedite.
Nonetheless, in October the Commission approved Comsat's construc­ 
tion of the urgently-needed Hawaii and Washington State stations—service
( ?8) 
to the Apollo programme was scheduled to begin within 18 months^ '—
while the carriers moved to head off any further expansion Comsat might 
envisaged on the basis of the Hay 19&5 policy declaration. In November 
a Puerto Rican subsidiary of ITT re-filed a request first made the pre­ 
vious March to build and operate an earth station there. The action 
was not altogether to AT&T's liking, since Bell and ITT had been plan­ 
ning jointly to build an advanced 720-circuit transistorised cable to
link the Caribbean region to Europe via Lisbon and to Capetown via
( 29) Ascension and the Canary islands/ y> To support its earth station
application, ITT now claimed that satellite service would be the better 
way to accommodate regional traffic growth—on the order of 29 percent 
annually since 1960. While Bell continued to insist that the cable 
would be more economical/ 3 ' ITT was apparently more concerned with 
using its telecommunications dominance in the Caribbean to justify ex­ 
clusive ownership of the satellite station. EGA and WUI challenged 
ITT on just that basis, arguing that if Comsat got the three mainland 
stations and ITT the Puerto Rican, "geographical monopolies" would in 
effect have been created. They asked for equitable ownership provisions
(32) for all international carriers.
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4. THE SECOND DECISION
When in January 1966 Comsat asked for permission to build the southeastern 
U.S. ground station, the carriers unleashed what the trade press called "a 
full-scale attack" on the whole of the PCC's interim policy, now scarcely 
eight-months-old.^ ~*' They alleged that Comsat's proposed location in 
West Virginia would cause technical interference with existing microwave 
facilities, and nominated themselves to "build, own and operate the station. 
Comsat countered that opposition to various outstanding construction per­ 
mits to link approved earth stations to gateway points already was jeopar­ 
dising the satellite service NASA would soon require, urged the PCC to re­ 
affirm its interface decision, and dismissed carrier interference claims 
as groundless. '
The Commission's response came in a second decision in February 1966. 
Its previous ruling on ownership of the first three stations was re-stated; 
indeed, in.view of NASA's pressing requirements the advantages of "a cen­ 
tralization of responsibility and control in Comsat are even greater than 
appeared when we first considered the matter."^ ' However, the FCC ac­ 
cepted AT&T's position on re-locating the interface between satellite sys­ 
tem and domestic network to the earth station site itself. Interface 
points could, the Commission said, be wherever efficiency dictated; the 
increased use of customer-to-customer leased lines tended to make the 
entire gateway concept obsolete—since gathering points could be by-passed 
—and Bell's alleged plans to introduce direct overseas dialing would 
similarly obviate gateway maintenance. Finally,"national security inte- 
rests"were said to oblige circumventing large population centres in favour 
of routing traffic directly to overseas transmission points. ' Although 
the continued value of Comsat's interface control was acknowledged—since 
it put Comsat "in a position to assure equitable access to the system"— 
actual or anticipated changes in AT&T's operations "substantially decrease 
the importance of the gateway concept." The interface with the national
network therefore "should be at or near the physical site of the earth
(37} station itself." vJ( '
In this first revision of the FCC's earth station ownership policy, 
Comsat was forced back to the station sites themselves, deprived of any
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opportunity to maintain a presence at the critical points of contact 
with the domestic network, and thus stripped of effective power to con­ 
trol access to the space segment by potential traffic sources. This 
second Commission action, as H. Schwartz has observed, reversed half 
of its original decision and neatly sliced in half the 19 months that 
would elapse between the initial policy statement and its complete re- 
versal/ 38)
Despite this setback Comsat pressed on, opposing both AT&T's appli­ 
cation to build a new cable link between the U.S. Virgin Islands and 
the mainland and ITT's request for a Puerto Rico earth station with an 
earth station application of its own—to be located on St. Croix, U.S. 
Virgin Islands—which was immediately attacked by the four international 
carriers. All agreed that this May 1966 Caribbean earth station appli­ 
cation represented an attempt by Comsat to widen and exploit the provi­ 
sions of the FCC's interim policy: "It now becomes increasingly clear,"
WUI charged, "that Comsat's 'single-minded interest' lies in its com-
(T.Q] 
plete dominance of international communications facilities."vy/ ITT
pushed for approval of its satellite station in Puerto Rico, noting 
with AT&T that most of the region's traffic originated and terminated 
there. Bell, however, went further in order to defend its cable pro­ 
posal against both earth station applications, and observed that the 
vast preponderance of the region's international traffic was with the 
United States, and therefore the promise of global interconnection via 
satellite was of little value: "Vague reference to television trans­ 
mission or of possible traffic to other parts of the world cannot sup­ 
ply this deficiency" in hard evidence of requirements.
Comsat countered that approval of the cable would mean "frozen 
investment in a specified capability for a 20-year period," while satel­ 
lites were continually being improved and replaced and would, besides, 
connect the region to a worldwide network/ ' The company's answer 
to the ITT earth station proposal was that Comsat's rates for satellite 
service, worldwide would be lowered substantially if it had ovmership 
of the Caribbean earth station: while its five-year revenue require­ 
ment would increase around 11 percent -to reflect the amortised outlay 
on the facility, Comsat forecast that its satellite circuit leases would
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rise by 52 percent thanks to Caribbean-U.S. traffic. The tariff re­ 
ductions that would result, according to Comsat, are noted in Table V.
Tatile V: Forecast
worldwide satellite
























5. DELAYS FEARED, INCENTIVES SOUGHT
Opposition to Comsat f s expanding plans continued on all fronts through 
the summer of 19&6, regarding a second antenna for its Andover station, 
another earth station on the West Coast in California, a second antenna 
in Hawaii and the still-pending West Virginia earth station proposal.^ ' 
The persistence of the carriers 1 objections was effectively inundating 
the PCC with so many contending applications and pleadings—any one of 
which might find recourse to full judicial review—that the fate of the 
satellite system itself appeared increasingly to be at risk.
Comsat seems to have been growing fast indifferent to the precise 
ownership modalities adopted, such was for instance the "urgent need" 
for a second East Coast earth station for Latin American traffic, and 
in August the company asked for an immediate decision on the West Vir­ 
ginia station irrespective of ultimate FCC policy. ^^' The White House 
director of telecommunications management similarly observed that month 
during a Senate appearance that the satellite system's "biggest problem 
in the period immediately ahead" was getting sufficient ground facili­ 
ties in operation to utilise the increase in space segment capacity.
-229-
He said the "conflicting filings" before the PCC "may bring about pro­ 
tracted delays" and noted that the new earth stations that would be needed 
on the West Coast and Hawaii should already be under construction and were 
not.^ -^ For his part, the White House official said he favoured joint 
ownership by Comsat and the carriers as a prelude to an eventual merger of 
all the international carriers. '
During those same hearings, before the Senate communications subcom­ 
mittee, the PCC indicated that a change in its interim policy was being 
considered. The Commission's chairman spoke sympathetically about the 
carriers' rate base concerns:
I think a major question is the...interest which the conventional 
carriers will have in a satellite system, if they are not permitted 
some participation in the ownership of the earth stations. (47)
The common carrier bureau chief likewise observed that without ownership 
shares, the carriers
are merely performing a function of an interconnecting carrier 
in a sense, merely recover, in their rates, the charges for ren­ 
tal and lease fees that they pay to Comsat for these facilities. 
They have nothing to make a profit on. (48)
Western Union International (WUl) now revived the plan first pro­ 
posed by AT&T before the PCC's first ownership decision, for a consor­ 
tium composed of Comsat and the international carriers to own jointly 
the earth stations while Comsat served as manager—a set-up, WUI said, 
modelled on Intelsat. ' Comsat's willingness to negotiate was sig­ 
nalled at a conference it called in early August of government agencies 
and the carriers, where the company warned that without the East Coast 
facilities it had proposed U.S. satellite traffic might have to be 
routed via Canada.
The PCC convened a series of carrier—Comsat meetings starting on 
August 22, ostensibly to work out arrangements for the West Virginia 
station. Held behind closed doors and attended by what were described 
as "very much first string" negotiators, the sessions soon extended their 
mandate to considering overall earth station policy.^-3 ' Under prodding 
from the FCC/^1 ' Comsat itself came forth with the proposal for a 50-50 
ownership split to be applied to pending applications: earth stations 
in the Caribbean and in West Virginia or Georgia, and a second antenna 
at Andover,^ 2 ' which would permit use of the Atlantic Intelsat II. The
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carriers pronounced the plan broadly acceptable, but were unable to de­ 
cide on a precise distribution of ownership shares by the October 1 dead­ 
line set by the FCC. '
In the absence of an agreement, EGA and ITT pressed for further con­ 
cessions from Comsat, reversing the willingness they had indicated to sup­ 
port Comsat's application for a second Andover antenna and announcing in 
early November that their cooperation depended on the joint ownership 
scheme's being extended to that earth station too.^-3 ' Comsat, having 
formally requested authorisation to build a station in California to use 
with a Pacific Intelsat II, now had three major applications pending— 
West Virginia, St. Croix and California—along with requests to modify 
the Andover and Hawaii installations,^ ' The company was especially 
concerned about the Caribbean earth station, since both AT&T and ITT 
were pressing for action on their cable—promising to use equal numbers 
of satellite and cable circuits—and Comsat was anxious not to lose the 
region for the satellite system.^ '
6. THE FINAL DECISION
On December 7» 1966 the FCC issued its revised interim policy, effective 
through 1969» to supersede its first two-year policy, which still had six 
months to run. All U.S. ground stations—including the three given to 
Comsat under the first decision—would be owned by a carrier-Comsat con­ 
sortium, which would exercise overall control of the stations and of 
Comsat'in the latter*s capacity as operational manager. The Commission 
noted that the carriers had failed to decide on apportioning their half 
of the shares, ruled that AT&T should own a total of 28.5 percent, RCA 
10.5 percent, ITT seven percent and WUI four percent.
The FCC justified its final decision by rejecting much of the ra­ 
tionale for its first two policy pronouncements. Indeed, as Schwartz 
has pointed out, the Commission now implied that its first ruling had
been illegal in that a Comsat ground station monopoly was now said to
( 57) "be contrary to the spirit and inteTrirof Congress," v J ' although the
apparent intent of the legislative changes by which carrier earth sta­ 
tion ownership was deleted from the Comsat Act had been precisely to
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leave the FCC with complete discretion in the matter/ 5 ' Similarly, 
whereas the Commission had in its first decision asserted that carrier 
representation on Comsat's board would be sufficient to ensure that their 
contributions to the ground station effort were made, it now stated that 
Comsat station ownership would mean the
carriers would not, for the extended period of time, be in a posi­ 
tion to make meaningful contributions to the development of the art 
and their incentives to aid in the growth of satellite communications 
would be severely limited...[They] would be driven to seek alterna­ 
tive means not necessarily dictated by efficiency but by need for 
survival. (59)
The FCC argued that "ownership participation and investment would provide 
powerful incentives to maximize use," and "the inherent advantages of 
[both cables and satellites] could be exploited to the maximum."^ '
Although, as Kinsley has pointed out, the FCC seemed unable to jus­ 
tify its decision consistently—on the one hand arguing that carrier in­ 
volvement was necessary to the satellite system's success, while on the 
other contending that without the carriers the system might be so success­ 
ful as to threaten their survival^ '—in fact both points were valid. If 
the carriers did not get the shares they wanted there might not be a satel­ 
lite system, since their capacity for obstruction had been demonstrated. 
And if they were not positioned to help assure a continued flow of cable 
traffic, and authorised to expand their rate bases and revenues with the
aid of satellite investment, the smaller record carriers might go out of
v • (62) business.
The new Earth Station CXvnership Committee submitted in March 1967 
its proposals for financial participation and operational control of 
ground facilities. In late May the FCC approved the consortium's re­ 
quest to establish the West Virginia station, and the next month the 
Commission applied the 50-50 formula to four other stations: a new sta­ 
tion in Jamesburg, California to serve South America, Hawaii and trans­ 
pacific routes, and transfers from Comsat of the stations in Washington, 
Andover and Hawaii.^ ' None of the rancour that had accompanied earlier 
earth station actions was evident and, as the FCC chairman remarked in an 
April 1968 report: __ __ ___
It is interesting to note that a whole series of claims and conten­ 
tions about interference, which the proposed earth stations might 
cause the terrestrial facilities of the other carriers, were quickly 
resolved [after the revised ownership policy was issued]... (64)
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Similarly, while in their previous capacity primarily as customers of 
Comsat the carriers had strenuously objected to the 12-ig- percent return 
Comsat had sought on its earth station holdings, the carriers now were 
"not only silent on this but have adopted it as a figure reasonably 
applicable to their investment in the earth stations."^ **'
The consensus remained, however, an uneasy one and Comsat was in­ 
volved in . further earth station controversies with RCA over service to 
Guam (a U.S. Pacific island possession), with ITT over another station 
in the Caribbean and with RCA over an earth station in Alaska. ' When 
in 1970 the FCC began a review of its 'interim* policy, Comsat argued 
that shared ownership had been necessary to expedite the system's deve­ 
lopment but that it was now possible to provide for unified control and 
management unhindered by conflicting interests in rival technologies.
Broadly speaking, the other carriers' dedication to the develop­ 
ment and optimum use of the stations has been hedged by a primary 
emphasis on their greater ownership of competing cable facilities. 
(67)
AT&T, Hawaiian Telephone—which held a 30 percent share of the Hawaii 
ground station—and I-JUI said they were by and large satisfied with the 
existing policy, although Bell believed itself entitled to a greater 
ownership percentage: while its holdings comprised 57 percent of the 
carrier shares overall, its usage of the stations was 78 percent of the 
total. ITT, trying once again to secure control of the Caribbean sta­ 
tion, proposed that individual station ownerships should be awarded to
the carrier making greatest use of each, RCA argued that all the sta-
( fiPi} 
tions should be owned and operated by a carrier consortium, minus Comsat/
The FCC review of its ownership policy continued, and as of 1976 
had not been completed/
CHAPTER TWELVE: COMSAT AS AN INDUSTRIAL DEPENDENCY--
THE 'AUTHORISED USER' AND 'THIRTY CIRCUITS 5 CASES
In a long series of controversial decisions, the Federal Commu­ 
nications Commission has reduced Comsat's role to little more 
than...a "brokerage service for leasing satellite circuits to its 
would-"be competitors for resale to the ultimate consumer.
- Congressional Quarterly, March 1968
1. OVERVIEW
The FCC's policy on Comsat's right to compete with the rest of the inter­ 
national carrier industry by offering satellite services directly to users 
was announced, contested and confirmed between June 1966 and February 1967. 
There had never been a question of Comsat's entering the retail business 
and providing, say, satellite-relayed telephone service to the general 
public in competition with cable-relayed calls. What the FCC's June de­ 
cision did was to formalise hitherto implicit restrictions on direct ac­ 
cess to satellite circuits by those private users with enough traffic to 
require long-term leases of capacity, who would henceforth have access to 
satellites only by contracting with the international carriers. The real 
stakes however were the U.S. government's massive overseas traffic, for 
which Comsat believed itself entitled to compete unhindered by carrier 
industry mediation. Since the FCC is not empowered to regulate state com­ 
munications, its June ruling on 'authorised users' could formally only ad­ 
vise against direct transactions between Comsat and the government. In 
fact, however, the decision was part of a continuing effort by the Commis­ 
sion to insert the carriers between Comsat and all U.S. satellite users, 
and should therefore be read in tandem with the '30 circuits' controversy 
which lasted until early 1967, when the Pentagon's attempt to lease trans­ 
pacific capacity directly from Gomsat was-4-hwarted by substantial rate 
reductions offered by the carriers under prodding by the FCC.
Both cases, in our view, should be located conceptually within an 
abortive process of operational integration between major components of
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the U.S. government's overseas communications capability and the commer­ 
cial satellite system, a process marked not just "by the 30 circuits case 
Taut "by Comsat's 1965 agreement with NASA to furnish Apollo programme ser­ 
vices and "by the Pentagon's self-imposed limits on the capacity of its 
own proposed satellite system as well—limits that would have made reliance 
on Intelsat routine and would therefore have strengthened the justification 
for state supervision of the commercial operation. The net effect of the 
authorised users and 30 circuits controversies was decisively to check 
that process, compel Comsat's independence from the state and confirm 
instead its vassalage within the private carrier industry—rendering the 
company more profoundly than hitherto subject to the restraints imposed 
upon satellite development lay its competitors.
_2... GOHSAT, THE RECORD CARRIERS AM) DIRECT SATELLITE SERVICES
Although the Comsat Act had empowered the Corporation to serve directly 
"authorized users, including the United States Government," it was not 
clear whether—with the exception of the government—'authorised users' 
was to "be an alternative term for the international carriers. In two 
speeches by PCC commissioners in 19&3, the phrase "common carriers' common
carrier" was used to describe Comsat's envisaged relationship to the rest-
(2.)of the industry, but as the common carrier bureau's deputy chief noted
in 1966 that formulation could be construed as defining Comsat's main, not 
its sole, function:
It is clear, from the Communications Satellite Act, that Comsat was 
intended to serve primarily as a carrier's carrier—that is, to con­ 
struct, install and operate communications facilities to be leased 
to the interested common carrier, which would use them to provide 
service to the ultimate users. Note the word 'primarily'. The sta­ 
tute does not specifically state this to be its exclusive function. (3)
In January 1965, even before Early Bird was launched, prospective 
users of satellite circuits—including the press wire services, television 
networks, IBM and the Pentagon—were expressing interest in securing low- 
cost, and preferably direct, access to the system/ ' and in mid-April the 
Associated Press became the first entity to apply formally to the PCC for 
certification as an authorised user, citing "bitter lessons on the hazards 
of dependence upon carriers, who have commercial responsibilities of their 
own, for desirable channels or frequencies."^ AP was soon joined by
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United Press International, The Washington Post and Eastern Airlines/ ' 
The question o'f how to handle transatlantic television relay gave - 
the PCC an opportunity to issue an initial, deceptively favourable ruling 
to the direct access aspirants. As a novel international service, TV was 
not readily classifiable as voice or record traffic. The record carriers 
asked for exclusive responsibility to handle television, but on June 22— 
soon after the 'authorised users' docket was opened—the FCC approved a 
request from the three U.S. TV networks to lease circuits directly from
Comsat. on a strictly temporary basis, pending a formal inquiry into TV
(7\ 
relay procedures to begin in October., ' The decision was not intended
to suggest a precedent and it certainly did not, since the PCC reversed 
it three weeks later and awarded TV relay service to the international 
carriers on a rotating basis—apparently, the CBS network charged, because
the carriers had in the meantime reconciled their differences and the re-
/ o\
cord carriers had dropped their insistence on exclusive rights.
Interest in direct satellite use was considerable, and by the Novem­ 
ber 1 deadline on filings in the authorised users docket 27 different en­ 
tities had submitted views to the PCC. most of them favouring lenient
(9)rules on access to satellite circuits. v ' Comsat's own submission was 
apparently modest in contention, consisting essentially of a request to 
deal directly with users in the following instances:
[if] (i) the carriers fail to provide a requested service via 
satellite although capacity is available; (ii) there is a need 
for development of technology or provision of new satellite ser­ 
vices and then only during the early developmental stages;...(iii) 
in which case and any other case there is a finding that the pub­ 
lic interest would be served by the authorization. (10)
Finally though Comsat asserted that it was "authorized by the Satellite 
Act to provide service directly to the Government in any instance when 
the Government requests service."^ ' Representing the government, the 
General Services Administration—which oversees the internal requirements
of the state apparatus—supported Comsat's contention that the government
(12) 
was under terms of the Comsat Act a fully authorised user. v '
The four international carriers, joined by the industry trade union,
opposed permitting any entity_other ;than_th.emselves to lease satellite 
capacity. AT&T cited a comment made by Sen. John Pastore, the Comsat 
Act's floor manager, in 1962 that "the market to be served by the corpo­ 
ration consists of the carriers who will use its facilities,"^ and
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later charged that the non-carriers "are not attempting to interpret 
the Satellite Act but to rewrite it."' ^ JTT tried to profit from 
the drift of the PCC's earth station deliberations by asserting that 
an entity had to be eligible to build and operate an earth station in 
order to qualify as an authorised user.^ -*'
Notwithstanding the apparent modesty of Comsat's own requests, the 
position of those entities which sought to deal directly with the com­ 
pany for satellite capacity posed a serious threat to the record car­ 
riers, whose vulnerability was already an active concern of the PCC's. 
^ ' At issue was the leased line market which, while accounting for 
16 percent of the carriers' overall 1965 international revenues, com­ 
prised nearly one-fifth of the earnings of the three main record car­ 
riers. As concerned voice traffic, although leased overseas lines pro­ 
vided less than 13 percent of international earnings and Bell, with the 
preponderance of traffic, received less than 10 percent of its interna­ 
tional revenues from leases, the other 'international' phone carrier—
GT&E's Hawaiian Telephone Co.—earned nearly one-third of its revenues
(17) for external service from leased lines. Opening up the market for
leased service to Comsat would therefore expose the weakest members of 
the carrier industry to satellite competition, while leaving AT&T rela­ 
tively unscathed.
Although Comsat did not itself propose to enter the leased line 
market writ large, the Corporation did assert itself wholly entitled 
to accept government business, which accounted for 70 percent of the 
leases of all commercial circuits industry-wide and 90 percent of leases 
of voice-grade circuits, much of which were handled by the record carri-
/ •] O\
ers as alternate voice-record traffic.^ ' The dependence of the small­ 
er international carriers upon government business is summarised in 
revenue terms in Table VI (next page.) For the four carriers consi­ 
dered, revenues from government leases comprised more than 60 percent 
of their total earnings from leased service and nearly 13 percent of 
their overall international revenues. If Comsat were empowered to charge 
leasing customers—whether private or governmental—the same rates at 
which it made satellite capacity available to the record carriers for 
resale, the latter would unquestionably have lost considerable business
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Table VIt Dependence of carriers upon government revenues, 1965
[in $OOOs] Total Total leased Revenues from
revenues revenues government leases
ITT Globcom 29,808 5,952 3,200 
RCA Worldcom 51,054 11,438 6,433
WUI 18,124 1,924 1,407
Hawaiian Tel.
(overseas) 14,280 4,741 4,606
Totals 113,266 24,055 14,646
Source: Federal Communications Commission, Memorandum Opinion 
and Statement of Policy, Docket 16058, "In the matter of autho­ 
rized entities and authorized users under the Communications 
Satellite Act of 1962," July 21, 1965. Reprinted in Senate Com­ 
mittee on Commerce, subcommittee on communications, Hearings; 
Progress Report on Space Cpmmunications« 10, 17, 18 and 23 
August 1966.89th Congress, 2nd Session, p.29
fig) and might have "been unable to survive. v " Of particular concern would
therefore be the switched or exchange services which comprised the bulk 
of their traffic and the principal services provided the general public. 
If the record carriers survived, normal telegraph service for instance 
would have to bear a bigger proportion of overall costs than hitherto, 
and rates would rise due to the loss of leased traffic; if the record 
carriers disappeared, Comsat would be in no position to replace the ser­ 
vices that would disappear with them.
3. COMSAT AND GOVERNMENT SATELLITE PROGRAMMES
That Comsat nevertheless was asserting its right to state traffic with 
the full support of the government was one indication that the failure 
of the 1963-64 discussions on formally joining Comsat's and the Pentagon's 
satellite programmes had in no way spelled an end to the search for a mu­ 
tually acceptable formula of cooperation between the two. Indeed in spite 
of the fact that the Department of Defence (DOD) was outspending Comsat on 
communications satellite R&D for fiscal years 1964 through 1967 by nearly 
three to one_and with NASA's outlay the government's total expenditure
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was more than four times Comsat'sv '—the state's interest in relying 
upon Comsat to meet a considera"ble part of its satellite communications 
requirements not only produced the 1965 NASA-Comsat agreement on Apollo 
services and the 1966 thirty circuits case, "but was influencing the con­ 
tent of the government's own satellite programmes as well.
The government owned or leased around 13.5 percent of the total na­ 
tional overseas communications plant as of 1965. Three-quarters of that 
was operated by or for DOD, and with military communications needs growing
at 10 percent yearly Pentagon usage was expected to comprise "between 75
(pp>N 
and 90 percent of all government space communications. v '
The first phase of DOD's communications satellite programme consis­ 
ted of Syncoms II and III which, although nominally part of the civilian
NASA's projects, were put to good use by the Pentagon to relieve conges-
(2^ tion on the Hawaii-Southeast Asia route. v ' Phase two of the military
programme was to be the Interim Defence Satellite Communications Project 
(IDSCP), to consist of from 16 to 23 satellites in sub-synchronous equa­ 
torial orbits—the precise number would depend on the success of launches 
with up to eight satellites per rocket—and to involve use of mobile ter­ 
minals on land and at sea. The first seven IDSCP spacecraft were orbited 
on June 16, 1966 and the DOD said the project would be "the world's first 
truly global satellite communications system."^ Work continued mean­ 
while on Tacsatcom, the tactical system considered "the most challenging
and the most important program of all in military satellite communications,"
(2<\^ 'which would involve giant high-powered satellites and portable ground
sets the sizes of rucksacks. The final phase of the Pentagon programme 
was to be the Advanced Defence Communications Satellite Project (ADSCP), 
which was approved in November 19^5 and expected to be fully operational
by 1970.
Comsat was naturally interested in getting as much business as it 
could from these projects. In February 1965 the company tried to secure 
for itself and Hughes Aircraft the $14m contract to supply components for, 
and manage, the IDSCP; but Philco had all but won that contract, and Com- 
sat's proposal was rejected/ 2 ' Comsat had also been concerned about 
DOD's operational use of the NASA Syncom satellites, and sought assurances 
that NASA's follow-on satellite series, the ATS', would not be used so as 
to deny Comsat Pentagon traffic. NASA had asked the FCC to permit the ATS
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spacecraft to use the desirable frequencies set aside for commercial 
usage. Comsat objected that NASA's proposed use would interfere with 
commercial satellite traffic, to which NASA replied that any interference 
"would at the very worst be minimal." It evidently was not however tech­ 
nical interference that worried Comsat, since the company agreed to the 
FCC's decision in March 1965 to allow NASA to use the frequencies as long 
as the ATS satellites were not utilised to carry administrative communica­ 
tions either for NASA or for any other government agency.' 2 ''
More important was the fact that Comsat was attempting to use the 
government's policy of providing its own satellite services only to meet 
'unique and vital' requirements in order to encourage strict limits on the 
usefulness of the proposed DOD systems. President Johnson had reiterated 
in his March 1966 message to Congress on Comsat 'that "it is the policy of 
the United States to support development of a single global commercial 
communications satellite system," adding:
The United States Government may establish and maintain separate 
satellite communications facilities including surface terminals 
to meet its unique and vital national security needs which cannot 
be met by commercial facilities. (28)
When the Pentagon's satellite programmes came under the scrutiny of the 
House military operations subcommittee in August, however, the precise 
scope of the military's systems was defined by the head of the Defence 
Communications Agency as follows:
We interpret a requirement as being unique and vital if it must be 
fulfilled under all conditions, even nuclear attack, and if no 
other means would be readily available to fulfill adequately that 
need. (29)
Consequently, the subcommittee found, the IDSCP was being designed to 
provide at a cost of $115m a total of two voice-grade circuits, intended 
as a 'last ditch 1 facility in case of nuclear war or some such contingency. 
Although after the hearings plans were announced to up-grade the system 
to 11 voice-grade circuits by mid-1967, the subcommittee insisted that 
a ten- or twentyfold expansion would be more to the point. ADSCP was 
similarly intended to furnish a modest increment in Pentagon capacity, 
and the subcommittee urged that-i-t-be up-graded to between 100 and 200 
voice-grade circuits, concluding:
The military needs its own hard-core system of secure, reliable, 
flexible and survivable communications, not affected by business, 
labor, and international complexities and incidents of commercial 
operations. (30)
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The "uncertainty" apparent in the government's satellite plans was attri­ 
buted "by the subcommittee to Comsat's "eagerness" to sell the state its 
services. '
4. THE APOLLO PROGRAMME AND INTEL5AT II
The first major instance of Comsat-state operational collaboration was, 
however, suggested by the government and proved to be of tremendous im­ 
portance to the commercial satellite programme. Without the contract 
with NASA for Apollo-related services, according to one Comsat official, 
"in all likelihood there would not have been an Intelsat II program."^ ' 
Comsat's forecasts as of 1966 of the availability of global satellite 
coverage were advanced—over-optimistically as it happened—by from one 
to three years as a result of the deal, which appeared to make service 
over two-thirds of the world certain, and global service possible, by 
the end of the year. Comsat's president testified in January 1966:
This early activation of an expanded communications satellite 
coverage is directly related to the interest of NASA in commer­ 
cial communications satellite capacity to meet its communica­ 
tions requirements in connection with the Apollo program. (33)
With Early Bird stationed over the Atlantic, an Intelsat II in the same 
region irould provide service for the first time to the South Atlantic, 
bringing Latin America and even western portions of the Indian Ocean 
into range; another II over the Pacific would double the number of cir­ 
cuits hitherto available between the U.S. and East Asia and make trans­ 
pacific television possible. Only coverage of a band between Pakistan 
and Thailand would remain before service was global. ' Furthermore 
NASA, which would be paying $27m over a three-year period, was enabling 
capacity in excess of its needs to be created: in the Pacific, for 
instance, the space agency was interested in using 75 voice-equivalent 
circuits and the Pentagon a further 85, leaving 80 circuits aboard a 
single Intelsat II for assignment to commercial traffic.
The National Communications System, acting on NASA's behalf, first 
approached Comsat in July 1965 to suggest that Comsat might be willing 
to meet NASA requirements for circuits to link Houston with points 
in Australia, Grand Canary and Ascension islands and a number of tracking
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vessels/ NASA would pay the $27m over a three-year period to Comsat 
and to the overseas telecommunications entities of Britain, Spain and 
Australia for their assistance. Although delays in satellite deployment 
later reduced NASA's obligation to $21.2m, the space agency nevertheless 
accounted for more than 28 percent of Intelsat's total revenues and nearly 
27 percent of its traffic from 1967 through 1969.^^^
Comsat initially tried to assemble a package deal for NASA by nego­ 
tiating on its behalf with the foreign entities, but Australia and Bri­ 
tain insisted on dealing directly with NASA—probably because the space 
agency had hitherto relied mainly on the Commonwealth cable system for
Pacific service and they saw no reason now to transact NASA business / -,P\
through Comsat. ' Under pressure from the foreign entities, the U.S. 
conceded an early preference for retaining surplus capacity for govern­ 
mental uses and agreed to let the excess be used commercially by Intel-
(39)sat. ' After terms were agreed by NASA and the four national entities
—including Comsat—the latter worked out arrangements with Intelsat on 
NASA's behalf.
There remained, however, the critical question of whether the PCC 
would permit the arrangement, involving as it did direct access to satel­ 
lite circuits by the U.S. government. In effect, as a House report later 
observed, the Commission was "presented more or less with a fait accompli." 
^ ' By the end of the summer of 19&5» the telecommunications entities 
of Britain, Spain and Australia had signed on; on September 30 Comsat 
applied to the PCC for authorisation to serve NASA directly and to con­ 
tract with Hughes for construction of the satellites;^ ' on October 5 
Secretary of Defence McNamara—as executive agent of the National Commu­ 
nications System—instructed NASA to finalise its arrangements with Corn- 
sat, ' and on October 29, before the FCC had acted on Comsat's appli­ 
cation, Intelsat's governing body approved the contract with Hughes for 
four satellites to be ready by autumn 1966.^ 4 ' An adverse decision 
would therefore put the PCC in opposition to NASA, the Pentagon, three 
foreign PTTs and Intelsat itself. On November 10 the Commission approved, 
while noting that the action wouLd-^iot imply a precedent as to the even­ 
tual disposition of the government's" standing as an authorised user of 
satellite capacity/ 44 ''
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5. THE PENTAGON SEEKS 30 TRANSPACIFIC SATELLITE CIRCUITS
On January 21, 1966—while controversy continued over the FCC's autho­ 
rised users docket—the Defence Communications Agency (DCA) was instruc­ 
ted "by Cyrus Vance, then deputy defence secretary, to "proceed immediate­ 
ly to conduct negotiations" i^ith Comsat toward procuring 30 transpacific 
satellite circuits to link military headquarters in Hawaii to installa­ 
tions in Japan, Thailand and South Vietnam. ^'
Despite its disclaimer of precedence, the PCC's approval of—or 
acquiescence in—the Apollo affair seemed to "bode well for this attempt 
"by the Pentagon to lease satellite circuits directly from Comsat. DOD's 
requirements i^ere urgent and exceptional: they were directly related 
to the escalating war in Southeast Asia^ ' and later in 1966 the Army's 
chief of R&D described the need for terminals in the Pacific as in "the 
highest military priority category."^ ' The Pentagon assumed it was 
authorised to deal directly with Comsat on the basis of a 1947 procure­ 
ment act, which empowered government agencies to dispense with publicly- 
tendered competitive bids where "it is impracticable to obtain competi­ 
tion,"^ ' and on the basis of the Comsat Act, in which Section 201a(6) 
authorises the U.S. president to
take all necessary steps to insure the availability and appropri­ 
ate utilization of the communications satellite system for general 
governmental purposes except where a separate communications satel­ 
lite system is required to meet unique governmental needs or is 
otherwise required in the national interest.
The application of that passage was, of course, precisely the issue 
in the continuing authorised users inquiry.
Why the government, whatever its authority to do so, should have 
wished to procure necessary satellite services commercially is another 
matter. In the Apollo case it was not a matter simply of NASA's leasing 
capacity from an existing network—indeed the government was in effect 
going to set one up for Comsat on NASA's behalf, notwithstanding the 
facts that NASA had developed the Syncom satellites upon which the Intel- 
sat Us would be based, was outspending Comsat by a handsome margin on 
satellite R&D and had a sufficient in-house capability to send men to 
the moon. NASA's explanation was that "we felt it was national policy 
to have a commercial entity responsible for communications using
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satellites," according to the agency's deputy administrator.^' Con­ 
gressional approval of the scheme was "based in part on a desire to 
strengthen Comsat's position internationally in view of the Intelsat 
re-negotiations beginning in 1969.^ '
The Pentagon's interest in using Comsat appears to have derived 
from a larger desire by the government to secure the satellite system 
as an accessible resource. The government had, as a matter of policy, 
committed itself to confining its own space systems to meeting highly 
specialised, 'command-control' requirements while relying on commercial 
facilities for most of its administrative and logistical traffic/^ ' 
although spokesmen were at the same time attempting to preserve "sound
cost efficiency and other management considerations" as additional fac-
(52)
tors which might yield a preference for in-house facilities, what­ 
ever the technical adequacy of commercial circuits. Relying upon In­ 
telsat would likely "be cheaper than constructing a fully comparable 
military satellite system and might even be more secure since, as the 
White House director of telecommunications management noted:
Vast international communications, commercial communications, have 
not been jammed as a rule. Technically, all electronic radiating 
systems are vulnerable, fundamentally. But we think that the in­ 
clination to jam 1 an international association of 52 nations would 
be somewhat remote, more remote than if only one nation were in­ 
volved. (53)
Precisely how attractive the government would find reliance upon In­ 
telsat depended, however, on the terms on which its circuits were made 
available—which was the subject of the ongoing PCG inquiry.
•In February 1966 the White House, through its Director of Tele­ 
communications Management James O'Connell, began an effort to influence 
the authorised users docket while retaining for the government discre­ 
tion over commercial communications dealings. O'Connell circulated to 
the Pentagon, FCC and other parties the draft of a proposed state poli­ 
cy on procuring commercial satellite services. The draft asserted that 
the government was by law an authorised user and could therefore deal 
directly with Comsat whenever the president decided it would be in the 
national interest. Notwithstanding-that right, however, in order to 
enable the FCC to finish its" inveTstigaTion, conduct studies on optimal 
arrangements and establish a basis on which a definitive policy could
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be decided, O'Connell proposed a one-year moratorium on direct deal­ 
ings. During that time the government intended "to exercise its rights 
as an authorized user and to seek services from Comsat only in those 
cases where exceptional and urgent circumstances exist" — as in the Apol­ 
lo affair. Otherwise the government would operate on "a comparative 
"basis," soliciting and evaluating proposals from all the commercial 
carriers including Comsat. '
O'Connell 1 s draft was rejected out of hand "by the Pentagon and the 
FCC. DOD. issued a one-page reply which agreed that the government was 
an authorised user and said that state agencies could therefore contract 
with whomoever they wished "to the end that the procurement will "be to
the "best advantage to the Government, price and other factors considered."
(55}\jj> i £Q t through common carrier bureau chief Strass"burg, said that
Comsat would need Commission approval before transacting business with 
anyone. The White House's suggested criterion of national interest was 
"too vague and indefinite" to serve as a policy guideline, and the govern­ 
ment's concerns as a potential customer of satellite services had to be 
put in the context of broader policy interests. Curiously, Strassburg 
concluded, "I see no compelling reason to depart from existing policies," 
of which officially at least there were none. '
In spite of its apparent reception, the White House intervention 
had the important effect of getting the Pentagon to open up bids on the
30 circuits to other international carriers in order to compare Comsat' s
(57) offer with those of its rivals. The move was also a concession to
the carriers, who were growing restive at Comsat's alleged abuse of its 
state paternity and at the company's presumption in concealing from them 
its- negotiations with DOD. ' Although Comsat later claimed to have 
informed the carriers during a January board meeting, EGA and WUI — not 
represented on the board — claimed- they knew nothing until April, and
Comsat appears to have taken pains to get firm commitments from foreign
(59) 
entities before the carriers had been fully apprised.^-"
In any event, after Comsat had enjoyed a four-month headstart and 
had all but concluded the arrangements with foreign correspondents to 
handle the Pentagon's traffic, a request for competitive bids was pub­ 
lished on May 2. ' DOD then "went through the motions" of evaluating
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the bids, as a House report concluded/ ' and on June 1—two days after 
the closing date—signed a master contract with Gomsat. Although not fi­ 
nally binding, this action appeared to confirm DOD's intentions.
6. THE AUTHORISED USSR DECISION
In the face of the Pentagon's apparent determination, the FCC took the 
unusual step of releasing on June 24 a public notice of its authorised 
users decision before the formal opinion and order were ready for issue. 
Comsat was not, the FCC said, "a full service carrier." Although the 
Satellite Act "clearly empowers the Commission to authorize Comsat to
provide service to entities other than the carriers," such service had
( 62}to be decided subject to the "objectives and purposes" of the law. '
Prominent among these were the requirements that the FCC guarantee "non- 
discriminatory access" (Sec. 401) by all approved users and that it "main­ 
tain and strengthen competition" (Sec. 102c) in the provision of overseas 
services. If Comsat were allowed to serve bulk private users directly, 
both objectives would be "frustrated": the record carriers would be 
unable, if offered services at the same tariffs as many of their cus­ 
tomers, to re-sell satellite capacity both competitively and at a profit, 
and would be deprived "of the opportunity to serve segments of the public 
under fair and equitable conditions."^ '
Sound policy indicates that...[the carriers] should not be required 
to depend solely on Comsat for satellite circuits while Comsat is 
simultaneously allowed to siphon the most profitable part of the 
business from them...(64)
Furthermore, since only "a very small part of the using public" had enough 
traffic to vrarrant bulk leases and since this was "not a situation where 
a proposed competitor would meet all or even a major portion of the essen­ 
tial public needs should it supplant the other carriers," permitting Comsat 
to enter the direct leasing market would oblige its rivals to raise their 
charges on switched services to the "detriment to the vast majority of 
users for the benefit of a few large users..."^ ^' Comsat was therefore 
forbidden to deal directly with .private.users unless the carriers refused 
to furnish them with requested satellite capacity.
In regard to government-Comsat transactions, the FCC conceded that by 
law "there is no question that the Government is to be included in the
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category of authorized user." 1^ ' As a matter of policy, however, and 
because government traffic figured so prominently as a source of carrier 
revenues, the PCC would not approve direct service unless the government 
stated that it was required in a particular instance in the national inte­ 
rest:
Comsat may be authorized to provide service directly to the Govern­ 
ment whenever such service is required to meet unique governmental 
needs or is otherwise required in the national interest in circum­ 
stances where the Government's needs cannot be effectively met under 
the carriers' carrier approach. (67)
There was, as a congressional report later observed, a "fine irony" to 
this aspect of the ruling, "for it closed a cycle of argumentation which 
boomeranged on the Government"—the same criterion of 'unique and vital 
needs' that the government had promulgated in regard to separate satel­ 
lite systems had been adopted by the FCC to restrict the government's 
entitlement to deal directly with Comsat. ' If the state was legally 
empowered to treat Comsat as an in-house resource, then the conditions 
under which it could do so would be no different than those governing 
creation of the state's 'own' systems.
Finally, included in the FGC's formal decision—issued in full on 
July 21—were instructions to the international carriers to submit pro­ 
posals for wide-ranging tariff reductions. Though ostensibly to reflect 
the savings anticipated from satellite operations, these price cuts were 
also explicitly to include reductions on overseas services for which 
satellite facilities were not then available or even likely to be avail­ 
able in the immediate future. The reductions were intended to reassure 
the government and other customers who required "redundancy and diversity" 
in international linkages—cables as well as satellites—that rates would 
be cheaper all round if the carriers were permitted to absorb satellite 
services into their ongoing operations.
7. THE 30 CIRCUITS CONTRACT CONCLUDED—AND CHALLENGED
Such price cuts would, however, have to be substantial to make up for the 
enormous difference between the carriers' rates and Comsat's, which came 
to light when five days after the FCC's decision was issued the Defence 
Communications Agency (DCA) awarded Comsat the 30-circuits contract for a
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three-year period. Indeed the gap was so wide that the Pentagon had 
invited the carriers in June to submit new bids, to little avail.' ' 
Comsat had offered DOD a rate of $4,200 per month for each voice-grade 
circuit—as against ITT's $10,000, WJI's $11,195, Hawaiian Telephone's 
$12,500 and RCA«s $11,000.^ ^ &' In short, Comsat was willing to provide 
service to the Pentagon at less than half the price of its nearest rival.
The PCC's power to prevent Comsat from honouring its contract with 
the Pentagon—though arguable in view of the government's statutory rights 
as an authorised user—led all parties to submit claims and counterclaims 
to the Commission. The carriers protested the 30-circuits contract, AT&T 
contending that it "looks upon satellites and cables as complementary and
not competitive,"^' ' and EGA arguing that the contract would "weaken the
(71) competitive position" of the carriers. ' The government had already
warned in June that if the authorised users decision were sustained, "it 
would appear important to review the general question of whether the
government should continue the policy of relying upon the common carrier/
(12} 
regulatory system for the provision of the bulk of its services." v ' In
mid-August the government and Comsat submitted "almost identical filings" 
arguing that the authorised users ruling should be amended but that the 
Pentagon-Comsat contract was valid regardless. Said Comsat:
There is not a shred of evidence in the Satellite Act, or in its 
legislative history, for the proposition that the government is to 
be limited in direct access to Comsat only to those unique situa­ 
tions in which the government would be justified in having its own 
satellite system. (73)
Furthermore, if satellite and cable services were to be priced uniformly— 
as the rate .reductions ordered in the FCC decision presupposed—satellite
tariffs would be kept artificially high, expansion would be inhibited
(74) 
and cabla technology would be shielded from competition.
The impasse was not, however, soluble before the FCC but in the course 
of hearings called by the House military operations subcommittee in August 
a way out emerged. Unbeknown to the carriers, and disclosed only during 
the hearings, the DCA-Comsat contract contained an escape—or 'assignment'— 
clause, relieving the Pentagon of liability for possible damages by giving 
it the option of assigning_the contract._tp_other carrers if it wished or 
if, for instance, Comsat could not obtain FCC clearance. The DCA had 
kept the clause secret by refusing the carriers copies of the contract
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since the clause ""bespoke an open-ended opportunity to vie for the Comsat
(jc\ 
contract," as the subcommittee later reported. v '
This the carriers promptly did, accepting the PCC's order to file 
proposals for rate reductions and submitting cuts of some 40 percent on 
transpacific services. ITT's new monthly rate per circuit would be 
$7i100—if the company were awarded the entire 30-circuit contract—and 
WUI offered $8,000 regardless of how the DCA contract was assigned, 
while promising to meet the ITT bid if it got the whole contract. EGA 
in early October filed similar reductions.^ '' Although the new rates 
were still much higher than Comsat 1 s $4,200 bid, the carriers had the 
enormous advantage of being able to promise reductions on not only the 
30 circuits but on the rest of the government's commercial requirements 
in the Pacific—as i^ell as those of other bulk users—while Comsat could 
only bargain on the basis of the 30 circuits and whatever other satellite 
capacity the government might be interested in leasing. Estimates varied 
as to how much the government would save by accepting the carriers' 
offers: the Pentagon and the White House calculated that application of 
the lowest composite rates—those proposed by WUI and ITT—would save 
per year between $6.1m and $6.7m in the Pacific, excluding the 30 cir­ 
cuits, and around $900,000 in the Atlantic, as against $2m to $2.9m in 
savings from Comsat; the PCC's figures were even more favourable to 
the carriers' offers, and by adding the savings the lower rates would 
provide on the 98 cable circuits the Pentagon currently leased in the 
Pacific and the reductions on the carriers' previous bids for the 30 
satellite circuits, along with expected savings if the foreign carriers 
followed the Americans' examples—and the reductions private customers 
would consequently receive—the Commission arrived at a total figure of 
$11.5m per year in savings for all commercial circuit users in the Paci­ 
fic. If. furthermore, the new composite rates were applied in the At-
(77) lantic region, savings would be even greater.
8. THE PENTAGON GIVES IN
The carriers' offer had virtually everything going for it, as the House 
subcommittee concluded: savings to the government would be greater, 
overall rate reductions would benefit all users, foreign administra­ 
tions might follow suit, "a more harmonious relationship among Government
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agencies and within industry would be promoted," and Comsat would suffer 
no loss of revenues "since it would supply, through Intelsat, the space 
segment services in any case."^ '
The Pentagon was, however, not satisfied that the carriers' proposed 
reductions were sufficient, and in mid-September Secretary of Defence 
McNamara informed the FCC that the lowest carrier rates were still "unjust 
and unreasonable:" ITT would, for example, be charging DOD $7,100 per 
month for services for which it would be paying Comsat $4,250, leaving 
ITT with a net $85,500 monthly from the 30 circuits alone.^'°' DOD also 
claimed its Atlantic cable rates were too high, and again warned that it 
might expand its own satellite system to handle administrative traffic if 
its objections were not heeded. '
Nevertheless, once the House subcommittee report was issued in October 
urging acceptance of the carriers' offer the handwriting was on the wall. 
On October 10 DOD announced it was ordering 10 satellite circuits from 
WUI for U.S.-Hawaii service, allegedly to enable DCA to gain experience 
in using commercial circuits prior to the anticipated commencement of 
transpacific service in April, and to hasten application of the new com­ 
posite rates. By December the 10 circuits had been apportioned among the
five international carriers, again supposedly for temporary experimental
f Q-\\
purposes. ' Then on January 31, 19&7 the White House director of tele­ 
communications management asked the PCC to give Comsat temporary approval 
to furnish the 30 circuits to the Pentagon for a preliminary period, after 
which they would be re-assigned to the other carriers.
Two days later Comsat was instructed to begin the DCA service, and 
the FCC stipulated that ITT, RCA, WUI and Hawaiian Telephone would take 
over as soon as practicable. In a separate order the Commission attempted 
to clarify its position on direct government-Comsat dealings by stating 
that such service would be permitted if the White House certified that 
it would be in the national interest. Although this proviso appeared to 
be a concession to Comsat, leaving open the possibility that the nearly 
moribund 30-circuits contract could be revived, any such intervention by 
the White House would at this point be difficult to justify: first, even 
if savings could be advanced as a 'national interest' consideration, the 
carriers' rate reductions had undermined the economy argument; second,
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the case for urgency had "been largely eliminated Toy the FCC's willingness 
to allow Comsat to provide the service immediately on a temporary basis; 
and third, any contention that Comsat was uniquely qualified to furnish 
the capacity would be clearly untenable, since the carriers were unaues-
(P.-1\
tionably qualified technically.^ '
So the authorised users decision, effectively extended to include 
state traffic, was sustained and by April 1, 1967 the international car­ 
riers were installed as middlemen in the entirety of Comsat's satellite 
business/ '
9. CONCLUSIONS
The authorised users decision has "been defended as "probably inevitable 
and almost certainly sound"^ ' and condemned as "tragic."^ ' Schwartz 
has written that in its absence the international carrier industry would 
probably have evolved into an AT&T-Comsat duopoly, with a corresponding 
decrease in the already deficient degree of competition/ ' To this it 
should be objected that it is far from clear that the industrial struc­ 
ture the decision was meant to preserve was preferable: the international 
carrier industry is probably best described as a monopoly disguised as a 
cartel, and even if Comsat's position had been sustained that company 
would still have remained competitive to both its owners and principal 
customers in its quest for private sector business—hence an unlikely
/ 00\
co-equal to AT&T in a duopoly/ ' To countervail AT&T in any meaning­ 
ful sense would require either merging Comsat with the record carriers 
and/or allowing Comsat to have as much state traffic as it could get, 
in both of which cases some substantial basis of industrial independence 
might, arguably, have been created.
For Kinsley the decision helped "to keep satellite economies obscure, 
preventing satellites from competing with the carriers' cables,"^ "' and 
the Rostow Report similarly concluded that the ruling has "insulated the 
record carriers from direct competition from Comsat."^ Such was, of 
course, a principal reason given by the PCC for obliging Comsat to deal 
exclusively through the carriers since the proposed competition would 
have comprised little more than 'cream-skimming'—Comsat taking over the
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lucrative leased-line business and leaving the record carriers—and the 
general public—to/ bear the increased costs of switched services, if that 
is these managed to survive. The problem with this distributive rationale 
is that its applicability to government traffic rests on a mystification 
of the origins of state revenues: since the state's operating expenses 
are borne ultimately by taxpayers—who moreover had already paid to deve­ 
lop the same technology they were now being obliged to pay the carriers 
not directly to use—the identification of the state with other big cor­ 
porate users is unacceptable. In these terms it would have been more de­ 
fensible to allow the .prices on switched record services to rise to the 
point where they reflected disaggregated costs—or even to provide a 
subsidy from leased revenues—than to penalise non-using taxpayers.
One is left with the simpler protectionist justification: the car­ 
riers were forbidden by law to undertake satellite development themselves 
and could therefore not compete id.th Comsat in the supply of those ser­ 
vices, and if they were obliged to purchase satellite capacity at the 
same prices as their erstwhile customers they would, through no fault of 
their own, be in sorry shape. As a congressman told Comsat 1 s chairman 
during September 1966 hearings:
It looks to me like [the carriers] are going to be dead ducks 
because they have not got the facilities and they cannot pos­ 
sibly compete with you on these services...So you will have a 
true monopoly when we get all through. (91)
Whether it was to be Comsat that would have to bear the costs of this 
protection was something that the FCC—and some Comsat officials—con­ 
tended was unlikely." A former Comsat vice president described the de-
(92) cision as "of no great economic consequence" to the company, ' and
the FCC similarly argued:
Since...Comsat's proposed charges to the carriers and other 
users would be substantially the same, it should realize sub­ 
stantially the same revenues whether the carriers or others 
lease circuits from it. (93)
This contention does not seem reasonable, however, and appears to contra­ 
dict a central reason given for the ruling: the potential price sensi­ 
tivity of demand for satellite services, if freed from the restrictions 
of composite pricing. If Comsat "would not" attract a greater volume of 
traffic by being permitted to set tariffs which reflected only satellite
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costs, there was no reason to prevent it from doing so, since the record 
carriers would retain the cable traffic that had hitherto "been sufficient 
for their survival. Furthermore, the argument implies that the FCC could 
administratively assure Comsat the same volume of traffic the company 
would attract if permitted to undersell its competition—which is both 
implausible practically and would be the very eventuality the Commission 
was trying to avert: what then would become of the switched services and 
indeed the undersea cables? The FCC, in short, could not have it both 
ways, could not claim to subvert and defend the same policies at the same 
time. Comsat could not help but lose from the decision, and its loss would 
be the carriers* gain.^^"'
If the authorised users decision could nevertheless be defended as 
a way to promo-te 'competition 1 and assure nondiscriminatory access, it 
did so at the expense of rational resource allocation. For private users, 
the administered preservation of companies whose operational usefulness 
has largely disappeared represents an illegitimate charge. For the govern­ 
ment, an obligation to pass through two levels of private middlemen — 
Comsat and the carriers—in order to gain access to a technology the state 
had developed, and only then upon payment of fees based on inherited in­ 
dustry costs, was likewise illegitimate. Moreover, it is hard to see how 
enforcing the preservation- of companies that largely depended for their 
survival upon state business would seriously contribute to competition 
within the private sector. To the degree that the decision was 'inevitable 
and sound', as Schwartz has claimed, those attributes derive from its ser­ 
vice within a wholly unsound context, defined by the desire to safeguard 
an archaic industrial structure by diluting the benefits of a thoroughly 
modern technology.
What is clear is that the combined impact of the earth station and 
authorised users decisions was to rewrite the 1962 legislation so that 
the situation would, in its essentials, conform, to the position on wl\ich 
the FCC and carriers had insisted throughout the legislative process. 
The practical significance of Comsat's formal status as a quasi-indepen­ 
dent corporation was all but eliminated: the company's domestic facili­ 
ties were, under the earth station decision, common property of the car­ 
rier industry; now Comsat would have to depend for its business on
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traffic shunted onto its circuits "by the carriers; and as the next chap­ 
ter will show, the prices of satellite circuits would "be determined "by 
the need to support and amortise in an orderly and lucrative way the 
totality of industry investment in plant. Having failed to convince 
the White House and Congress that it would "be "best to integrate satel­ 
lite communications fully and formally into the existing carrier indus­ 
try, the FCC and carriers did so administratively—effectively restitch- 
ing the fabric of evasions and ambiguities that had so deliberately been 
woven into the f Comsat compromise 1 .
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: SATELLITES AND CABLES, 1966-73
1. OVERVIEW
The third principal arena of U.S. satellite controversy concerned the 
coexistence of undersea cable technology and communications satellites. 
Through authorisations for new cables in the Caribbean, Atlantic and 
Pacific issued between 1966 and 1973, the structure of industrial con­ 
trol over satellite technology that was extended in the earth station 
ownership decisions and defended from attenuation by the state in the 
authorised users rulings was sustained on the level of technological 
dominance.
At stake in these cable authorisations was the degree to which 
satellites either would be free to maximise traffic and realise econo­ 
mies of scale, which in turn would permit lower tariffs and greater ex­ 
pansion of services, or conversely would be obliged to develop in a 
parallel fashion with submarine cables, prevented from depriving a 
growing cable network of a substantial share of overseas traffic and 
indeed compelled to reflect cable costs in the rates charged to satel­ 
lite users. Hence while the cables would serve primarily the metro­ 
politan countries, the impact of their operations would be global through 
lower satellite utilisation and higher tariffs worldwide.
Before recounting the history of these cable authorisations, the 
chapter begins with a comparison of cable and satellite capabilities, 
costs and reliabilities, which concludes that in most respects satel­ 
lites were the superior communications technology. The determinants 
of continued cable construction are then discussed—including U.S. state 
policies favouring intermodal diversity in overseas links and possibly 
government uncertainty over the future of American control over Intel- 
sat, analogous policies in Europe supporting cables on technical and 
political grounds, and the outstanding interests of the U.S. carrier 
industry in preserving the more profitable cable technology.
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_2. . CABLES AND SATELLITES COMPARED
The so-called satellite era has also teen a period of dynamic growth and 
technical advance in submarine cable technology. Between 1955 and 1970 
some 94 voice-grade cable systems linking continents or coastal points 
were constructed/ ' and global mileage of undersea cables trebled in the
( n\
first decade after Early Bird's launch in 1965. v; Table VII provides 
the numbers of countries in representative years which were directly con­ 
nected to international broadband transmission systems, and suggests the 
parallel pace of cable and satellite growth. '
Table VII; Total countries linked directly to international broadband
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Coca Beach, Florida. 8
Inherent advantages; Cables were not without some inherent advantages 
over satellites, providing telephone service without time delays or echo 
problems, placing no demands on the frequency spectrum, causing no inter- • 
ference with over-the-air services, offering greater life expectancies 
than satellites and requiring no theoretically limited assignments in the 
geostationary orbital band/ ' Satellites, on the other hand, offered: 
linkages whose costs were insensitive to terrestrial distances, direct 
interconnection—unmediated by lengthy overland lines—of all points 
equipped with ground stations, practically instantaneous compensation 
for most technical malfunctions in-space through availability of in-orbit 
spare satellites, television relay, and the possibility of point-multipoint 
transmission.
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Capacity and costs; Cables were steadily improving in terms of 
greater carrying capacities and declining costs per circuit. The first 
transatlantic cable, TAT-1 in 1956, provided 36 voice circuits at a capi­ 
tal cost of $45m in current dollars; TAT-5 in 1970, the first transoce­ 
anic cable with transistorised amplification, offered 720 voice circuits 
between the U.S. and Spain at a cost of $>107m. Costs per circuit had 
thus fallen from f1.25m to $140,000 in less than 15 years/ 5 ' Further­ 
more a technique, known as Time Assignment Speech Interpolation (TASl), 
had been perfected whereby simultaneous conversations were interleaved 
through rapid sampling—such that the first four TAT cables, with a nomi­ 
nal combined capacity of 470 circuits, could be stepped up to 580 and 
TAT-5 could provide 825 voice circuits.^ ' Methods of burying cables 
at their most vulnerable points, near coastlines, were also refined to 
reduce their susceptibility to breakage by trawlers, their most common 
enemy. Finally, although cables were normally depreciated over a 20-year
period some estimates held that the new models would last as long as a
(7) century. x '
Notwithstanding those advances, satellites were still given the edge 
over cables in most respects. Comsat's chairman spoke in 1966 of a 'cost- 
effectiveness ratio' of twenty-to-one in favour of satellites, based on 
average cable lives of 20 years and satellite lives of five years, capital 
costs for satellites at one-half cables', and satellites offering 10 times 
the cables' circuit capacities. Inasmuch as Comsat was also forecast­ 
ing improvements from satellite generation to generation of four-to-one
in circuit-years (capacity multiplied by satellite useful life), those
(9)
estimates were probably conservative. V7 ' A 1968 study by the U.S. Na­ 
tional Academy of Engineering examined three strategies for meeting an 
anticipated 10 percent annual traffic growth in the North Atlantic between 
1975 and 1985: 1.) all additional investment in satellites; 2.) incre­ 
mental investment divided between cables and satellites, but emphasising 
satellites; 3.) incremental investment again divided, but emphasising 
cables. The Academy's findings, summarised in Table VIII (next page), 
were that: "[TJhe optimal system would be the maintenance of existing 
cables with incremental investment concentrated in satellites, except
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when Defense needs are overriding"—in which case the Pentagon should 
pay for the additional cables.^1 ' A 1971 study for the White House
Table VIII; Comparison of three strategies for meeting transatlantic
requirements through cable and satellite deployments
Strategy 1985 traffic percent- Cumulated annual
age via satellite costs, 1976-85,
US $m
1.) All incremen- 
investment in satel­ 
lites 85 90
2.) Incremental in­ 
vestment mainly in 
satellites 70 127
3.) Incremental in­ 
vestment mainly in 
cables 48 184
Source: Merton Peck, "The single entity proposal for inter­ 
national telecommunications." Yale University, 19&9» mimeo.
Office of Telecommunications Policy of projected costs for 1976 similarly 
concluded, in spite of generally adverse assumptions made as to satellite 
use, that for transoceanic communications—where cables were at their 
best as compared with satellites—current satellite technology was still 
about one-third cheaper than current cables. ' In terms of purchase 
prices alone, the entire eight-satellite Intelsat IV space segment—in­ 
cluding in-orbit and on-ground spares—which offered some 5»000 voice 
circuits per satellite, cost roughly as much as a single TAT-5 cable,
which was capable of linking only two points directly and providing a
(12) maximum of 825 circuits.
It is therefore clear that when the FGG approved in 1966 construc­ 
tion of an 800-circuit cable fromJElorida to Puerto Rico at a projected 
cost of $38.5m, in 1968 a 720-circuit~$107m TAT-5, and in 1972 a 3,500- 
circuit $145m TAT-6, it was not acting to minimise costs. Indeed in the 
first instance the Commission simultaneously approved a satellite earth
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station in Puerto Rico, and the Rostow Report later observed: "[E]ven 
if the highest responsible estimate of demand for 1970 should materialize, 
either the cable or the earth station will turn out to have been a re­ 
dundant facility." 1^ -*' That the PCC was disinclined to assign importance 
to costs was clear when the Commission refused to discuss costs in its 
TAT-5 authorisation, ' and when the PCC chairman announced in June 1971 
that circuit cost estimates would not and should not be decisive in the 
TAT-6 case. -^
Comparative reliabilities: Although AT&T claimed, during the opening 
phase of an PCC inquiry into long-term international planning in late 
1970, that "cable circuits have proven to be much more reliable than 
satellite circuits,"^ ' the contention is arguable and, on balance, in 
spite of some considerable difficulties with the Intelsat III series 
satellites appear to have been the more reliable technology. The Ills, 
deployed between September 1968 and July 1970, unfortunately came during
a critical period of cable deliberations—and with only two unqualified
(17) 
successes in eight attempts did the satellite case little good. '
In all, the satellite system sponsored 15 launch attempts between 
April 1965 and December 1971 j four satellites failed to achieve orbit 
and four others had some technical malfunction that either limited or 
eliminated their usefulness for communications before the end of their 
projected lives. The Intelsat IV series—which had been intended to 
inaugurate officially the global system—was more successful; deploy­ 
ment began in January 1971 and by Hay 1975 Intelsat's overall success
/ -• o\
rate for the preceding decade had risen to 12 out of 21 attempts. 
With the IVs, furthermore, Intelsat initiated a policy of stationing 
a spare high-capacity satellite—or its equivalent in earlier craft—
over each of the three oceanic regions to incorporate a full measure
(19) of circuit redundancy into the system.
Intelsat also had problems on the ground, attributed by Comsat to 
the separation of earth and space segment ownerships in the U.S. but 
also due to use of small, mobile stations by NASA during the II series. 
^ 20 ' In any case Comsat contended that most of the outages were brief 
and were caused by switching to alternate equipment for maintenance
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purposes rather than by actual malfunctions. v ' Nevertheless between
1970 and 1971 earth station service continuity was improved to 99.99 per­ 
cent and circuit losses due to ground problems were reduced 25 percent. '
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the satellite system seems to have 
been more reliable than the cable network in at least two respects: the 
duration and seriousness of technical mishaps. AT&T's 1970 contention 
of cable superiority was based upon figures which showed that for the 19 
months ending with July 1970—hence comprising the entire lamentable III
series—satellite circuit failures had averaged 11 per day as against one
(23) per month for cables. The figures ignored, however, the length of
time required for repairs and circuit replacement: at their worst—where 
insufficient spare capacity aboard the satellite being used existed, or 
if no in-orbit back-up satellite was available—a replacement satellite 
could be launched within two or three days; cable breakages, which rarely 
led to anything but a total loss of circuits, took anywhere from three 
days to two weeks to locate and repair.^ ' Consequently, while Intel- 
sat' s reliance on cables for emergency back-up facilities was derisory, 
the cable network's dependence on satellite 'cable restoration' services 
was chronic and gave no signs of improvement with the more advanced 
cables: only once were cables needed to restore satellite circuits, that 
in 1969 when a total of 49 circuits was shifted onto the Caribbean cable; 
TAT-5 failed four times in 1971 alone—requiring 500 hitherto cable cir­ 
cuits to be shifted onto satellites for up to two weeks and when in April 
a second cable broke, at the same time, 633 circuits were transferred to
Cpc)
satellite. In all, although this is only a partial indication, Corn- 
sat' s revenues from cable restoration service were 68 percent higher in
1971 than in 1968, in spite of the fact its tariffs were lower.^
If, in short, a single technology were to be selected to assure 
reliable, low-cost and high-capacity overseas communications, the choice 
\irould seem clearly to be satellites. The need for choice, however, was 
not accepted by most of the interested parties in the cable-satellite 
deliberations.
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3. DETERMINANTS OF CABLE CONSTRUCTION
The technical, political and economic case for continued cable building 
itfas such that Comsat was virtually the only participant in the actual 
deliberations to oppose further authorisations. That is not to say, 
however, that Comsat 1 s were the only interests that stood to be harmed 
by more cables, as we shall see.
Technical factors; The U.S. government's support for cable con­ 
struction derived from a national policy favouring a diversified overseas 
transmission capability. As the White House director of telecommunica­ 
tions management (DTM) told a congressional committee in 1966:
It would be a serious mistake at this time to conclude that cables 
are outmoded. The development of transistorized, broadband cables 
should be aggressively pushed in the United States as vrell as 
abroad. They are a natural complement for satellites and do not 
consume the frequency spectrum. (29)
The White House similarly praised the "wisdom" of the FCC's TAT-5 and 
Caribbean cable decisions in November 1969: "In times of crises it is 
vital that the United States have the means of communicating overseas
which will provide the greatest overall reliability of service."^
( ^'l) The PCC was no less concerned with technical diversification, and
when the Commission's chairman declared in 1971 that relative satellite- 
cable costs would not be decisive in the approval of TAT-6, he noted 
the importance of maintaining reliability through intermodal diversity. 
(32)
The policy was recognised as encouraging higher costs—and tariffs— 
than would otherwise have been the case. During the Comsat Act debates 
the FCC chairman was asked whether a carrier could charge a dollar for 
services it could provide through alternate means for 20 cents. "We 
would not be doing our job," he replied,
if we permitted any kind of return that was not geared to the 
particular facilities useful for the service. The trouble with 
it is that in the communications field, first of all, by national 
interest we are required to keep more than one service going. (33)
The National Academy of Engineering study cited above (see Table VIII) 
also cautioned that the cost savings a. primarily satellite-based overseas 
plant would provide had to be balanced against "the better quality of 
cable service resulting from shorter time delays and the potential
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benefits of mixed-mode service—for example, greater reliability and re­ 
tention of competitive modes... "^) The 1968 Rostow Report, while ac­ 
knowledging the costs of the policy and arguing that optimal use of the 
two technologies was unlikely as long as they were separately owned, ^ ) 
nevertheless endorsed the pending TAT-5 application in the interests of 
"total availability," as Rostow later said. "Ultimately it was a defence 
question."^ '
The technical concern with diversity was shared in Europe, though 
not apparently for military reasons. The British Post Office sought a 
50-50 split in the traffic loads to be borne by cables and satellites, 
and furthermore initiated within Intelsat the notion of using two satel­ 
lites in the Atlantic, one 'major path' facility to handle messages among 
big traffic stations and the other to link all terminals in the region. 
Along with other European PTTs the British were significantly ahead of 
AT&T in introducing international direct dialing, which intensifies the 
need for reliability in commercial overseas linkages since callers whose 
calls cannot be completed tend to continue trying, thereby placing added 
loads on domestic grids. It was estimated that a loss of more than 25 
percent of overseas capacity at a stroke could provoke disruption of domes­ 
tic telephone service, and the British sought to design their international
facilities so that no more than that would be concentrated in a single
(37) transmission device.
Political factors; For the U.S., relying primarily on the Intelsat 
system for overseas linkages might have led to a situation where control 
over the national capability was substantively shared with foreign PTTs 
and, by extension, foreign governments. While this concern was not ex­ 
pressed as such in the official cable deliberations, the American govern­ 
ment was unquestionably aware by early 1967 that considerable European 
discontent with Comsat—and U.S.—Intelsat dominance existed, and that 
material political reforms might very well be necessary to ensure Intel- 
sat' s continuance beyond the interim period. President Johnson's message
( 38) 
on communications policy in August noted that foreign sentiment, x and
by the autumn American diplomats were-circulating drafts of proposals for 
permanent Intelsat arrangements. Although cable ownerships were also 
shared internationally, the share quotas were fixed from the outset and
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were usually distributed only among the few countries where the cable 
heads were landed. Although American shares were high, the cables were 
politically non-controversial and therefore much safer than satellites.
New cables were also politically attractive to the European Intelsat 
members, offering a means to pressure Comsat, to resist efforts to accel­ 
erate satellite deployment and to moderate reliance on an international 
venture whose future was uncertain. The presence of a credible cable 
alternative meant the possibility that serious intransigence on Comsat's 
part in acceding to European demands could provoke a pull-out from In­ 
telsat—or a shift simply to leasing satellite circuits—without endan-
(39) gering overseas services. " Having sufficient cable capacity available
could also help sustain European efforts to defer approval and deployment 
of new satellites—especially the Intelsat IVs—until after the re-negoti­ 
ations were concluded, when it was hoped modified procedures would result 
in more contracts for European firms and aerospace development would be 
sufficiently advanced to permit more successful competition.^ ' Finally, 
it seems reasonable to surmise that cables would enable the Europeans to 
hedge their bets on Intelsat: if the organisation fell apart because of 
political irreconcilabilities, important international linkages would be 
retained notwithstanding. European PTTs were in any case actively sup­ 
porting construction of the TAT-6 cable at the same time as the permanent 
Intelsat arrangements were being negotiated. '
Economic factors; The principal elements of the U.S. carriers 1 inte­ 
rest in new cables were contained in this summary of the pro-cable argu­ 
ment provided by Comsat in November 196?:
We are aware that under the Communications Satellite Act, the satel­ 
lite offers to U.S. carriers no rate base or profit potential com­ 
parable to their investment in cables. Vie are aware that to the 
European cable participants, the cable affords a larger measure of 
control in the limited system than they may expect in the global 
system. To the same parties, also, the cable offers transiting in­ 
come between cable head and communicating point. We appreciate that 
the economics of cable manufacturing and cable laying industries are 
favored by keeping their facilities busy... (42)
At issue for the American carriers was not their existing outlays in under­ 
sea cables—AT&T alone had as of 1965 some $225m worth of cable holdings^ 4 ' 
_since there was no precedent for the PCC's striking these assets from 
the carriers' rate bases and no suggestion that it should, but rather the
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future of a far more lucrative source of continuing investment than the 
satellite system. .-The TAT-5 cable, for instance, was initially estimated 
to cost $70m—not including another $20m in land connections—which would 
he depreciated over from 20 to 25 years, yielding a cumulative return to 
its owners of around $260m.^) Hence a single cable might easily expand 
AT&T's rate base more satisfactorily than the company's total investment 
in U.S. satellite ground facilities—the carriers' being unable to include 
their space segment (Comsat) shares in their rate bases.
AT&T not only operated submarine cables, however, it also built them. 
While Bell claimed that .foreign cable companies would "move into the vac­ 
uum" to the detriment of the American capability in the field if the U.S. 
carriers'cable proposals were rejected,^ ^' its patriotic impulse is hard 
to credit. It was a British subsidiary of ITT, Standard Telephone and 
Cables Ltd., that was fast becoming the world's leading cable outfit^ ' 
and'.Bell's real concern was very likely that its Western Electric manu­ 
facturing subsidiary would be held back by FCC restrictions while ITT 
continued to refine and market cables elsewhere. ITT though did not 
view its cable interests so exclusively, and joined with AT&T in urging 
the various authorisations.
Comsat*s dissent; For Comsat itself, new cables would help fulfill 
the threat implied by the authorised users decision by legitimating diver­ 
sions of potential satellite traffic onto the new facilities. The cables 
would provide the carriers with the incentive—and indeed the financial 
necessity—to deprive the satellite system of traffic. Application of 
composite rates—making satellite and cable tariffs uniform—would mean 
that satellite rate reductions need go little further than the system's 
carrier customers, whose charges to ultimate users would remain buoyed up 
by parallel investments in cables. Only if the carriers had no choice 
but to route traffic via satellite would this threat be allayed. Other­ 
wise, as Comsat's chairman put it, the carriers' use of satellite cir­ 
cuits would be "like renting a motel room down the street when you have
(47) a spare room in your own home."
Although Comsat 1 s prospects-far-rate base expansion would suffer, 
however, its immediate financial prd"spects~were probably in little dan­ 
ger: it was unlikely that Comsat would be unable to meet its current 
revenue requirements no matter how heavily its costs would, because of
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the traffic the new cables would absorb, fall on each utilised satellite 
circuit. Nevertheless Intelsat's financial prospects were at issue, and 
to the degree that Comsat's leadership would be tested by its ability to 
defeat this threat to the satellite system the company was obliged to fight, 
not for itself alone. Comsat told the FCC that "the economic benefits from 
satellite operations are dependent on the use of large capacity satellites 
and maximum utilization of the system."^ ' Commenting on the TAT-5 pro­ 
posal in November 196?, Comsat's chairman wrote:
We oppose any compromise solution in the Atlantic which would 
handicap the economic capability of satellite communications 
and would water down the commitment of the U.S. to the lowest 
cost communications for developed and less developed nations 
alike, many of whom may never have cable service. (49)
The awareness that lower utilisation in the North Atlantic would mean 
higher satellite tariffs elsewhere was not lost on Third World Intelsat 
members, and led to a protest of the pending transatlantic cable plans 
from a meeting of the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission in 
Mexico City in autumn 1967. New cables would mean, in effect, sub­ 
sidy of the richer nations by the poorer through denial of operational 
economies to those who gained virtually nothing from the success of the 
policy the subsidy would finance. '
Pre-conditions: This protest helps illuminate some of the political, 
technical and industrial pre-conditions upon which satellite-cable rivalry 
was based, without which the determinants of cable construction we have 
described xrould not have operated. Politically, the U.S. government's 
deliberate reliance on commercial facilities for most of its requirements 
made it po'ssible for state exigencies—e.g. bi-modal plant—to shape the 
commercial capability, and to shift the additional costs onto private 
users worldwide. Technically, the rivalry would probably have been un­ 
thinkable had it not been for genuine and substantial improvements in 
cable technology; those gains may not have made cables the equal of 
satellites, but they made the two broadly comparable which would not have 
been the case if transistorised cables had not been developed. Industri­ 
ally, carrier interest in further cables derived from the retention of 
rate base regulation and a multi-firm overseas communications industry, 
notxdthstanding suggestions that both be modified to eliminate some of
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the economic peculiarities that militate against rational resource 
allocation "between the- two transmission modes.^ ' What is, in sum, 
notable about all of these pre-conditions and indeed the determinants 
to which they gave rise is that they were pre-eminently American—or 
at "best transatlantic—concerns, "but with decidedly global consequences.
4. THE CARIBBEAN CABLE
Although the fourth transatlantic phone cable, TAT-4, was actually com­ 
pleted after Early Bird's launch, Comsat had assumed its existence in 
satellite service projections and TAT-4 was not controversial. The 
carriers' 1966 application to build a high-capacity cable in the Carib­ 
bean, however, surprised Comsat and became a preliminary and revealing 
skirmish between Comsat and the carriers—largely because applications 
to construct an earth station to serve the same region were filed at 
the same time, and some choice between or balancing of the two tech­ 
nologies was unavoidable. The FCC's adjudication introduced two ele­ 
ments that were present in each of the subsequent cable authorisations: 
obligations on the carriers to divide traffic between cables and satel­ 
lites, and to reduce their tariffs.
In February 1966 AT&T asked for Commission approval to construct 
jointly with ITT its first advanced 720-circuit cable 1,250 miles from 
Florida to Puerto Rico and the U'.S. Virgin Islands (USVl), at an esti­ 
mated cost of $33m. The application was important due to the volume 
of Caribbean traffic and the relationship the proposal had to AT&T's more 
ambitious cable plans. Traffic from Puerto Rico and the USVI had been 
growing at around 33 percent yearly—as against 17.6 percent between the 
U.S. and the rest of the world—and by 1965 accounted for more than one- 
fifth of all overseas phone calls to and from the United States.^ 5 ' Bell 
forecast a requirement of 588 new international phone circuits for the 
region by 197 3. ^ '
Moreover, AT&T had plans for extensive cable systems in the Western 
Hemisphere and their fate might be foreshadowed by the treatment the 
relatively modest Puerto Rican facility received. These included con­ 
tinuation of a recently-completed link to the Panama Canal Zone down
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the west coast of South America and perhaps across the Andes to Argen­ 
tina and up the east coast to Brazil.^ ' Other cables to Venezuela 
and the Dominican Republic were either under construction or proposed,^'' 
and AT&T was candid in its intention to make full use of its undersea 
network, notwithstanding the satellite system. The company's 1966 ser­ 
vice forecasts envisaged that most traffic between the U.S., Caribbean 
and Central America would soon be going via cable, and noted that satel­ 
lite circuits would be used to communicate with southern parts of South 
America until the mid-1970s, when "cable systems will be available to 
these locations." Bell's preferred policy favoured cables for shorter 
distance links, a mix of cables and satellites for intermediate dis­ 
tances (including transatlantic and U.S.-Hawaii routes), and satellites 
for some very long distance links (U.S.-Japan) and for "reaching dis­ 
tant countries that have very light circuit loads, such as some of the 
countries in Africa and Asia," although traffic to North Africa and
/ cCA
South Africa would go by cable.
ATc?cT was clearly giving away little in its plans for satellite 
usage. Major traffic routes were either claimed as exclusively suited 
to cable links (as with the Caribbean) or proposed for an intermodal 
mix whose precise composition had yet to be negotiated. Satellites 
were assigned priority only where Bell had no cables—to Japan for 
instance—or where cables would be evidently uneconomic.
Although ITT had applied in March and again in November 19&5 ^° 
build the region's satellite ground station, it was the February 1966 
cable proposal that prompted a response from Comsat, and in April the 
Corporation asked for authorisation to put an earth station on St. 
Croix, USVI, requesting at the same time that the cable application be 
denied. Without the Caribbean region traffic, Comsat said, its per 
circuit revenue requirement and consequently its tariffs would increase 
by 35 percent, over the next five years, Caribbean traffic would 
enable rates to come down by one-quarter. Comsat argued that a 
satellite earth station, at a cost of $6m, would bring the entire eas­ 
tern Caribbean into the global system and provide direct access to all 
points in the network. While approval of the station would "contribute 
greatly to the economic viability of the satellite system" and would
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"serve as a demonstration to all the smaller or less well-developed 
countries of the world that the United States has confidence in the 
future of satellite communications," construction of the cable would 
inhibit expeditious satellite development and therefore "substantially 
undercut the policy of the United States."^ '
AT&T charged that Comsat's anti-cable position was "grounded in 
large part on the untenable contention that there is some overriding 
national policy favoring the use of satellites over cables..." Bell 
minimised the importance of the promised global connections satellites 
would offer, noting that less than 1.5 percent of 1965 traffic to and 
from the region involved points other than the U.S. mainland,^ ' a 
figure which ignored Comsat's intention to provide direct service to 
the West Coast, which would have deprived Bell of cross-country tran­ 
siting income. ITT naturally could not criticise the need for a satel­ 
lite ground station as such and focussed its remarks on Comsat's bid 
to be its sole owner.
On December 7» 19^6 the PCC authorised construction of both the 
AT&T-ITT cable and the earth station, the latter to be owned jointly 
by Comsat and selected carriers. Two stipulations written into the 
decision are especially important: 'proportionate fill' and tariff 
reductions. The Commission noted the expressed willingness of Bell 
and ITT to lease a total of 100 satellite circuits for service to the 
region, and announced a utilisation formula that would obligate the 
carriers to lease equal numbers of satellite and new cable circuits, 
thereby dividing traffic growth on a 5°-50 basis. Also, to reflect 
satellite economies and the savings a greater traffic volume would 
produce, the carriers would be expected to enact a promised 25 percent 
reduction in composite rates to and from the region.
Application of the proportionate fill policy—first put forth in 
a very different form by AT&T in its January 1964 commitment intended 
to assure equal numbers of satellite and cable circuits in the Atlan­ 
tic^ '—proved inconsistent, incomplete and contentious in the Carib­ 
bean, men the cable's ownership_jjuotas were announced in January 
1967, a division of circuits'among the-four carriers concerned was 
also agreed whereby the entire capacity of the cable was in principle 
assigned—which would imply a corresponding commitment to use 720 satel­ 
lite circuits.^ ' When the Puerto Rican earth station opened in
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January 1969, however, the carriers claimed that meeting the fill ra­ 
tio depended upon overall traffic volumes: although they were then 
using 123 cable circuits, they were willing to activate only 70 satel­ 
lite circuits and not the 100 previously promised.^ '' The problem, 
as "both Comsat and AT&T had forewarned, was that there simply was not 
enough traffic to go round; the FCC had predicted a 1969 recruirement 
of 268 new voice circuits for the region, and even that had failed to 
materialise. '
Comsat nevertheless insisted upon the proportion it had been pro­ 
mised of what traffic there was. Claims and counterclaims ensued until 
July 1969, when the FCC ordered AT&T to stop using 13 Plorida-USVI cable 
circuits and activate 13 satellite circuits instead. The Commission 
also ruled that Comsat was entitled to the full $3m in annual revenues 
that a lease of 100 satellite circuits would have brought, and allowed 
Comsat to compensate itself through higher charges to the carriers on 
other services. ' Finally in January 1970 AT&T was ordered to pay 
Comsat for 18 satellite circuits that Bell was not leasing due to con­ 
struction of the cable, an action intended to compensate Comsat for 
AT&T's effective non-compliance with the 50-50 proportionate fill for- 
mula.™
5. THE FIFTH TRANSATLANTIC GABLE (TAT-5) CONTROVERSY
Comsat had consoled itself over the paucity of traffic for Early Bird 
with the belief that the TAT-4 cable, which went into service in mid- 
September 1965, would be saturated by the end of 1966 and the Atlantic
(71) satellites would then get a needed surge of new traffic. v ' Comsat
had not, however, counted on TAT-5, plans for which appear to have
been prompted partly by AT&T's expectations of a slump in its cable-
(72) building business, and partly by the anticipated completion of some
new Mediterranean cables which strengthened the case for a transatlan-
(73) tic facility directly to southern Europe to feed those new links, v
and aggravated Bell's concern with ITT undersea cable dominance.
Taking a lesson from Comsat, AT&T and the other international car­ 
riers tried to secure international agreement on the new transtlantic 
cable before asking for FCC authorisation. In September 1967 a meeting
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was held in Lisbon of the four U.S. overseas carriers and the PTTs of 
Italy, Portugal and Spain, where a 720-circuit cable between the U.S.
/ 7 A\
and southern Europe was proposed for completion in 1970. v ' ' The cable 
would be built by ST&C and Cables de Lyon, with repeaters, transistors 
and amplifiers supplied by Western Electric.^ '-*' Spain's interest in 
the facility derived from a desire to end its dependence upon France 
as a transit point for all its U.S. traffic—satellite and cable—but 
both Spain and Italy indicated they would attempt to maintain parity 
in their uses of the two modes. '
AT&T's announcement that the new line, "together with out plans to 
increase substantially the number of satellite circuits in service to 
Europe, would further insure the diversity and dependability of commu­ 
nications betx^een the United States and transatlantic points," drew a 
favourable initial response from the Pentagon—aware of the important 
U.S. naval and air installations in Spain—though it left the State 
Department unimpressed. State asked for and got a 60-day delay before 
any agreement was signed—pending, it was said, release of the Rostow 
Report—but the carriers were evidently still hopeful of presenting
the PCC with a fait accompli and scheduled a second meeting with the————————— (77) 
European PTTs for November 27 in Geneva. At that meeting, however,
a request was made on behalf of the State Department, FCC and White 
House for another delay while the cable-satellite review continued in 
the U.S. The Europeans were reportedly dismayed, and a spokesman noted 
their "vital interest" in the timely provision of this "essential means" 
of communication, and the "indispensable diversification" TAT-5 would
afford. The PTTs announced March 1, 1968 as the deadline after which
( 78^ 
a thorough review of the entire situation would be necessary.
Comsat had in the meantime mounted a counterattack, criticising 
carrier satellite usage and cable costs, and apparently accelerating 
plans for the Intelsat IV series. In early October a Comsat official 
pointed out that the carriers were using the full number of available 
transatlantic cable circuits—580—but only 110 satellite circuits, 
less than half the available totaTf - another 1,200 satellite circuits 
were scheduled to be operational during 1968 when the Atlantic Intelsat
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III was launched. v '•" AT&T thereupon asked for another 80 satellite 
circuits.^ ' Comsat also reminded the FCC that TAT-4 and TAT-5 to­ 
gether xrould provide 1,200 circuits for $150m, which would entitle the 
cables' owners to more than $500m in revenues over the next 20-25 
years. A single Intelsat IV offered 5,000 circuits, would be depre­ 
ciated over one-third the time—thus allowing for replacement by more 
advanced and lower-cost'components—and would be part of a global space 
segment that would cost less than the two TAT cables. ' In November, 
as "a tactical move in its eleventh-hour fight" to block the cable, 
Comsat announced plans for the $97.2m Intelsat IV programme for 1970- 
73, although at the time the Ills were approved in 1966 Comsat had 
contended the IVs would not be operational before 1972. '
The carriers contended however that the proposed TAT-5 was not just 
another transatlantic cable because southern Europe was currently wholly 
dependent on satellites for direct links to the U.S. Moreover, the issue 
was said to be one of "balance": without TAT-5, according to AT&T, the 
anticipated 19 percent annual increases in transatlantic traffic would 
mean that by 1970, the total proportion of traffic going by satellite 
would have risen from 20 to 60 percent, and to 75 percent by the end of 
1972. TAT-5 would enable cables to provide 46 percent of capacity in 
1970 and around half by late 1972. ' It is notable that AT&T's figures 
were premised on comparisons of satellite usage and cable capacity: par­ 
ity was not based on equal degrees of utilisation—e.g. half of cable 
capacity and half of satellite capacity—but rather on anticipating the 
proportion of total traffic a fully-utilised cable system could handle. 
Maximum cable capacities, in short, would determine the levels of satel­ 
lite traffic, however inadequately that traffic filled the satellites. 
Furthermore, even this curious parity formula would require activation 
of equal numbers of cable and satellite circuits, which according to Bell's 
1966 service forecasts the company had no intention of doing.
When, however, the PCC on February 16, 1968 announced approval of 
the TAT-5 cable, among the conditions the Commission attached was that 
agreement be secured with foreign co-operators that cable and satellite 
facilities in the region be leased
in numbers sufficient to assure that this cable and the satellite 
facilities provided to handle traffic between the United States
f-271-
and their respective countries shall each lie filled at the same 
proportionate rate. (85)
The carriers were also instructed to negotiate rate reductions of at least 
25 percent with their foreign partners, since AT&T had promised that the 
new cable would offer just such savings. '
6. FIGHTING OVER FILL RATIOS
The PCC's proportionate fill policy, as set forth in the TAT-5 authori­ 
sation, was never effectively implemented. By the time the cable opened 
in April 1970, Comsat had "been asking for eight months for a firm state­ 
ment on intermodal mix from the FCC, claiming that carrier traffic fore­ 
casts were "sensitized to anticipate carrier applications for new cables" 
and that sound planning was consequently difficult. ' Moreover, an 
Intelsat III was scheduled for service over the Atlantic in January 1970, 
and the carriers were contending that the FCC's fill rations had not been 
intended to apply to the III series. ITT and RCA said that the policy 
referred not to satellites 'that had already been approved when it was pro­ 
mulgated, but to those which would come later—that is, not to the Intel- 
sat Ills, but to the Ill-g-s which were never deployed and the IVs. The 
carriers produced an- April 1968 memorandum to that effect from a meeting 
with the European TAT-5 participants, and then boycotted the Atlantic III 
altogether. '
Notwithstanding Comsat's complaints of lost revenues, the FCC 
sustained the record carriers' objections in part by ruling in Hay 1970 
that the second Atlantic III launched that month was a back-up facility 
and therefore exempt from fill requirements. In return the record car­ 
riers, who had hitherto not used any TAT-5 circuits either pending re­ 
solution of their complaints, agreed to lease one more satellite circuit 
for every two they leased on TAT-5.
Despite the apparent agreement that the PCC's ratios would apply in 
any event to the Intelsat IVs, they were not. ITT in fact tried to get 
first the White House and then the FCC to postpone or prevent the first 
IV launch scheduled for January 1971,- since^the company claimed the satel­ 
lite was not needed. Instead the Commission's common carrier bureau an­ 
nounced in May a five-to-one utilisation formula: the carriers were to 
activate immediately five Intelsat IV circuits in the Atlantic region for 
every one TAT-5 circuit they used, conditional only upon rate reductions
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from Comsat. Although the decision actually accorded with AT&T's esti­ 
mates of what would be necessary to comply with the PCC's 1968 TAT-5 poli­ 
cy, it appeared to signal a victory for Comsat. ^ ° '
By September, however, the five-to-one formula — which had of course 
only been adopted to enable Comsat to make up for the carriers' earlier 
non-compliance — had been scrapped due to pressure from the U.S. record 
carriers and European PTTs. The PTTs of 17 European countries had met 
in November 1970 and declared themselves opposed to fixed fill ratios, 
although they accepted a 50-50 satellite-cable traffic split as a useful 
planning objective. At a transatlantic meeting in February 1971 which 
the PTTs had requested, agreement was reached on continuing consultation 
"between U.S. and European carriers and the Europeans proposed a one-to-one 
fill ratio. Consequently, after the FCC's Hay 1971 five-to-one declara­ 
tion the Europeans complained vigourously that they had not been consulted
and that any attempt to implement the new policy would lead to "severe fi-
(92) nancial and operational effects."
Although the PCC replied that it had assumed that AT&T's proposals 
reflected understandings already reached among the carriers and PTTs, and
the FCC's policy was "not only consistent with, but in fact implemented"
(93) Bell's proposals, proportionate fill was doomed. After a meeting in
late September with representatives of the U.S. carriers and 14 foreign 
PTTs, the FCC on October 15 revised its formula to the preferred one-to- 
one ratio for voice traffic and dropped ratios altogether for record traf-
7. TAT-6 AND THE TRANSPACIFIC GABLE
In September 1969 AT&T informed the FCC that it would soon apply to build 
two new 720-circuit cables, between the U.S. and France and the mainland 
and Hawaii, both to be needed by 1972-73. Bell also said that it expected 
to ask for authorisation in 1970 to lay a further transatlantic cable of 
substantially higher capacity than theretofore — 1,800 to 3,000 circuits. 
The new Atlantic links would be needed to avert a "serious imbalance" in 
th3 region by I960, when according to AT&T 84 percent of total capacity 
would be furnished by satellites. ^ ' Bell noted concern expressed by
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French, Belgian, Dutch and Scandinavian PTTs that TAT-5 would soon be 
filled, but the PCC—fearing a repeat of the TAT-5 episode—instructed 
AT&T in December to stop negotiating with the Europeans over TAT-6 while 
the Commission continued its new inquiry into overseas planning.^ ' 
In September 1970 AT&T formally applied to build an $86m, 720- 
circuit cable to Prance—the capacity of which could be up-graded to 
845 circuits through TASI sampling techniques. In spite of support from 
the Pentagon and European PTTs however AT&T appears to have fatally tipped
its hand by alluding the year before to the new generation of cables with
(97) much higher capacities which it was developing. w " The new White House
Office of Telecommunications Policy—created in 1969 to succeed the Direc­ 
tor of Telecommunications Management—told the FCC in May 1971 that the 
"administration's position" was that existing cables and Intelsat IVs 
would meet regional requirements through 1977 and that new Atlantic 
cable deployments should await availability of the 3,500-circuit lines, 
whose costs would be comparable to the Intelsat IVs'. The FCG ac­ 
cordingly turned down the 845-circuit TAT-6 proposal in late June, and 
invited applications for a 3,500—circuit facility t attaching at the same
time no conditions as to traffic-sharing with satellites aside from a
(99) reference to "reasonable parity."
Bell submitted its application to build the high-capacity cable in 
December 1971 and the FCC approved it the following March. TAT-6 was 
scheduled for opening in 1976 at a cost of $145^. Although no fixed 
sharing formula was included in the authorisation, the FCC noted that 
more than 8,000 circuits were currently unused on the two Intelsat IVs 
then over the Atlantic, and said it would expect traffic growth to be 
divided one-third to each of the IVs and one-third to TAT-6.^ '
In spite of the Commission's rejection in June of the 845-circuit 
version of the TAT-6, AT&T proposed in late September 1971 to build a 
similar cable between San Francisco and Hawaii at a cost of $59m » The 
Hawaii link was intended as the first section of a transpacific cable 
to Japan, a route AT&T had said in 1966 it wished to use satellites to 
serve, and while the FCC continued deliberating on the Hawaii cable 
AT&T requested authorisation for the Hawaii-Japan segment in October 1972.
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Comsat was relatively, unconcerned about the California-Hawaii link, since 
it appeared likely; that Intelsat's traffic "between those points would "be 
transferred to a domestic satellite before long, but the company did ask 
that the cable not be used to carry traffic destined for beyond Hawaii. 
The Hawaiian state governor, however, asked the FCC to turn down the cable 
since its construction would, he believed, mean higher tariffs.^ '
In June 1973 the PGC approved both segments of the transpacific cable. 
To meet the Hawaii governor's objections, 25 percent rate reductions were 
ordered from the carriers. Although the Commission asked Comsat and the 
carriers to draw up traffic-sharing plans, by 1975 there was little agree­ 
ment and the FCC continued consideration of the matter.^ '
8. CONCLUSIONS
The paradox in satellite-cable rivalries lay in the fact that much the 
same forces that had promoted satellite development were also instrumental 
in providing satellites with their most damaging competition. Neither the 
U.S. government, FCC nor—for the most part—the carriers ever wavered 
from a commitment to proceed with satellite formation, even while they 
insisted more cables be built. Both the state and the communications 
industry still stood to gain from satellites, although they agreed on the 
need to restrain the impact satellite technology might have, respectively, 
upon maintenance of a diversified overseas plant and upon profitability. 
It is indeed arguable that the FCC's compliance with most of the carriers' 
proposals eliminated a major obstacle to satellite development (although 
it iirould be unwise to push the argument too far): as long as industry 
got its cables, it would have little reason to object to new satellites; 
if the carriers could keep their cables fully loaded and use satellites 
virtually as and when they wished, they would have little reason not to 
tolerate expansion of satellite services.
Nevertheless, it was clear that satellites were not then or in the 
future to be the exclusive—or even principal—means of international com­ 
munication among metropolitan countries. To satisfy the transatlantic 
preference for a bi-modal mix, to placate the American carriers and to 
furnish the Europeans with negotiating leverage vis-a-vis Comsat, satellites
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would be denied the chance to realise operational economies of scale if 
that chance came at the expense of undersea cables and the whole complex 
of overland facilities that permits submarine links to serve inland areas. 
The obligation to coexist with cables helped provoke a relocation of 
satellite services, since customary intercontinental long-haul service 
could no longer be viewed as the most promising area of satellite growth 
and expansion. By their very success, the restraint and compression 
that had characterised pre-emptive underdevelopment were forcing satel­ 
lites toward fields where their superiority was uno^iestionable. The 
political expression of this displacement would—almost inevitably—be 
a revision in the terms of American and European co-dominance within 
Intelsat. That revision derived formally from the fact that since satel­ 
lite usage determined political weight in the organisation, the division 
of North Atlantic traffic between satellites and cables would reduce the 
metropolitan countries' Intelsat traffic margins over the growing use of 
satellites elsewhere. Moreover, satellites could only become of greater 
importance to those who had no alternative means of international commu­ 
nications—to say nothing of techniques to permit cheap and rapid moder­ 
nisation of domestic communications facilities. The cable decisions, in 
sum, facilitated the devolution of control over satellite technology.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: KEEPING SATELLITES OUT OP THE UNITED STATES
1. OVERVIEW
The haste that the U.S. inspired in international satellite development 
seems equalled only by the delay tolerated at home in domestic satellite 
deployment. It was more than nine years after Early Bird that the first 
American domestic satellite was launched—for Western Union, the national 
telegraph monopoly, in July 1974. By that time, eight fourth-generation 
Intelsat satellites were in service internationally, a Soviet internal 
system had been operational since 19&7, a Canadian domestic network was 
into its second year of service, and upwards of a dozen companies and 
consortia had been asking to provide U.S. domestic satellites for at 
least seven years. The PCC policy under which the Westar spacecraft 
was authorised was promulgated in June 1972, seven years after the Com­ 
mission's formal inquiry had begun and two years after the White House 
had recommended much the same policy: opening the field to competent 
private entities subject to certain minimal service and antitrust re­ 
quirements.
Since the history of efforts to create U.S. domestic satellite ser­ 
vice compares in length and convolutions to the history of international 
satellite communications, which is the principal focus of this study, it 
will be necessary to confine the treatment that follows to sketching the 
empirical domestic record. Our theoretical interest in this history is 
two-fold: to consider domestic satellite formation as 1.) parallel to 
and independent of the international process, and as 2.) a component of 
a larger process encompassing both spheres.
The first perspective helps illuminate some of the distinctive fea­ 
tures of pre-emptive imderdevelopment through a consideration of the 
evident lack of urgency in the domestic case, which is attributable to 
the essentially lasser-faire—or laisser-ne-pas-faire—role assumed by 
the state. In part that role was determined by the absence of consensus 
within the private sector over domestic satellite services and organisa­ 
tion, which was itself fueled by the increasing sophistication of satellite
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technology and the range of applications it could readily accommodate. 
More important to the state's tolerance of delay, however, were the facts 
that domestic service was not deemed essential to meet pressing require­ 
ments and that, if anything, the civil and political turbulence of the 
period suggested caution in introducing a technology that might lower 
the cost and increase the availability of general telecommunications ser­ 
vices.
Prom the second, and for our purposes more important, perspective, 
the U.S. domestic history is evidence of a fruitful course of satellite 
development that was not pursued during the first phase of technological 
formation, thus helping sustain our characterisation of that period as 
one of pre-emptive underdevelopment. The mere contemporaneity of inter­ 
national and domestic events is not, of course, in itself sufficient to 
merit grouping the two processes within a single overarching description. 
Important empirical linkages did, however, exist: 1.) U.S. urgency con­ 
cerning global satellite deployment led indirectly to omission of domes­ 
tic prescriptions from the Comsat Act, thus setting the stage for the 
lengthy deliberations that ensued; 2.) the Americans were promoting 
an expansion of Intelsat's competence to include regional and in some 
cases domestic satellite services, which would be contradicted by a de­ 
cision awarding U.S. satellite development to private entities with no 
Intelsat affiliation; 3.) an anti-Comsat decision might rigidify the 
company's stance in the Intelsat re-negotiations and endanger the com­ 
promises that might be necessary; 4«) a chief concern of Comsat's 
carrier rivals in the struggles recounted in previous chapters—which 
deprived Intelsat of traffic and opportunities to cut tariffs—was to 
reduce the likelihood of Comsat's extending its satellite monopoly do­ 
mestically. In sum, the chief political uncertainty holding back satel­ 
lite development in both spheres was the same—Comsat, and its future 
prerogatives.
2. DOMESTIC SATELLITE CONTROVERSIES THROUGH MARCH 1970
Consideration of domestic satellite'service"'was provoked by an industry 
hitherto excluded from participation in satellite development—the broad­ 
casters. Their proposals for a system dedicated to broadcast relay
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challenged both AT&T's long-lines monopoly and Comsat's desired satellite 
monopoly, and raised the question of whether satellite services should "be 
created solely on a common carrier basis to serve all telecommunications 
users or for narrowly specialised uses as well. These issues remained 
unsettled from the time the FGC opened its formal inquiry on domestic 
satellites in March 1966 until the Commission's first decision was an­ 
nounced just four years later — and well beyond.
In May 1965 the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) told the FCC it 
would soon request authorisation to buy and operate a satellite system 
to distribute network TV programming in the U.S. and abroad. ABC, which 
was immediately joined by the National Broadcasting Company (N'BC), had 
drawn up a plan with the help of Hughes Aircraft for a ^25m system — in­ 
cluding space segment and two transmitting stations — that would enable 
it to save more than half the ^12m it paid AT&T every year to relay TV 
nationwide. The proposal was submitted to the FCC in September and
returned to the network in March 1966 because, the Commission said, it
(2) "presents basic questions of law and policy which must be resolved."
A domestic satellite docket was then opened, with a December 1966 dead­ 
line on proposals.
Comsat had responded to ABC's announcement by saying that it too 
was exploring various domestic satellite possibilities and expected to 
propose an elaborate ^flOOm system in the near future. Furthermore, Comsat 
contended, satellite service at home was "a matter entrusted to the Cor­ 
poration under the Communications Satellite Act," and independent involve­ 
ment by the networks would therefore be illegal. The company proposed 
a high-capacity multipurpose network of four satellites — one for each time 
zone — to provide 16 TV channels and more than 20,000 voice and record cir­ 
cuits at a total cost for space and ground segments of between ^llOm and
. Comsat's stated intention was to "combine TV with the general
satellite communications market, thereby maximizing the savings to all 
users, including television," but in fact the TV relay market was but 
a subsidiary part of the massive volume of U.S. domestic telecommunica­ 
tions that Comsat wished to handle. As the company's board chairman said:
This market is extremely important to Comsat and its shareholders.
For the foreseeable future, it is vastly greater than any expec­
tancy for Comsat's share in the long-distance international market.
(6)
Indeed, even ignoring the fast-growing demand for non-voice (e.g. data) 
services, interstate phone calls were of a different order of magnitude 
from international, with domestic long-distance calls expected to be
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around 60 times greater than international by 1980.^'
AT&T and Western Union had in March 1966 offered to support Corasat's 
proposal before the FCC if Gomsat agreed to function domestically solely
as a carriers' carrier, seeking neither to own ground facilities nor to/ o\
contract directly with the TV networks. ' Comsat turned down the offer, 
and AT&T submitted a domestic satellite proposal of its own in December 
for a ^340m system to supplement its existing network and carry the full 
range of telecommunications traffic, including broadcast relay. Bell 
said the cost iirould be some ^200m less than comparable ground facilities, 
and repeated its offer to allow Comsat to act as owner and operator of
the space segment as long as terminals, interfaces and routing decisions
(a) 
remained under AT&T control.
In addition to the proposals of Comsat, AT&T and NEC—which called 
for a more elaborate broadcast relay system than ABC had proposed, but 
which was nevertheless supported by the networks^ —by the time of the 
deadline for proposals the Ford Foundation, in its capacity as patron 
of noncommercial television, had submitted a plan for a Broadcasters' 
Nonprofit Satellite Service (BNSS) to furnish television relay service 
at lower rates than AT&T had hitherto provided, while generating surplus 
revenues to subsidise a noncommercial TV network. Ford, after consul­ 
tations with Hughes Aircraft officials, estimated that satellites could 
for ^20m per year provide the same interconnection services that a re­ 
cent AT&T rate increase would mean was costing ^65m from Bell; the net­ 
works could be charged ^Om—thus saving them tfl^m—and the remaining 
J2>30m would go to noncommercial broadcasting, which would also receive 
free nationwide interconnections. Although the plan offered a way 
to strengthen the ailing noncommercial TV industry—and indeed catalysed 
a series of actions culminating in November 196? in the creation of the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting to oversee a new noncommercial network
^• 12'—and suggested the kind of repayment for publicly-financed space
(\-\\
R&D that some legislators felt was overdue/ J ' it also effectively uni­ 
fied an opposition that otherwise would have had little in common: the 
commercial TV networks, who had no wish to subsidise a competitor; AT&T, 
which stood to lose both its TV "carrying revenues and its participation 
in the domestic satellite field; and Comsat, which would be denied the 
exclusive rights it claimed.
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The Ford Foundation plan was no more successful than the sugges­ 
tion of Hughes Aircraft for a high-powered satellite network to inter­ 
connect cable television systems and broadcast directly to home TV re­ 
ceivers. In an effort to break the logjam of filings and counter- 
filings before the FCG, Comsat applied in March 196? for interim status 
as owner and operator of a ^58m pilot satellite system, intended to be 
operational by 1969 and to test the feasibility of domestic satellite 
use. Earth stations would be concentrated in the western part of the 
U.S. in order to serve the various phone systems owned by GT&E and avoid 
directly competing with AT&T for its own traffic. ^'
In spite of doubts expressed by White House officials over the need
for domestic satellite services, and the lukewarm support offered by
(l?) some nominal supporters, the FCC was by mid-196? rumoured to be fa-
f-\Q\
vouring Comsat 's proposal for a pilot system. In August, however, 
President Johnson announced formation of the Rostow Task Force to examine 
the full range of government communications policy, and the FCC volun­
tarily suspended its own deliberations during the year— and-a^half
(19) that the group conducted its studies.
The Rostow Report was finally released in May 19t>9 — without, however, 
White House endorsement — and supported Comsat 's plan, while recommending 
that carriers, broadcasters and other users be eligible to participate
in ground station ownership. Again the FCC was said to be close to
( 21 ) awarding Comsat interim responsibility, and Comsat began in June to
negotiate with 1JASA for use of an experimental ATS spacecraft domestical-
Once again, however, White Ho^^se intervention cut short an apparent
pro-Comsat drift by the FCC. Reportedly after seeing a draft of the
(23) policy 'the Commission was ready to announce, the Office of Telecom­
munications Policy in late July told the FCC that "a small working group" 
had been formed "to assist the administration in further reviewing this
area. " / A report was promised within 60 days, but the FCC expressed
(25) dissatisfaction with yet another delay."
By mid-August the group was reported to favour restricting Comsat 's 
pilot status in the interest of promoting competition among not yet spe­ 
cified entities/ and when it failed to report in October as promised 
AT&T touched off a new flurry of satellite interest among the TV networks
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by announcing a 44 percent increase in its television carrying charges. 
Bell's reaction to. the subsequent revival of proposals for a satellite 
system dedicated to TV relay — which came notwithstanding the FCC's pre­ 
vious indications that it favoured multipurpose systems^ — was both 
surprising and showed almost preternatural anticipation of the direction 
White House and PCC policies took. AT&T said it
believes the wisest policy at this time would be to permit any 
organisation or group interested in establishing a domestic satel­ 
lite system — including the networks — to apply for a license to 
establish and operate such a system. We believe this approach 
would allow flexibility and incentive for creative private initia­ 
tive, and would provide the most appropriate means for an orderly 
development of domestic satellites. (29)
Bell added that it was no longer certain that satellites would be econo­ 
mical to deploy domestically, except to avoid peak period congestion and 
furnish back-up capacity.
While effectively calling the networks' bluff, AT«T's new policy 
was also clearly in tune with White House preferences. On January 23, 
1970 the working group announced: "Competition in the offering of satel­ 
lite services appears to hold forth greater benefit to the economy and 
the public than would a single chosen instrument." The government there­ 
fore "should encourage and facilitate the development of commercial domes 
tic satellite communications systems to the extent that private enter­ 
prise finds them economically and commercially feasible." Since 
there were believed to be enough orbital slots to accommodate antici-
pated systems, and since there were "insufficient economies of scale 
...to warrant government restriction of competition," the preferred 
policy was 'open skies' — subject to minimal conditions — at least 
for the next three to five years.
.Although Comsat protested that "the establishment of a commercial 
satellite system by a U.S. entity other than Comsat would require new 
legislation," and noted that the real outstanding question was "who
is financially big enough to play the game?"^ , the company's share
(37) price slid badly and its prospects dimmed. AT&T, however, recovered
from its coyness of the autumn and announced it would soon file its own 
satellite proposal: "Close operational integration with other modes of— - - — — — — — — ———— -' / "iR^
transmission will provide the public the maximum benefit,"^ Bell said. 
On March 24, 1970 the PCC published its long-awaited First Report
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and Order on domestic satellites, in which it invited concrete and de­ 
tailed proposals—much like the one from ABC that the Commission had 
claimed exceeded its competence five years earlier—to provide the basis 
for further decisions. The FCC said it was "unable to determine" whether 
one or more multipurpose systems, specialised systems, or the White House- 
supported open entry should be approved, and announced:
Thus, we will consider applications by all legally, technically 
and financially qualified entities as to what system or systems 
are to be authorized in the context of specific proposals. (39)
While hinting at possible restrictions on AT&T's domestic satellite role, 
the Commission explicitly rejected Comsat's claim to a domestic franchise, 
though stating that if Comsat chose to operate at home it would be allowed 
to serve customers directly.
The KIC's turnabout from its reported support for Comsat's interim 
plan was opposed by elements of its professional staff, and was in 
part a response to political exigencies: the Commission's chairman, a 
career civil servant, had retired and been replaced by the ITircon Adminis­ 
tration with a political appointee well-known among right-wing Republican 
Party circles; the White House had signalled, through the December
1969 of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, an interest in taking a
(43) more active role in policy-making in the field; and since statutory
authority over domestic satellites was not clear, the possibility of a 
legislative battle existed if the FCC's rulings were, as the OTP direc­ 
tor later warned, "sufficiently out of step." Nevertheless, there 
had been little support even among those who backed Comsat's plan for 
awarding the company an indefinite domestic monopoly, and the desire for 
an interim arrangement was based on purely temporary technical and eco­ 
nomic expediency. The White House pro-competitive position was both 
consistent with the Chicago School 'free market liberalism' the adminis­ 
tration espoused, ' and a recognition that the technological-industrial 
environment was such that a good many firms—not least key aerospace com­ 
panies like Hughes, THW and Lockheed and the burgeoning computer indus­ 
tries of 'Silicon Valley', all based in Nixon's home state of California— 
stood to make a lot of money from relatively unrestricted satellite deve­ 
lopment. "^ Above all, however, the government's willingness to entrust 
domestic satellite development to the vagaries of the private economy— 
without insisting on expeditious deployment or anything of the kind—
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suggested a considerable degree of state indifference to the field, or 
at least, a greater concern with procedures than with ultimate services. 
"It was concluded," as the press statement accompanying the January 1970 
policy said,
that Government policy should encourage and facilitate the deve­ 
lopment of commercial domestic satellite communications systems 
to the extent that private enterprise finds them economically and 
operationally feasible, but that there is no reason to call for 
the immediate establishment of a domestic satellite system as a 
matter of public policy nor to promote uneconomic systems or dic­ 
tate ownership arrangements. (48)
The key question remained, whatever the pro-competitive rhetoric, 
the restraints that would be imposed on ATebT, whose traffic would very 
likely be sufficient—even without cross-subsidisation—to permit it 
to undersell most competitors in the domestic satellite industry. For 
Comsat, however, the FCC's rejection of its pilot project and the Com­ 
mission's relegation of the company to one among many in the satellite 
field, came just two weeks after the Intelsat re-negotiating conference 
had voted on March 9 to cut substantially Comsat's role in the permanent 
international arrangements. The coincidence of these two events repre­ 
sents, formally, a decisive break in the process of satellite formation
and are landmarks in the transition from pre-emptive underdevelopment
(49) 
to a more intensive, politically de-monopolised development process.
3. DOMESTIC SATELLITE ACTIQUS. 1970-75
Although the PCC»s March 1970 ruling set a deadline of March 1971 on 
submissions and applications, the Commission did not announce its find­ 
ings until June 1972. Eleven separate proposals had meanwhile been 
filed, including: Western Union, for a three-satellite system to handle 
mainly telegraph and teletype traffic, but with enough capacity for TV 
relay as well; Hughes and GT&E, for a two-satellite network to inter­ 
connect Hughes 1 cable TV systems and GT&E's phone systems; MCI, the 
company that had broken Bell's monopoly over specialised carrier ser­ 
vices, and Lockheed, whose two-satellite system would serve intercity 
data markets and possibly the TV-networks-;- Pairchild-Hiller, for a 
giant 120-transponder satellite—10 times the capacity of an Intelsat 
IV_-fco carry AT&T's phone traffic; and RCA, for a satellite to link
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Alaska—where HCA had recently acquired a communications network from 
the Pentagon—to the lower 48 states.^-5 '
Two separate proposals ivere made by AT&T and Comsat, the first for 
a joint system whose space segment would be owned by Comsat and ground 
facilities by Bell and which would be dedicated solely to AT&T's phone 
traffic, and the second from Comsat alone to serve all users other than 
AT&T: record carriers, data industry, network and cable TV. ' Comsat 
told the PCC that those two systems would exhaust the available markets:
"The market base for a truly multipurpose system should not be fragmented
(c2) by authorization of multiple system." v '
From the government, in spite of reports that the White House was 
"backing toward preference" for some restrictions out of a fear of ruinous 
competition, OTP reiterated its pro-competitive position and recom­ 
mended the PCC approve all applications. The Justice Department, 
however, strongly criticised the joint Comsat-AT&T plan—since "Comsat 
is already subject to an unhealthy degree of control by AT&T"—and 
further advised that the TV relay business be denied to any system in 
which Bell was involved, since that market tvas the biggest sure source 
of revenues apart from telephone traffic.
Restrictions on Comsat, however, not on AT&T figured prominently 
in the FCC's second Report and Order which, approved by a 4-3 vote and 
issued"on June 16, 1972, otherwise affirmed the 'open entry' position 
favoured by the White House. The two proposals in which Comsat 
was involved were judged to have considerable anti-competitive poten­ 
tial: while the joint plan would make it impossible for Comsat to 
compete with AT&T for retail customers, it would likely provide Comsat 
with enough money to make competition with Comsat's second system by 
other entities interested in serving non-Bell customers equally impos­ 
sible. Comsat was therefore offered a choice: either to operate its 
own system as a carriers' carrier, wholesaling capacity to any autho­ 
rised users including 'AT&T, or to serve on a wholesale and retail basis
( ^Rl 
all potential customers apart from AT&T. A further blow to Comsat
was the PCC's requirement that all parties seeking to furnish domestic 
satellite service offer to include Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico in 
their plans, which would deprive Intelsat of some 40 percent of its 
revenues and take from Comsat a considerable portion of its international
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(59)voting power. ^^^' The sole restriction on AT&T was a temporary pro­ 
hibition on entering the specialised leased-line market; the delay 
would give competitors a head.start and provide the FCC with cost data 
that'would help prevent AT&T from eventually cross-subsidising its 
own operations in the same field. '
The Commission also raised the long-simmering issue of AT&T's 
29 percent ownership of Comsat, ' which figured in the PCC's final 
ruling on domestic satellites in December 1972. Comsat had in Septem­ 
ber merged its hitherto independent proposal to serve non-AT&T custom­ 
ers with a similar plan advanced by HCI and Lockheed, thus enabling 
Comsat to argue that approval of its joint plan with Bell would not 
harm its competitiveness in the specialised services market because 
Comsat would only own one-third of the latter system. The PCC approved 
the MCI-Lockheed-Comsat proposal in December, and furthermore reversed 
its June ruling on the AT&T-Comsat scheme—which now would be authorised 
if Bell sold off its Comsat holdings. While the sale would not mitigate 
Comsat's dependence upon Bell in a joint venture—since AT&T would con­ 
trol all the traffic and ground facilities—it was felt that Comsat 
would participate more effectively in the MCI-Lockheed system, which
was expected to compete with AT&T in specialised markets, if Comsat/ f ^ \
was formally independent.
In January 1973 Comsat established a wholly-owned subsidiary, Comsat 
General, gave it ^200m and empowered it to undertake virtually all sub­ 
sequent non-Intelsat business—maritime and aeronautical, as well as 
domestic satellite development. Within three years Comsat General 
had greater outstanding investments than its parent, ' and after a 
series of inter—corporate reshuffles had installed itself admirably 
as the prospective satellite partner of two giants of U.S. industry, 
AT&T and IBM. The arrangement with AT&T had derived from earlier plans— 
though with the additional participation of GT&E, which had given up its 
previous intention of jointly establishing a separate system with Hughes 
Aircraft. Comsat General contracted with Hughes for construction of 
four 14,400-circuit satellites in September 1973, with deployment ex­ 
pected to begin in mid-1976 of two Comstar spacecraft, the entire capa­ 
cities of which would, be leased to AT&T. A third satellite was scheduled
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for launching early in 1978 to furnish GT&E with long-distance links. •"
IBM, which had virtually been destined all along to be a major 
customer of Corasat's second, specialised satellite system, bought out 
MGI's and Lockheed's shares in the venture in July 1974. 'The Justice 
Department and Federal Trade Commission objected, however, to the pro­ 
posed ownership of the system—55 percent IBM and 45 percent Comsat— 
since the set-up would be similar to the original AT&T-Corasat plan: 
IBM would be controlling facilities that were supposed to be used by 
its teleprocessing competitors. The PCC therefore turned down the 
proposal in January 1975» instructing IBM and Comsat to find a third 
partner. A major insurance company, Aetna Life and Casualty, was re­ 
cruited and in December the three companies formed Satellite Business 
Systems Inc., and began planning a highly sophisticated, digital com­ 
munications system, capable of extremely high-speed transmission and 
able to operate with 16-^to 23-foot unmanned ground antennas. Al­ 
though the PCC approved the project in 1977, further hearings were 
ordered after objections from the Justice Department and AT&T—whose 
own entry into the private leased-line satellite market was prohibited 
until July 1980—and initial deployment of SBS spacecraft was not ex­ 
pected before 1981. "
The record carriers Western Union and RCA meanwhile were well ahead 
in domestic space segment deployments, providing capacity that was used 
or re-sold by a number of new 'satellite' entities on the ground. Wes­ 
tern Union's Westar series began operations in 1974? and in addition to 
the expected telegraph and teletype traffic attracted the business of 
the Public Broadcasting System—which aimed to stop using AT&T inter­ 
connections by 1979—, a new Spanish International Network of eight 
TV stations, a 16-station Independent TV News Service and the American 
Satellite Corporation, a subsidiary of the aerospace firm of Fairchild- 
Hiller which specialised in teleprocessing. RCA began forming its Sat- 
com network with an agreement in January 1974 "to lease capacity from 
the Canadian domestic system; in March 1976 deployment of RCA's own 
satellites began, and a number of cable TV operators, religious broad­ 
casters and a new type of 'superstation'—a nominally local TV station
that used satellites to distribute programming nationwide to cable sys-
( 68) terns—were soon among its customers/ ' While entertainment and other
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broadcasting uses predominated in initial domestic satellite utilisation, 
the anticipated entry of SSS (iBH-Gornsat) , AT&T and perhaps Xerox into 
the specialised leased-line market was expected to produce an important 
shift toward business applications, as well as a dramatic increase in 
revenues from some ^lOOm in 1978 to perhaps ^2, 000m in the mid-1980s. ^ ^'
4. COI'TGLUSIONS
Considering the U.S. domestic satellite history as a process of techno­ 
logical formation independent of and parallel to the international, the 
paradox between urgency abroad and delay at home is especially curious 
when the capability of the technology available in 1962 is compared with 
that of later in the decade: Telstar, able to relay 240 phone calls or 
one substandard TV channel between two huge terminals for brief periods, 
as against Fairchild-Hiller's proposal for a geostationary satellite with 
100 times Telstar's capacity, capable of assigning capacity instantly upon 
demand among multiple routes and with narrow-beam antennas to serve many 
small ground stations.
Hot only, however, did the evident ripeness of the technology not 
compel its rapid deployment, but its sophistication engendered serious 
obstacles, since no one conception of how to apply satellites domestical­ 
ly could claim to be logically and uniquely implied by the state of the 
art. Each feasible application — broadcast relay, cable TV interconnec­ 
tion, long-distance phone service, teleprocessing or multipurpose — sum­ 
moned the interest of different entities and industries, whose demands 
had to be negotiated and adjudicated.
The absence of a private consensus — like the one the international 
carriers manoeuvred into a kind of existence in 1961 — was a principal 
determinant of the apparent paralysis of the most important force in 
satellite development, the state, for the discord made immensely more 
difficult the state's task of distilling, clarifying and formalising 
principles of institutionalisation and preferred modalities of service. 
Moreover, private sector indeterminacy derived also from uncertainty 
over the future of AT&T's industrial ^ Lominance, which the state both 
shared and nourished through the anti-Bell actions taken in other fields
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while domestic satellites were being discussed.
The state's hesitancy is not, however, reducible to the lack of 
consensus in the private sector: indeed the carriers' 196! pseudo- 
consensus was in large measure a response to state insistence on satel­ 
lite formation, and it was this insistence that was absent in the domes­ 
tic satellite case. The simple reason was that domestic satellites did 
not implicate in a significant way the sorts of conditions that the 
state is normally responsible for securing. Apart from improving link­ 
ages with Alaska and getting Hawaiian and Puerto Rican traffic off the 
international satellite system, 'national security' considerations were 
not involved—if indeed they were involved in those instances. America's 
image abroad would not be enhanced substantially. Host important, the 
overall adequacy of the national telecommunications plant was believed 
generally sound irrespective of satellites, and the government was not 
even convinced that they would be economical domestically.
Furthermore, to the degree that state responsibilities were impli­ 
cated in domestic satellite formation, caution seemed indicated. If, 
as some believed, satellite deployment could produce rapid declines in 
the general costs of communicating, new patterns and intensities of 
social relatedness would result—perhaps further straining a society 
which in the late 1960s ;^as already facing an unpopular war abroad, 
civil turbulence and seasonal near-insurrections in major cities. The
evidence that such concerns explicitly entered upon satellite delibera-
(71)tions is, admittedly, scant. Nevertheless, there was a common fi­ 
nality to the delays arising from industrial and state-industry nego­ 
tiation, and the effective denial of communications facilities that 
might have provoked dramatic changes in the possibilities of social 
relatedness.
Domestic satellites and pre-emptive underdevelopment:_ Pre-emptive 
underdevelopment is clearly an incorrect characterisation of satellite 
formation within the United States. The absence of state insistence 
eliminated the need for the carriers to compromise by undertaking con­ 
strained satellite development as a means of securing technological 
control. Every effort was made—through interminable study, repeated 
attempts at rulemaking, and shifting industrial alliances—to decide 
control prior to, not by means of, deployment. The result was not an
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initial period of incomplete action, "but of inaction.
Conceptually, both international and domestic histories neverthe­ 
less were aspects of a single process of constraint—absolute in the 
U.S., relative abroad—and liberalisation. The absence of domestic 
satellite development is valuable evidence that the technology was 
underdeveloped during the first phase of overall technological forma­ 
tion: one might even say that the forms of satellite technology that 
were deployed operationally in the 1960s and early 1970s were marginalia 
compared with the sophistication—and traffic levels—satellites might 
have attained in the U.S. Satellites were not only stunted, but shunted 
away from where their immediate potential was greatest.
Empirically too, the domestic satellite history did not unfold 
independently of international events—no more than the latter were 
unaffected by U.S. controversies. The two areas were interpenetrated 
as concerned: 1.) the absence of legislative intent regarding domes­ 
tic satellites in the Comsat Act's mandate of rapid international 
development; 2.) the presumptive interest of U.S. carriers in domes­ 
tic markets while they were fighting Comsat over international satel­ 
lite issues; 3«) the problematic relation of the 'single global sys­ 
tem' to U.S. satellites; 4«) "tne uncertain future of U.S. dominance 
in Intelsat; and 5-) a fear of forcing Comsat into unacceptably rigid 
negotiating positions vis-a-vis its international partners.
First, the urgency that had inspired the Comsat Act ruled out at­ 
tempting to deal with the apparently more remote, and certainly more 
difficult issues of domestic satellite service. The conditions for 
delay at home were engendered by the same haste with which satellite 
service abroad was approached. During the legislative hearings, Sen. 
Long at one point asked Secretary of State Rusk why satellites had 
not from the outset been considered for domestic applications:
Secretary RUSK.. I think the principal impetus behind space com­ 
munications was intercontinental, to link those more effectively 
that are not now linked, by TV and other means, and to deal with 
a rapidly expanding growth of circuits across, say, the Atlantic...
Senator L01IG. No one except the so-called international carriers 
was even offered the opportunity-to advise in'this matter. (72)
In effect, both were correct:—the-"principal impetus" was .internation­ 
al, and it required the exclusive participation of the international
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carriers for its success. Extending consideration to domestic appli­ 
cations could not have expedited the process although, as a 196? For­ 
tune magazine article on domestic satellites observed:
Decisions might have come more easily if these issues had been 
seen more clearly when legislation was drawn in 1962. How they 
are greatly complicated by Corasat's enmeshment in Intelsat, and 
by the U.S. effort to forge a single dominating instrument in 
the international field...(73)
. Second, it is likely that much of the opposition to Comsat's 
attempts to expand its Intelsat-related operations in the U.S.—and 
at least some of Comsat's desire to do so—derived from domestic 
satellite ambitions. The carriers did not wish to foreclose their 
own options in the field, as conceding to Comsat sole ownership of 
ground stations and rights to serve customers directly might have 
helped to do. Comsat would then have been in a far better position 
to pursue its self-selection as domestic chosen vehicle, offering 
its earth stations for internal uses, proposing an economical mix 
of international and national spacecraft, and pointing to a record 
of smooth dealings with many of the same ultimate users it would be 
serving domestically.
Third, by November 1967 Comsat had drafted and circulated pro­ 
posals for transforming Intelsat into a permanent organisation, thus 
commencing a re-negotiation process that lasted until July 1971- The 
U.S. supported a role for Intelsat as the site of responsibility for 
a single, integrated global system, entitled to undertake specialised, 
regional and domestic satellite development. A decision denying Com­ 
sat its domestic franchise.in favour of private entities with no
affiliations with Intelsat would therefore contradict and perhaps
(75) 
undermine official American international satellite policy.
Fourth, if the U.S. in effect endorsed the 'single global system' 
by awarding a franchise to Comsat on the strength of its Intelsat 
role, and if Comsat's dominance in the international body were sub­ 
stantially reduced, the U.S. might have entrusted control of a con­ 
siderable component of its domestic communications plant to an extra- 




Pinally, the FGC was aware of the precarious position Corasat was 
holding internationally, and of the possibility that a decisive set­ 
back at home might force Comsat to the wall, determined to insist on
diplomatically •untenable conditions that might endanger Intel sat's
(77) continuance. "If Comsat," as The Economist observed in 1969,
were allowed to run a domestic satellite service, it probably 
would not give a damn about retaining its much-criticised 
domination of Intelsat...which means little in terms of cash 
in the bank. (78)
If, however, domestic conditions were such that Comsat could not be 
awarded its exclusive rights, the uncertainties arising from delay 
were preferable to the firm resolution that might come from defeat.
Hence, notwithstanding the various factors unrelated to the 
international which determined the pace and style of U.S. domestic 
satellite formation, the two processes had much in common: a focus 
of political uncertainty in Comsat; and a single dynamic of poli­ 
tical and industrial compression which drove the technology's deve­ 
lopment along a course of lesser resistance—internationally toward 
diversification and reduced dependence on metropolitan regions, and 
in-the U.S. toward specialised applications which would leave un­ 
touched the heartland of AT&T's monopoly. Once those limits were 
agreed, liberalisation of control and more intensive exploitation of 
satellite technology could ensue.
PART FIVE
THE END OP PRE-EMPTIVE UNDERDEVELOPMENT:
The setting and conduct of international negotiations, 1969-71
CHAPTER FIFTEEN: TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ACID THE 'SINGLE GLOBAL SYSTEM 1
1. OVERVIEW OF PART FIVE — DE-COUPLING AND LIBERALISATION
Operational satellite development was by the late 1960s approaching limits 
set by the unstable political accommodations out of which the Intelsat sys­ 
tem had emerged. This chapter and the three succeeding ones consider the 
determinants of the impending technological stalemate and the way in which 
their influence upon satellite formation was reduced or re-defined, per­ 
mitting a more liberalised regime of satellite control to emerge, and a 
new intensity of technological development to be achieved in the after­ 
math of the 1971 adoption of permanent organisational arrangements for 
Intelsat.
The evidence of technical stalemate—which is examined in comparison 
to post-1971 developments in Chapter 19—included: 1.) qualitative limits 
on the range of satellite applications undertaken either within or without 
Intelsat, since the Europeans were opposing any expansion of Intelsat f s 
operational mandate and the Americans were discouraging independent com­ 
munications satellite projects outside Intelsat; 2.) stagnation—rela­ 
tive to subsequent years—in the proliferation of Intelsat ground stations, 
which was related to uncertainties about the organisation's continuance 
and to the value of the services it currently offered; 3.) low levels 
of space segment utilisation, the remedy for which required agreement 
on Intelsat f s right to diversify its services even if independent satel­ 
lite systems might thereby be pre-empted.
Restraints on satellite development and use were engendered not by 
technological problems but by political discord over two principal con­ 
cerns: Intelsat's sphere of competence and its internal distribution of 
power. Regarding the first, either Intelsat could be transformed into 
a comprehensive operational and, quasi-regulatory entity, with authority 
to undertake virtually any international,"regional or domestic communi­ 
cations satellite applications and with priority over systems members
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might wish to create independently this, the 'single global system'  
or Intelsat could be confined mainly to providing its existing services, 
primarily intercontinental telephone, and thereby leave the way clear 
for others, whose facilities for other applications would neither com- 
pete with Intelsat nor deprive it of traffic. Regarding Intelsat's 
internal organisation, the choice was between creating an international 
agency run democratically by an all-member assembly and a de-nationalised 
management, or ratifying the existing "North Atlantic club"^ 1 ' adminis- 
tratively streamlined, politically skewed.
Both areas of political concern were inevitably focussed upon Gom- 
sat, whose comprehensive dominance within Intelsat made change impossible 
without impingeing on Comsat's prerogatives. Just as it had been the 
European response to the power Comsat wielded during the 1963-64 nego- 
tiations that had produced an insistence on a fixed duration to the 
initial Intelsat arrangements, so it was the future of Gomsat's domi- 
nance that was the political axis of the 1969-71 re-negotiations. Com- 
sat sought to widen its own opportunities in the satellite field through
(2)
promoting the 'single global system' concept and opposing efforts to
eliminate—in the name of democratic procedures—certain key features of 
its internal dominance of Intelsat.
As before, however, Comsat's real strength in the negotiations was 
based principally upon its relationship to the hitherto technically in­ 
dispensable stocks of U.S. aerospace hardware and expertise, and to the 
commercially vital flows of American international communications. 
Comsat's ability to determine the availability of those resources derived 
not from any independent power the company exercised domestically—as its 
collisions with the carrier industry had proven—but on its utility as an 
instrument of American satellite policy which, in turn, was no stronger 
than the U.S. interest in the satellite field as an arena in \?hich to 
pursue larger international political objectives. Even a superficial 
comparison, however, of the strident and urgent rhetoric that accompanied 
passage of the 1962 Comsat Act with President Nixon's welcoming of the 
May 1971 conclusion of the Intelsat permanent arrangements—"For seventy 
nations to agree on anything is a super accomplishment"^ —is enough to 
suggest that a downward revision in the political weight attached to 
international satellite determinations had intervened.
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Satellites had become disengaged, in the interim, from the main 
contextual political concerns that had engendered efforts to control 
and deploy satellite technology and upon which that control, once se- 
cured, iiras meant to exert influence a process we shall call de-coupling. 
De-coupling refers not to changes within the satellite field itself, but 
to the progressive attenuation of linkages between that field and the 
more fundamental political objectives of dominant participants in it, 
which was premised in part upon the irrelevance or obsolescence of 
satellite technology as a political instrument and in part upon the suc- 
cessful attainment of the goals originally sought through participating 
in satellite formation.
De-coupling meant, at the same time, relaxation of the politically- 
related constraints on satellite development that had characterised the 
initial phase of pre-emptive underdevelopment, since the combination of 
urgency and developmental limits had been produced by rival approaches 
to satellite control that were born from the same concerns whose influ- 
ence was now being decisively reduced. De-coupling was hence a pre- 
condition for the subsequent devolution of satellite control to a lib- 
eralised, politically pblycentric regime in which demands for wider 
and more intensive technological exploitation could more readily be met.
In this and the two chapters that follow, the principal Intelsat 
controversies of the 1964-?! period operational competence and inter- 
nal power-sharing are examined in terms of the two broad sets of con- 
textual political relations that satellites had, in one way or another, 
served: relations among metropolitan industrial countries, mainly 
transat1antic; and relations between metropolitan and Third World 
countries, or North-South. The changed political conditions of each 
sphere are considered, and the importance of providing, procuring or 
controlling satellite technology as a means of sustaining or modifying 
dominance in each is assessed.
This chapter discusses the 'single global system' concept of a 
comprehensive Intelsat in light of European-American strategic policies 
and commercial rivalries. In Chapter 16 the same satellite controversy 
is examined in terms of metropolitan-Third,World relations, in particu- 
lar the challenge to U.S. globalism posed by European efforts to revive 
particularistic 'spheres of influence', proposals to reform and democratise
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Intelsat internally are considered from the perspectives of both trans­ 
atlantic and North-South relations in Chapter 17, which is followed in 
Chapter 18 by an account of the 1969-71 Intelsat re-negotiations when 
these issues were formally addressed. Finally, Chapter 19 recounts the 
aftermath of those negotiations and concludes this study with a considera­ 
tion of findings.
The chapter continues with a consideration of the competence—'single 
global system 1—issue in the context of transatlantic relations. As the 
likelihood of a strategically significant, independent European nuclear 
capability receded, the continuing U.S. prevention of technological trans­ 
fers that were potentially valuable to European satellite-related work 
emerged as more firmly based upon a desire to preserve commercial advan­ 
tage than upon fears that control over the Western strategic deterrent 
would be fragmented. This commercial component was justified by concern 
with Intelsat f s fate and future operations, and to secure the integrity 
of the single comprehensive satellite system the U.S. supported efforts 
to suppress independent satellite development were required. To the 
degree, however, that these efforts included denying use of American 
rockets, they risked stimulating the Europeans to develop their own, 
which would eliminate the most potent long-term leverage the U.S. had 
over independent space projects, perhaps resuscitate European nuclear 
weapons ambitions, and absorb funds that the Americans wanted fed into 
the U.S. post-Apollo space programme. Furthermore, insisting on Intel- 
sat f s satellite monopoly over specialised satellite services might great­ 
ly complicate resolution of principally transatlantic issues and further 
delay provision of valuable and lucrative services.
The short-term defence of an Intelsat satellite monopoly thus called 
into play measures whose longer—term consequences not only would not 
serve, but might actually frustrate pursuit of more important policy 
objectives—endangering transatlantic cooperation in new fields, and 
possibly, if paradoxically, strengthening European competitiveness in 
existing commercial aerospace fields. A recognition that the benefits 
of monopolisation through Intelsat were less impressive than those draw­ 
backs, and that permitting liberalisation of satellite control would not 
prevent vital technological interests from being pursued, underlay the
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concessions the U.S. ultimately made to European Intelsat members. 
2. THE. .STRATEGIC COMPONENT
Intelsat's interim period coincided with a time of considerable Euro­ 
pean resistance, led primarily by France, to the continuance of U.S. 
postwar military and economic dominance. The period was bracketed by 
President DeGaulle's January 1963 pronouncement against British entry 
into the European Economic Community (E3D)—for Prof. Kissinger, a 
"watershed in European-American relations"^ '—and by the U.S. govern­ 
ment's August 1971 suspension of the convertibility of the dollar, an 
unprecedented action provoked by the unwillingness of European central 
banks to honour the dollar's status as a principal reserve currency. ' 
Throughout the period Prance pursued development of an independent nu­ 
clear arms capability; in March 1966 the French withdrew from the inte­ 
grated NATO command, and later refused to sign the nuclear Non-Prolifera- 
tion Treaty concluded in July 1968 by the U.S., Britain and the Soviet 
Union/ 7 '
American strategic policy consistently opposed creation of new na­ 
tional nuclear forces, and although the possibility remained that a 
transnational capability might be accepted—e.g. a federated European 
state—the likelihood of such political unification was remote enough 
to justify strong urgings that recalcitrant allies, including West
f Q\
Germany and Japan as well as France, sign the 1968 treaty. Since 
warheads were assumed to be more or less easily developed, attempts to 
sustain the policy on a technological level were concentrated on re­ 
straining the proliferation of militarily useful delivery systems— 
rockets, guidance and telemetry equipment. The Americans relied on 
domestic 'munitions control' regulations—derived, curiously, from a 
1954 Mutual Security Act—which empowered a munitions control board 
in the State Department to review and prevent proposed commercial trans­ 
actions whose consequences might injure national security, howsoever 
defined. Although aggrieved U.S. manufacturers complained in the 
late 1960s that foreign trade "in"electronics and aerospace equipment 
was being stopped even in strictly civilian fields, a review of items 
on the proscribed list conducted by the State Department in 1970—after
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requests by the Pentagon and NASA—retained all space-related items 
"because," a White House official said, "there is as yet little space 
technology which does not impinge on military uses."^ 10 '
U.S. suspicions that European space programmes might be a blind for 
lingering military ambitions were presumably strengthened by the chronic 
absence of clearly defined scientific or commercial objectives within 
the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), in which Prance 
was a principal participant. ' During a 1966 Parliamentary review of 
Britain's ELDO role, for instance, aviation ministry officials acknow­ 
ledged that the ultimate uses of the current ELDO rocket project remained
(12) an open question. ' Prance's military aspirations may have been "de-
monstrably political rather than military,"^ ' but no less political 
justifications could be offered for developing a multilateral European 
strategic capability on grounds that it would facilitate and deepen 
efforts at European unification:
The Community's industrial and technological policies, equally 
necessary for an economic union—and more so for political union— 
would have to include the armaments industries and defence tech­ 
nologies. . .Thus the 'European defence and security option' trould 
become a political consequence of unification in a federal state 
rather than a strategic requirement or even a military advantage 
for Europe. (14)
Realistically, though, the likelihood of a European capability's 
emerging to force a revision in American 1JATO control—let alone a 
disintegration of the alliance—was remote: the French nuclear pro­ 
gramme was limited and dependent, wider interest in following Prance's 
lead was practically non-existent, and nuclear weapons technology was 
meanwhile advancing well beyond the ICBH stage. The French force de 
frappe through the 1960s consisted of three dozen obsolescent bombers, 
which required American-supplied jet tankers for long-range missions;
and in spite of Prance's formal withdrawal from NATO, its strategic
(15) 
force still relied on the alliance's early warning systems. v The
entire programme was delayed by budget cuts occasioned by conventional 
arms requirements, rising costs of nuclear development and the post-May 
1968 reorientation toward domestic expenditures. Although only 
a portion of the arsenal originally scheduled to be available by the 
early 1970s was deployed, ' that achievement suggested the ineffec­ 
tiveness of U.S. export controls where the potential recipient of the
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technological transfers had both the ability and will to develop the 
technology independently.
Not only did France fail to win wider European support for and par-
( T Q\
ticipation in nuclear arms development, ' but even the nominally civil­ 
ian multilateral launcher programme had been crippled by disagreements 
over how to apportion work according to national investment shares—the 
juste retour principle—, by concern over rising costs and by doubts 
over the programme's ultimate usefulness. The British climaxed several 
years of dissatisfaction by withdrawing from ELDO in November 1970, when
the programme was centered on development of the 2f600m synchronous Europa
(19) 3 rocket. A truly Europe-wide commitment to launcher development
came only in April 1975» when the European Space Agency (ESA) was created 
under a British director-general, inheriting all 10 of ESRO's members— 
while ELDO had had only five, further evidence of slack interest in 
rocket development. Although the French had insisted that its own laun­ 
cher projects—including the Ariane synchronous rocket and a largely 
idle base in Guyana—be accepted as the collective responsibility of 
ESA, it was nevertheless envisaged that France would continue paying 70 
percent of the base's costs over the next five years. ESA took on 
the Ariane rocket though and multilateral launcher development work 
continued.
The strategic importance of such efforts—whether under French or 
European auspices—was meanwhile being made questionable by development 
of far more sophisticated weapons systems. The practicability of anti­ 
missile defences summoned a response first through deployment of multiple 
independently-targetted warheads —several to a single missile—and sub­ 
sequently through development of low-altitude Cruise missiles, launched 
from aircraft and equipped with guidance systems enabling them to evade 
ground radar and deliver nuclear bombs for one-fiftieth the cost of an 
ICBM. Soviet and American scientists were also, by the mid-1970s, work­ 
ing on space-borne systems employing laser or particle-beam weaponry, 
which would further increase the vulnerability of traditional rockets.
3. THE COMMERCIAL COMPONENT:^ rfHE~5DTGLE GLOBAL SYSTEM
In view of the apparent marginality of nuclear weapons development in
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in Europe, the military justification for U.S. export restrictions can­ 
not account for the vigour with which they were enforced. American 
policy was also broader in coverage, as a White House official indicated 
in 1971s "Valuable technology and know-how should not be given promis­ 
cuously, and of course we must avoid endangering our national security 
through inadvertent technology transfer."^ 2 ' As early as March 1965 
the State Department stopped Hughes Aircraft from selling satellite 
technology to the British Aircraft Corporation to enable BAG to build 
a synchronous communications satellite for London-Sydney service. The 
Economist observed:
The reason had little to do with military security. The State 
Department appeared to think that American industry has a valu­ 
able monopoly in commercial satellites which should be exploited 
for maximum profit, which means keeping the knowledge in America. (23)
The French were prevented in 1966 from buying communications technology 
for.satellite experiments, ' and by 196? the White House had confirmed 
existence of what an account called a "flat ban on the export of U.S.
technology that might possibly be applied to commercial communications
(25)satellite development outside the Intelsat system." Around 95 per­ 
cent of foreign requests for technical information from American firms 
were delayed by the State Department; among the two to three percent 
ultimately disapproved, a spokesman noted, "a number" were "related to
communications satellites, and particularly to satellites whose rela-
( ?6) tionship to Intelsat haS'not yet been clearly defined."^
Export restrictions were a means of defending the 'single global 
system 1 policy—first introduced to the Europeans soon after the Comsat 
Act was passed, formally rejected by them during the interim negotiations, 
but nonetheless reaffirmed by President Johnson in his August 196? policy 
message to Congress: "Our country is firmly committed to the concept of 
a global system for commercial communications," which would avoid dupli­ 
cation of space and ground facilities, reduce costs and ensure efficient 
frequency uses/ 2 " the President said. Therefore, "Intelsat should be 
the permanent organization for operating the world's global system, and
...all domestic and regional systems should be under its supervision,"
(28) which would include assuring technical compatibility/ and which would
prevent what a former State Department official termed the "very wasteful..
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and commercially unprofitable" proliferation of separate systems.
The cornerstone of the American position on independent systems 
was 'compatibility 1 . In principle, Intelsat could be given certain 
regulatory powers to ensure technical non-interference and adjudicate 
conflicts over frequencies and orbital slots without being entrusted 
with comprehensive responsibilities as to construction, operation, 
management and rate-making of regional and/or domestic systems. ' 
Despite arguments that the development of regional (i.e. intra-conti- 
nental) networks might—as long as Intelsat controlled interconnec­ 
tions among them—expand the demand for Intelsat circuits "by 'collect­ 
ing 1 domestic 'traffic," Comsat was opposed to such projects and had
suggested as early as 19&5 that regional traffic might eventually double
(32)
Intelsat f s revenues. The U.S. government was less certain, and as
of August 1966 the White House director of telecommunications manage­ 
ment (DTK) described separate systems as an "open" policy question: 
"The national interest is not clearly apparent in any of the cases 
that have recently been advanced." Consequently the American pro­ 
posals on permanent Intelsat arrangements, submitted in October 196? to 
the ICSC, said nothing about regional systems, ' and a speech by Com­ 
sat 's international vice president in April 1963 ostensibly devoted to 
the subject did nothing but categorise the various networks then being 
proposed. **' Notwithstanding internal uncertainties, however, U.S. 
embargoes on satellite-related foreign trade effectively endorsed a 
wide-ranging notion of 'compatibility*—at least until Intelsat offi- 
'cially decided on its sphere of operations—whereby the potential com­ 
petitiveness of proposed systems with Intelsat was sufficient to make 
them unacceptable.
4. THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE
To the Europeans, these strictures smacked of the celebrated 'American 
challenge', implying continuing dependence upon American discretion of 
European efforts to develop commercially valuable aerospace technology. 
Their response was four-fold: _attemptingjfco improve European competi- 
tiveness within Intelsat; developing a technical and organisational
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capability to make the threat of separate development credible; pro- 
posing a divided ownership scheme within Intelsat that would erase the 
distinction between global and regional systems; and supporting limita- 
tions on Intelsat*s operational competence. In all, the Europeans' goal 
was to enhance their prospects of participating on satisfactory terms in 
the commercial space field.
Improving the European position in Intelsat;_ It is difficult to 
determine the degrees to which European aerospace mobilisation in the 
mid- to late-60s was designed to improve the collective position vis-a- 
vis the U.S. in Intelsat, or was genuinely expected to produce viable 
independent space systems. The July 1966 decision by an interministerial 
conference to up-grade ELDO's current project to meet geostationary re- 
quirements, for instance, was justified on both counts: according to
ELDO's secretary-general, it would "provide independent launcher capa-
(V?)
city for European commercial payloads" by 1979j according to Bri­ 
tish space industry officials it would enable the Europeans to negoti­ 




Intelsat contracts their existing quotas entitled them to. Ame ­
can officials believed the real objective was negotiating leverage, 
but the immediate intent mattered less than the capability to fulfill 
the implied threat.
The money paid to non-U.S. companies for the first three Intelsat 
spacecraft generations had been derisory: Early Bird was entirely built 
in the U.S.; 2.3 percent of Intelsat II contract money and 4«6 percent 
of Intelsat III, all subcontracts for minor components, had gone abroad. 
^ ' As of 1967 Western European Intelsat members had contributed 28 
percent of the system's capital and received less than, four percent of 
its contracts, and were thus reluctant benefactors of American aero­ 
space companies. The Europeans refused, however, to approve the Intel- 
sat IV series without assurances of more contract money, and more than 
36 percent of the costs of the first four IVs was consequently spent 
in Europe/ 43 ' Nevertheless, by November 1970 ninety-two percent of
Intelsat f s total expenditures had gone to American firms or to NASA,
(44) while U.S. shareholding stood at just over 50 percent.
As Comsat was fond of pointing out/45 ' however, European aerospace 
ambitions were difficult to reconcile with their actual expenditures. As 
of February 1966 the U.S. was spending on space activities roughly as much
-303-
as the British on their entire defence budget (£2.000m), while Western 
Europe's space expenditures totalled around £60m.^ 4 ' On a per capita
basis the gap was equally remarkable: Prance 45-3- pence, Britain 254-(<i7) ~ 
pence, the U.S. £11.^" The ability of European firms to compete for
Intelsat contracts could not fail to suffer accordingly, as this June 
1966 memorandum from the UK National Industrial Space Committee suggests 
in its explanation of why no British firm had bid on the Intelsat III 
prime contract:
This arises purely and simply from the fact that due to the absence 
of any significant national space programme no British company has 
the necessary experience or expertise to submit a bid as a prime 
contractor within 30 days on a fixed price development contract 
with a guaranteed reliability for the end product. (48)
Even by 1971» when the costliest era of American space endeavours was
all but past, Western Europe was spending collectively and individually
(49) less than 10 percent of U.S. totals.
Independent space projects: Even if sustaining the effort to im­ 
prove the collective position in Intelsat was a principal objective, 
European aerospace work required projects of its own to orientate R&D 
and, in time, to yield commercially lucrative results for application 
inside or outside of Intelsat. Preliminary work began in 1967 on two 
communications satellite projects: a European telecommunications and 
broadcasting network, and the Franco-German Symphonic system.
The 14-member European satellite group • (GETS) asked E3RO in the 
spring to draw up plans for a continental satellite system. The 
European Space Council, which had been created in late 1966 to coordi­ 
nate the work of ESRO, ELDO and GETS, appointed a committee of PTT rep­ 
resentatives, broadcasters and aviation ministry officials to study 
ESRO's proposals in November 1969. The plan was formally released in 
July 1970, and called for creation in the 1980s of an elaborate, high- 
powered synchronous satellite system—each spacecraft radiating a full 
kilowatt of power and capable of 10-15,000 voice circuits and two TV 
channels. Up to one-half the total traffic carried among European PTTs— 
most traffic going more than 500 miles—would be accommodated, and the 
system would extend real-time-En-revision television service to outlying 
members of the European Broadcasting Union like Cyprus, Iceland and 
Lebanon.
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In June 196? a ^40m satellite plan was announced by France and 
Germany, which would involve geostationary spacecraft linking the two 
countries to western and southern Africa, the Caribbean, Quebec and 
eastern South America. The project arose from two parallel programmes, 
SARDS in France and Olympia in Germany, and included for a four percent 
Belgian participation. Called 'Symphonie', the system would be used 
mainly for TV distribution and some telecommunications, and would re­ 
quire smaller and cheaper ground stations than those hitherto deployed
for Intelsat, which was hoped to make adherence especially attractive
( 52)to Third World countries. ' Indeed by March 1968 Intelsat was reported
as "wooing French Africa" through overtures to the Ivory Coast, Cameroons
and Malagasy Republic in hopes of keeping them from following Senegal into (C.T.)
Symphonie. w '
Divided ownership of Intelsat's space segment; It was argued, main­ 
ly by the French, that regional satellite plans* could easily be accommo­ 
dated within the Intelsat framework if the regime of undivided space 
segment ownership were replaced with one where the users of specific 
spacecraft decided their own requirements and were empowered to meet them. 
Influence would therefore be based upon regional, not global, traffic 
volumes and contracts presumably would be distributed accordingly. In­ 
telsat, or some successor organisation, would under the French plan en­ 
sure technical compatibility and service continuity among four constitu­ 
ent satellite systems, each run by a separate users' consortium.
It was said that the divided ownership scheme-;—which had wider Euro­ 
pean support only inasmuch as the association of PTTs (CSPT) drafted its 
1967 proposals for a permanent Intelsat to include both undivided and 
divided ownership possibilities, -^—followed "logically and fairly" 
from the notion of basing influence upon use, and that it would benefit 
the "large majority of Signatories" who used only one satellite.^-3 
Since a geostationary satellite was "only regional and of limited cover­ 
age," it was "practically impossible" to distinguish between domestic
and regional—or for that matter 'global'—spacecraft, and divided own-
(57)ership would thus be more appropriate to the technology itself. Fi­ 
nally, the French adopted the"U.S. _'single global system' rhetoric to 
argue that their ownership proposal would establish a principle under 
which comprehensive services could be offered through Intelsat: "...A 
system of separate ownership is the only one that might possibly become 
'single global' and also extend its scope to encompass a multitude of
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services, assured "by a diversity of operating entities," which might 
even include Soviet "bloc countries, whose regional—as against global— 
traffic shares would entitle them to participate on acceptable terms. '
Restricting Intelsat's competence; Numerous arguments were ad­ 
vanced in favour of exploiting satellite technology on a regional, as 
against a global, basis: synchronous satellites had an inherently
regional character, reinforced by development of highly-focussed an-
(59)tennas; similarly, narrow beams reduced the need for global coor­ 
dination to avoid technical interference and made regional decisions 
on usage the more pressing concern;^ ' proposed regional systems con­ 
cerned land masses roughly comparable to the U.S., and were therefore 
no different from American domestic plans for which Intelsat's advice— 
let alone approval—was not sought; it was technically unlikely 
that spacecraft dedicated mainly to intercontinental usage would either 
have sufficient capacity or be suitably positioned to handle regional
traffic, and even if they could it would be unwise to concentrate so(£<->\ 
much capacity in a single facility, and specialisation in the form
of regional space segments would permit use of smaller and cheaper ground 
stations. These arguments found considerable support within UN 
organs, principally the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites 
and UNESCO, and among Intelsat's European members.
Commercial arguments were, as the French recognised in their di­ 
vided ownership plan, even more persuasive, and a 1969 memorandum from 
the Eurospace aerospace and electronics consortium observed:
European firms could not compete with U.S. industry and the only 
' way, to assure that their development effort is of value, at least 
in the envisaged future, is to exploit their systems in a regional 
context. (66)
If, therefore, the qualitative breadth of Intelsat's activities could be 
confined, regional satellite development could ensue irrespective of 
higher local costs and without directly impairing the integrity of the 
'single global system', as currently defined. It was necessary
to define the limits of the future competence of Intelsat and, 
within this sphere of competence, the criteria on the basis of 
which regional systems may beconsidered as compatible with 
the world system. (67)__..._____ _._.__.
Furthermore, since Intelsat's scope
should be limited in principle to the space sector of systems 
over which international traffic that lies within the competence
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of the Telecommunications Entities signatories to the Agreements 
is carried...
the organisation would furnish only public, fixed-point voice and record 
services. With other offerings Toy definition "outside the competence of 
Intelsat, risk of duplication of competition disappears and the concept 
of regional systems becomes possible."^ '
Confining Intelsat's operations on geographical—i.e. regional—grounds 
was not therefore the sole objective of this position. At issue as well 
was the organisation's entitlement to enter so-called specialised fields, 
principally aeronautical and maritime services. The American view was that 
Intelsat "would have authority to furnish...all services which can be pro­ 
vided by means of communications satellites."^ ' As the Rostow Report 
argued:
By providing a reservoir of expertise in satellite planning, 
[jntelsat] should continue to be the focal point for coordinated 
planning for the most effective global utilization of satellites, 
and should likewise serve as a forum for coordinating plans for 
specialised satellite uses. (?0)
The European position was, essentially, that Intelsat's entry into those 
fields was negotiable but not self-evidently justified, and that certain 
collaboration with other international bodies—e.g. the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (iCAO) and the International Maritime Organisation
(iHO)—which represented potential users and already exercised authority
(71) over the relevant services should be required. The majority ICSC
recommendation, approved in December 1968 and forwarded to the Intelsat 
re-negotiating conference, was that Intelsat be permitted to provide spe­ 
cialised services only if specifically authorised by a majority of its 
membership—who were to determine that the proposed services would be 
technically and economically acceptable—and if Intelsat's primary inte­ 
rest in furnishing fixed-point public telecommunications services would
(72) not be adversely affected.
3. EFFORTS TO CREATE SPECIALISED SATELLITE SERVICES
Previous attempts to offer aeronautical and maritime services within In­ 
tel sat had been thwarted in part by the general disinclination of the 
European members to furnish Comsat with other fields to which to extend 
its dominance—but only in part. It was also true, notwithstanding the
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tidiness of the comprehensive satellite system concept, that these 
services involved different institutional and indeed national consti­ 
tuencies than had hitherto been active or dominant in Intelsat: PTTs 
did not normally provide aviation guidance or links among ships at sea; 
the countries whose fixed-point telecommunications traffic bulked large
(-71)
were not necessarily those with big shipping fleets; v ' and improved 
aeronautical services were of concern mainly to those airlines that faced 
growing congestion on Worth Atlantic routes. ^' To a degree, therefore, 
Intelsat's expansion was prejudiced by the particular nature of its com­ 
position and structure of dominance—based upon PTTs and national fixed- 
point traffic shares. Furthermore, the technical requirements of spe­ 
cialised services might well be different from those of its existing 
operations, involving virtually miniature terminals and perhaps different 
zones of coverage (e.g. transoceanic air and sea routes.)
Aviation; Nevertheless, by proceeding through Intelsat, Gomsat could 
hope to apply its voting power and technical leverage, and guarantee itself 
an important role especially in the aeronautical field, where the need for 
satellite services was believed by some to be great. Beginning in 1965?
when Comsat's tests with Early Bird and NASA's experiments with Syncom III
(75)demonstrated the feasibility of serving aircraft via satellites, Corn- 
sat sought to involve itself and Intelsat in the field, where the defi­ 
ciencies of the existing combination of Very High Frequency (VHP) and High
Frequency (HP) radio services—such that transoceanic flights were some-
( 76) times cut off from contact for an hour or more —prompted the IGAO in
(17} 1963 to identify a need for satellites by 1970 V " ' and the U.S. Federal
Aviation Agency (PAA) in 1966 to term the requirement in the North Atlan-
(7Pi} 
tic as "immediate."
The FAA first asked Comsat if the company was interested in supplying
(79) aviation services in 1965 ' but Comsat was able to get only one bid from
industry—which was considered too higlr '—and the PAA turned instead 
to experimenting with a NASA ATS spacecraft.^ ' Comsat began developing 
a plan for "an initial demonstration of service,"^ which government 
agencies rejected in 1963 as providing for insufficient capacity. The 
principal communications service"Sf~T;h8 U.S. airlines, Aeronautical Radio 
Inc. (Arinc), then offered to join with Comsat in modifying the plan to 
include use of higher capacity satellites, and domestic efforts continued. 
(33)
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Comsat had proposed to the ICSC in 196? that Intelsat begin work 
on creating an aeronautical service using multipurpose satellites, and 
on Intelsat f s behalf commissioned Philco-Ford to conduct an engineering 
study of potential systems. Intelsat however went no further, due 
to French and British opposition. The French were leaders in airborne 
transmission equipment operating in the Ultra-High Frequency (UHF1 ) range, 
while the U.S. airlines—and Comsat—wanted the system to function in 
the lower VHP bands, which would entail replacing less equipment. Per­ 
haps as a consequence, the French were concurrently arguing that Intel- 
sat should keep out of mobile services altogether on grounds that these 
were not commercial but public—i.e. intergovernmental—services. 
For their part, the British were simply not convinced of the immediate 
need for aeronautical satellite facilities and concluded, on advice from 
the ICAO, that Comsat's goal of operational service by 1971 was needless­ 
ly ambitious; since it was the advent of the supersonic Concorde that 
was expected to aggravate the need for improved transatlantic facilities, 
1975 would be adequate. Furthermore, the British agreed with the French 
on the desirability of UHF operations, because the VEF range was growing 
too congested. Comsat nevertheless issued a formal request for pro­ 
posals to manufacturers in August 1968, and in a September submission to
the ICSC the American government supported Comsat's view that an immediate
(Pi} 
requirement existed.
Maritime; Little was proposed and nothing was done in regard to ap­ 
plying satellites to maritime communications prior to the 1969-71 Intel- 
sat re-negotiations, in spite of expressions of interest in the field by
/00\
Comsat dating from 1964. Both the need for and economic practicability 
of such service ware doubtful: although existing facilities were even
/ Qq\
poorer than those of aircraft, ; ' ships had less outstanding need to 
improve them than did aeroplanes, since up-to-the-moment locations were 
not generally required and better general telecommunications services— 
radiotelephone or teletype—would be of questionable importance, and un­ 
likely to be considered worth several thousand dollars in additional
/ \
monthly operating costs per ship.^" ' Changes in the character of the 
shipping industry—containerised cargo ships, supertankers, seismic re­ 
search vessels requiring high-speed data links with shore-based computers— 
later altered the situation (see Chapter 19), but it was nevertheless
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estimated that a maritime system would need 35-40 percent of world 
shipping to "be viable.
Hence, in the field of aviation if not maritime services — although 
it is notable that Intel sat 's first decision to experiment with satel­ 
lites for commercial ships was in spring 1972, after the permanent ar­ 
rangements had "been adopted — delay was produced in part by European re­ 
luctance to authorise an expansion of Intelsat's competence, where such 
expansion would offer Comsat and U.S. industry the opportunity to extend 
U.S. dominance into attractive fields for independent exploitation.
6. LAUNCH SERVICES
The technical basis of that dominance, however, was ultimately the U.S. 
geostationary launch monopoly: until that monopoly was either broken or 
placed at the unconditional disposal of European commercial space efforts
they would remain vulnerable and dependent, irrespective of the three-fold
(92) increase in overall European space expenditures between 1964 ^^ 1972.
Protecting the 'single global system' from possible rivalries, though, 
posed a considerable problem to the American defence of its launcher mono­
poly. Whereas the U.S. had previously offered launch services to the
(93) Europeans in part to discourage their channeling money into ELDO, ' to
furnish the rockets the Europeans now wanted to use would assist the very 
satellite competition that the U.S., in Intelsat's name, were trying to 
prevent. Consequently American launch services were reportedly denied 
to the Symphonic project.
This defence of Intel sat threatened not only to encourage independent 
launcher development, however, but to dampen prospects for further Euro­ 
pean participation in U.S. space programmes. 3y early 1970 MSA was at­ 
tempting to draw European interest to its post-Apollo projects — the or­
biting space laboratory and the reusable 'space shuttle', the latter in-
(95) tended for 100 or more flights into space. w> ' In response to congres­
sional reluctance to approve lavish space expenditures, 1TASA hoped to 
raise more than a billion dollars from Europe — 10 percent of the shuttle's
development costs. European aerospace_officials in return wanted assur­ 
ances that U.S. launchers would be made available for their satellite 
projects, before funds then assigned to ELDO were diverted to the post- 
Apollo programme. ITASA and the State Department were by early 1971
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prepared to concede the launcher question, but Comsat officials repor­ 
tedly went to the White House in May and threatened not to sign the In­ 
tel sat permanent arrangements—then ail-but concluded—if the launcher 
offer was not withdrawn, which it then was.
Nevertheless the U.S. position remained that launch services would 
"be available "for projects consistent with peaceful purposes and interna­ 
tional agreements," so the precise nature of the new Intelsat agree­ 
ment would be important in determining the likelihood of further offers. 
A decision relegating Intelsat to a circumscribed area of competence would 
therefore be advantageous to U.S. as well as European space programmes, 
since it would free NASA to assist European commercial payloads and perhaps 
release the funds the space agency needed.
CHAPTER 16: THE 'SINGLE GLOBAL SYSTEM' AMD NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
1. OVERVIEW
Issues relating to future control of satellite communications did not 
arise solely from transatlantic concerns, but were animated as well by 
contention derived from the sphere of relations between metropolitan 
industrial and Third World nations. At play were: 1.) the opportuni­ 
ties presented by regional as against globalised satellite approaches 
to European and American interests for lucrative and politically bene­ 
ficial transactions with underdeveloped countries; and 2.) the pros­ 
pects of Third World nations for obtaining on desirable terms the com­ 
munications services they increasingly believed indispensable to na­ 
tional development strategies.
Within the conflict between globalism and regionalism at the level 
of Intelsat can be detected elements of a larger controversy that was 
dividing the 'Ilorth Atlantic community'. What became, in effect, a 
renunciation by the United States of its attempt to mandate a global 
satellite monopoly through Intelsat was a response in part to the vi­ 
gour with which the Europeans were seeking particularistic links with 
Third World regions, in part to the risk that stalemate might endanger 
American and European exploitation of attractive markets, and in part 
to the outstanding interest of Third World countries in increasing the 
variety of potential sources of necessary services.
2. THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE
Despite assurances from scholars like Kissinger that "the process of 
de-colonization has sharply reduced Europe's interest in extra-European
affairs,"^ 1 ' and predictions from others that a unifying Europe "may
(2)sink into the provincialism of a large Switzerland,"^ collective Euro­ 
pean policy toward the Third W6'rrd~~was^byjthe late 1960s directed toward 
fashioning new links with old empires, and even challenging the United 
States in areas where American commercial and political hegemony was
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strongest.
Formal arrangements; Indications of an unflagging European inte­ 
rest in commercial partnerships with Third World nations were evident 
even during the 1956-58 negotiations that yielded the Treaty of Rome and 
founded the EEC: at the insistence of Prance and Belgium—and over oppo­ 
sition from Germany, Italy and the Netherlands—an association of African 
francophone states was created and a free trade zone and common develop­ 
ment fund were established to help draw the overseas colonies and terri­ 
tories of the Six into the EEC.^' Continuing efforts accompanied the 
1963 debates over British entry, when the Dutch and Germans succeeded in 
having the major external tariffs of interest to the Commonwealth reduced, 
partly to facilitate Britain's admission and partly to assure the Communi­ 
ty enhanced access to the Commonwealth if Britain were kept out. ' Fur­ 
ther overtures to Africa resulted in the Yaounde Convention, signed in 
July 1963 by the EBC^and 18 African states formerly linked to Prance,
noi 
(7)
Belgium and Italy, and in the September 1969 Arusha Convention am ng
the EEC, Nigeria and the three states of former British East Africa.
Negotiations over trade preferences during the latter 1960s expanded 
out of Europe's traditional sphere of interest in Africa to Latin Ameri­ 
ca, culminating in the July 1970 Declaration of Buenos Aires, intended 
to serve as the basis for closer cooperation between the 18 — later 22 —/o\
Latin American signatories and the EEC. ' Yaounde was renewed in 1971 
and replaced in 1975 by the Lome Convention, which created commodity price 
stabilisation measures and reduced tariffs on some Third World industrial
exports. Jl The EEC had meanwhile unilaterally announced in July 1971 
a generalised preference scheme covering 91 Third World countries, 
and a year later the eight British Caribbean dependencies of the Carib­ 
bean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) opened negotiations on special 
ties with the Community.
Lome created a preferential trading zone comprising at first 46, 
and within three years 54 countries of Africa, the Pacific and the Carib­ 
bean, which were linked to the EEC through 'reciprocal' trade preferences,
commodity stabilisation schemes and an aid programme administered by the
(l2K European Development Fund. ; ~ TalZs ~were^ proceeding with Egypt, Lebanon,
Syria and Jordan, and formal negotiations continued with Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Turkey over creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area, which 
would include North Africa as well/ 13 ' The 1972 forecast of R. Dahrendorf 
that there would soon be 58 countries tied by various formal commercial
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preferences to the EEC had, in the space of a few years, been well over- 
taken. ^ )
Substantive trends—concentration and diversification; The formal 
arrangements both assisted and reflected growing volumes of transactions 
between the EEC and Third World. Even before British entry, the EEC had 
by 1970 replaced the U.S. as the most important trade and aid partner of 
underdeveloped countries, absorbing more Third World exports and origin­ 
ating a greater flow of private capital and official aid. ^  -*' The degree 
to which the dependence was mutual is another matter: due to declining 
prices of primary materials the importance in money terms of Third World 
trade actually fell during the 1960s from the 25 percent of world volume 
of the previous three decades to around 15 percent, ' and, as P. Jalee 
has noted, if 19&5 is compared with 1952 the range of significant trading 
partners for each of the metrolitan countries had widened, but the propor­ 
tion of trade conducted between each and its top three trading partners 
increased an average of 6.5 percent. Nonetheless, overall dependence
may well be reducible to sectoral dependence within industrial economies,/•-, o\
as H. Magdoff has argued, and there can be no question that the Third 
World was vital as a source of primary materials and dynamic market growth. 
Although transactions involving the EEC and its members with underdeve­ 
loped countries had tended to concentrate in areas of traditional interest, 
the concentration was weakening. In 1970 nearly half of the Community's 
Third World trade was with Africa, owing partly to pre-emptive efforts re­ 
lated to possible British entry and partly to vigourous French policies to 
reassert ties with francophone Africa. ' Prance had also by 1972 become 
the biggest exporter of industrial equipment to Arab countries. Signs 
of geographical diversification were evident too, however, especially in 
Latin America, where the U.S. was providing around 70 percent of foreign 
investment, sending the region 35 percent of its imports and buying 30 
percent of its exports. Between I960 and 1969, while Latin American ex­ 
ports to all metropolitan countries increased 45 percent, those to the 
U.S. rose only 10 percent and exports to the Six increased 72 percent. 
Italy, Germany and France in particular emerged as strong commercial com­ 
petitors to the United States and--a&-sources of capital for manufacture
(2i] —..— — ___- 
and extractive activities. v ' Evidence of the breakdown—or widening—
of the former pattern of dependence includes the 1975 German-Brazilian 
deal on uranium enrichment; Germany, which had been reliant on the U.S.
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for 90 percent of its uranium, would exchange enrichment facilities for
Brazilian ore, despite American efforts to keep such technology out of
(22)Latin America.
Japan; In addition, the Japanese commercial and political presence 
in the Third World was broadening and deepening. Both U.S. and EEC pre­ 
ference schemes typically excluded products that had sensitive implica­ 
tions for domestic industries — particularly manufactures, in which the
export-orientated economies of East Asian centres like Taiwan, South
(2^)
Korea and Singapore specialised. ' Japanese policy exploited this
discrimination through liberalised trade preferences covering exports 
of special interest to Southeast Asia, and through a ^20, 000m coopera­ 
tion fund which offered the very assistance to emerging heavy industries 
— steel, shipbuilding and petrochemicals — that Europe and America had 
been unwilling to extend. ' Furthermore Japanese interest was expand­
ing into North Africa and Latin America, and by the late 1970s the latter
(25) 
was the location of around 35 percent of Japan's overseas investraent f
including steel and shipbuilding in Brazil, motor manufacture in Mexico, 
and other heavy industrial projects in Argentina, Colombia and Venezue-
'Spheres of influence'; While indications of regional diversifica­ 
tion in metropolitan transactions with the Third World are of interest, 
they should not detract from the more compelling evidence of strong 
trends — opposed by the United States — toward geographically concentrated 
commercial arrangements. "The formation of a bloc," as one scholar wrote
of the EEC, "may not have been the intent originally, but it is the ines-
(27) 
capable conclusion to the proliferation of special agreements. " v Whe­
ther called "blocs," "spheres of influence,"^ ' what Kissinger termed
(29) 
in 1972 the "pentagonal power structure of the international system, " v
or G. Barraclough's "regulated, regionally organized world economy,"^ 
rivalries among the domains were intensifying as the stakes increased; 
by 1970 Third World countries were absorbing 43 percent of Japanese 
exports, by 1978 forty percent of EEC exports, and as of the mid-1970s 
the non-OPEC developing countries took a bigger share of American ex­ 
ports than the EEC and Soviet bloc combined.
The United States was growing increasingly aware of the threat spe­ 
cial agreements posed to its own commercial prerogatives. A 1971 presi­ 
dential trade commission observed that American business was operating
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in a "radically" changed environment abroad from that of the immediate
(32)postwar years. ', The U.S. tried unsuccessfully to block the spread
of EEC trade preferences in Latin America by threatening to exclude 
beneficiaries from its own generalised 'most favoured nation' scheme. 
Secretary of State Kissinger, in an April 1973 speech, sought to con­ 
trast America's "global responsibilities" as a superpower with the "re­ 
gional interests" of Europe as an economic unit. ' H. Malmgren sum­ 
marised the U.S. position effectively as follows:
The profound interest of the United States in the establishment 
and use of international rules and institutions on a global basis 
is threatened. This is not a matter of theoretical, ideological 
enthusiasm for certain types of principles and procedures. The 
United States does have global political and economic interests. 
The global economic interests are best protected by rules of non- 
discrimination which apply as widely as possible. The global poli­ 
tical interests are best served by rules which restrain divisive 
economic nationalism. (35)
3. SATELLITES AND THIRD WORLD MARKETS
Inevitably, negotiation over global versus regional formulas for satel­ 
lite control was informed by this larger rivalry for political and commer­ 
cial advantage in the Third World. Globalism in the satellite field was 
viewed in Europe as a recipe for American dominance, as this 19^5 French 
commentary, which noted as well the direct advantages Intelsat's single 
global system promised the U.S. in equipment sales, observed: "Above 
all, this would open to the Americans the possibility of considerable 
political and strategic implantation" in Third World countries.^ Re­ 
gionalism, on the other hand, offered not just diversification of access 
and influence, but relatively clear paths for possible international and 
industrial consortia to develop and market satellite equipment and ser­ 
vices, and to benefit from an indeterminable volume of sales of space and 
ground segment hardware. In March 1971 British Aircraft, for instance, 
revealed a ^36m proposal for a synchronous satellite—which the company 
got experience in building due to a subcontract that had enabled it to 
assemble an entire Intelsat IV, the_first operational communications satel­ 
lite built in Europe—which was._announced-_as suited to service in the Third 
World
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Purthermore, a vast potential market in conventional telecommuni­ 
cations equipment existed—from earth stations, relays, exchanges, switch­ 
ing apparatus to the telephones themselves—for which satellite-related 
transactions could serve as inducements and which, moreover, the basic 
transmission capacity satellites provided would open up. Between 1963 
and 1975 world investment in new telecommunications plant averaged 19 
percent growth per annum, and international trade in the field rose 13-5 
percent yearly. Top contenders in the market included ST&C in Eritain, 
Ericcson in Sweden and Thomson CSF in Prance, as well as IBM and ITT's/ -,o\ *
U.S. operations.
U.S. industry and the single global system; The attractiveness of 
overseas markets made U.S. manufacturers far more eager to market their 
wares abroad than they were grateful for the protection their government 
was providing through 'munitions control' restrictions on their trade. 
In 1967 the Aerospace Industries Association complained that member firms 
were being prevented from exchanging sufficient preliminary information 
with prospective foreign customers to enable actual negotiations to take 
place. The AIA urged "a thorough review of the present export procedures
and definitions that are hampering effective marketing of U.S. space pro-
(39) ducts and know-how in the world market."^ ' American policy, in the AIA's
view, was actually stimulating foreign competition, and the group criti­ 
cised
the assumption that lack of U.S. technical assistance will effec­ 
tively prevent a foreign nation from making headway in a given 
technology, e.g. launch vehicles or communications satellites, 
only to see U.S. refusal to help as spurring that nation to deve­ 
lop that technology independently, and subsequently deny any fi­ 
nancial return to the U.S. [and] create new competition for U.S. 
industry in the world market. (40)
Hughes and TRW were described in early 1969 as especially hard-hit by 
the restrictions, and KcDonnell-Douglas was prevented from selling a 
Thor-Delta rocket to the French and Germans without assurances that it 
would not be used to orbit communications satellites. The aerospace in­ 
dustry's spokesmen condemned "an arrogant use of technological power to 
enforce Comsat's position on the rest of the world," and the "tremendous­ 
ly bureaucratic" practices of the State Department, which ivas stopping 
exchanges of wholly unclassified information. "We favor," according to 
one industry official, "a proliferation of communications satellite
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systems tinder appropriate regulation."^ '
The satellite market the companies wanted to enter was one they had 
been nurturing since Early Bird was launched. With NASA's help they had 
thereby "brought the attention of Third World governments to the possibili­ 
ties offered by satellite service. Representatives of Hughes, General 
Electric, TRW and consulting firms like Page Engineers had been roving 
far and wide, generating interest in for example domestic satellite broad­ 
casting in Brazil and -regional telecommunications via satellite for Latin 
America. ' After two years of negotiation—with the State Department— 
Hughes was allowed to conduct a feasibility study of direct satellite 
broadcasting for Mexico« and the company prepared a similar plan for 
Iran, which involved a jfeOm educational TV system. NASA had been 
providing operational demonstrations with its Hughes-built ATS spacecraft 
of experimental domestic service in Australia, and later for direct satel­ 
lite broadcasting to community receivers in India. Hughes' attempt s-f 
to meet requests from Brazil for experimental ATS service were, however, 
rejected by the State Department pending conclusion of permanent Intel- 
sat arrangements.
4. THIRD WORLD SATELLITE INTEREST
In Intelsat; Judging from the number of Third World countries that 
joined Intelsat, the spread of ground stations and circuit usage increases, 
U.S. industry was largely preaching to the converted. By 1972 more than 
half Intelsat's members were Third World countries, and nearly half the 
system's ground antennas were located-in them.^ Circuit usage as of 
1970 was more than double the capital subscription of the members con­ 
cerned, ' since virtually everywhere earth stations were made opera­ 
tional, total overseas communications volume rose rapidly and dramatical­ 
ly.^) This table suggests the volume increases of four Third World 
countries by comparing voice traffic figures from the year before earth 
stations began operating with figures for 1973, and giving the number of 
years that had elapsed between the two:
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.Table IX; International traffic increases for four Third World countries
Pre-satellite Interval 1973 voice 

















"busy signal: a victim of satellite commu- 
Pathways. Washington: Communications Sat el
1 no. 2, November-December 1975'
Earth station location was seen as conferring particular commercial 
advantages to host nations within a region, and local editorialists 
wrote of the "excellent rewards" and "open doors" satellite system mem­ 
bership was producing. The both costly and at times humiliating
(52) colonial heritage of indirect international routing, and natural
barriers that had prevented direct communication even between neighbour­ 
ing countries, were surmountable thanks to satellites. ^ Third World 
interest in Intelsat's operation had prompted members to pool their 
ownership quotas in order to send collective representatives to the
interim governing committee: an Asian group of eight countries, an Arab
(54) group of 13 and a Latin American group of four each had an ICSC memoer.
New appljl cat ions:_ The most prevalent and pressing Third World re­ 
quirement was not, however, for international circuits but for domestic 
networks, which could be furnished either through nationally-owned or 
regionally-shared satellites/ 55 ' and could make available TV service 
for education and national development and basic improvements in tele­ 
communications plant—arguably "one of the key elements, if not the 
catalyst, in (the] chain process of economic growth."
While the contention that priority should be assigned to modernising
(S?) communications facilities had not gone unchallengedw '—and it has been
noted, for instance, that Indonesia's plan for domestic community broad­ 
casting via satellite called for use of Siemens colour TV sets each costing 
around 12 times the national per capita income^ 5 ^—once such modernisation
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is accepted as a policy objective satellites have much to commend them. 
Network television in Africa, for instance, was determined by the ITU
to be practically impossible without satellite relays because of the
(59)continent's low population density. A cost study of telecommuni­ 
cations alternatives for Brazil, which compared satellites with coaxial 
cable and overland microwave relays and even added the costs of 152,000 
TV sets equipped for direct satellite reception, nevertheless found that 
initial capital outlays plus projected five-year maintenance costs for 
the satellite option were less than one-quarter those of cables and some 
40 percent those of microwave. ' Other estimates put the cost of pro­ 
viding Latin America with a TV distribution network at ^600m initially 
plus ^(60m per year through conventional methods, and ^20m plus jzfl2m per 
year with satellites. ' Where countries required all-new facilities
for the full range of telecommunications and broadcasting services, satel-
( 62) lites were said to be economical even for relays of 50 miles or less,
and were believed to enable nationwide TV networking to be introduced 
within four years, as against a past average of 10-12 years in techni­ 
cally advanced countries.
Social cohesion; The appeal of satellite services was not limited 
to their putative benefits for educational, agricultural training, birth 
control and health information programmes. "Many developing countries," 
a 1971 UN report stated,
face an acute problem arising from social forces of disintegra­ 
tion...! single system of mass communications providing a common 
shared experience to the entire population can perform an impor­ 
tant role in making credible the oneness of the territory. (64)
A principal objective of India's direct broadcast experiment was "contri-
>f Indc 
,,,(66)
buting to national cohesion," ' and while a UN study concluded o o­
nesia, "Only a satellite system can efficiently link these islands'
—some 3,000 in number—a particular concern was said to be "the- fear of
(67) regional revolt and what in army circles is known as 'Kuomingtangism'." v
A Brazilian diplomat appraised his country's satellite plans somewhat 
similarly:
A satellite will treat all parts of the country equally. That 
is important in a federalized_cpuntry such as ours. All the 
politicians feel that their states are getting an equal share. (68)
Even in an industrial country like Canada national unity was invoked as 
a justification for satellite deployment.
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Hence, for all these various reasons by mid-l^Yl domestic or re­ 
gional satellite projects were being formally considered by Brazil, by 
an Andean group of nine South American countries, by an Arab group con­ 
sisting of six countries and the Arab States Broadcasting Union, and by 
Japan, while the Canadian system was nearing completion. '
5. BROADCASTING ATO BTTELSAT
Since many of these ambitions concerned TV service, the relationship of 
broadcasting to Intelsat is important to assessing the organisation's 
candidacy to undertake or supervise the projects. Both technically and 
organisationally, intensive use of Intelsat's space segment for televi­ 
sion service was, though feasible, not self-evidently appropriate.
Technically: A satellite system dedicated primarily to TV trans­ 
mission—whether to modest-sized receiving stations for re-broadcast,
to specially-augmented community TV sets or to unaugmented receivers—
(71) would require large amounts of satellite capacity. ' More capacious
satellites than Intelsat had hitherto deployed would likely be required, 
and pricing would—in order for the service to be competitive with spe­ 
cially-designed systems—have to be untied from current voice-circuit 
equivalences. Furthermore, modifications in earth station standards 
would be required: the 85-foot Intelsat antenna standard, needing ex­ 
tensive re-broadcasting, was suited mainly to already highly-developed 
areas; elsewhere economic efficiency would be determined by the numbers
of ground stations having access to the satellite at once, and costs
(72) would have to be reduced to encourage earth station proliferation.
Intelsat's earth station standards were excessively high from the
(70) standpoint of TV distribution requirements/' ' and this consideration
was provided for in both Soviet and Franco-German satellite plans. In 
1968 the Soviets proposed an Intersputnik system, to be the international 
and geostationary counterpart of its domestic elliptical-orbiting net­ 
work; emphasis was placed on TV distribution to dispersed users equipped 
with 10- to 12-foot diameter antennas.^ ^' Symphonie too would stress TV 
relay and incorporate as standard earth stations costing one-third Intel- 
sat f s, which i 
anti-monstre.'
' were characterised as "monsters" requiring "une politiaue 
,,(75)
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A further drawback to a globalised approach to satellite broad­ 
casting service was technical discontinuities in TV standards—a total 
of 12 different monochrome and three different colour transmission stan­ 
dards, each incompatible with the other. '
Orsranisational conf 1 ict s;_ The institutional separation of broad­ 
casters from telecommunications entities, and the different functional 
interests it expresses, had given rise to considerable discord over 
satellite TV use since Intelsat was created. Both European and Ameri­ 
can broadcasters had spoken bitterly about the tariffs and terms imposed 
on their efforts to have access to satellites, insisting on assurances
of full-time availability—if not priority—, exclusive frequency allo-
(77) 
cations and the right to own separate terminal facilities. ' After
an initial promotional period of TV relay free of charge on Early Bird, 
television officials found themselves confronted, as a practical matter, 
with a variety of national telecommunications entities demanding widely 
differing payments for essential links. European PTTs evidently were 
much less interested in encouraging TV traffic: as of 1969, ^ en minutes 
of transatlantic television transmission cost ^3»290» of which ^2,400 
covered the European earth station-satellite connection and ^890 the
/yO\
same service on the American side. European telecommunications 
officials were said to view TV relay "as an amusing but slightly childish
gimmick to be used on suitably portentous occasions and then forgotten."
(79) Broadcasters believed that they had been 'used* for promotional
/ o,-, \
purposes by Intelsat, and the European Broadcasting Union asked its 
members to boycott the system in 1965-66 to protest high charges and low
/ Q-i N
priority assigned to TV. U.S. broadcasters too complained initially 
that satellite tariffs were "grossly excessive" and"prohibitive" and
asked for uniform through-rates and a reduction of the 30-minute—later
(32") 
cut to ten—minimum transmission time Intelsat required payment for.
Intelsat responded with substantial rate reductions, although offi­ 
cials were skeptical that satellite charges had much influence on the 
volume of TV relay traffic.^ ' One study found that even if satellite 
service was offered for nothing the hourly costs of television trans­ 
mission, from studio to local transmitter^abroad, would fall by less than 
15 percent because of continued charges lewied by operators of ground 
links.^ ^' Others objected, however, that lower prices "might produce 
new kinds of programming that...have never been given an opportunity to 
develop. In advance of inaugurating such a price structure, it is
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difficult to predict what effect it might have."^ ^'
Comsat introduced price reductions of around 40 percent and cut 
the minimum TV transmission time to 10 minutes on the eve of the re­ 
negotiations in February 1969, and the company used the occasion to 
criticise domestic rules under which TV traffic was shared on a rota­ 
tional basis among the U.S. carriers.^ ' Although European PTTs re­ 
duced their fees as well, broadcasters still were confronted with a 
variety of post-reduction charges, as Table X indicates. It is noted 
that Intelsat f s own space segment tariffs were uniform, and thus had 
nothing to do with the variation of nearly 100 percent between highest 
and lowest TV relay rates.
Table X_:_ Variations in satellite television relay charges, 1969




























Comsat defended Intelsat's charges as "already promotional"—the ICSC fi­ 
nance committee found in 1970 that TV relay was actually underpriced in
t Orj\
terms of fully allocated costs, the usual basis of Intel sat pricing^1 '— 
and said that "the major burden of...increasing the use of satellite tele-
( QQ\
vision" fell on individual national administrations/ ' Intelsat never­ 
theless modified its practice, since 1963, of charging each receiving sta­ 
tion in a multi-destination broadcast as if it were the only receiver, and 
charges per station were effectively halved in November 1970 at the insis­ 
tence of broadcasters in Spain, Portugal and Latin America; daily live 
TV news exchanges among them subsequently began in 1971.
The dominant tendency during Intelsat's interim period, notwithstanding
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increases like the ten-fold rise in hours of transatlantic TV relay 
between 1966 and 1969^ '—was for television use to be restricted to 
events of wide international interest or to specially-conceived pro­ 
grammes like the 1966 multinational 'Our World 1 telecast. Coverage 
of the 1970 World Gup in Mexico City, for instance, comprised around 
half the total satellite TV transmission time for that year. "^
So despite the gradual introduction of policies more favourable 
to broadcasters, the history of Intelsat's relations with national broad­ 
cast interests suggests that the organisation's standing as a logical 
candidate for more extensive activities in the field was not proven. 
Furthermore, largescale television use—whether customary relay or 
direct broadcasting to community or home receivers—would require ad­ 
mitting to Intelsat a functional constituency different from that
hitherto dominant in the organisation, one which had moreover a his-
(92) tory of strained relations with PTTs and carriers.
6. THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO RB-NSGQTIATION
The interests of Third World nations in satellite communications thus 
concerned above all securing access to space facilities on domestic 
or regional bases—the latter primarily in order to share costs of 
domestic uses—to pursue development objectives relating to economic 
growth, mass education and national unification. Intercontinental 
links were conceded to have been well provided by Intelsat, but were 
generally considered of lesser importance than potential domestic ap­ 
plications. Nevertheless, if Intelsat could provide space segment 
facilities capable of furnishing domestic services, certain economic, 
political and technical advantages would accrue. First, costs could 
be shared widely, especially if the capacity Intelsat made available 
was essentially surplus and was leased at promotional rates; even if 
priced to reflect fully allocated costs, savings could still be consi­ 
derable compared with the costs of procuring satellites and launchers
independently. Second, political reliance would be diffused rather
(9^) than concentrated upon one or mare-neighbouring regimes. Third,
Intelsat's technical record was good, and the organisation's technical 
advice could be trusted; evaluation of various proposals for associated
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ground equipment would likely be of a high technical standard.
Third World countries nevertheless stood to benefit from modifi­ 
cations in Intelsat's existing practices, especially as concerned voting 
and management. As the next chapter discusses further, the virtual dis- 
enfranchisement of these members had to be ended: even if their tech­ 
nical confidence in Comsat and the ICSC was high,.they had no reason to 
assume that their own interests would automatically conform with accords 
reached among metropolitan countries. Similarly, efforts to internation­ 
alise Intelsat's management would mean opportunities for advanced tech­ 
nical training and operational experience for nominated staff.
The interests of Third World countries in the questions of inter­ 
nationalised procurement policies and regional systems were, however, 
mixed. On procurement, it was argued that in the long term underdeve­ 
loped countries would benefit from Intelsat's helping create a variety 
of sources of equipment they might require. European attempts to insert 
requirements that procurement be distributed widely among potential sup­ 
plying nations justified themselves accordingly:
To avoid perpetuation of a situation of monopoly to the advan­ 
tage of only one country and at the expense of all the other 
member states of Intel sat by stimulating worldwide competition 
in order to achieve lower prices and better quality. (94)
This theoretical advantage was, however, more than outweighed by the 
unwillingness of Third World members to subsidise European aerospace 
development by paying part of the higher prices on equipment built for 
Intelsat in Europe, an unwillingness firmly expressed during delibera­ 
tions over the Intelsat IV series. In June 1963, because of European 
insistence, the three firms competing for the prime contract were told 
by Comsat and the ICSC to provide for extensive international subcon­ 
tracting. Hughes Aircraft's initial reward of ^72m included ^20m in 
subcontracts for companies in eight European countries, Japan and Cana­ 
da, which went some way toward meeting earlier demands that every third 
Intelsat spacecraft be built outside the U.S. -^ Latin American and 
Arab ICSC members, however, demanded to know how much more "all this 
education and abetment of already industrialised nations" was going to 
cost, and Comsat readily replied that the series would cost pjm more 
than if Hughes performed all the work itself, and ^4m more than if the
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subcontracts had all been let to American firms. ^ ' Although it is 
said that Comsat's eagerness to confirm the misgivings was self-serving 
and that the company produced no data to support its estimates, ° ' they 
may well have been accurate and were believed in any case. One Latin 
American IC3C member commented:
We are going to have to pay to ship the last two spacecraft to 
the United Kingdom for assembly, then back to the Hughes plant in 
California for acceptance testing, then to Cape Kennedy. And this 
is just the beginning. The future will tell how many failures we 
shall have to finance because these subcontractors doe not have 
Hughes 1 long experience with...satellites. Then the same policy 
will be followed with Intelsat V. (98)
The protest was accompanied by demands for technical assistance funds 
to match the added costs attributable to internationalised procurement. 
As a result, the 36 percent foreign manufacture that went into the first 
four Intelsat IVs was cut on the next four spacecraft, yielding an over­ 
all figure for the entire series of 26 percent. As Le Monde later warned 
about the European negotiating position on procurement, "If they remain
intransigent on this point, the European group would doubtless lose the
(99)support of the developing countries. " WxV In effect, if developing di­ 
versified sources of satellite equipment was ultimately to the advantage 
of Third World countries—an arguable proposition, inasmuch as competi­ 
tion among U.S. suppliers might be just as beneficial as international 
competition—the goal might just as readily be achieved by leaving the 
satellite field open to non-Intelsat suppliers: if European governments 
wished, they could then subsidise the bids offered by their national in­ 
dustries so as to meet or better American proposals.
As to regional satellite systems, the attractions—political pres­ 
tige as well as actual services—of the various proposals made by metro­ 
politan aerospace firms and considered by Third World governments had to 
be weighed against the potential damage independent systems might cause 
Intelsat which, if not a wholly satisfactory organisation was at least 
a fully operational one. It was feared that a system like Symphonic, 
using high-capacity narrow-beam synchronous satellites, would skim off 
lucrative transatlantic traffic with lower tariffs and necessitate higher 
Intelsat charges among light-traffic "countries/ As a RA1ID Corpora­ 
tion study had warned:
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...If domestic or regional systems grow to large proportions, 
they would seriously disrupt traffic for the global system and 
a multitude of separate, competing satellite systems could e- 
merge—each small, each high-cost on a per-circuit "basis, and 
together denying the countries the efficiency of a large-scale 
shared operation. (lOl)
Symphonic was therefore largely opposed by Intelsat Third 'Jorid members, 
and an early 1969 meeting of the Latin American group pronounced itself 
skeptical of regional satellites in general and hostile to Symphonie in 
particular:
We want Europe in the Intelsat system as a balance against the 
strong position of the United States. We are apprehensive of 
the Symphonie program...This is not an intra-European regional 
system, but another global system. It would link European coun­ 
tries with their former colonies. (102)
As with the procurement issue, the Third World position on the U.S. 
'single global system' was thus a pragmatic one: if such a system 
could deliver the services they required on acceptable terms, they 
would procure from it; that did not however mean—as Chapter 13 will 
show—that they wished to be barred from looking elsewhere for those 
services by an abstract commitment to globalism or by a desire to 
appease the U.S. Generally then the Third World position dovetailed 
with that of the metropolitan aerospace industry, whose American com­ 
ponent viewed liberalisation of satellite control as a means to exploit 
its industrial dominance, while the European component saw the same 
relaxation of restraints on separate development as a way to undermine 
that dominance. Out of the future collision between those confident 
irreconcilables it was possible that the Third World would be able to 
obtain on desirable terms the services it needed.
CHAPTER 17: THE POLITICS OP REORGANISING ETELSAT
1. THE mPCaTAlIC5 0? OaGAITISATIOHAL IlEPOim EFFOHT3
Controversy over formal modifications of Intelsat's structure and pro­ 
cedures was expressed stridently, if inexactly, in terms of alterna­ 
tive models of international collaboration—the Americans insisting 
on the value of a streamlined 'business-like' operation subject to a 
minimum of 'political' proceduralist restraints, while the Europeans 
denounced unilateralism, proclaimed the indispensability of democratic 
forms and brandished the model of a truly international 'ULT-type 1 agency.
Although it might seem that the issues were less importejit than 
those relating to Intelsat's competence—if Intelsat were functionally 
confined, its internal organisation would matter little—in fact the 
conflict over reorganisation played three distinct roles within the 
overall process of negotiating a permanent Intelsat, and was closely 
tied to seemingly more substantive issues because: 1.) it concerned, 
in general, the distribution of effective power within Intelsat, 2.) 
might ultimately determine Intelsat's actual spheres of competence, 
and 3.) furnished rallying points for more substantive matters.
First, the proposed reforms would unquestionably affect the struc­ 
ture of control over Intelsat. How far power would actually be redis­ 
tributed was an open question: whatever the Third World enthusiasm 
for democratising formulas, the most likely immediate beneficiaries 
of a reduction in American dominance were the Europeans, and the fact 
remained that their interest in the satellite field was primarily that 
of potential suppliers of equipment, and services while the majority of 
Intelsat members were potential customers. Mutual advantage presumably 
was possible, but there was no self-evident identity of interest.
Second, internal procedures and changes in structure might prejudge 
the likelihood of Intelsat f s expansion into new fields. If unequivocal 
prohibitions on a wider sphere of._.cojnp_e.ten.ce were not agreed, the key 
questions would concern the kinds of internal authorisations that would 
have to be obtained before such activities could ensue. If the procedures
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were complicated and difficult, Intelsat might never undertake work 
formally within its "bailiwick; an essentially restrictive motivation 
would "be obscured "by the appeal for democratisation and wider partici­ 
pation in decision-making.
Third and similarly, the proposed reforms had symbolic and rhetor­ 
ical value to Suropean efforts to rally support behind their positions 
on more material matters. During the actual negotiations, the reforms 
were included in omnibus packages of proposals which included procure­ 
ment sharing, specialised services and the like, and attempted to legi­ 
timate those as fully consistent with greater multilateralism.
2. POSITIONS PIT RSCCGMISATIOH
Entering into the negotiations on permanent Intelsat arrangements, the 
main positions on reorganisation were as follows.
Creation of an all—member assembly: This was formally agreed by 
virtually all parties, and contention centered on the assembly's 
powers. The American position was that the assembly would meet annu­ 
ally 1.) to "receive and consider a report from the Governing Body" on 
the previous year's activities; 2.) "to consider and approve or dis­ 
approve the recommendations of the Governing Body concerning any change 
of Manager or of arrangements between the organization and the Manager;" 
and 3.) "to discuss matters relating to the operation of the Intelsat 
system and make recommendations thereon to the Governing Body." Voting 
in the assembly would require a numerical majority which would have to 
include at least two-thirds of Intelsat's total investment shares. 
In short, powers would be limited to review and advice, and decision- 
making procedures would be skewed to ensure dominance by heavy traffic 
countries: if Comsat retained even 25 percent of Intelsat's shares, 
another eight percent—or the agreement of Great Britain alone—would 
enable assembly actions, to be blocked. It is notable too that the U.S. 
wished to give the assembly substantive powers only in regard to the 
managership, thereby making potential anti-Comsat initiatives within 
the governing body more difficult to sustain.
The unified European position declared the assembly "the supreme 
organ of the organisation:"
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it would consist of representatives of each country who had 
signed the Definitive Agreement. It should have adequate 
powers in order to lay down the policy of the organisation. 
In the case of undivided ownership, it would take decisions; 
in the case of separate ownership, it would make recommenda­ 
tions to the various owners' consortia. (2)
The actual divergencies between the European and U.S. positions re­ 
mained, however, to be seen, since even the Europeans placed limits 
on the application of one-nation one-vote procedures. These would 
be followed on matters of general policy, regulation and internal 
organisation, but on questions of management and project execution 
votes would be weighted by investment shares. ' A British submis­ 
sion in March 1968 to GETS stated that the assembly "should be more 
than a sounding board...but it should not have powers to interfere 
in detail with the development, planning and operational functions 
of the Governing Body, and it should only have very general powers 
with respect to financial matters.' Thus, notwithstanding the 
European insistence on the assembly's having ultimate supervisory 
authority, definite limits existed for both sides on the degree of 
redistribution of power that would be permitted.
The governing bod?/: Much the same proximity can be detected in 
the apparently contrasting positions taken on the composition and pow­ 
ers of Intelsat's governing board. The U.S. favoured retaining a small, 
cohesive decision-making body like the 1CSO. Its powers would be 
comprehensive—including principal responsibility for the design, deve­ 
lopment, construction, operation and maintenance of the space segment— 
and would be limited only by those few functions assigned to the assem­ 
bly. Although board membership would be expanded from its interim level 
by admitting any five Intelsat members regardless of their shareholdings
—in the ICSC a 1.5' percent collective minimum was set—the U.S. wanted 
a two-thirds weighted vote to be required on all substantive issues. 
This provision would be coupled with a 50 percent ceiling on the voting 
power any one member could wield—"with a view to preventing there being 
inordinate voting power in any one member"—but would nonetheless have 
virtually guaranteed Comsat a comprehensive veto over Intelsat actions.^ 
The European alternative" all^asjsigned the governing board "powers 
of decision in order to direct the current affairs of the organisation"
—if, that is, space segment ownership remained undivided. (Under a
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separate ownership.scheme, its powers would necessarily be recommenda­ 
tory.) It was by and large agreed that "the Governing Body of an enter­ 
prise providing operational service should be effective and to a larsre
(7-) 
extent free from detailed control." w/ On voting, though, the Europeans
insisted on procedures to prevent not jiist unilateral actions but uni­ 
lateral vetoes as well; hence the two-thirds weighted vote recmirement
(8) 
urged by the U.S. was unacceptable. v '
Identify aj:id_accouiitability of manager^ Positions on Intelsat's 
management were deeply divided. The U.S. began the re-negotiation pro­ 
cess apparently committed to Comsat's indefinite continuance as sole 
managerial entity. Some moderation of the 1963-64 American position 
was evident inasmuch as the formal basis of the Intelsat-manager rela­ 
tionship would now be made contractual and not constitutional, but the 
U.S. insisted "a single entity be designated to serve as manager," and
that entity be Comsat "in order to provide continuity and make use of
(o) 
the experience accumulated." v ' Furthermore, since two-thirds weighted
votes in both the governing board and the assembly would be needed to 
change the management contract, Comsat would very likely be able to veto 
any efforts to replace it as manager.
The alternative conception, promoted strongly by the Europeans, was 
of a "de-nationalised managerial entity"^ 1 ' to consist of "an interna­ 
tional organism which could not be a member of either the General Assem­ 
bly or the Board of Directors." The manager would be directly responsi­ 
ble to the board and operate under its authority, and would be headed by 
a secretary-general selected by the board and confirmed by the assembly. 
Although the European members insisted that immediate steps be taken 
toward substantive internationalisation of the management, they indicated 
too that the precise nature of the transition from Comsat might be nego­ 
tiable. The British account of a March 1968 GETS meeting noted:
There is widespread recognition that an international Management 
Organ is the objective to be aimed at, but there will be differ­ 
ences both as to timing and as to the intermediate steps towards 
the objective, (ll)
negotiation was therefore bound to focus on the advantages of different 
transitional schemes: if the time period were fixed but long, or sub­ 
ject to continuing review, and modification, Comsat's assent might be won 
to the principle of internationalisation.
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3. • BACKGROUND TO RSFORH COgTHOVS'-'tSIBS
Notwithstanding the concessions, in general the U.S. was not only hos­ 
tile to many of the reforms proposed but was irritated by the importance 
assigned them by their supporters. Intelsat had, in the American view, 
been "the largest and most functional international joint venture ever 
established," according to Comsat's chairman:
Improvements can be made, but fundamental restructuring will 
hardly commend itself to those who are interested in maintain­ 
ing the pace of progress which has been enjoyed during these 
initial years. (12)
The State Department apparently felt the U.S. could neither give in 
altogether to the reformers nor simply refuse to continue with the re- . 
negotiations without endangering the previous decade of American policy 
in the field.
... T he only way in which we can hastily conclude these agree­ 
ments would be to accommodate the views of the other countries 
without insisting on and negotiating those safeguards which we 
consider essential to the U.S. interest. Obviously, such capi­ 
tulation would not be tolerable. (13)
If the conference foundered, the U.S. would be held responsible:
...cancellation or delay would be regarded by other members of 
the consortium as a U.S. effort to perpetuate our high degree 
of control under the interim arrangements. (14)
Thus, for official American policy the impulse toward organisational 
reforms offered few opportunities and a number of risks. Little could 
be gained by reaching agreement with the reformers; but much—perhaps 
all—could be lost if agreement were not reached. Resolution was in­ 
dispensable even if the Americans could not see quite why.
Comsat; In gross terms, Comsat's own corporate objectives had 
hitherto basically coincided with those to which Intelsat was dedi­ 
cated—expeditious and global satellite deployment—since the absence 
of a clear technical achievement and a self-sustaining operation would 
have made dubious Intelsat's continuance on any terms reasonably ac­ 
ceptable to Comsat, and raised the spectres of a shrunken satellite 
system and of its possible disintegration. •*' At'a stroke, U.S. 
policy would have failed and" ComsaT's~only sure commercial operation 
would have been lost.
-332-
In spite of that basic consistency, Gomsat's role was easily "the 
most controversial feature of the original agreement,"^ 1 ' and the com­ 
pany recognised that certain elements of its Intelsat dominance—its 
investment quotas and the absence of an all-member assembly—were un­ 
tenable. First, Comsat's shareholdings were too high: by the end of 
1970, when its share of global satellite traffic was around 35 percent, 
Comsat cn-jned more than 52 percent of Intelsat's total equity. "^ The­ 
oretically this disproportion was to Comsat's advantage, since the com­ 
pany's rate base was accordingly inflated and it was earning a 14 percent 
return on its Intelsat investment, part of which return derived from 
the international traffic of other countries. Prolongation of the interim
arrangements and indeed higher satellite tariffs would therefore, in prin-
(18) ciple, benefit Comsat. ' Nevertheless from 1967 on, Comsat acknowledged
the need for a reduction in its investment and voting shares, and pro­ 
posed an upper voting limit of 50 percent for governing board members,
(19)
irrespective of their proportion of total system usage. While bring­ 
ing investment into line with use would help ensure that "the organisa­ 
tion will maintain its international character" by narrowing Corasat's 
edge, ' it would also release Comsat capital from the global system
for investment elsewhere, either domestically or in specialised inter-
(21) national systems.
Second, Comsat conceded that Intelsat f s two-tiered interim struc­ 
ture—governing board (lC3C) and manager—would have to be augmented by 
a generalyassembly of all members. Ilany signatories were clearly little
more than "spear-carriers," as one journalist put it, who paid ^60,000
(22) 
to join Intelsat and had no say in anything. v ' In his August 1967
policy statement President Johnson said the U.S. supported the assembly's
(23) creation "so that all may share in the consideration of policy,"
and various Comsat utterances later in 19&7 indicated support for "pro-
(24) viding a forum in which all Intelsat members would have a voice,"
although it was also noted that by pooling their investment shares 47 
of 58 current Intelsat members were formally represented on the ICSC.^
This willingness can be attributed in part to fears that the Soviet 
Union was, as Comsat's president said in March 1967, "developing and 
demonstrating communications satellites of their 'own as a basis for a 
major recasting of the present organisational structure at some future
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date." When the Soviets announced at a UN conference in the summer 
of 1968 their plans for an Intersputnik international system, foreign 
delegates reportedly were especially impressed by provisions that would 
give all participating states votes on the system's governing board/ 2^' 
Soviet observers later attended the first Intelsat plenipotentiary ses­ 
sion in February 1969 and urged equal representation of all member coun­ 
tries on Intelsat organs, noting that usage would, in the Intersputnik
plan, determine investment shares and revenue distribution but rot
. . . (28) voting weights.
The managership; Notwithstanding those concessions, Comsat held 
firm on retaining its managership, which even in 1964 had been suffi­ 
ciently sensitive an issue to warrant explicit mention in the interim 
agreements that in the ICSC's eventual recommendations as to permanent 
organisation, consideration should be given to "whether the interim 
arrangements should be continued on a -permanent basis or whether a per­ 
manent international administrative and technical staff should be estab­ 
lished."
Throughout the interim period other ICSC members charged Comsat, at 
one time or another, with arrogance, high-handedness, using its techni­ 
cal position to prejudge decisions on system choice and deployment sche-
(29) 
dules and then using its voting weight to sustain its prejudgments.
On the general question of retaining a national management entity, per­ 
haps the watershed case involved the Intelsat III contract, where the 
FCC had been reluctant to authorise the series even after the IGSC had 
approved it, and the incompatibility of Intelsat's manager being sub­ 
ject to the unilateral actions of a wholly national agency was decried. 
^ ' As one State Department official put it:
The timing of events and the way the FCC regulatory actions ap­ 
peared to our partners was that the U.S. was reviewing or second- 
guessing actions after they had been made with full U.S. partici­ 
pation. (31)
Although the FCC was subsequently enjoined to make its recommendations 
before and not after ICSC actions, and although Comsat sought to offset 
charges of conflict-of-interest by introducing an internal division of 
responsibilities in January 19^63—whereby a separate department from 
that which served as U.S. Intelsat representative would handle manage­ 
ment functions—the feeling remained that Intelsat should not be subject
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to 7CC oversight but that as long as Comsat remained the organisation's 
sole manager such national influence was unavoidable. 2 '
Research, and development.- An even more important reason for oppo­ 
sition to Comsat's managership was related to the company's apparent 
interest in expanding its own 't&D activities—and perhaps even entering 
the satellite-manufacturing business. In September Vj6) Consat opened 
an elaborate complex of laboratories outside of "'."ashington, D.C., which 
the company said were needed to carry out its Intelsat managerial role, 
evaluating proposals, testing equipment and the like. Other ICoG mem­ 
bers however were skeptical and noted Cornsat's outstanding interest in 
the U.S.' domestic satellite business, its need to expand its rate base, 
and the incentive the facilities would give Comsat to urge Intel sat 
to carry out more in-house—as opposed to contracted-out—R&D. Intel- 
sat 's total luiD outlays were some ^4m in 1969—almost entirely in-house, 
i.e. Comsat, work—and by 1970 Comsat was proposing that Intel sat ear­ 
mark a fixed percentage of its operating revenues to .u_':D, leaving it up 
to the manager to decide on what proportions would be contracted out and 
conducted by Comsat. Some considered the laboratories, from the point 
of view of legitimately Intelsat-related work, "disproportionately large, 
disproportionately well-equipped and overly expensive"—in fact a facili­ 
ty not to test but to build satellites. ' If that was true, and if 
Comsat remained as Intel sat's manager, the company might shortly find 
itself in the enviable position of evaluating satellite proposals of its 
own concurrently with its competitors'—from which much of Comsat's ex­ 
pertise would very likely have originated. Furthermore, the company's 
advantage could only be enhanced by Intelsat's interim practice of ac­ 
quiring titles to inventions and discoveries that emerged under Intel- 
sat contracts, thus preventing suppliers from offering the same tech­ 
nology to other procuring entities.^ 34 ' Neither the American aerospace 
industry nor those Intelsat members hopeful of themselves supplying 
space segment equipment for the global system could be indifferent to 
these possibilities, and the leverage in the technical field to be per­ 
mitted Comsat—or some other managerial entity—was an important consid­ 
eration in deciding the identity of the manager and the structure of 
accountability to which it would be subject.
Nevertheless, Comsat was implacably opposed to an international
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managerial organ, and that opposition became—along with an unwilling­ 
ness to assign substantive powers to the Intelsat assembly—the core 
of the company's position on reforms. In favour of retaining Comsat 
as manager was its technical record and know-how: "It would be foolish," 
as one European delegate put it, "to toss aside the known ability and 
experience of Comsat."*' ^' When the ICSG voted in December 1968 on its 
recommendations on permanent organisation, however, the result was 17-1 
against Comsat's indefinite continuance. '
4. CONTEKTOEIG MODELS OF COLLABOHATIOH
Underlying the various specific positions on Intelsat's structure and 
procedures were the rhetorical and substantive attractions of different 
models of international collaboration—commercial enterprise and inter­ 
national agency. American pronouncements were steeped in the certainty
that a single worldwide system efficiently managed and not sub­ 
ject to the vagaries of votes by an international debating soci­ 
ety will permit far more orderly and rapid development than would 
occur if responsibilities were diffused and basic decisions de­ 
pended upon international conferences. (37)
An international agency was "likely to be formalistic rather than opera­ 
tional, cautious when the state of the art may warrant action and enthu-
( ^^ *) 
siastic where caution may be required," orientated not to efficient
project definition and resource utilisation but to the practice necessi­ 
ty of continually assembling a political consensus and carefully guiding 
it toward goals that would be obvious to a "business-like enterprise. " 
To others, however, Intelsat was "an inadequate organisation, one 
which does not meet, the needs of the majority of its members,"^ and 
indeed did not even solicit their participation in its running as a 
properly international agency offering a valuable public service ought 
to do. The effective disenfranchisement of most Intelsat members was 
not just unfair in principle; it also seriously misrepresented the 
manner in which real reliance on the organisation for essential ser­ 
vices was actually distributed. Paradoxically, the heavy traffic coun­ 
tries that dominated Intelsat were, Jjhanks to cables, less generally 
dependent upon Intel sat than were-light-traffic members tirith no alter­ 
native facilities. Furthermore, by restricting Intelsat f s properties 
to the space segment—necessary though this was to avoid entanglement
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in domestic facilities — a considerable part of the total investment 
made by members in satellite communications was excluded. While by 
mid-1971 around ^300m worth of hardware and services had gone into 
the space segment, around ^200m was invested in earth stations, ' 
the property of countries whose ground segment outlays added nothing 
to their entitlement to influence Intelsat actions while contributing 
substantially to their stakes in those actions.
It seemed also that the opportunities confronting Intelsat con­ 
cerning "expansion of services and earth station proliferation were 
greatest in hitherto disenfranchised or under-represented regions and, 
furthermore, that some of these future activities were far more contro 
versial than those Intelsat had thus far undertaken. "It becomes ap­ 
parent," said A. Chayes, former legal adviser to the State Department,
that many of the most important decisions to be made about com­ 
munications satellites over the next decade will be highly poli­ 
tical, more so as satellites become powerful enough to beam di­ 
rectly to home receivers without the interposition of a national 
ground station. This growing political element must find reflec­ 
tions in the allocation of voting power. And the distribution 
of votes in proportion to use simply does not do that. (42)
5. IiTTELSAT'S ' POLITIC ISATIQIT'
Superficially, as one Comsat official has written, "the climate for 
negotiation of the Intelsat definitive arrangements was gradually 
•politicized'," whereas during the interim negotiations, "political 
considerations, while present, did not significantly affect the out­ 
come." While it was certainly true that the 1969-?! negotiations, 
involving 70 and not 17 nations, were considerably more contentious 
and conflicted than the 1963-64 sessions, that fact does not neces­ 
sarily justify qualifying the later set as more political. In our 
view, important changes in the character and location of the opera­ 
tive political concerns had intervened — and for hitherto dominant par­ 
ticipants in Intelsat, a lower order of political objectives were at 
stake in the negotiations which began in 1969*
The issues that emerged during Intelsat 's interim period had been 
submerged in 1964 by an inexorable and unilateral determination of the 
United States to see a powerfully symbolic and operationally valuable
-337-
technology deployed with all the urgency the U.S. could inspire. The 
satisfaction of that objective during the interim period had de-activated 
it as the principal determinant of collective policy and action. The 
success of the endeavour had fulfilled and outrun the limited policy goal 
for which it initially had "been undertaken. In the absence of that ob­ 
jective flowed a number of theretofore secondary goals, some of which 
had been shunted aside by the push to meet it—like international pro­ 
curement—and others of which had essentially emerged in the course of 
its satisfaction—like regional systems, which pre-required synchronous 
satellites, and the constituent assembly. Consequently the locus of 
political concern had shifted from the sphere of superpower rivalry and 
the fundamental terms of transatlantic cooperation, to where the main 
unresolved issues involved subjects on which no consensus yet existed 
because none had been required. The agenda of issues had been widened, 
apace with the growth of Intelsat's membership and with the search for 
new satellite applications that had remained unexploited because they 
were unrelated to the major formative political concerns; contestation 
could only follow suit. The principal political movement was, however, 
devolutionary, away from the profound 'politicisation' of the 1963-64 
negotiations and toward a broader, but less sensitive, array of concerns.
CHAPTER 13: NEGOTIATING IHTELSAT'S PEHMAEJMT AERAKGELEMTS, 1969-71
The plenipotentiary conference to create definitive arrangements for 
Intelsat opened in Washington, D.C. on February 24, 1969. "The mood," 
said one magazine, "may well "be closer to that of a stockholders' get- 
together than of a diplomatic conference."^ ' In fact it took 27 months, 
with three full conferences—attended by representatives of from 67 to 
78 countries—and six sessions of various preparatory bodies before final 
agreement was reached on May 21, 1971.
1. PREPARATIONS
Formal preparations began early in 1967» when the 18-mernber European 
Telecommunications Satellite Conference (GETS) opened discussions and
the 13-nation Arab group at Intelsat began talks directed at forming a
(2) 
common front with Latin American members. in the U.S. a five-member
interagency panel began work at that time on drafting the American pro­ 
posals, which in October were the first to be released. The U.S. plan 
represented an uneasy accommodation between Comsat and the State Depart­ 
ment—since the Pentagon had early been told that any special compliance 
with military requirements would be politically impossible to negotiate
^ '—and reports of divisions within the U.S. delegation surfaced inter-
( A}
mittently throughout the conference. Comsat grew increasingly con­ 
cerned by the possibility that negotiations might break down unless it 
modified certain of its positions, and conceded certain organisational 
reforms upon which the State Department and Europeans had been insisting. -3 '
The State Department was said to have been impressed, as the 19&9 
conference opened, by tho presence of 29 non-member countries, including 
seven of the eight signatories of the 1968 Intersputnik agreements.^ 
Partly in response to their presence, delegates devoted considerable 
attention to modifications that would make adherence to Intelsat as uni­ 
versal as possible, and the possibility of merging the proposed Inter- 
sputnik system with Intelsat's was informally discussed. The Soviet role
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was described as "probably the biggest uncertainty"^' of the con­ 
ference's first stage and strengthened the case against Comsat's main­ 
taining a "distribution of forces of one commander-in-chief and 64 
privates," as one editorial characterised Comsat.^ ' The brief his­ 
tory of Franco-Soviet satellite cooperation suggested that whatever 
intervention the Soviets would choose to make would likely be to rein-
f Q\
force known French positions. ' The combined determination of the two 
countries to see Intelsat replaced or decisively restructured would have 
to be taken seriously by the U.S., and the sooner indications were given 
that grievances could be redressed within the Intelsat rubric, the less 
potent the threat would, be.
2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFERMCB
First conference: The first plenipotentiary conference, from February 
21 to March 21, 1969} created four 'committees of the whole' to deal 
respectively with structure and functions (including the scope of Intel- 
sat services), legal and procedural matters, financial arrangements, and 
other operational questions (among them procurement and technical mat­ 
ters.) The four weeks allotted were insufficient for the full conference 
to hear the committees' reports, and when the conference recessed a pre­ 
paratory committee was formed to write draft articles based on the vari­ 
ous reports.
Preparatory committee; The preparatory committee (Prepcom) was the 
site where the main alternative packages of proposals were assembled and 
informally discussed. Three sessions were held between June and December 
1969—in aii t around eight weeks of meetings—with some 40 members and 
nine non-members attending. ' During this period the U.S. delegation 
chairman resigned as a result of the change in government; also, in 
September an international conference on satellite communications was 
held in France, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace and the Twentieth Century Fund. Its report was released in Decem­ 
ber and widely read by Intelsat delegates, and recommended Intelsat's 
transformation into an integrated""and" comprehensive satellite organisa­ 
tion, empowered to bid on any regional or specialised projects and to 
advise on technical and economic compatibility. The report also urged
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that Intel sat "become its own manager after a transitional phase, that 
weighted voting be restricted to a narrow range of issues, and that 
procurement should "be directed toward encouraging international diver­ 
sity of supply sources, even at the risk of higher initial costs. ^'
The U.S. and its supporters released their proposals in a package 
prepared "by the Australian and Chilean delegation, and known as PC45, 
during the second Prepcom session in September. PC45 was opposed by a 
second document, PC54» representing the views of the Western Europeans 
and their supporters and released in November at the third Prepcom ses­ 
sion. These drafts became the poles between which negotiation continued. 
Sixteen Third World countries were among the 22 reportedly associated 
with the U.S.-backed PC45 proposals, while the PC54 document attracted
support from five Third World countries—along with the notable 'defec-
(12) 
tions 1 from the American camp of Japan and Canada.
Resumed conference: The resumed plenipotentiary, the second of 
three full conference sessions, ran from February 16 to March 20, 1970 
and was attended by 67 of Intelsat's then-75 members, 18 observers and 
representatives of the UH and ITU. The session opened with release of 
an inconclusive draft document that had emerged from informal talks 
held shortly before the conference re-convened among PC45 and PC54 sup­ 
porters. • Although little progress was made toward compromise on that 
basis, midway through the session—on March 6—a more comprehensive at­ 
tempt, known as Document 93r was introduced by the Australian and Japanese 
delegations and quickly acclaimed as the likely basis for final agreement. 
Only three weeks remained to the session, however, and at the close an 
intersessional working group (F.iG) was created to prepare a single set 
of recommended texts on the basis of Document 93. Unlike the Prepcom, 
the BIG was given full negotiating powers and while the fully conference 
was scheduled to re-convene on September 8, the IWG was empowered to post­ 
pone the third session if necessary.
IWG: The IWG held 10 weeks of meetings in three sessions between 
mid-May and mid-December 1970, and was attended by 47 member countries. 
Despite an invitation from Guatemala to hold sessions there, and 
some grumbling on Capitol Hill over the half-million dollars the confer- 
was costing/ 1 ^"' meetings continued in Washington—in part because the 
U.S. delegation reassured Congress "that a relocation of the site of the
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conference to another country could have seriously adverse effects on 
the U.S. negotiating posture."^ •" The IWG's work load obliged it to 
reschedule the third session of the full conference from September to 
April 1971, and draft articles were forwarded to it for consideration.
The final conference; Attention at the final plenipotentiary con­ 
ference focussed on the IWG texts, and particularly on language left 
bracketed due to lack of agreement. Held from April 14 to May 21, 1971, 
the conference was attended by 78 of Intelsat f s then-79 members, 12 ob­ 
servers and representatives of the UN and ITU.
Despite predictions at the end of the IWG sessions that the "foun­
dation for final agreements" existed and the work was 75 percent com­ 
pleted, ' the conference was soon running behind schedule and some
(17) 
participants ventured that another full session would be necessary.
A European effort, led by the French delegation, attempted to rally sup­ 
port for major changes in texts provisionally agreed, in order to give 
further power to the intergovernmental assembly and to reintroduce pro­ 
curement distribution formulas. The American position hardened consid­ 
erably at this point, and in early Hay the U.S. delegation released a 
set of 11 proposals described as non-negotiable and indispensable to 
American approval of the final agreements. These included: eliminating 
procurement formulas to ensure "minimum necessary flexibility" in con­ 
tracting procedures; widening Intelsat T s scope of services "to insure 
that the definition of public telecommunications includes those services 
traditionally considered to be public in nature"—a reference to British 
efforts to have all mobile services classified as "specialised" and there­ 
fore to require more elaborate internal authorisations than "public" ser­ 
vices; a sufficiently high capital ceiling to enable the governing board 
to procure the next satellite generation without approval by the consti­ 
tuent assembly; and a recasting of amendments procedures, which the U.S. 
wanted to require a two-thirds weighted vote in the assembly—thus as­ 
suring; Comsat a veto—and the Europeans insisted should require an 85
Cl8) 
percent unweighted vote.
American acceptance of the European-backed amendments procedure 
turned out to be the key to final agreement. On May 19, at a 25-nation 
negotiating caucus, the U.S. delegation agreed to the 85 percent unweigh­ 
ted vote requirement in exchange for acceptance of its other 10 demands.
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After another five days of closed-door meetings, final agreement was 
announced on May 21 by the conference chairman and head of the U.S. 
delegation, Abbott Washburn: "There were times when I never thought 
I would be standing here saying that we had reached agreement," he said. 
"Nobody is completely happy with the result, but all believe it is vi­ 
able." The vote on the permanent arrangements was 73 for, none 
against, with four abstentions—Prance, Mexico, Monaco and Malagasy. 
Criticisms of the final form were made by Sweden, the UAR, Syria and 
Algeria, but all indicated they would sign the document nonetheless. 
The agreements were opened for signature on August 20, 1971 and entered 
into force on February 12, 1973.
The process by which the various issues addressed by the conference 
were resolved is now recounted.
3. THE SCOPE OF INTELSAT SERVICES
Precisely which services Intelsat would be empowered to provide, and 
subject to what internal approvals, was one of the most intractable 
questions the conference addressed; final agreement came only toward 
the end of the 1971 plenipotentiary session.
Domestic service was, however, much easier to agree on than were 
regional and specialised applications, in part because the 1968 ICSC 
action on the Canadian domestic system had set a generally acceptable 
precedent. While the 1967 U.S. submission to the ICSC's preparation 
of its recommendations had stated that "as a general rule the basic
Intelsat system will also be able to provide efficiently and well domes-
(22) tic communications services," v the Americans acknowledged that there
could be no question of binding Intelsat signatories from establishing 
strictly domestic services, and insisted instead that a balance was re-
ouired between sovereign national rights and legitimate international
(23) 
concerns—e.g. orbital slots, fregency assignments.
Under the U.S. plan, Intelsat members could choose either to lease 
circuits for domestic purposes from Intelsat spacecraft, to operate a 
separate satellite or satellites for domestic service, or to operate 
a separate space segment jointly with neighbouring countries for their 
respective domestic requirements. In regard to financing, members could 
ask Intelsat to pay for the necessary space facilities (in which case
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the satellites would likely be used for international traffic as well), 
they could pay Intelsat to provide and operate the satellite, or they 
could finance and furnish the spacecraft independently, subject only to 
minimal technical coordination with Intelsat. ^' In sum, Intelsat's 
role as managerial, operational or regulatory entity would be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, with pivotal responsibility assigned the coun­ 
try or countries most directly concerned.
In its May 1968 ruling on the proposed Canadian system, the ICSC 
had found no legal obstacles to the plan as long as technical coordina­ 
tion ensured that domestic frequency use did not interfere with Intel-
(25) sat service. Formal endorsement of the implied policy by the United
States—which had already agreed to launch the Hughes-built Canadian
satellites, very likely to help Canada keep Quebec out of the Symphonic / p/- \
system —came shortly after the first conference was recessed in a 
letter from the U.S. delegation chairman to a senator. Separate domes­ 
tic systems would be acceptable with "no qualifications except for tech-
(2?) 
nical coordination with Intelsat."
In view of the general American insistence on the widest possible 
interpretation of Intelsat's competence, this position on domestic satel­ 
lites suggested that the subject would be relatively non-controversial. 
During the first conference, however, there was some disagreement over 
whether the power to decide on the compatibility of a separate domestic 
should be vested in Intelsat's governing body or its intergovernmental 
assembly. The controversy went no further than the European-supported 
PC54 draft, issued at the third Prepcom meeting in November 1969» which 
stipulated that members interested in creating their own domestic sys­ 
tems should consult with the governing board in advance; the board would 
then advise on the proposal's technical compatibility with the Intelsat 
system. The various financing provisions set forth in the 196? American 
draft were accepted, and the resulting formulation was written into Ar-
/ p Q \
tide XIV of the permanent agreements.
Regional systems ivere a far more contentious subject. While the 
U.S. pre-conference submissions did not object to separate systems that 
would provide different services—e.g. direct broadcasting—and be con­ 
fined to a definite geographic region, the position was silent as to the 
permissibility of satellite systems that would be distinct geographically 
but not functionally from Intel sat's/ 29 ' The implication, however, was
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that the Americans did not recognise a legitimate need for other inter­ 
national systems that would duplicate Intelsat's services, a position 
supported by other pre-conference IGSC contributions: Australia and 
Canada urged that members refrain from any activities that would compete 
with and divert traffic from Intelsat; the Asia/Pacific group wanted all 
but domestic systems prohibited. The Western Europeans, however, argued 
that no restrictions should be placed on the rights of members to pursue 
independent satellite projects regardless of their geographic or func­ 
tional scopes, and the French reiterated support for dividing space seg­ 
ment ownership which, they said, would make the regional-global distinc­ 
tion academic. The ICSC's recommendations to the conference indi­ 
cated majority support for allowing no independent systems that would
compete with Intelsat, while permitting specialised regional networks
f ^l) 
if established in consultation with the governing board.
Little progress was made at the first conference, where much of 
the discussion on the subject was devoted to the acceptability of the 
"single global system" wording which the U.S. wanted inserted in the 
agreements' preamble. The term was supported by Nigeria, Malaysia and 
the Philippines—reportedly reflecting Third World fears that regional
systems would drive up Intelsat tariffs—and by New Zealand, Italy and
(^2)Israel. India proposed "integrated worldwide system" as an alter­ 
native, and was backed by most of the European delegations, Canada, 
Australia, Indonesia and the Polish observers. The controversy was- 
defused when the U.S. announced that "single" modified "global" and 
not "system," a clarification that for some reason made the phrase uni­ 
versally acceptable.
The more substantive dispute over liberalising rules governing cre­ 
ation of regional systems was led by Japan, in favour, and the United 
States, opposed, during the first conference and from there to the Prep- 
corn, where debate centred on: first, whether Intelsat's determinations 
would be binding on members or simply advisory; and second, whether in 
making those determinations Intelsat would be entitled to consider an,y 
economic harm regional systems might cause as sufficient reason to rule 
against them, or whether some stipulated degree of economic harm would 
have to be demonstrated. On the first question, both PC45 and PC54 
drafts agreed that members should be obligated to "ensure," in consultation
-34?
with the Intelsat governing board, that proposed systems were tech­ 
nically and economically compatible. The PC54 position, however, was 
that "substantial" economic harm would have to be threatened before mem­ 
bers could be enjoined to abandon the project; the U.S.-backed PC45 
draft omitted the modifier, thus making any economic harm unacceptable.
The matter remained unsettled during the 1970 conference, and the 
Australian-Japanese compromise Document 93 left the word "substantial" 
bracketed—reserved for later decision. At the first II7G session though 
a wording change put forth by the New Zealand delegation broke the dead­ 
lock: "significant" would be inserted instead of "substantial" to quali­ 
fy the economic harm a proposed regional system would have to threaten 
before Intelsat's governing body could rule it incompatible? the board 
would then advise the intergovernmental assembly, where the decision 
could be ratified or reversed. American acceptance of this formula 
was confirmed by a February 1971 announcement by the State Department 
that launch services would be offered to independent regional satellite 
projects upon a finding by Intelsat's intergovernmental assembly that 
they were acceptable.
Specialised services remained controversial up to the closing days 
of the 1971 conference. The ICSC's recommendations indicated signifi­ 
cant—arguably, substantial—differences of opinion, while suggesting 
that agreement did exist on the need to prevent Intelsat's entry into 
specialised fields from impairing its ability to continue providing cus­ 
tomary public telecommunications services. A majority ICSC recommenda­ 
tion—which under the approved nomenclature meant support of from 10 to 
13 of the board's 18 members—favoured specialised services to be offered 
if the governing body found they would not adversely affect Intelsat's 
principal mission. "Substantial" support—sis to nine members—was how­ 
ever expressed for requiring formal amendment of the permanent arrange—
(37) 
ments before such services could be provided.
At the first conference, the American position that Intelsat be 
empowered to furnish any service that communications satellites could 
provide received backing from Canada, Kuwait, Iran, Israel, Nigeria and
/ , n \ ——
the Philippines. Arrayed against this view were not only the Euro­ 
peans, but a number of Third World countries who feared that specialised 
applications would impose costs on them without offering compensatory
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benefits. The consensus in Committee I was that any specialised ser­ 
vices should "be "acceptable from the technical and economic points of 
view, and that the Organisation's ability to provide the Space Segment
for public telecommunications services [should] not be adversely affec-
(39) ted." • Left unresolved were such key questions as which specific
services would be defined as specialised, how such services would be 
financed, and which Intelsat organs would make the critical decisions 
as to technical and economic acceptability.
During the Prepcom sessions, the U.S.-backed PC45 position was to 
allow Intelsat's governing board—subject to review by the intergovern­ 
mental assembly—to decide upon Intelsat's entry into specialised fields, 
conditional upon a finding that public services would not be impaired. 
The PC54 draft, however, proposed a series of procedures likely to make 
such expansion difficult: first, while the governing board would rule 
on technical and economic acceptability, it was the intergovernmental 
assembly that would decide whether Intelsat would provide the services; 
second, contracts would have to be concluded vd-th specific users before
services could be furnished; third, consultation with specialised UN/ .,-.\
agencies with jurisdiction in pertinent fields would be required.
Compromise drafts circulated at the beginning of the 1970 confer­ 
ence retained the PC54 position, but the conference itself did little 
but refer the matter to the IWG. It was by that time clear that some 
agreement existed on Intelsat's theoretical entitlement to enter spe­ 
cialised fields, either through new uses of the existing space segment 
or through specially dedicated new spacecraft. To accommodate Third 
World fears that additional costs would be incurred and borne in part 
by them, the IWG recommended that if a separate space segment were cre­ 
ated by Intelsat for specialised services, specific users should finance 
the satellites and related facilities—unless a decision to the contrary 
was taken by the second constituent assembly composed of PTTs and other 
formal signatories of the agreements, called the Meeting of Signatories. 
Nothing was stipulated concerning specialised uses of Intelsat's existing 
space segment. A definitional dispute also arose within the IWG: ear­ 
lier drafts had defined specialised services to include radio naviga­ 
tion, scientific research and direct satellite broadcasting; at the 
third IWG session, however, the British proposed that any mobile ser­ 
vices apart from those already furnished by Intelsat under the interim
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arrangements would be classified as specialised. The IWG's report to 
the conference incorporated this expanded category of specialised fields, 
although U.S. acceptance was unlikely. '
The British position was nevertheless sustained by three preliminary 
votes of the final plenipotentiary, prompting the American delegation to 
declare its rejection essential to final U.S. approval of the accords. ' 
The U.S. was willing to exclude from the definition of 'public 1 telecom­ 
munications "flight control of aircraft or of aviation or maritime navi­ 
gation" not hitherto provided by Intelsat—since at least maritime tele­ 
communications xvould have remained open to Intelsat without the elaborate 
authorisations entry into specialised fields was likely to require. ^ ' 
It was not, however, until the day before final agreement was reached 
that a settlement was reached, which substantially accorded with the U.S. 
position: mobile services not previously furnished by Intelsat would be 
considered as specialised when they would be provided
through mobile stations operating directly to a satellite which 
is designed, in whole or in part, to provide services relating 
to the safety or flight control of aircraft or maritime radio 
navigation. (44)
At the planning stage, the intergovernmental assembly would have to ap­ 
prove any proposals made by the governing board for specialised services 
requiring dedicated facilities. In the case of specialised uses of the 
'public 1 space segment, the board was obligated to ensure that fully 
allocated costs were recovered from the actual users and not borne by 
other Intelsat members.
In all, the various questions raised by Intelsat r s future expansion 
into domestic, regional or specialised services were answered only equi­ 
vocally by the guidelines contained in the permanent arrangements. The 
United States, to be sure, was unable to secure for Intelsat the exclu­ 
sive rights to comprehensive satellite services that certain of its pre- 
conference declarations had asserted—but the Europeans were equally un­ 
successful in clearly prohibiting Intelsat from undertaking such expan­ 
sion. On balance, however, the restrictive impulse carried the day: on 
regional systems, Intelsat would have to determine that proposals consti­ 
tuted material threats to its viability before the plans could be disap­ 
proved; on specialised systems, as one Cbmsat official complained:
,..[A]S a realistic matter, there is such a miasma of cumbersome, 
if not impossible, bureaucratic restrictions and approvals required 
that it does not appear very likely that Intelsat will engage in 
such activities in the future on a significant scale. (46)
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In fact, Intelsat's expansion would depend on case-by-case determina­ 
tions, subject to an agreed priority assigned to conventional public 
telecommunications services: long-haul voice and record traffic, and 
television relay. Whether Comsat's prophesy would come true remained 
to be seen.
4. POWERS. COMPOSITION AND PROCEDURES OP THE GQVERIIII-IG BOAPJ)
There was general agreement, both within the ICSC and at the 1969 con­ 
ference, on the need for a small executive organ composed largely of 
heavy-traffic countries and responsible for directing Intelsat's busi­ 
ness on a routine basis. It was also agreed that while the board's 
membership should be limited, provision should nevertheless be made 
for representation of smaller countries. Proposals on how best to ex­ 
pand board membership differed somewhat: the U.S. suggested a minimum 
investment share be set, and that any five countries be entitled to 
collective representation regardless of their combined shares; the 
British favoured a minimum combined shareholding without further pro­ 
visions; a plan proposed by Canada, Germany and India would have had 
the board composed of the 18 Intelsat members with the biggest invest­ 
ments, plus four seats reserved for regional representatives chosen by 
countries not otherwise represented. Discussion of voting procedures 
at the first conference indicated a widespread desire to prevent weighted 
votes from sustaining or preventing actions contrary to the wishes of a 
numerical majority on the board. Under the Canadian et al. scheme a 
certain percentage of votes would be assigned on a regional basis, but 
Britain and the United States objected that an imposition of actions 
upon Intelsat's biggest shareholders would be unacceptable.
The principal dispute concerning the governing board, however, both 
at the first conference and during the Prepcom sessions, involved its 
powers vis-a-vis the intergovernmental assembly—particularly, the degree 
to which the board would be subject to scrutiny and authoritative review 
by all Intelsat members. The PC54 draft sought to enhance the assembly's 
powers by designating it the primary Intelsat organ and assigning the 
board definite and inclusive powers; the PC45 plan gave ^e board any 
residual powers not otherwise listed. As concerned composition, PC54
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provided for countries not otherwise represented to select board mem­ 
bers on a regional basis, while PC45 proposed that those countries with 
insufficient investment quotas be allowed to pool their shares, as had 
been done with the ICSC. More important, PC45 asserted that investment 
quotas should be based on the total amounts of traffic—international 
and domestic—routed by members through the Intelsat space segment, but 
that a 45 percent maximum be set on the votes any one board member could 
cast regardless of his investment share—a feature that might have been 
a major concession by the U.S. since if Intelsat satellites were used 
for domestic traffic the American traffic share might have been as much 
as 80 percent of the total. The U.S. claimed that including domes­ 
tic traffic in national shares would help encourage use of Intelsat's 
space segment for such purposes, ' but PC45 proposed additional safe­ 
guards to prevent Comsat dominance of board actions: the agreement of 
at least one other board member would be needed to block a vote, and 
three others would be needed to carry a decision. The PC54 proposals,
however, were that only international traffic should be used to compute
(50) 
investment—and hence voting quotas.
Compromise efforts during the second conference, culminating in the 
Australian-Japanese Document 93, resolved some of these conflicts. The 
list of board powers was prefaced by the "including but not limited to" 
phrase favoured by the U.S.-backed PC45t implying that unstated residu­ 
al powers accrued to the governing body. Another troublesome matter, 
concerning the powers of the board vis-a-vis the assembly over appoint­ 
ing or removing Intelsat's secretary-general (see below, pp. 351-4), was 
also settled: Document 93 asserted that a right of appeal to the assem­ 
bly would mean long and time-consuming disputes—"If the Board of Gover­ 
nors is to be in command of the work, it must have full power over the 
staff—including the Director General."^ ' Agreement also was reached 
on precisely which space segment usage would be counted in determining 
investment and voting shares. All traffic routed via jointly-financed 
spacecraft would, as PC45 proposed, count toward investment quotas; but 
only international traffic would determine voting weights, as the PC54 
supporters bad urged, although certain classes of domestic traffic would 
also be counted: where the traffic was between points separated by the 
high seas (e.g. U.S.-Hawaii), by another country (East-West Pakistan) or
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by natural obstacles that made conventional facilities more or less use­ 
less (the interior of Australia, e.g.) ' The PC54 provision for re­ 
gional representation on the board was also included in the compromise,
and a 40 percent ceiling on the voting weight of any one member was 
proposed; substantive questions would require a two-thirds weighted vote, 
but at least four members must vote in favour regardless of their com­ 
bined voting weights, and all but three members' votes would be enough to 
carry an issue no matter how small the numerical majority's combined 
weights. '-^
With minor changes, the Document 93 compromise was retained by the 
IWG and forwarded to the final 1971 plenipotentiary. There the main 
recommendations on voting and board composition were approved: a 40 
percent voting ceiling along with the other safeguards to prevent uni­ 
lateral domination, consideration of certain kinds of domestic usage in 
computing investment and voting shares, and provision for collective rep­ 
resentation on the basis of combined quotas and for a maximum of five 
regional representatives. Until the first session of the Meeting of 
Signatories—the constituent assembly composed of PTTs and other nomi­ 
nated national entities—the board would be composed of the top 12 traf­ 
fic-generating countries and any others whose combined quotas equalled 
that of the twelfth largest. •'-'' The French delegation led a last-ditch 
unsuccessful attempt to weaken the board's authority by assigning final 
say over hiring or firing Intelsat's secretary-general to the inter­ 
governmental assembly, but the principal lines of the Australian-Japanese
(56) compromise were retained in the final version.
5. THE ALL-MEMBER ASSEMBLIES
Despite the broad agreement that Intelsat's structure would have to be 
expanded from its interim two-tiered arrangement to include a formal 
assembly of all members, both the nature and powers of such an assembly 
were contentious matters. The American proposal was for an intergovern­ 
mental assembly empowered to review Intelsat's activities periodically 
and recommend long-term policy directions. A preliminary problem with 
this approach was its failure to distinguish between the roles appropriate 
to national governments and to the operating entities that would be the
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(57) 
actual signatories of the agreements. W( ' Most of the other conference
participants felt it necessary to provide for separate governmental rep­ 
resentation in order to permit national interests to be safeguarded; the 
operating entities should be involved as participants in, and perhaps 
supervisors of, Intelsat's operational affairs. Hence, during the first 
conference a proposal for a four-tiered structure was made by Australia, 
Belgium and Chile, the two new tiers to be an intergovernmental Assembly 
of Parties and a Meeting of Signatories composed of operating entities. 
A more radical Swedish proposal to establish two separate institutions— 
the one commercial and operational and the other intergovernmental and
/ c-g\
political—drew little support.^ '
The U.S. conceded the need for two assemblies, and there proved to 
be little dispute over the powers and responsibilities of the Meeting of 
Signatories, which would enable PTTs to review Intelsat policy in their 
capacities as investors and co-participants in commercial and operational 
matters; the importance of making the Meeting a review body was in any 
case lessened by widening membership of the Board of Governors. Contro­ 
versy over whether the intergovernmental Assembly should supervise the
(59) Board continued, however.
The PC54 proposals were to empower the Assembly to define Intelsat's 
overall policies, review the implementation of the agreements, and con­ 
sider and decide upon any changes in the organisation's functional com­ 
petence—especially concerning specialised services. The Assembly would 
also appoint or remove the director- or secretary-general. Under the 
PC45 provisions, the Assembly's powers were restricted to amending the 
agreements, requesting information from the governing board, issuing 
opinions and recommendations, and deciding whether members had with­ 
drawn from Intelsat owing to violation of the agreements.
At the 1970 conference agreement was finalised on the need for two 
assemblies, and the intergovernmental Assembly of Parties iras designated 
in principle Intelsat's primary organ; it would meet within the first 
year after the permanent arrangements entered into force, and thereafter 
upon request by one-third of Intelsat's membership. The Australian- 
Japanese document said little, however, as to the Assembly's actual pow­ 
ers, but resolution of some of the outstanding issues concerning Intel­ 
sat's management (see below, pp. 351-4 ) defused the question somewhat 
by the time the Intersessional Working Group began deliberations. The 
U.S. believed the Assembly's powers to be the most important remaining
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issue, and the formulation finally approved by the IWG was closer to 
the U.S. PC45 than to the PC54 position: during the September-October 
IWG session Canada and Mexico proposed empowering the Assembly to "give 
consideration to those aspects of Intelsat which are primarily of inte­ 
rest to the Parties as sovereign states," and the IWG accepted that 
formulation.
During the 1971 conference, however, the matter was revived when 
18 nations—led by Prance, Sweden and Switzerland—proposed changes in 
the IWG language to give the Assembly "the power to establish guidelines 
concerning the general policy and long-term objectives of Intelsat..."
Thirty-one members supported the change by the time the issue 
reached the full plenary, but a spokesman then announced that the U.S. 
delegation would refuse to sign the agreements if the change were ap­ 
proved, and it subsequently failed. The IWG formulation, however, was 
also unable to win the necessary two-thirds majority for adoption, and 
further negotiation produced a wording change empowering the Assembly 
to give "due and proper consideration" to actions taken by the Board 
and the Meeting of Signatories. In that form the relevant article was 
finally adopted on May 19.
Thus two all-member assemblies were created. The intergovernmental 
Assembly of Parties retained its formal status as Intelsat r s principal 
organ while losing most of the substantive powers its major supporters 
had wanted for it. A Meeting of Signatories, composed of operating en­ 
tities, was empowered to make recommendations to the Board on opera­ 
tional and managerial matters, future programmes and the like, and could 
set the minimum investment shares to be required for Board membership. 
' •" Its real role in future Intelsat deliberations was nevertheless 
qualified by the very reforms that had widened opportunities for direct 
participation on the Board.
6. MANAGEMENT
It quickly became evident that Comsat's managership would, in its 
existing form, be impossible for the U.S. to retain. Early in the de­ 
liberations held in committee during the 1969 conference agreement was 
reached that Intelsat«s manager either would be internationalised, or
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would be subject to thoroughgoing international control. In both 
cases a directorate or secretariat would be established as an execu­ 
tive organ within Intelsat. Considerable disagreement remained over 
the degree to which the new organ would take over technical and opera­ 
tional matters, whether Comsat would be retained for those purposes 
under contract, to whom Comsat would be responsible as a contractor, 
and what kind of transition toward internationalisation should be man­ 
dated to ensure operational continuity.
The U.S.—supported by a number of South American and African 
countries and, initially, by Japan—at first insisted that "interna­ 
tionalisation of the organization does not, in theory or in fact, re­ 
quire internationalizing the manager,"^ ' but Comsat's position was
soon moderated under the combined pressure of the State Department and
(Cl \
other Intelsat members. American objections to the various tran­ 
sitional schemes focussed on the notion of having the new executive 
organ interposed between Comsat and the governing board, while mana­ 
gerial functions were gradually transferred to the new international 
staff. Proposals at the first conference nevertheless stressed full 
internationalisation as the ultimate objective: a plan submitted by 
five European members, Canada and India urged a five-year deadline for 
completing the transition, but an alternative put forth by Australia, 
Chile, Nigeria and Venezuela—countries otherwise allied with Comsat— 
stated that although the objective was desirable, its attainment should 
depend upon continuing consultation between Comsat and the governing 
board to guarantee continuity.
The managership was the most controversial question addressed by 
the Prepcom, in spite of substantial modifications in the U.S. posi­ 
tion. PC45 signalled a retreat from insistence that Comsat remain as 
sole managerial entity: an international secretariat would be created 
under a secretary-general appointed by and responsible to the board, 
and would immediately take on administrative and financial responsi­ 
bilities. The board would meanwhile commission a wide-ranging inde­ 
pendent study of managerial options, especially in regard to the opti­ 
mal division of in-house (secretariat) and contracted (Comsat) func­ 
tions. Comsat would remain technical and operational manager under
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contract to the board, and might stay on indefinitely if the manage­ 
ment study so recommended. ''
The European-backed PC54 proposals, however, called for swift and 
complete internationalisation; a director-general would oversee a 
wholly in-house international staff that would replace Comsat entirely 
within five years. The directorate would immediately take over general 
administrative and financial responsibilities, and any activities re­ 
lated to procurement and specialised services, leaving Comsat for the 
time being with the remaining operational and technical functions. Sig­ 
nificantly, though, PC54 left open the possibility that certain speci­ 
fied responsibilities might continue to be delegated by contract even 
after the five-year transition, but the management study the board was 
to commission iirould not examine the overall wisdom of internationali­ 
sation or determine the ultimate direction of the transition.
During the 1970 conference, the Australian-Japanese compromise 
largely settled the basic principles governing changes in Intelsat f s
management, and effectively dashed any lingering hopes of securing
(71) Comsat's tenure. "To keep the Conference from foundering," one
American official wrote, the U.S. delegation "acquiesced in the Japan­ 
ese—Australian compromise package, although this meant a significant
sacrifice by the United States with regard to the future management
(72) of the system." The entirety of Intel sat's management—and not
just the non-technical functions the U.S. was ready to surrender— 
would be internationalised under a director-general after a six-year 
transition. The American contention "that the concept of a director- 
general interpositioned between the manager and the governing body was
(7^1unacceptable" was however endorsed, in that Comsat's interim con­ 
tract for managerial services would be directly with the board.
Immediately after the agreements entered into force the board would 
appoint a transitional secretary-general, who would be kept informed of 
Comsat's activities and would observe major contract negotiations. The 
management study recommended by both PC45 and PC54 drafts would mean­ 
while be commissioned, but regardless of the study's findings the board 
would appoint by the end of 1976 a permanent director-general to suc­ 
ceed the secretary-general and serve as Intelsat's chief executive of­ 
ficer. The key to U.S. acceptance was said to be a provision calling
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for the amount of work eventually to be performed under contract to be 
maximised, although this provision still had to be clarified. The
U.S. still professed to be "skeptical and somewhat agnostic" as con-
(75) cerned internationalised management, and declared that Intelsat's
ultimate arrangements should not be decided until the management study 
had been finished. '
Settlements reached within the IUG effectively ended debate over 
management. The American delegation proposed language to ensure that 
the director-general contracted out, to the maximum extent possible, 
necessary services; but European delegates objected that the director- 
general would therefore become little more than a figurehead while Com-
(771 
sat would remain the real technical and operational power. ' The IWG
solution was to stress the commitment to full internationalisation, while 
inserting language which made organisational efficiency and operational 
continuity the principal criteria of the management study, and which I jQ\
stipulated that contracting should be maximised to the extent practicable.
7. PROCUREMENT AITD TECHNICAL HATTERS
A three—sided division emerged over procurement policy at the 1969 con­ 
ference. 1.) The European position, contained in a Swedish submission, 
was that when bids on equipment contracts—both prime contracts and major 
subcontracts—were comparable as to quality, price and delivery condi­ 
tions, the awards should be distributed internationally so as to approxi­ 
mate national investment quotas. ' 2.) Third World delegates, mainly 
those who had been involved in joint meetings of Latin American and Arab 
members, proposed an 'equal treatment clause 1 , whereby any cost increases 
due to international contract distribution would be matched by technical 
assistance grants. ' It was claimed that around 45 of Intelsat's then- 
68 member countries were unlikely to compete for contracts, and "correc­ 
tive steps" were therefore appropriate. 3.) The American view was 
that Intelsat should procure with a view solely to getting best price, 
quality and terms, and it was this position that attracted—for the 
moment—majority support within th-e-conference committee responsible for
A -,- (82) 
drafting procurement policy.
While the PC45 draft issued during the Prepcom sessions omitted any
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reference to international contract distribution, the PC54 document kept 
the issue alive "by stressing that application of any formula would first 
depend on the comparability of competing bids; only when more than one 
bid offered the 'best 1 combination of quality, price and terras should 
contracts be awarded "so as to ensure the widest possible international 
participation in procurement with a view to furthering by competition the 
long-term interests of Intelsat."^ '
The procurement debate was overshadowed during the 1970 conference 
by the management issue, and was therefore referred to the IWG where it 
remained as "the major hurdle" facing the group at its final session in 
December 1970. Although the IWG had previously approved a procurement 
article with a softer distributional clause, in December West Germany led 
Belgium, Canada, Prance, India, Japan, Switzerland and Britain in insis­ 
ting the PC54 language be adopted. No agreement was reached and the mat-
/ Qc-\
ter went to the final conference.
There the British delegation, among others, argued that the distri­ 
butional formula would add nothing to space segment costs, since it/ Q/-\
would come into play only when bids were otherwise comparable. The 
Europeans' argument was at first successful, and the plenary approved 
the addition of the clause on May 6. Then however the dispute was again 
revived by Chile, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia, and the U.S. listed dele­ 
tion of distributional requirements as one of its non-negotiable demands. 
After conciliation efforts, the original IWG language was re-adopted: 
"If there is more than one bid offering such a combination"—offering, 
that is, the "best combination of quality, price and the most favourable 
delivery time"—"the contract shall be awarded so as to stimulate, in
( ftT \
the interest of Intelsat, world-wide competition."^ Thus rejected 
was the wording urged by the PC54 group—in the event of comparable bids 
"the widest possible international participation in procurement" should
be sought.
A further S3t of issues related to procurement concerned the rela­ 
tive merits of titles and licences attached to equipment development 
under contract to Intelsat. During the interim period Intelsat—and 
Comsat—had insisted on acquiring full titles to the results of work 
carried out for the system, and thereafter making them available to In­ 
telsat members strictly for facilities to be used with the global space
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(89) segment. Clearly, retaining the titles was more expensive—since
contractors insisted on compensation—but it helped safeguard the 'single 
global system 1 by preventing the same technologies from being used in 
other satellite systems. Pressure had been mounting since at least 1969 
with one under which Intelsat would purchase, at lower cost, limited 
licences on equipment; ultimate rights to market the hardware of exper­ 
tise would remain with the contractor, from whom they would be available 
for other satellite projects. By the time the IWG began its sessions 
the U.S. had given in on its preference for titles. Some dispute re­ 
mained as to the precise conditions under which the governing board 
would be permitted to deviate from a licencing policy, and agreement 
was finally reached toward the end of the final conference, when a 
specified and limited range of instances was accepted as suitable for 
board discretion. Consequently, Intelsat members would henceforth 
have considerable rights to use technology developed for Intelsat in 
their own satellite systems.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The permanent Intelsat arrangements provided for a large, if not cum­ 
bersome, organisational structure consisting formally of four, and ef­ 
fectively of five, organs: a governing board meeting at least four 
times a year; an intergovernmental Assembly of Parties gathering once 
every two years; an annual Meeting of Signatories composed of operating 
entities; an executive organ headed initially by a secretary-general 
and, after the six-year transition, by a director-general; and a •man­ 
agement services contractor', designated as Comsat for the transitional 
period and responsible to the board—but if retained beyond the six 
years, to be accountable to the director-general. The transitional 
formulas, one Comsat official complained, "called for one of the most
awesomely complicated transitional and organizational structures in the
(91) tortuous annals of international cooperation." v More prosaically,
an Intelsat governor has observed that the new arrangements "have not
(92)
made Intelsat more efficient, just more expensive,"w and an FCC com­ 
missioner—who had served as U.S. delegation chairman during the re­ 
negotiations—has commented that the all-member assemblies whose creation 
required so much effort had little to do aside from "talking about how
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well everything is going."
The changes in Intelsat dictated by its permanent arrangements were 
not, however, meant to improve or even to modify its operational perfor­ 
mance. They were intended 1.) to symbolise convincingly the multination­ 
al character that members wished the organisation to have, and 2.) to 
provide the means through which a fuller range of national and regional 
political interests that had mobilised to participate in satellite acti­ 
vities could, potentially, influence the organisation's actions. The 
principal focus of both symbolic and substantive enfranchisement efforts 
was Comsat's interim dominance over Intelsat, and the main thrust of re­ 
form was toward moderating that dominance so as to produce a structure 
that would respond better to the policy objectives that members might 
procure or create satellite services to fulfil.
On the face of it, the re-negotiations' success appears greater 
formally than substantively—when viewed, that is, in terms of impact 
upon Comsat's role. While, as 0. Riegel has observed, the conference 
outcome "represented what was substantially a general retreat by the 
United States from its major positions," it was also true that "in 
terms of practical power, in spite of the concessions the United States 
would appear to have lost little if anything."^ ' The new constitu­ 
ent assemblies seemed little threat to the interim regime where "control 
...rests solidly with the advanced nations," and in particular Comsat.
?QC)
V7xV Although a voting maximum was enacted in the Board of Governors, 
the ceiling was higher than Comsat's current—or likely future—traffic 
volume and therefore "would not appear to hurt the United States too 
much in the long run." Similarly, the material impact of the com­ 
plex transitional management arrangements was diminished by Comsat's 
mandate to continue as principal managerial entity for another seven 
or eight years, thus giving the company a total of 13 or 14 years in 
the job.^°'' Comsat would still be manager when the next big round of 
contracts—for Intelsat V—came onto the agenda, and the precedents 
set by its tenure would make it unlikely that the eventual transfer 
of responsibility to an international directorate would produce signi­ 
ficant alterations in operational practices.
Nevertheless, there were at least two real consequences of the 
1969-71 negotiations, in terms of accountability and confinement. First,
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even though Gorasat remained—for a time—technically and operationally 
indispensable, it would be subject to a radically different structure 
of accountability. The company's ties to Intelsat were henceforth con­ 
tractual and negotiable? review procedures would be more extensive and 
opportunities for scrutiny far more widely distributed among members. 
Comsat would still be, faute de mieuz, in a managerial role rather closer 
to what it had previously played than some would have liked—but its 
tenure depended not on its continued self-selection, but on a convincing 
demonstration that its service to Intelsat was not likely to be bettered 
by some other entity.
Second, the re—negotiations established clear priorities governing 
expansion of Intelsat's sphere of activities, and left the way open for 
separate satellite systems. Specialised applications, for instance, 
would be evaluated first and foremost as to their likely impact on what 
henceforth was agreed to be Intelsat's principal mission—international 
public telecommunications. The likelihood that Intelsat attempt to stop 
its members from creating new systems for broadcasting or telecommunica­ 
tions was slim indeed. The organisation had, in sum, chosen its major 
path of future development; the path was narrower than the proponents 
of the 'single global system' had wished, but it was no longer claimed 
to be the only path.
CHAPTER 19: AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS
Finally, space will be annhilated and thought will travel as 
fast as the speed of electricity and the ingenuity of man has 
made possible. Science thus will serve mankind if political 
organization can keep pace.
— Francis Colt de Wolf, 1946^
This final chapter consists of two main parts, the first a survey of 
satellite developments from the conclusion of permanent arrangements 
for Intelsat through the mid-1970s, the second offering theoretical 
conclusions related to the characterisation of satellite formation pro­ 
posed in Chapter Two but in light of the historical account that the 
study has presented. It is necessary to demonstrate empirically the 
technical and organisational transformation of the satellite field 
that was inaugurated by the 1971 Intelsat agreements in order to jus­ 
tify the search for determinants of that transformation, which should 
be located in the changed political objectives which participation in 
satellite formation promised to fulfil.
1. INTELSAT:; STALEMATE BROKEN
Notwithstanding the internally negotiable, and hence uneasy, features 
of the lengthy transition to internationalisation provided for by the 
permanent arrangements, satellite development within Intelsat showed 
almost immediate signs of resurgence and expansion of services.
Earth station proliferation; While 63 antennas were built in 39 
countries for Intelsat during the seven-year interim period from 1965 
through 1971, a further 84 antennas were added to the system in the 
four years following the 1971 re-negotiations. The average annual 
addition of ground station antennas thus rose from nine through 1971 
to 22 through 1975, and the number of countries with their own Intelsat
ground facilities increased from a total of 39 at the end of 1971 to
(2) 
72 by the end of 1975. '
Space segment utilisation: Although when considered relative to
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to capacity, utilisation of Intelsat's space segment declined sharply 
from a 1965-71 average of 39.2 percent to 27.5 percent from 1972 to 
mid-1975i it is notable that the system's on-line capacity more than 
doubled when global deployment of the Intelsat IV series was completed 
in 1972—and circuit leases would therefore have had to double immedi­ 
ately simply to maintain the previous level of utilisation. When the 
post-1971 absolute rise in full-time circuit leases is considered, how­ 
ever, substantial improvement is evident: from 2,917 circuits leased 
worldwide in December 1971, to 6,689 in mid-1975.^'
Diversification of usage; Circuit lease figures had become, further­ 
more, poor indications of total system utilisation since Intelsat began 
in April 1972 to offer long-term leases of bulk capacity (half- and full- 
transponders) at rates substantially below those which would be justi­ 
fied by voice circuit equivalences. ' In terms of overall usage, by 
1976 eleven countries were leasing a total of c% transponders—more than 
two—thirds the capacity of an Intelsat IV—for domestic telecommunications 
and bilateral television exchanges: in effect, as much capacity was be­ 
ing devoted to these applications as to intercontinental relay. Among 
the customers were: Spain and Mexico for TV exchanges; Algeria, which 
had established a 14-station domestic telecommunications network; Bra­ 
zil for domestic uses; Malaysia for live telecasts between the Malay 
Peninsula and Eastern Ilalaysia; Norway, to interconnect North Sea oil 
operations, and Chile, Nigeria, Zaire and the Philippines. Negotiations 
were also underway with the Arab Telecommunications Union over use of 
Intelsat spacecraft for Mideast regional service.
This diversification was aided by more tolerant policies toward
smaller, non-standard earth stations, which comprised nearly 29 percent
(7) 
of the antennas added to the system between 1972 and the end of 1975«
Smaller earth stations were authorised in January 1976 for Chad, Sierra
(8) 
Leone, Thailand and Upper Volta. v ' Partly as a consequence, TV relay
traffic more than doubled in volume between the end of 1971 and 1974 
and, interestingly, a broadcast-like pattern of usage began to emerge— 
whereby total earth station transmission times were outpaced by the in­ 
crease in hours of reception, as multi-destination telecasts became 
more frequent. Prance inaugurated a daily TV transmission to 11 franco­ 
phone countries, and by 1974 total transmission time was half that of
(9) reception.
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Comsat and the Intelsat IV-As: Comsat became Intelsat'3 'manage­ 
ment services contractor' under a contract running from August 1974 to 
February 1979 f which set a ^500,000 yearly fee and, as amended in 1976 
to allow for the director-general's assumption of responsibilities, pro­ 
vided Intelsat's executive organ with substantial and continuing powers 
of review over Comsat's Intelsat-related activities. '
Comsat had, however, used its remaining tenure under the interim 
arrangements to promote successfully what some Intelsat members viewed 
as an accelerated follow-on satellite series to the Intelsat IVs. The 
IV-As, offering around double the capacity of the IVs, were first op­ 
posed by the U.S. international record carriers and later by European 
ICSC members, on grounds that the satellites—six in all, at a total 
cost of 2279m—would be deployed between 1975 and 1977, while the ad­ 
vanced Intelsat Vs xrould be available by 1979- Nevertheless, Comsat 
prevailed, and the first IV-A was launched in July 1975» the same month 
the request for proposals to manufacturers for the Vs was published. Of 
the first Atlantic IV-A's 20 transponders, one was reserved for demand- 
assignment (SPADE) service and another for two simultaneous TV channels. 
(11)
2. SEPARATE SYSTEMS
International regulatory changes: Preparation had already been 
underway within the International Telecommunications Union (iTU) for 
modifications of regulatory practices to accommodate a possible multi­ 
plicity of satellite systems—and competing claims on orbital slots 
and frequencies. 12 ' A World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC), 
the first such conference to deal with space communications since the 
1963 EARC, was held in Geneva in June-July 1971. Its results included 
an eight-fold increase in the frequencies formally eligible for satel­ 
lite use—an expansion thax effectively would be even greater, ovang 
to advanced frequency re-use techniques—and new procedures to ensure 
coordination between terrestrial and space users, and among existing 
and prospective space users. Of special importance were provisions 
entitling ITU members who had no satellites to object to proposed sys­ 
tems on the basis of possible interference with future plans. Previ­ 
ously, a satellite system would be registered virtually automatically
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— and thereby approved — as long as its specifications were not chal­ 
lenged on grounds of interference with current uses, but the new pro­ 
visions gave standing to prospective satellite operators and therefore 
placed some obligation on satellite-operating countries to consult with 
others to ensure more editable long-torm opportunities in the field. '
Launcher services; After the Intel sat arrangements were concluded, 
the United States in September 1971 offered full launch services for 
the proposed European satellite system which, it was decided, threatened 
measurable but not substantial economic harm to Intel sat. The Europeans, 
however, viewed the concession as but a temporary advantage, and the 
French pushed ahead with development of their Ariane rocket, designed 
eventually to put two synchronous satellites in orbit at once. Pore- 
casting a growing demand for launch services — 30 to 40 communications 
satellites envisaged during the 1980s for India, Brazil, Scandinavia 
and various Arab countries, among others — Prance secured support for 
multilateral rocket development in 1975 from the new European Space 
Agency. Although the American space shuttle offered, in principle, 
cost savings over the Ariane, the Europeans remained wary of the still 
mal-defined terms under which the shuttle's services would be available 
to them, •) ' and were therefore reportedly heartened by the Soviet Union's 
April 1975 announcement that it would provide launch services to inter­ 
national satellite projects. Meanwhile the ESA budgeted some
for Spacelab — the space station the U.S. shuttle would eventually place 
in orbit, a facility believed to be of great potential value to certain
industrial processes — an allocation which was twice NASA's own budget
(17) for the laboratory.
Regional and domestic systems; The modifications in Intel sat 's 
own rules on transponder leases and earth station standards dampened 
but did not eliminate interest in separate telecommunications and broad­ 
casting satellite systems. Three systems, on which work had already be­ 
gun, were deployed or expanded in the immediate post-1971 period: the 
Soviets, after a first successful test launch of a geostationary satel­ 
lite in April 1974, announced plans in March 1975 to expand their domes­ 
tic Molniya network through addition of synchronous satellites designed 
to serve small-diameter community TV antennas; Telesat-Canada began 
operations in December 1973; and the first U.S. domestic satellite was 
launched five months later.
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The first experimental Symphonie satellite was launched by 
NASA in December 1974? a follow-on spacecraft was scheduled for launch 
in August 1975> and was to begin providing TV and radio distribution 
services, initially relying on extensive terrestrial links but later 
to be used with small-diameter ground antennas. ' A comprehensive 
feasibility study by a UNESCO/ITU joint mission for a regional Latin 
American educational TV satellite system was requested by eight coun­ 
tries in 1970 and was expected to be published in late 1975, and re­ 
quests to manufacturers for bids on a Brazilian domestic system were 
to be issued by the end of that year. In early 1974 a group of Arab 
ministers of information reaffirmed confidence in the findings of a 
1970 UNESCO/ITU study which had recommended an Arab Communications Sat­ 
ellite System; the current plans of the Arab States Broadcasting Union 
and the Arab Telecommunications Union envisaged a regional system of 
two 12-transponder satellites providing 5-7»000 voice circuits and 2-5 
television channels. Japan had immediate plans to launch two Japanese- 
built geostationary satellites with U.S. rockets in 1977 t to be followed 
in 1978 by an experimental communications satellite put in orbit by a 
Japanese rocket. Indonesia's domestic system, which would use a Hughes- 
built satellite similar to that of the Canadian and U.S. Westar space­ 
craft, was scheduled to begin educational TV service in August 1976. 
Pending creation of an ASEAN system in the early 1980s—which would 
jointly serve Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philip­ 
pines—the Philippines and Malaysia announced interest in leasing capa­ 
city from Indonesia spacecraft. Planning continued on West African and 
Australian systems, while in Europe a geostationary Orbital Test Satel­ 
lite (OTS) was scheduled for mid-1977 launch; OTS was a precursor to 
the European Communications Satellite, which would offer operational 
service to CEPT and EBU members and possibly direct broadcasting to aug­ 
mented home TV sets, beginning in 1980.
Maritime services; Intelsat's governing board authorised Comsat 
to conduct satellite experiments with Cunard Lines in spring 1972, and 
in spite of objections from British and French ICSC members sent a re­ 
port to the International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IKCO) show­ 
ing the feasibility of using the next generation of Intelsat spacecraft 
for maritime communications/ 1" Meanwhile, however, parallel efforts
-364-
independent of Intelsat in the U.S. and Europe appeared likely to cul­ 
minate in creation of a. new international satellite organisation dedi­ 
cated to maritime communications.
In November 1972 the U.S. Navy awarded a contract to TRW for a naval 
satellite system, Fleetsatcora, which was expected to begin operations 
around the end of the decade.^ ' The Navy announced interest in having 
an interim system and in March 1973 Comsat General, the only entity to
have submitted a bid, received a ^28m contract from the Navy to provide
(2l) 
two years of maritime service. ' Comsat General contracted with Hughes
in May to purchase a ^40m three-satellite Maritime Satellite (Marisat) 
space segment, which would be operational in the Atlantic and Pacific
by 1977 and, moreover, would provide enough capacity in excess of Naval
(22) 
requirements to permit Comsat to solicit commercial customers. Under
an PCC order in April Comsat was obliged to sell minority shares—total­ 
ling just under 15 percent—to the U.S. international record carriers. 
An overall outlay of $S>2m was envisaged to cover the satellites, two 
elaborate ground installations, and 200 sophisticated shipboard terminals 
—with four-foot antennas and automatic mechanisms to ensure that they
remained locked on to the satellites—which would furnish voice, record
(23) 
and high-speed data services.
In 1974 ESRO—and later the European Space Agency—announced plans 
to modify the OTS spacecraft for maritime usage, and began work on a 
MAROTS project to put a European satellite over the Indian Ocean by 1977« 
ESRO was to manage the project—in which Britain sought a 56 percent 
interest and for which two UK firms, Hawker-Siddeley and Marconi Space 
Systems, were competing for the prime contract—and Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Norway were participating.^ 4 ' The ini­ 
tial focus of MAROTS on Indian Ocean shipping lanes clearly complemented 
the Marisat plans for Atlantic and Pacific coverage and the possible 
benefits of a merger—suggested by the IMCO as early as 1972—led to 
the convening in April-May 1975 of an intergovernmental conference to 
consider establishment of an International Maritime Satellite System 
(Inmarsat) in London. In addition to the U.S. and MAROTS project mem­ 
bers, the conference attracted participation from the Soviet Union, East 
Germany, Poland, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Japan and
Liberia. ^ '
Although Comsat General's Marisat system began operational service 
of 14 ships in May 1976, the company remained interested in formalising
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international arrangements to permit service to be sustained after its 
contract with the U.S. Navy—extended owing to delays in construction 
of TRW's Pleetsatcom—expired in 1980.^ 26 '
Aviation services; Work on aeronautical satellites also continued 
in a parallel fashion in Europe and the United States. Comsat's work, 
in cooperation with the aviation communications carrier Arinc., to design 
a VHP system suited to the U.S. airlines was discontinued during the
Intelsat conference, largely because of the downturn in business experi-
(27) enced by the principal American airlines, Pan Am and TWA. '' The White
House Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) had meanwhile been formu­ 
lating government policy in the field, and in January 1971 called for 
pre-operational deployment in the Pacific by 1973 and the Atlantic by 
1975* The OTP policy represented a two-fold setback for Comsat: first 
because the Federal Aviation Agency was named to manage the project, 
and second because the White House endorsed the UHP system favoured by 
ESRO and NASA but hitherto opposed by Comsat and the U.S. airlines. The 
policy also, however, restated a commitment to leasing capacity from an
eventual system—rather than owning and operating it—but the status of
/ op.} 
Comsat's ^lOOm two-satellite proposal was nevertheless unclear. '
Under International Civil Aeronautics Organisation (ICAO) agreements, 
responsibility for aviation communications was divided internationally:
the U.S. in charge of the Pacific, and Canada and Britain primarily re-
(29) sponsible for the Atlantic. ' A shift to intergovernmental negotiations,
notwithstanding the American policy of leasing circuits to the state, was 
apparent when discussions among the FAA, ESRO and the Canadian government 
over a joint satellite project opened later in 1971- At a meeting of an 
ad hoc intergovernmental group in Madrid in August, it was decided to
form an Aerosat Council composed of representatives of each participating
(30) government in order to draft formal arrangements.
Despite having by 1972 made four different aeronautical satellite 
proposals, Comsat was on the brink of being left out of the field alto­ 
gether: the Aerosat draft agreement—formally a memorandum of understand­ 
ing between the FAA and ESRO—called for joint governmental ownership, in 
contradiction to the 1971 U.S. policy favouring leases. Under pressure 
from Comsat and the American airlines, "a division of views" developed 
within the government^ '—reportedly with the State and Transportation 
departments supporting the Aerosat plan, while the OTP and Dr. Kissiflger,
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then a presidential adviser, opposing it v '—and President Nixon 
rejected the compact in February 1972 on grounds that it conflicted 
with a commitment to procure services from privately-owned sources.
Further negotiations produced another memorandum in 1974 among 
ESRO and the U.S. and Canadian governments providing for joint experi­ 
ments on transatlantic aviation satellite services. Aerosat remained 
formally intergovernmental, but after competitive bids were evaluated 
Comsat General was selected over RCA by the Aerosat Council to serve ' 
as American representative. The system's ownership was divided 47 per­ 
cent each to Comsat General and ESRO and six percent to Canada. Comsat 
General was to lease capacity to the FAA—which also would pay the ^36ra 
launch costs—and the two-satellite system, estimated to cost ^72m, was 
scheduled for 1979 deployment. The Aerosat Council, headquartered in 
Paris, issued a formal request for bids in March 1976.
Direct satellite broadcasting; The most controversial potential 
application of satellite technology—broadcasting directly from satel­ 
lites to TV or radio receivers—remained unlikely to be deployed opera­ 
tionally on a large scale as of the mid-1970s. Intelsat had made no 
effort to undertake direct broadcasting development, and the application 
had without objection been included among the 'specialised services' 
requiring elaborate authorisations under terms of the 1971 agreements. 
By the time UNESCO approved in October 1972 a "Declaration of guiding 
principles on the use of satellite broadcasting," the matter had been 
on its agenda for 10 years. ^ -? ' As of the mid-1970s the only notable 
attempts to broadcast from satellites had been a NASA experimental 
project, using an ATS spacecraft first within the United States to 
transmit educational TV to schools and clinics in three regions and 
then to broadcast to community receivers in 5|000 villages—nearly 
half receiving signals direct from the satellite—located in six dif­ 
ferent regions of India. The one-year Satellite Instructional Tele­ 
vision Experiment (SITE) was agreed bilaterally between NASA and the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission.
The reasons for inaction in the direct broadcasting field are 
numerous, and easily sufficient, to-warrant a study comparable in length 
to this one. " Worthy of brief mention are: 1.) the historical 
legacy of international broadcast, as aga^Jist telecommunications, regu­ 
lation; 2.) the larger controversy of 'national cultural sovereignty'
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versus the 'free flow of information 1 ; and 3.) the virtual absence 
of policy on the part of the most advanced technical power in the 
field, the United States.
Whereas international telecommunications regulation was initially 
inspired by previous postal agreements, early attempts to regulate in­ 
ternational broadcasting actually applied principles derived from na­ 
tional control over airspace—and in effect attempted to supply juri­ 
dically the protections that were eliminated technically by the ability 
of foreign transmitters to reach domestic audiences directly. ' Ef­ 
forts were made as early as 1959 to prohibit broadcasting from space— 
ostensibly for the same reasons that extra-national 'pirate' broadcast­ 
ing was declared illegal—and the French tried unsuccessfully to have
(^q) 
satellite broadcasting banned at the 1963 EARC. ''
Direct broadcasting became an "exemplar of the challenge to na­ 
tional sovereignty"^ during the debate revived in the latter 1960s 
within various international forums—notably UNESCO and the UN Commit­ 
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (CPUOS)—over the continued 
wisdom and acceptability of the 'free flow 1 of international informa­ 
tion to which UNESCO was nominally dedicated, a doctrine which was held 
to have legitimated a one-way flow of media traffic from the metropoli­ 
tan to the Third worlds and thereby jeopardised the political and cul­ 
tural sovereignty of underdeveloped countries. In 1966 the UN 
General Assembly began efforts to have the CPUOS address formally the 
issues raised by satellite broadcasting, and in 1968—as a result of 
Canadian and Swedish initiatives—a Working Group on Direct Broadcast 
Satellites was created. Subsequent debate there and within UNESCO led 
to the 1972 UNESCO declaration of principles, which supported a require­ 
ment for prior consent by prospective receiving countries and cautioned 
on the need to avoid 'spillover' of broadcasts onto unwilling third
+ • (42) countries.
While the U.S.—along with Japan and a dwindling number of other 
countries—was upholding the 'free flow' position internationally, there 
was "an appalling lack of Government policy" in the satellite broadcast­ 
ing field, as a 1969 congressional report concluded.^' A State Depart­ 
ment official had testified that government policy was one of leaving 
options open,^' and the U.S. later tried to postpone the final vote 
on the UNESCO declaration and ended up abstaining. ->) American policy
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was caught between a mild official interest in using broadcast satel­ 
lites internationally—mild because there was little indication that 
anyone else was likely to deploy such large and powerful spacecraft— 
and fierce resistance domestically by broadcasters to further develop­ 
ment of a technology that threatened to subvert the entire structure 
of the broadcast industry by making local transmitters obsolete. ' 
While there were recommendations of greater U.S. work in the field "in 
order to maintain our present leadership,"^'' and suggestions that 
Intelsat create and maintain the space segment of a worldwide space 
broadcasting system, ^ ' little effort was made to pursue either course 
and the probability of anything but limited, bilateral arrangements was 
slight.
That relegation of broadcast satellite development to domestic or 
regional projects was, arguably, consistent with the general transforma­ 
tion of the satellite field, which we shall now consider.
3. CONCLUSIONS; PRE-EMPTIVE UMDEEDWELOPMENT SUCCEEDED
The satellite field has since 1971-72 begun to display a technically 
multifocal and politically polycentric character; various unexploited
!
or underdeveloped technological applications have been undertaken by 
a loosely coordinated regime of international, regional and domestic 
projects, whose combined efforts promise substantially greater develop­ 
ment of the technology than had been achieved during the initial period 
of pre-emptive underdevelopment. Our concluding task is to sketch the 
connections between the two phases in order to support the proposition 
that the period of monopolistic control and developmental constraint 
made possible—and indeed engendered—the subsequent period of liberali­ 
sation of control and, potentially, maximisation of technical develop­ 
ment.
The model introduced in Chapter Two of pre-emptive underdevelopraent 
described a technological formation in which control of a technology was 
sought and secured through rapid and limited development. A floor on 
development existed, consisting ofthe minimum necessary to discourage 
rival deployments and thereby to prevent loss or dissipation of control; 
but a developmental ceiling also existed, defined by the harm more in­ 
tensive technical exploitation or wider deployment would cause to the
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outs-tanding interests of dominant participants.
As a sustained technological formation, pre-emptive underdevelop- 
raent required two sets of conditions, one primarily external and the 
other internal. First, the stakes of the process had to be considered 
politically and industrially important, as was clearly the case during 
the first decade of satellite formation from 1961 to 1971: the U.S. 
government's two-fold requirement for improved operational services 
and an impressive 'propaganda of the deed 1 , the American carrier in­ 
dustry's concern with the potential impact of satellite services upon 
future prospects, and the fears of European countries that lucrative 
opportunities in commercial space fields would be foreclosed to the 
long-term detriment of high-technology industries, together suggested 
that satellite formation was a novel arena of substantial importance 
to the pursuit of the particular and otherwise unrelated interests of 
major participants.
Second, internally the mode of formation had to be structured so 
as to confine the opportunities for substantive influence to those 
participants Tvhose functional collaboration was essential to the under­ 
taking: further enfranchisement would threaten both the process 1 pre­ 
emptive urgency, by obliging more extensive negotiation and consensus- 
formation, and its developmental limitations, by expanding the range 
of demands that could be made upon the technology. The character of 
satellite formation that was negotiated during the 1961-71 period— 
both defensive in orientation, owing to the protectionist strategies 
of the U.S. carrier industry and of European participants, and posi­ 
tive in its commitment to some degree of rapid technological develop­ 
ment, owing to the U.S. government and later to Comsat—was no raore 
stable than the political hold of those participants over the process 
was firm, since negotiation would not otherwise have to be confined 
to the terms suggested by their interests.
The most apparent transformation during this first phase was in­ 
ternal to the mode of formation, which expanded in nominal composition 
and gradually devolved politically toward a different locus of deter­ 
mination. From a preliminary structure wholly internal to the U.S. 
government—first the military and then civilian space programmes— 
the mode was expanded in 1961-62 to include a small number of private
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companies that were tied to the state through regulatory controls. 
As international collaboration was secured in Europe, "both military 
and civilian components of state influence over the enterprise de­ 
clined: the military's satellite interest was progressively re-direc­ 
ted toward projects separate from the commercial effort; civilian 
governmental oversight was reduced as an immediate result of the car­ 
rier industry's opposition to the state's serving as patron of their 
satellite-owning competitor, and of European objections to national 
regulation of a supposedly international undertaking. The increase 
in the formal participation of Third World countries expanded further 
the composition of the mode of formation, and created intense pressure 
to widen accordingly the opportunities for substantive influence—a 
result of the very success of the technical project in achieving its 
goal of global deployment.
While internal changes in the mode of formation were making its 
concentrated structure of control untenable, external changes were 
making monopolisation of the commercial satellite field both unnece_s- 
_sary and indeed undesirable from the standpoint of the hitherto domi­ 
nant interests in the field. The American 'single global system 1 
policy lingered well after it had ceased to serve any interest but 
Comsat's: the strategic value of the technology transfers that the 
policy was invoked to prevent had been diminished by the absence of a 
significant European challenge to U.S. NATO hegemony; and the threat 
separate satellite systems were believed to pose to Intelsat was les­ 
sened by Intelsat's own installation as a viable—if functionally 
limited—enterprise. While the Europeans had all along opposed and 
resented the single comprehensive system approach, they were joined 
in viewing the eventuality as undesirable by U.S. manufacturers, the 
American carriers (who wanted their own satellites) and, to a degree, 
by Third World countries who were solicitous of Intelsat's future 
but had no wish to see the availability of satellite technology re­ 
stricted by continuing transatlantic stalemates. Furthermore, among 
the industrial countries, mutually beneficial development of special­ 
ised satellite applications mighlTTje endangered if attempts were made 
to adapt Intelsat»s structure and procedures to accommodate projects 
that would better be pursued in forums specifically suited to the 
particular fields.
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In short, the overall functionality of rapid and constrained 
technological formation had been eliminated: what needed to be seized, 
had been; what needed to be protected, had been. Moreover, in the 
process the stakes of further satellite development had become literal­ 
ly globalised. Once the technology had, largely through Intelsat, been 
proved useful and economical, it became subject to a novel array of de­ 
mands that were broader and more pressing than those of the narrow spec­ 
trum of metropolitan industrial and political interests that had compro­ 
mised pre-emptive underdevelopment into existence. These emergent inte­ 
rests challenged the agreed definition of satellite technology as a 
supplementary means of intercontinental relay and supported more inten­ 
sive development and wider availability of satellite services—and for 
the industrial countries it would have been both commercial and politi­ 
cal folly to resist these demands, or to permit outstanding intra- 
metropolitan controversies to stand in the way. Monopolisation had 
created conditions best exploited by liberalisation.
The initial floor of minimally necessary satellite development 
had been durably constructed, since there could be no question of another 
global satellite system now emerging to compete with Intelsat. This 
floor had, however, become the foundation on top of which a new minimum 
level of requirements was being assembled. For metropolitan countries, 
attempting to meet those requirements promised considerable gains, while 
failure to recognise them threatened little but loss of markets and in­ 
fluence. For potential customers, services that were increasingly 
deemed essential were at stake.
As for the ceiling on satellite development that had been built 
from the defensive responses of initially dominant participants, effec­ 
tive protections now seemed to exist for all to whom greater satellite 
development had posed a threat. Limits unquestionably still existed 
but, with the exception of direct satellite broadcasting, they were 
primarily technical and economic—e.g. national spending priorities, 
spectrum and orbital space—and political only inasmuch as such deter­ 
minations inevitably express underlying relationships of dominance and 
subordination, nationally and internationally. There was no longer 
an authoritative political consensus fashioned around the desirability, 
of the acceptability, of restraining satellite development. Pre-emptive 
underdevelopment had been succeeded by the product of its own success.
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CHAPTER WO: THE FRAMEWORK
1. See, e.g., E. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovation, (London: Macmil-
lan New York, 1962) for description and application of the innovation/ 
diffusion model. As M. DeFleur has observed (in "Mass communication 
and social change," in J. Tunstall (ed.), Media Sociology. London: 
Constable & Co., 1970. p. 60), "innovation" has been variously used 
to describe newly invented items of technology, a new deviant form 
of behaviour enabling an individual to achieve a culturally-sanctioned 
goal illegitimately, a cultural modification, and the act of adopting 
a new procedure, belief of device. E. Rogers (op. cit. , p. 19) de­ 
fines it as "an idea perceived as new by the individual," and J. 
Bohlen offers "a change which involves a reorientation of individual 
value structure" (in "Research needed on adoption models," in W. 
Schramm and Roberts (eds.), The Process and Effects of Mass Communi­ 
cations, rev. ed. London: University of Illinois Press, 1971* p.
2. M. Godelier, "Structure and contradiction in Capital," in R. Black­ 
burn (ed. ), Ideology in Social Sciences. London: Pont ana/Coll ins, 
1972. p. 335.
3. R. Williams has used "operational" in the same sense that we have 
used "instrumental." (op. cit., p. 20).
4. N. Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings; Cyberngtics and. Society. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950- P» 8.
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5. For account of problems deriving from operation of filters on feed­ 
back, which impede reception of intelligence about previous outputs, 
see K. Deutsch, The Nerves of government (N.Y.: Free Press, 1962.)
6. A. L. Stinchcorabe, Constructing Social Theories. N.Y.: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1963. p. 151.
7. Symmetric and asymmetric communications are described, in terms of 
differential abilities to transmit, receive, initiate, terminate 
and determine content, in S. Hymer, R. Murray, T. Wengraf, "The 
political economy of communications." Unpublished paper, London, 
1968.
8. F. Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services. New Brunswick, N*J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1974.
9. Examples of the efficiency of such systems, supplied in Dvornik, ££._ 
cit.. include: Persian voice relays of the 3rd Century B.C. could 
transmit orders in one day over distances requiring a 30-day journey 
(p. 44)» beacons linking Xerxes' imperial capital to his dominions 
in the 1st Century A.D. kept the emperor informed on a daily basis 
of "all that was happening in Asia," according to a contemporary ac­ 
count (p. 32); the Mongol fire signal network could, it was said, 
cover the distance of a three-month march in 24 hours (p. 294); Mon­ 
gol horse relays could cover 200-250 miles in a day (p. 290—1); in 
the 9"th Century A.D. the North African Arab dynasty could receive 
messages from the tip of Spain in Alexandria in a single night (p. 219).
10. K. Clark, International Communications:^ The American ffititude. N.Y.: 
Columbia University Press, 1931. P« 17.
11. D. Smythe, The Structure and Function of^Electronic Communications. 
University of Illinois Bulletin no. 82, June 1957.
12. Dvornik, op. cit., p. 91-2.
13. J..M. Herring and G. C. Gross, Telecpmmunications; Ec0n°roj._c3_and 
Regulation. N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1936. p. 19-20$ President's Com­ 
munications Policy Board, Report T Telecommunications; A Program 
for Progress. Washington: March 1951' P- 30.
14. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1972. p. 19»
15. F. J. Brown, The (/able and_Wireless Communications of the World, 2nd 
ed. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1930. p. 12-15.
16. Herring and Gross, op. cit._, p. 29-31.
17. Clark, op. pit., p. 113, 153? W. A. Williams, The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy. N.Y.: Delta, 1962. p. 22. The first transpacific cable 
was built by the British in 1902, although preparations for a U.S. 
facility dated to 1865, when a line across Alaska and Siberia was
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discussed, and the Wavy was authorised to map the Pacific floor in 
1873 as a preliminary to cable-laying. E. Barnouw (A Tower in Babel; 
A Hi.stpry of Broadcasting in the United States, Vol. 1, to 1933. N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press, 1966. p. 15) records that the embarrassment 
of the U.S. Navy's having to transmit victory of its decisive vic­ 
tory in the Battle of Manila over British telegraph cables—by ship 
to Hong Kong, and thence over cable through the Indian Ocean, Red and 
Mediterranean seas, and the Atlantic—was an immediate stimulus to 
American cable plans, but the growing appreciation of the political 
and commercial importance of China seems a more compelling explana­ 
tion (see W. A. Williams, op. cit., passim.)
18. The spread of credit and money has been attributed in part to new
communications technologies. Paper had been known in the West since 
the early 8th Century, but largescale paper production began in Europe 
only with the commercial revolution of the later Middle Ages. With 
printing, furthermore: "The accessibility of information favoured 
the growth of new centres of finance," as H. Innis has written (Em- 
pire and Communication3 t rev. by M. Q. Innis. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1972. p. 128, 146.)
19. An optical .relay between London and Portsmouth, built by the Royal 
Navy during the Napoleonic Wars, was later retained for commercial 
users (Smythe, op. cit. 1957.) American stockbrokers in the early 
1800s constructed a hillside semaphore system between N.Y. and 
Philadelphia and could send stock quotations the 100-mile distance 
in 30 minutes. (Bagdikian, op. cit., p. 4.)
20. Julius Reuter started his wire service in 1851 to relay closing mar­ 
ket prices between Paris and London via the new Dover-Calais cable. 
Earlier, Reuter had used carrier pigeons to close a gap in the Paris- 
Berlin overland cable. (N.Y. Times, March 10, 1976.)
21. In the U.S., for example, United Fruit, Standard Oil and Pirestone 
Tire & Rubber were either pioneers in development of or were early 
to adopt wireless technology. (See Barnouw, op. cit. 1966, p. 20, 
29; also Herring and Gross, op. cit., p. 88, 297.)
22 Herring and Gross, o^^ci^.. p. 109-110, noted that of the two major 
U.S. international cable operators, nearly all the traffic handled 
by one and 81 percent of the other's consisted of commercial and
news messages:The volume of business and earnings of American cable com­ 
panies, as well as their; facilities, have increased commen- 
surately with the growth of foreign trade of the United States 
and social and diplomatic intercourse with foreign nations.
Between^oi !and 1927 the totafTength of undersea cables owned or
magazine editorial noted the commercial indispensability of com­ 
munications facilities: "Upon their efficiency depends whether
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in the United States will grow in the future, as Great Britain has 
in the past, as a center of world thought and trade." (Quoted in 
H. Schiller, "Economics and electronics forging an American cen­ 
tury." Paper delivered to the Conference on Engineering in Inter­ 
national Development, Center for Research and Education, Colorado 
State University, Estes Park, Colo. August 27-September 1, 1968.) 
A NASA official stated in 1966: "It is not difficult to understand 
this tremendous burst in the requirements for global communications, 
for trade patterns have assumed global proportions." (L. Jaffe, 
Communications in Space. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966. 
P. 6.)
23. The works of H. Innis (see note 18 supra.; also, The Bias of Com­ 
munication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951.) lay con- 
siderable emphasis on the perishability—and transportability—of 
certain communications media (e.g. papyrus, paper, radio) as fa­ 
vouring 'hierarchical' administration over large territorial units: 
such media are 'space—biased', according to Innis, in that geographi­ 
cal reach is enhanced; but because the media are not durable, com­ 
municating skills must be delegated to peripheral points in order to 
ensure continuity over time—and the resulting form of administra­ 
tion cannot therefore be highly 'centralised'. Innis' otherwise 
exhaustive study of pre-electrical media ignores the apparently 
space-biased signalling methods we have mentioned, and therefore does 
not consider the notion we have advanced that delegation of authori­ 
ty, and the possibilities of independent coordination among peripher­ 
al points (which distribution of communicating skills—for recopying 
e.g.—attributed to space—biased media would permit), could both be 
pre-empted by 1.) continuous contact over time between centre and 
margins, and 2.) technical and/or procedural prohibitions on inter- 
marginal communication.
24. House Committee on Government Operations, Government Use ofti Satel­ 
lite Commuaicat^ions, House Report no. 2318. Submitted October 19, 
1966. 89th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 1966. p. 16. 
(hereinafter: House Rept. i on Govt. Satellite Use 1966.)
25. Dvornik, op. cit., passim.
26. Herring and Gross, op. cit., p. 205.
27. P. J. Brown, op. cit., p. 12-15, 23-4.
28. See Dvornik, O£.__cit._, p. 93-100. Dvornik quotes (p. 83) this passage 
from Julius Caesar's writings in which much the same principle is 
recommended for managing rumours:
Those states which are supposed to conduct their public admin­ 
istration to greater advantage have it prescribed by law that 
anyone who has learned anything of public concern from his 
neighbors by rumor or report must bring the information to a 
magistrate and not impart it to anyone else...Magistrates con­ 
ceal what they choose and make known what they think proper 
for the public.
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29. J. Galtung, "A structural theory of imperialism," Journal of Peace 
Research, No. 2, 1971. P- 93.
30. Galtung writes (ibid. , p.
How could — for example — a small foggy island in the Worth Sea 
rule over one-quarter of the world? By isolating Periphery 
parts from one another, by having them geographically at suf­ 
ficient distance from each other to impede any real alliance 
formation, by having separate deals with them so as to tie them 
to the Centre in particularistic ways, by reducing multilateral­ 
ism to a minimum by having all kinds of graded membership, and 
by having the Mother Country assume the role of window to the 
world.
31. Cable-relayed traffic from Rangoon to Djkarta passed via Tokyo, from 
Dakar to Lagos via Paris and London, from Tahiti to American Samoa 
through California. (Lyndon Johnson, "President's message on commu­ 
nications policy," August 14, 1967, reprinted in Rostow Report, p. 4. 
hereinafter: 1967 Presidential Policy Statement.) An excellent in­ 
stance of indirect routing was provided by an Intelsat traffic ana­ 
lyst in an interview (Henry Chasia, Washington, April 12, 1976): a 
telephone call between two villages 20 miles apart, one in western 
Tanzania and the other in eastern Zaire, was routed through Dar es 
Salaam, Nairobi, London, Brussels, and Kinshasa, and cost 20 percent 
more than a call to London. On the other hand, British imperial 
policy had set a penny-per-word rate on news from anywhere in the 
Empire to London (Galtung, op. cit.). and internally the Reuter press 
service empowers the editor in charge of British news to route stories 
directly onto the international wires, without first passing through 
the world news editor for approval — as news from anywhere else must 
do. (Tour by the author through Reuter's headquarters, London, April
1977.)
32. See: W. S. Rogers, "International electrical communications," Por- 
eian Affairs,, Vol. 1 No. 2. December 15, 1922; Clark, op. cit., pp. 
113, 151-3; W. A. Williams, op. cit., pp. 22-3; Herring and Gross, 
t pp. 29-32, 36-7.
33. W. A. Williams, op. cit., p. 22.
34. W. S. Rogers, op. cit,; Herring and Gross, op. cit., p. 37-
35. W. A. Williams, op. cit.. p. 231; Clark, op. cit., p. 153.
36 By 1930 the British imperial and international network comprised
168 000 miles of long-distance cables out of a world total— for all 
undersea .cable lengths— of around 350,000; the British network was 
nearly twice the size of the -Aserican. (P. J. Brown, pj>. cit., p. 4.) 
Even as of 1966, some American officials maintained that Britain 
controlled the world's biggest international communications complex. 
(in H. Schiller, op. cit. 1968. note 22 supra. )
37 "Governments were forced to act quickly and in common, to interna­ 
tionalize the practice, since the Marconi company, backed by the
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governments of Great Britain and Italy, was aiming for a monopoly." (Clark, op. cit., p. 170.) See also L. Loevinger, "Cooperation in international communications," Department of State Bulletin Vol. 53 No. 1378, November 22, 1965. p. 830; and A. Smith, The Shadow in the Cave. London: George Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1973. p. 24.
38. Loevinger, op. cit., p. 830.
39. A. Briggs, The Birth of Broadcasting, Vol. I of the history of broad­ casting in the United Kingdom. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. p. 34> Barnouw, pp. cit. 1966. p. 42; Herring and Gross, op. cjt., p. 77«
40. The Roman roads relied upon horses provided by inhabitants of re­ gions through which the roads passed, and the Mongol postal system obliged localities to supply horses, boats when necessary, food and whatever else messengers required. (Bvornik, op. cit., pp. 97, 291.) The analogy with a modern government's contracting tvith private com­ panies may seem far—fetched, but in each case the collaboration of non-state agencies is deemed operationally necessary—or highly con­ venient—and the possibility of widened influence upon the resulting communications system is thereby created.
41. Smythe, op. cit., p. 14«
42. P. Parsons, The Telegraph Monopoly. Philadelphia: C. P. Taylor, 1899- P. 7.
43. The 1927 creation of Cable & Wireless Ltd. by the British Parliament is a good case in point. Legislation followed upon recommendations made by an Imperial Conference—requested by the Canadian and Austral­ ian governments—which had been called to consider the serious reduc­ tions in cable revenues owing to the recent introduction of short­ wave radio service among Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa and India. C&W was a merger of formerly state-owned operations into a private entity; HM Government would appoint its chairman and one other director, and the company was required to consult with the Imperial Communications Advisory Committee on policy matters and to obey the orders of Commonwealth governments on military ones, (see: P. J. Brown, op. cit., p. 101-3; also T. 0. Elias, "The contribu­ tion of telecommunications and direct satellite broadcasting to tech­ nical assistance and nation-building," in McWhinney (ed.), op. cit*, 
p. 122.)
44. Statements of this position have included this from NASA's adminis­ 
trator in October I960:
Traditionally, communications services in this country have been provided by privately-financed carriers competing with each other to serve the public interest under Federal controls and regulation. There seems to be no reason to change that policy with the advent of communications satellites. (Gouldner, 
op. cit., p. 111.) 
In April 1962, the vice president of General Telephone & Electronics,
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America's second biggest domestic phone carrier, declared:
Private enterprise has given the United States a communi­ 
cations system second to none. There is no reason to be­ 
lieve that a government monopoly, which will pay no taxes 
and not have a profit incentive, can do a better job than 
private enterprise. (T. Brophy in Telecomm. Repts., April 
30, 1962.)
45« Galloway, op. cit.. pp. 9-H-
46. Examples include: Morse's invention of the telegraphy, inspired 
by a government inquiry into building an optical telegraph relay 
to link Washington and New Orleans after the War of 1812; state 
coordination and direction of radio RM) during the First World 
War, which resulted in new devices and patents; early private 
efforts to build Latin American and transpacific cables, actively 
solicited and encouraged by the government; transpacific phone 
cables "accelerated by the strong urging" of the state. See: 
Smythe, op. cit. 1957, p. 50» Galloway, op. cit., p. 9i Bar- 
nouw, op. cit. 1966, p. 52 ; Military operations subcommittee, 
House Committee on Government Operations, J3ate 1.11te Communications 
—1964. Part I, March 17, 18, 19t 24, 25, 26; April 7, 8, 9, 14, 
15, 16; May 21, 27 and 28, 1964. Washington: GPO, 1964. p. 297. 
(hereinafter: 1964 Satellite Hearings Part I.)
47. Examples include: Electrical telegraphy was refined and opera-
tionalised by the Post Office between 1843 and 1847* In the cable 
field, President Grant promulgated a ban on foreign cable landings 
in 1869 where prospective foreign licensees held monopoly conces­ 
sions abroad that would deny American companies—of which there 
were none as yet—reciprocal rights. The 1927 Radio Act autho­ 
rised the Navy to handle commercial traffic where private facili­ 
ties were unavailable. Earlier, so-called amateur radio users 
were barred from the preferable frequency ranges. Internationally, 
the government has acted throughout this century to secure frequency 
assignments for private usage before the ITU's International Fre­ 
quency Registration Board. See: Clark, op. cit.. pp. 111-12; 
Herring and Gross, op. cit.. pp. 91-2, 231-2, 288; Smythe, 0£._ 
cit., p. 87-
48. First federal legislation, in 1866, authorising state aid to tele­ 
graph companies reserved the government's right to buy the resul­ 
ting systems and, by the 1920s, nearly 100 bills had been intro­ 
duced to nationalise the communications industry. The 1527 Radio 
and 1934 Communications acts provided for state licensing of trans­ 
mitters and also restricted foreign shareholdings in U.S. licensees. 
State conditions have included determining the routes of overseas 
linkages: the first U.S. transpacific cable was routed, at govern­ 
ment insistence, bypassing the German-owned Marshall Islands despite 
the technical optimality of landing there; in 1935 the government 
prevailed upon AT&T to establish radio service direct to Paris, in­ 
stead of via London as AT&T preferred. State policy on competition 
among U.S. carriers in furnishing overseas links has varied according
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to whether the state's principal concern was preventing rivalries 
that might result in undue concessions to foreign customers or, as 
in the postwar era, encouraging multiple and hence more reliable 
service offerings. See: Clark, op_. cit.. pp. 112, 120; Herring 
and Gross, op. cit.. pp. 38, 289, 295; Ij6_4 Satellite Hearings Part 
p. 294i A. Ende, "International telecommunications: Dynamics of 
regulation of a rapidly expanding service," Law and Contemporary 
Problems Vol. XXXIV No. 2, Spring 1969. p. 395; A. Ende, "Inter­ 
national Communications," in "The common carrier and regulation," 
Fe_deral Communications Bar Journal Vol. 28 No.s 2 & 3, 1975. pp. 
156-61.
49« Of particular importance have been antitrust-related interventions. 
(For general background, see: S. E. Berki (ed«), Antit rust_Pol_icy_L 
Economics and Law. Boston: D.C. Heath, 1966.) AT&T was forced to 
divest itself of the telegraph monopoly Western Union acquired in 
1910. RCA-NBC was forced to sell one of its two radio networks in 
1941» which subsequently became ABC. A 1956 Justice Department 
settlement, while permitting AT&T to keep its manufacturing subsid­ 
iary Western Electric, prevented AT&T from entering non-common car­ 
rier services—especially cable television—for some 15 years. Ef­ 
forts by ITT to buy the ABC network were stopped by the Justice De­ 
partment in 1968 (although they had been approved by the FCC.) See: 
Barnouw, op_. pit. 1966, pp. 47-8; Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 78-81; 
R. Bunce, Television in the Corporate Interest. N.Y.: Praeger, 
1976. pp. 91-3.
50. Schiller, op. cit._ 1969, pp. 34-5.
51. As of 1966, the U.S. government was the world's biggest user of 
international commercial circuits, using around 15 percent of the 
total capacity of all international common carrier systems. (Tele- 
coma. Repts. , February 28, 1966.)
52. R. Williams (gJ^gjjjLt P- 14) has warned of the need to transcend 
the debate between "technological determinism" and "symptomatic 
technology:"
Each view can... be seen to depend on the isolation of tech­ 
nology. It is either a self-acting force which creates new 
ways of life, or it is a self-acting force which provides 
materials for new ways of life.
The solution, according to Williams, is to restore intention to the 
process of technical discovery and invention, and to demonstrate 
that social purposes play a direct role in organisation and orien­ 
tation of R&D.
53. Fire beacons, for instance, were first used by the Assyrians in the 
llth Century B.C. and were subsequently re-adopted by the Persians, 
Greeks and Romans. The Greeks added a water clock which permitted 
an impressive variety of pre-arranged signals to be relayed, and the 
Romans used pairs of beacons at each terminal, introducing a binary 
code through which words could be spelled out. (Dvornik, op. cit.. 
pp. 15-19, 32, 42-3.)
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54» "All the essential features of signalling by Hertzian waves were 
really outlined in scientific laboratories long before any idea of 
utilising them for commerce had occupied prominent attention." (The 
Electrician. October 14, 1898. Quoted by Briggs, op. cit., p. 3277"
55» P« H. Cootner, "The economic impact of the railroad innovation," in 
B. Mazlish (ed.), The Railroad and the Space Program: An Explora­ 
tion in Historical Analogy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965. 
p. 108.
56. Examples include continuing use of optical signalling—e.g. strobo- 
scopic warning lights, naval semaphores—, the value of the posts 
despite a century of telephony, and the revival of private couriers 
—ironically as adjuncts of advanced communications industries like 
broadcasting and data processing.
57. Herring and Gross, op. cit.. p. 80. In the 1920s the cable industry 
developed and rapidly deployed cables incorporating a new high-perme­ 
ability loading material (permalloy) and multiplex features, whereby 
several conducting cores were wrapped within a single cable strand. 
The net result was four to five times the capacity of pre-permalloy, 
non-multiplex cables, at costs from 15 to 20 percent higher. (See: 
P. J. Brown, op_. cit., pp. 81, 86; President's Communications Policy 
Board, Report,, Telecommunications; A Program for Progress. Washing­ 
ton: GPO, March 1951 •p. 131.)
58. S. C. Gilfallan, The Sociology of Invention. Chicago: Pollett Pub­ 
lishing Co., 1935. P« 12.
59. Equifinality is, for Stinchcombe, "the causal centrality of conse­ 
quences." (See Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 80.)
60. A. G. Bell's patent filing was followed a few hours later by another 
telephone patent filed by one ELisha Gray, whose patent was later 
purchased by Western Union; the whole dispute was later settled, 
in Bell's favour, by the U.S. Supreme Court. (See Gouldner, op, cit., 
p. 38.)
61. E. Williams, op. cit_., p. 26.
62. In the evolution of electrical communication, it might easily
have happened that wireless might have preceded wire communica­ 
tion. In that case, the use of land wires to guide the etheric 
waves of wireless transmission would...have been hailed as a 
great step forward—minimizing the electrical power required, 
and conducing to that secrecy and reliability under all atmo­ 
spheric conditions which wireless has not yet completely given. 
The invention of the cubsar-ine cable would have been regarded 
as still more noteworthy. (F. J. Brown, op. cit., pp. 6-7.)
63. R. Williams, op. cit.. p. 19' .
...The key question, about technological response to a need, is
less a question about the need itself than about its place in an
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existing social formation. A need which corresponds with the 
priorities of the real decision-making groups will, obviously, 
more quickly attract the investment of resources and the offi­ 
cial permission, approval or encouragement on which a working 
technology, as distinct from available technical devices, de­ 
pends.
64. Houlton, op. cit., Abstract.
65. Smythe, op. _cit. 1957» P« 14«
66. G. E. C. Wedlake, SOS; The Story of Radio-Communication. Newton
Abbot: David & Charles Ltd., 1973- pp. 80-2; also Briggs, op. cit., 
p. 34.
67. General Electric perfected fluorescent lighting in the 1930s and, 
having secured patent control, failed to market the device in pre­ 
ference to the shorter-lived, high-turnover incandescent bulbs. 
(Testimony of Lee Loevinger, in Subcommittee on Monopoly, Select 
Committee on Small Business, U.S. Senate, Hearings, Space Satellite 
Communications. 87th Congress 1st Session. Part I, August 2, 3, 4i 
9, 10 and 11, 1961. Part II, November 8 and 9, 1961. Washington: 
GPO, 1961. p. 52. Hereinafter: Senate J-Ipnoppljy Hearings 1961.)
68. By 1912, around four-fifths of the world's radiotelegraph stations 
were aboard ships, and most of the rest were land-based facilities 
for communicating with ships. (Smythe, op. _oit. 1957i P« 37.)
69. Briggs, op., cit., p. 32; Barnouw, op_._citi 1966, p. 42; Herring 
and Gross, pp|t cit., p. 77«
70. The plan was rejected in 1906 and 1909, finally approved in 1911 
when the possibility of war seemed growing, but re-examined after 
a scandal broke involving Marconi officials. The plan was re- 
approved in 1913, but little work had been done when war began. 
Reluctance has been attributed to Marconi's poor relations with 
the Post Office, perhaps due to cable holdings. (Wedlake, op_i cit. , 
pp. 80-2; Briggs, oj%_cit., p. 34.)
71. AT&T had bought the valve patents of Lee DePorest, an early radio 
inventor; United Pruit acquired J. G. Pickard's company and his 
patents on crystal detection equipment; GE and Westinghouse owned 
vacuum tube patents from their work on light bulbs. Litigation 
arose among these companies and Marconi's. (Barnouw, op. cite, pp. 
47-8.)
72. R. Gabel, "The early competitive era in telephone communication
1893-1920," Law and Contemporary Problems Vol. XXXIV No. 2, Spring 
1969. passim.
73. Those bills died in committee, despite support from the Postmaster 
General and the Navy. (See Smythe, QP. cit. 1957, p. 37? Barnouw, 
op. cit. 1966, p. 52.)
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74« Clark, op. cit. t p. 242; President's Communications Policy Board, 
op. cit. 1951, p. 131.
75. Wilson acted under presidential powers assigned by the 1912 Radio 
Act to take control of communications facilities "in time of war 
or public peril." (Public Law 264 sec. 2, 62nd Congress, cited in 
Barnouw, op_»^c_it«, p. 41.)
7°". Under wartime powers the disputes were put on ice. Contrac­ 
tors were to make the equipment needed. Claims under patent 
rights later could be filed with the government and adjudi­ 
cated. A letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, as assistant sec­ 
retary of the Navy, guaranteed each contractor 'against claims 
of any and all kinds' in the carrying out of government con­ 
tracts, and each was told to use 'any patented inventions 
necessarily required'.
G. Archer, History of Radio. II.Y. Historical Society, p. 138, quoted
in Barnouw, pp. cit., p. 48.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.. p. 52.
79- Along with its own pre-war stations, the llavy had as of 1918 all the 
American Marconi transmitters, a high-powered station seised from 
Telefunken, a French transmitter and two others built during the 
war for direct communication with Prance. (Herring and Gross, OJD^ 
cit., p. 80.) Smythe has written (op. crU, p. 50) that new patents 
deriving from state-supervised or —conducted R&D during the war 
would have guaranteed the government postwar industrial dominance 
even if confiscated properties were restored.
80. Orders are said to have come directly from President Wilson, then 
at Versailles and exasperated by Lloyd George's conduct at the 
Peace Conference. (Clark, pp. cj.t., p. 243.)
81. Barnouw, op. cit. 1966, pp. 58-9»
82. Legislation authorising state ownership of the communications in­ 
dustry—including the telephone system, which had been nationalised 
late in the war—was then pending in Congress. (Herring and Gross, 
op. cit., p. 81.)
83. Barnouw, op. cit. 19661 p. 59; Herring and Gross, op. cjrt., p. 82. 
By 1921, GE, Westinghouse, AT&T and United Fruit had traded patents 
for stock and owned 65.1 percent of RCA.
84. Ibid.
85. Barnouw, op. cit. 1966, p. 59.
86. RCA's actions were "carrying the principles of the Monroe Doctrine
into the field of communications in the Western Hemisphere." (dark, 
op. cit., p. 197? see also Herring and Gross, op. cit., pp. 82-3.)
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8?. Pour operational areas were agreed. RCA got the U.S. and its over­ 
seas territories, along with certain rights to Canada and the Carib­ 
bean; Marconi got the British Empire. In those two parts of the 
world either company could use the other's patents. In a 'no man's 
land 1 including most of Europe, Russia, Japan and Argentina, neither 
could use patents controlled by the other. The rest of the world was 
deemed neutral, and the patents of both could be used freely by both. 
(Smythe, op. cit. 1959, PP« 50-1.)
88. By 1934 RCA maintained 57 direct circuits to 47 countries. (Herring
and Gross, pp. cit., p. 85.) According to Smythe, the boom in equip­ 
ment sales domestically owed much to the government's turning a blind 
eye to RCA's use of state-held patents (op. cit. 1959, p. 51.) He 
quotes 1929 congressional testimony by one of the Navy officers who 
had helped persuade GE to form HCA:
We gave them (RCA) advice, and we urged them on. And I might 
say that we thought we were doing a great thing, to help set 
up a great American company to compete with the British mono­ 
poly in communications, (ibid.^ p. 52.)
89. When transatlantic radiotelegraphy was first introduced in 1903, its 
rates were one—third less than cables, (p. J. Brown, op. cit., p. 96.)
90. Ibid., p. 97.
91. Ibid., p. 99» Herring and Gross, op. cit., p. 26.
92. When Marconi began radio service between England and Canada in 
1926, for example, and the next year between England, Australia, 
South Africa and India, the cable carriers lost half their busi­ 
ness. This was a principal reason for the 1927 conference that 
led to creation of Cable & Wireless Ltd. (Wedlake, op. cit., p. 144? 
P. J. Brown, op. cit., p. 101.) See note 43 supra.
93. RCA had five domestic collection and distribution centres as of
the early 1930s. (President's Communications Policy Board, op. cit. 
1951, P. 34.)
94. Herring and Gross, op. cit., p. 202.
95. Ibid., p. 203. The authors conclude:
It is inconceivable in a competitive system that a telegraph 
company having cable lines of its own would handle the foreign 
communications of its competitor with the same care and expedi­ 
tion as it handles its own...This...prevents the Radio Corpora­ 
tion from competing with the cables in certain high-speed ser­ 
vices to and from points outside Hew York City.
96. Barnouw, op. cit., p. 267.
97. By the end of the First World War, 9° percent of European-North
American traffic passed through London. (Herring and Gross, pp. cit., 
pp. 26-7.)
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98. State concern with the future viability of cables in the face of 
radio competition was a. major reason for recurrent proposals in 
the U.S. for a British-style merger of competing overseas trans­ 
mission modes. Such a merger was considered by Congress in 1929» 
1934, 1935» 1942 and 1945. (See Herring and Gross, op. cit., pp. 
202-210, 385; A. Ende, op. cit. 1969, p. 413; Testimony of Dal­ 
las Smythe in Sen. Antitrust Hearings 1962 Part I, p. 205.) Tne 
1951 presidential commission, notwithstanding its anti-merger 
recommendation, stated the cable—protection argument as follows: 
The cable companies have been burdened with a heavy invest­ 
ment in plant. Intense competition with each other and from 
radio has held down profits. Development of radio in the 
international field has added circuits faster than traffic 
has grown...Fundamental to this problem is the possibility 
offered by radio of providing, with relatively small capital 
outlay, circuit capacity exceeding the normal requirements of 
international communications. (President's Communication 
Policy Board, 073. cit., p. 128.)
With the advent of telephonic cables in the mid-1950s, the question 
of intennodal diversity became less critical in consideration of 
merger than was the survival of the so-called record carriers—who 
handled all traffic other than voice—at a time when the only U.S. 
voice carrier (AT&T) in the overseas field had deployed a suffi­ 
ciently high-capacity cable to handle easily the relatively small 
capacity requirements of the record carriers. Merger was therefore 
considered solely in regard to the record carriers, in order to 
increase their strength vis-a-vis AT&T, and was supported^by the 
PCC in 1959 and by a special interdepartmental committee in 1966. 
(Smythe testimony in Sen. Antitrust Hearings 1962 Part I, p. 205; 
Telecomm. Repts., June 20, 1966'.)The notion of merging all 
transmission modes under a single ownership—comprising voice and 
record carriers—was again revived by the Rostow Report (Ch. I, 
p. 20; Ch. II, p. 8.)
99. Houlton (op. cit. t p. 50) defines a template as "the ordering of 
the components or sub-systems" of a communications system, in 
other words, a definite form in which a technical potential is 
deployed.
CHAPTER THREE: THE EMERGENCE OP U.S. GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SATEL­ 
LITE POLICY, 1957-61
1. 0. W. Riegel, "Communications by satellite: the political bar­ 
riers," Quarterly_Review of Ecorigmi.cS-and Business Vol. II, No. 4, 
Winter 1971. p. 24.
2 As of 1972 around 86 percent of the 815 U.S. satellites launched 
since 1958 had been military, and 84 percent of those in service 
were military. The military proportion of the Soviet total, 630 
spacecraft, was not known but was suspected to be higher. (R.
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Vayrynen, "Military uses of satellite communications," Instant Re­ 
search on Peace and Violence Ho. 1, 1973. Tampere Peace Research 
Institute.)The Pentagon's satellite system provided global cover­ 
age four years before Intelsat, and its 1969 military spacecraft 
outweighed commercial satellites by nearly five-to-one. (See: 
B. Maddox, op. cit.. p. 79» Dr. F. P. Adler, "Broadcasting from 
satellite," Address at the 6th International Television Symposium, 
Montreux, May 19, 1969 t reprinted in Satellite Broadcasting: Impli­ 
cations for Foreign. Policy. Hearings before the subcommittee on 
national security policy and scientific development of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Congress, 1st Session. May 13, 
14, 15 and 22, 1969. Washington: GPO, 1969. p. 272. Hereinafter: 
Sat.. Broadcasting Hearings 1969«) The U.S. tactical military sys­ 
tem, T&csatcom, was created between 1967 and 1972 at a cost around 
three times that of the Intelsat space segment, (see: 1964 Satel- 
IjLte..Hearings Part I, Testimony of Gen. Alfred D. Starbird, direc­ 
tor of Defence Communications Agency.) As of 1969 military satel­ 
lites were using equipment not expected to be available for commer­ 
cial applications before the mid-1970s. (A. Mattelart, "Modern 
communications technologies and new facets of cultural imperial­ 
ism," Instant Research on Peace and Violence, No. 1, 1973») See 
also D. Smythe, "Conflict, cooperation and communications satel­ 
lites." Unpublished paper presented at Symposium on Mass Media 
and International Understanding, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, September 
1963.
3. Riegel, op. cit. 1971, p. 24.
4. "The U.S. got the brains; the Russians got the mechanics," accor­ 
ding to one German scientist. (W. Shelton, Soviet Space Scplora- 
tion; The First Decade. London: Arthur Barker, 1968.p. 31.)
5» Ibid., Ch. 3. Early and sustained Soviet interest in rockets, on 
the other hand, was a response to the U.S. lead in manned bombers 
and A-bombs.
6. Between 1946 and 1948, a total of one million dollars was spent by 
the Air Force and Navy combined on boosters, improved flight tech­ 
niques, and payload and equipment designs. (House Committee on 
Science and Astronautics, Hearings t| Defense Space Interests. 87th 
Congress, 1st Session. March 17, 18, 20, 21 and 23, 1961. Washing­ 
ton: GPO, 1961. p. 177. Hereinafter: House Mil. Sat. Hearings 
1961.)
7. Larger outlays were prevented, in part, by President Elsenhower's 
own disinclination to invest in possibly needless arms. (V. Van 
Dyke, Pride and Power; The Rationale of the Space Program. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1964. p. 11 and passim.)
8. Goldsen, op. cit., p. 7«
9. See Van Dyke, opjV,cit^ t PP. 13-16.
-390-
HQTESt CHAPTER THREE, CONTINUED
10. There was some objection to allowing the project access to classi­ 
fied military information. (Goldsen, ojp. cit., p. 7.)
11. Quoted in Van Dyke, Q£»_ci_t._. p. 12.
12. Aliano, op. cit., p. 47.
13. Ibid, and Van Dyke, op_._cit. , pp. 120-1.
14. Quoted in Aliano, OJD. cit. , p. 50. Sherraan Adams, a White House
aide, later wrote: "Nobody in Washington had really given much con­ 
sideration to the possible importance of an invasion of space as 
psychological propaganda or even as scientific achievement." (ibid* P. 47.) ———
15. Quoted in Van Dyke, op. cit. , p. 140.
16. Quoted in Aliano, op. cit. t p. 24.
17« Quoted in W. Shelton, "Neck and neck in the space race," Fortune, 
October 1967.
18. G. A. Almond, "Public opinion and the development of space techno­ 
logy," in Goldsen (ed.), op. cit. pp. 74> 81. As Shelton has 
written (op. cit. 1968, p. 52j:
Never before has a nation t?idely believed to be second-rate 
in education and technology so drastically demonstrated in a 
single conspicuous stroke that it had forged a revolutionary 
and potent new instrument unmatched anywhere on the face of 
the globe.
19. Mansfield, oj>. cit.., p. 171«
20. Galloway, pp. cit . , p. 12; Goldsen, op. cit . , p. 8.
21. House Mil. Sat. Hearings 1961. p. 82.
22. G. Alien, testimony before House space committee, in II. Y. Times, 
January 23, I960. The subcommittee led by Sen. Lyndon Johnson 
investigating the nation's "preparedness" had similarly concluded:
23. "The immediate objective is to defend ourselves. But the equally 
important objective is to reach the hearts and minds of men every­ 
where." (Quoted in Eilene Galloway, "Congress and international 
space cooperation," Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences, International Cooperation in Outer Space; A Symposium. 
92nd Congress, 1st Session. Sen. Document 92-57 » 1971- Herein­ 
after eS3ae <SJy^^ p. 4« }
23. Testimony of R. W. Johnson, in House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, Satellites for World Communications. Hearings. 
86th Congress 1st Session, March 3 and 4, 1959- Washington: 
GPO, 1959. p. 13« (Hereinafter: House Space Committee Hearings 
1959. )
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24. The House space committee's chairman, Rep. Overton Brooks, took
up this post after 22 years on the House Armed Services Committee, 
a fact which suggests the interpenetration of the two realms.
25. House Space Committee Hearings, 1959. p. 14.
26. Sen. John Stennis, June 1961, quoted in Kildow, pp. cit., p. 21.
27. James Webb, in N.Y. Times. October 8, 1961.
28. The NASC consisted of the secretaries of Defence and State, the 
administrator of NASA, and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Com­ 
mission.
29. "Declaration of policy and purpose," National Aeronautics and Space 
Act, reprinted in Galloway, op. cit., p. 13. Some reluctance on 
the part of the military to share findings with NASA can be inferred 
from an "Air Force policy letter to commanders11 of February 1, 1961, 
in which the various benefits the military space programme had re­ 
ceived from the civilian were recounted, (see House Mil., Sat. Hear­ 
ings 1961. pp. 96-7.)
30. Testimony of J. Rubel, assistant secretary of defence for research 
and engineering, in House Space Committee Hearings 1^61, p. 635« 
The question arose again during 1964 House hearings when Rep. William 
Randall questioned NASA official R. Garbarini:
Mr. RANDALL... .Now, vie hear all this talk about throwing all 
this money away with NASA for peaceful uses of space. That is 
just not so. There is a lot of this that is fed right back into 
the military. Isn't that true? 
Mr. GARBARINI. Yes, sir. 
(1964 Satellite Hearings Part I, p. 367.)
31. See note 29 sujora.
32. In September 1961, the NASC executive secretary E. Welsh included 
ICBM's among America's peaceful uses of space, (in Van Dyke, op_._ 
crU, p. 83.) The following January, Welsh helpfully explained 
that "it is our national policy that all our space efforts are 
peaceful...(W)e have space missions to help keep the peace and 
space missions to improve our ability to live well in peace." 
(Speech to American Astronautical Society, January 17, 1962, Wash­ 
ington. Reprinted in Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 
U.S. Senate, Staff'JReport, Communications Satellites: i Technical 
Economic and ^vt^riiaTip.aa']^p_ej^l_gpjiejcitg. February 25, 1962. 87th 
Congress 2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 1962. p. 72. Hereinafter: 
Sen. Space Committee Rept. 1962.) Connoisseurs of legalisms are 
referred to the comments of Air-Force assistant secretary B. McMil- 
lan (in Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 83), of Richard Gardner, former 
Columbia University professor and then-official of the State Depart­ 
ment's office of international organisations (in his In Pursuit of 
World Order. London: Praeger, 1964. p. 19). and. of Abram Chayes
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(in Schiller, cip. cit. 1965) who, as the State Department's legal 
advisor, offered the mainstream explanation: "When we talk about 
peaceful uses of space, we mean the use of outer space for non-ag- 
gressive purposes."
33. Sec. 102(b), in Galloway, op. cit., p. 13.
34? See claims cited Aliano, pp. cit., p. 54; Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 16; 
and Shelton, op. cit. 1968, pp. 54-5•
35. See: Ad Hoc Committee on Space, Report to the President-Blect, re­ 
printed in House Mil. Sat. Hearings 1961. p. 19.(hereinafter: 
Hiesner Report.);also Sen. Space Committee Rept. 1962, p. 76. 
During 196! legislative debates, it was not anticipated that suf­ 
ficiently powerful rockets for geostationary payloads would be 
available before 1964» which according to Fortune magazine was 
"another penalty of the decision in the early 1950s to build rockets 
just powerful enough to carry warheads, while unimaginatively dis­ 
regarding the needs and potentials of space exploration." (Lessing, 
op., cit.) Typically, commercial payloads have been launched by 
combinations of military first-stage and civilian upper-stage 
rockets—e.g. Thor—Delta, Atlas-Centaur, Titan-Agena. (see Comsat 
Ann. Repts. 1968, pp. 33-5? 1972, p. 37.)
36. House Mil. Sat. Hearings 1961, p. 198. Previously, under terms of
a September 1959 directive, the Air Force had primary responsibility 
for civilian and military launchers, (ibid., pp. 9-10*)
37« For example, the August I960 launch of Echo I, a 100-foot diameter 
metallic balloon and the first passive communications satellite. 
(j. R. Pierce, The Beginnings of Satellite Communications. San 
Francisco: San Francisco Press Inc., 1968.p. 21.)
38. Echo.. I could reflect one millionth of a millionth of a millionth
(lO~ ) of the 10 kilowatts of energy beamed at it from the ground. 
(Ibid.) It would have taken a surface the size of two football 
stadiums to relay a television signal, and passive satellites tend 
to wrinkle in time and lose reflective properties. (Lessing, op. 
pit.) Passive satellites did, however, retain their advocates, 
(see S. H. Reiger, A Study of Passive Communications Satellites, 
Report prepared for NASA. Santa Monica: RAHD Corporation, 1963.)
39. Project West Ford, undertaken by ARPA in 1961 and carried out in 
May 1963, was the last big passive project, an audacious and con­ 
troversial scheme to launch millions of tiny metal needles into 
low orbit to form an artificial troposphere. Radio astronomers 
feared that they would hear no more from deep space, but little 
harm—or good—came of it. (see 1964 Satellite Hearings Part I. 
pp. 242-56, for discussion.)
40. House Mil. Sat. Hearings 1961, pp. 9-10.
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41. Letter to the Secretary of Defence from the Administrator of NASA, 
reprinted in House Mil. Sat. Hearings 1961. pp. 24-5.
42. "Agreement between the Department of Defense and the National Aero­ 
nautics and Space Administration concerning the Aeronautics and 
Astronautics Advisory Board," September 13, I960. Reprinted Ibid., 25-6. ———
43. Testimony of Elmer Engstrom, senior executive vice president of RCA, 
in House Space Committee Hearings 1961. p. 69. Geostationary—or 
synchronous—satellites are stationary relative to a fixed point 
on the earth's surfact, since they are positioned over the equator 
at an altitude (23,400 miles) where their orbital velocity equals 
the earth's rotational speed. Random-orbiting satellites are placed 
at lower altitudes, and travel faster than the earth rotates.
44• As is discussed in Chapter Five, the military believed geostationary 
spacecraft to be vulnerable to destruction or jamming, required po­ 
lar coverage which satellites placed over the equator are not espe­ 
cially suited to, and felt that the on-board propulsion equipment 
synchronous satellites required made them susceptible to being shifted 
around by adversaries on the ground. When NASA took over synchronous 
satellite development in autumn 1962, it was given use of the earth 
stations built by the Array for Project Advent. (Senate Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Communications Satellite Legislation^ 
Hearings. February 2? and 28, March 1, 5, 6, 7, 1962, on S. 2650 
(Bill to Amend the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1953) and 
S. 2814 (Bill to Provide for the Establishment, Ownership, Operation 
and Regulation of a Commercial Communications Satellite System, and 
for Other Purposes.) 87th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 
1962. p. 274. Hereinafter:. Sen. Space Committee Hearings 1962.)
45. Hughes Aircraft, which built NASA's Syncom series, was selected by 
Comsat to build Early Bird. The latter was described by a Hughes 
official as "very similar to the early Syncoms." (Testimony of Dr. 
Alien Puckett, in 1964 Satellite Hearings Part I. p. 376.)
46. John A. Johnson, Interview. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1976.
47. All I960 presidential campaign quotes from Van Dyke, op. cit., p. 23.
48. Weisner Report, p. 17. (See note 35 supra.)
49. "Prestige," as one academic wrote in 1963, "will be a major—if not 
the dominating objective motivating nations to participate in, and 
indeed to try to excel in, space activities." (K. Knorr, "The in­ 
ternational implications of outer space activities," in Goldsen (ed.) 
op. cit., p. 130.) See also: A. L. Horelick, "The Soviet Union 
and the political uses of outer space," and G. A. Almond, op. cit., 
both in Goldsen (ed.), op. cit. Frequently cited were Khruschev's 
remarks to Kennedy during their 1961 meeting in Vienna (in Ibid. p. 43): 
You cannot drive people to Communism by war. It is necessary 
for people to realize the need to replace capitalist society
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by a Communist society...We want to provide an example, and 
I think our example is not a bad one. Whose rocket was it 
that first went to the moon? The Communist. Who first photo­ 
graphed the hidden side of the moon? Communists.
50« House Space Committee Hearings 1961, p. 595.
51. Rep. Brooks, Ibid., p. 46"!•
52. Adduced by a congressman in July 1961 was this passage from a speech 
in June by M. V. Keldysh, president of the Soviet Academy of Sci­ 
ences: "A priority of the highest importance is assigned to arti­ 
ficial earth satellites as a means for the solution of a number of 
economic problems," among them weather forecasting, solar energy 
utilisation and radio transmission. (House Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, Communications Satellites Part I, Hearings 
on Establishment, Ownership, Operation and Regulation of a Commer­ 
cial Communications Satellite System. July 25-28, 1961. 87th Con­ 
gress, 1st Session. Washington: GPO, 196!. p. 306. Hereinafter: 
HouseCommerce Hearings 1961, Part I.) The Soviets had no "economic 
problems" with their overseas links, since they had little require­ 
ment for them, and it seems certain (in retrospect, that is,) that 
domestic communications were the real concern.
53« Testimony of George IfcGhee, undersecretary of state for political 
affairs, in Sen. Space Committee Hearings 1962, p. 193.
54* In April 1974 Cosmos no. 637, an experimental synchronous satellite, 
was successfully launched. In March 1975 plans were announced for 
a Statsionar-T satellite network, which would incorporate geosta­ 
tionary spacecraft in an improved domestic communications system. 
(See Intermedia, August 1975, P. 6.) The orbital configuration 
theretofore preferred by the Soviets was sub-synchronous and highly 
elliptical—i.e. satellites were at high altitudes over the Soviet 
Union, thereby maximising the time they were useful to terminals 
there, and at lower altitudes on the other side of the earth.
55. Testimony of Abram Chayes, 1964 Satellite Hearings Part I, p. 267.
56. Figure is as of 1963, in D. Smythe, "On thinking about the effects 
of communications satellites." Paper for the American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Washington: June 30, 1964*
57. Sen. Homer Capehart, in Sea. Space Committee Hearings 1962, p. 303.
58. Sen. Space Committee Rept. 1962, p. 142.
59. Ibid., p. 144. ' -'——
60. Goldsen, op. cit., p. 8. Similarly, in the Sen. Space Committee 
Rept. 1962, p. 25:
The success of the United States in being the first to accom-
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plish this objective will encourage other nations to seek 
technical and other help from the United States rather than 
turn to the Soviet Union for leadership.
61. It was estimated that a single geostationary satellite over the 
Atlantic could serve 90 percent of the world's telephones. (Dr. 
Alien Puckett testimony, in Sen. Space Committee Hearings._1.9.62, 
P. 225.
62. Quoted in Noam Chomsky, "The Pentagon Papers and U.S. imperialism,"
Bertrand Russell Centenary Symposium, Spheres of Influence in the Age 
of Imperialism. London: Spokesman Books, 1972. pp. 14-15.
63. Quoted in Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 275*
64. Aliano, pp. cit., p. 247.
65. Ibid., p. 248. Schlesinger, Kennedy's in-house historian, wrote that 
"the Khruschev speech, though sufficiently tough, confined its belli­ 
cosity in the main to the underdeveloped world; and here, as Kennedy 
understood, the Russians were confronted by opportunities they could 
not easily resist." (op. cit., p. 276.) That interpretation was 
not, however, the only possible reading, as E. Crankshaw has pointed 
out by suggesting that the speech was probably directed more to China 
than to the U.S.—a response to China's increasingly strident enthu­ 
siasm for Third World liberation movements, and a claim for Soviet 
political and ideological (though not necessarily military) leader­ 
ship. (See: E. Crankshaw, Khruschev; A Career. N.Y.: Avon Books, 
1966. p. 284.)
66. D. Halberstam, The Best and the^ Brightest. N.Y.: Random House, 1969. 
p. 84.
67. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 323.
68. Ibid., p. 144.
69. Aliano, op. cit., p. 275«
70. Weisner is said to have been among the first to urge, in 1949-50,
a revision of U.S. thinking to encompass 'limited' wars. (Schlesing- 
ger, op. cit., p. 279«
71. Aliano, op. cit._, p. 275.
72. Weisner Report, p. 37.
73. As of December I960, uncoordinated communications satellite projects 
were being conducted by the Army, Navy, Air Force and NASA. The 
Air Force subsequently was given exclusive responsibility for Pen­ 
tagon space R&D, a decision unpopular with the other services and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See House Mil. Sat. Hearings. 1961. p.2.)
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74« In 1959 U.S. Secretary of Defence Gates proposed selling Polaris
missiles to the NATO allies, and NATO's supreme commander suggested 
transforming NATO into an independent nuclear force. Later various 
schemes for a 'multilateral force' (ML?) were floated, but the issue 
of ultimate U.S. control over warheads remained central to their 
failure. (See: Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 723-5; S. Hoffniann, 
Gulliver's.Troubles^ or the Setting of American Foreign Policy. 
London: McGraw-Hill, 1968. pp. 278-9 and passim.; H. Kissinger, 
The Troubled Partnership. London: McGraw-Hill, 1965. pp. 144, 157 
and passim.)
75« Tropospheric scatter—or 'tropo'—relies upon the low-lying tropo­ 
sphere to disperse signals over wide areas, which has the advantage 
of avoiding the ionosphere used by high-frequency radio but subject 
to static, fading and interference. The wastage of radiated power 
is enormous: perhaps one-trillionth of transmitted strength is 
detected. The technique is useful, however, in communicating among 
widely-dispersed terminals, although its carrying capacity is much 
inferior to line-of-sight microwave. (From research provided by 
Joseph A. Connor, based upon interviews with U.S. military person­ 
nel stationed in Mediterranean installations, autumn 1974-)
76. Testimony of Gen. Alfred Starbird, in 1964 Satellite Hearings Part I, 
P. 77.
77. Ibid.
78. Testimony of Dean Rusk, secretary of state, in Senate Forei,"?! Re­ 
lations Hearings, p. 190.
79. Gea. Starbird, in 1964 Satellite Hearings Part __I, p. 77. As late 
as 1968 the White House director of telecommunications management 
estimated that only 39 percent of communications originating in 
the U.S. reached its overseas destination directly, i.e. without 
transiting a third country, (in P. D. Trooboff, "Intelsat: ap­ 
proaches to the renegotiation," Harvard International Law Journal 
Vol. IX No. 1, Winter 1968. p. 197)
80. Gen. Starbird, Ibid.. p. 77.
81. See note 75 supra. This system was replaced in 1966 by a more
sophisticated network of tropo and microwave, capable too of linking 
up with satellites to assure diplomatic and military communications 
in Europe and the Mediterranean.
82. Schlesinger, op. cit., pp. 708-9.
83. In Telecomm. Repts., October 12, 1964. According to testimony given 
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1. Kildow, op. cit.. p. 88.
2. Sen. Space Symposium 1971. p. 209.
3- As of the end of 1965 Comsat listed total assets of $2l3m, 
of whi.ch $190m was held in cash or temporary cash invest­ 
ments. A year later the Corporation still had &172m of 
its assets in such forms—which provided a return of 
nearly $9.6m for the year, as against $6.4m in total opefa- 
ting revenues from Early Bird's first 18 months of ser­ 
vice. With Comsat's share of Intelsat's capital require­ 
ments averaging overall around half the originally fore­ 
cast $200m, the company's income from cash investments-- 
mainly 5% percent time deposits--exceeded its net opera­ 
ting income until 1970. (See: H. T. Simmons, "Comsat 
Corporation—A brighter future?", Interavia, June 1966; 
Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1967 [hereinafter: Wall 
St. Jrnl.j;Telecomm. Repts., February 6, 1967; Comsat 
Ann. Rept. 1972, pp.104-5.)
4. See Kinsley, op. cit., ch. 9 passim. Kinsley's insuffi­ 
cient attention to these essentially anti-AT&T decisions 
is a major flaw in his argument that the state's regula­ 
tory capability was fundamentally compromised, compliant 
to Bell's wishes and unable to formulate and promulgate 
an overriding definition of the 'public interest 1 .
5. Carrier holdings fell from 50 percent of totaJ Comsat 
stock, held by 161 companies, to 0.3 percent owned by 
57 carriers between 1964 and 1974- (Comsat Ann Repts. 
1967, p. 44> 1974, P- 57.) ITT led the way in divesti­ 
tures, with three major sales in 1967 and 19^8 which 
netted a total of around &40m from a four-year invest­ 
ment of some $19m. ITT's divestitures seem to have been 
motivated partly by a desire to bring its holdings into 
line with those of other major carriers, partly by dis­ 
satisfaction with Comsat's positions on the earth station 
ownership and authorised users cases, and partly by ITT's 
own liquidity requirements--since the company was cur­ 
rently pursuing an aggressive acquisition programme, 
which included an attempt to buy the ABC television net­ 
work. (See: N.Y. Times, December 6, 19^8; Telecomm. 
Repts._, May 8, 1967; Business Week, June 8, 1968; 
Wall St. Jrnl., December 6, 1968; Testimony of James 
McCormack, in House Interstate and foreign Commerce 
Committee, Hearings, Comsat Board of Directors, 91st 
Cong. 1st SessionT 18 February 19t)9.Washington: GPO 
1969. p. 12. [hereinafter: House Comsat Hearings 1969.]
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A. Sampson, The Sovereign State of ITT. NY: Stein and 
Day Publishers, 1973- pp. 90-3; Telecomm. Repts., 
June 25, 1977.) RCA sold its entire 250,000 shares in 
December 1970, explaining—not very plausibly—that the 
money was no longer needed by Comsat. (Telecomm. Repts. 
December 21, 1970.) GT&E's subsidiary Hawaiian Tele­ 
phone sold out in May 1971, leaving AT&T the sole car­ 
rier left on Comsat's board. (Aviation Week, May 17, 
1971-') • Bell was finally obliged to sell in June 1973 
under terms of a January 1972 FCC decision, which made 
divestiture of Comsat shares a condition for AT&T's 
entry into the domestic satellite field. (See below, 
Chapter 14.)
6. That position is taken by MaddoA, op. cit., p. 99, and 
is implied by Kinsley, op . cit., Ch. 3. As will be 
clear in Chapter 12, Comsat never actually requested 
authority to provide service to bulk private users, al­ 
though the Authorised Users decision did--in passing-­ 
deny Comsat such permission.
7. See Chapter Five, note 34 5 supra.
7a. In effect, carrier holdings were of throe kinds: the 
Initially 150 or so small holdings--t-anj; in':, from a few 
hundred shares to the 10,000 he-Id by the Rochester' Tele­ 
phone Co.--which seem simply to have, been considered 
good portfolio investments; RCA ' s and WU1 ' s holding^, 
which though large were insufficient to warrant seats 
on Comsat's board, and inadequate to assure the two 
companies of reliable information as to Comsat's in­ 
tentions (see, e.g., House Rept. on Govt. Sat el 1 ite Use 
1906, p. 9;) and the holdings of AT&T, ITT and GT&.IZ-- 
with respectively three, two and one seats on Com&at. 's 
board. It is the latter which are of greatest interest 
here .
Juni8. See: Federal Communications Commission, Memorandi
Opinion and Statement of Policy, Docket. 1005S, "In the 
matter of authorized entities and authorised usert- un­ 
der the Communications Satellite Act of 1002," July 2t, 
1905. Reprinted in Senate Commerce Committee subcom­ 
mittee on communications, Hearings; Progress Report on 
Space Communications. August 10, 17, 1<? and 23, 19Ob. 
89th Cong. 2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 19^0. (herein­ 
after: Auth. Users Decision.)
8a. See, e.g., Kinsley, op. cit., p. 205. This was also the 
position taken by the Senate opponents of the Comsat 
Act.
9. Comsat Ann. Rept. 1972, p. 20.
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10. Such, for example, .was reportedly the case when Comsat's 
board voted on whether to ask for FCC authorisation to 
own and operate the domestic earth stations; the car­ 
rier representatives walked out of the meeting. (J. 
McDonald, "The Comsat compromise starts a revolution," 
Fortune, October 1965.) On the other hand, it has also 
been alleged that Comsat was initially quite interested 
in the Ford Foundation's domestic satellite proposals, 
but that opposition within Comsat's board from carrier 
representatives quickly dampened the company's enthusi­ 
asm. (H. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 477.)
11. Schwartz, op. cit.. pp. 458-9.
12. ITT' s outlook was very likely conditioned by its hopes 
of acquiring ABC which, if combined with a domestic 
earth station role, would have given ITT in-roads to 
the domestic market. GT&E was discussing various schemes 
with Hughes Aircraft to use satellites to interconnect 
both GT&E's phone systems and Hughes' cable TV proper­ 
ties. RCA's divestiture coincided with its purchase of 
the military's Alaska communications system, which en­ 
abled RCA to begin furnishing domestic telecommunications 
service via a Canadian satellite. AT&T stayed on Com­ 
sat's board apparently in hopes of using Comsat as an 
essentially in-house supplier of satellite services: 
allowing Comsat's expertise and reputation to shield 
an arguably illegal arrangement from criticism. For 
further discussion, see Chapter 14-
13. For background, see P. Samuelson, Economics: An Intro­ 
ductory Analysis. 6th edition. London: McGraw-Hill, 
1904. Ch. 24.
14. A kind of disaggregation could presumably be achieved
by applying existing usage ratios. In some cases, how­ 
ever, the ratios may simply reflect current pricing and 
have little objective value (e.g. day vs. night phone 
service.)
15. The advantages of composite pricing were explained in 
1906 by the chief of the FCC common carrier bureau:
This practice has promoted the improvement and 
expansion of service by encouraging the carriers 
to modernize their plant promptly with reasonable 
assurance that their investments in existing plant 
will not be unduly affected.
(B. Strassburg, quoted in Schwartz, op. cit., p. 471.)
16. Regulation by rate base was described in a 1936 study
as a "long standing issue" at the time of the 1934 Com­ 
munications Act, which created the FCC to handle func­ 
tions previously exercised by the Federal Radio Com­ 
mission and the Interstate Commerce Commission. (See:
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Herring and Gross, op. cit.. pp. 415-16.) A U.S. Trans­ 
portation Department official has written:
There is no general theory of public utility regu­ 
lation. What often passes for theory is a recon­ 
struction of historical events woven into a pat­ 
tern of generalization to meet contemporary issues.
(R. Gabel, "The early competitive era in telephone com­ 
munication, 1893-1920," Law and ..Contemporary Problems 
Vol. XXXIV No. 2, Spring 1969- p. 340.) Gabel argues, 
as has Gabriel Kolko in his study of the advent of 
federal regulation (Railroads and Regulation, 1877- 
J916» Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 
that regulation was essentially the programme of in­ 
dustrial conservatism, permitting barriers to entry 
to be erected and slowing the pace of innovation in 
the telephone industry. The potential for abuse is 
acute, furthermore, when a regulated carrier is owned 
in common with an equipment supplier—as with AT&T and 
Western Electric, respectively the dominant forces in 
the carrier and communications manufacturing industries. 
Western supplies 95 percent of the Bell System's equip­ 
ment, and Bell accounts for more than 80 percent of 
Western's business--most of the rest consisting of 
military contracts. (Goulden, op. cit., pp. 11, 79.) 
In all, Western's output comprises &5 percent of the 
communications equipment market, witli half the remain­ 
der supplied by subsidiaries of GT&E, the second big­ 
gest domestic carrier. (Irwin, op. cit., p. 31.) The 
prices and profits of Western had never been subject 
to a definitive FCC inquiry as of I960 (Sen. Antitrust 
Hearings 1962, Part I, p. 195) and, Irwin observes, 
"the integrated supplier has fallen between the stools 
of antitrust and regulation" (op. cit ., p. 31 )•
The problem, from the perspective of rate base regula­ 
tion, is that the prices a carrier pays to a wholly- 
owned supplier may essentially be adjusted to sustain 
whatever pricing strategy the carrier wants to pursue: 
if the carrier faces no competition, higher equipment 
prices translate into higher tariffs on communications 
services—as well as higher profits for the supplying 
subsidiary; but if the carrier has competitors, lower 
equipment prices can justify lower—perhaps predatory-­ 
tariffs to undersell the competition. Moreover, if a 
supplier dominates the manufacturing market, determin­ 
ing what a fair market price is may be practically im­ 
possible. (See: A. E. Kahn, The Economics of Regula­ 
tion, Vol. II. London: John Wiley & Sons 1971- P- 291; 
Goulden, op. cit., pp. 84-6; Sen. Antitrust Hearings 
1962 Part I, p. 171, and Part 11, p. 325-)
17. As of the early 1960s, the FCC common carrier bureau 
regulated $390m worth of plant and $120m in annual 
operating revenues with a staff of 68—a workforce 
that had fallen from 80 in 1952 despite a doubling
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of industry's costs and revenues over the period. (Sen. 
Antitrust Hearings .19,62 Part I, p. 213.) A 1948 study concluded that in the telephone field, "The Commission 
just skims the surface," and found the existing staff 
"clearly is inadequate." (quoted in Ibid., pp. 213-14-) 
Similarly, in 1962 the report by an independent manage­ ment consultancy concluded that the common carrier bu­ reau's responsibility was "of an order of magnitude and 
significance which exceeds the Bureau's resources." 
(yuoted in Ibid. Part II, p. 657.)
18. Averch and Johnson, op. cit., p. 1063.
19. H. B. Meyers, "The FCC's expanding, demanding universe," 
Fortune, June 1966.
20. Since international service accounted for only one or 
two percent of industry's total costs and revenues, 
"We felt we could spend our time more profitably on 
other matters," the FCC chairman explained in 1962. 
(Sen. Antitrust Hearings 1962. Fart I.I, p. 331.)
21. See: L. L. Johnson, "Communication.-, .satellites and
telephone rates! problems of government regulation." 
Memo KM-2845-NASA, October 1961. Reprinted in Ibid.
A statement of FCC policy first made in June 193^ was 
introduced into the Comsat congressional debates by a 
commissioner .in order to explain the advantages of in­ 
formal discussion:
Many of the problems of interstate telephone regu­ 
lation are continuing in nature, calling for frank, 
informal discussion between company and Commission 
representatives. The atmosphere of the conference 
table seems ordinarily much more conducive to the 
development of positive results in such matters 
than does the adversary air which tends to sur­ 
round most formal proceedings.
(Quoted in Ibid., p. 291.) Although the ICC chairman 
stated in 19b2 that the Commission "lias in general been 
successful in obtaining rate reductions that appeared 
warranted without conducting protracted and costly 
hearings," (Ibid. Part 1, p. 212) Del I had been permit­ 
ted a $65m increase in long-distance phone rales in 
1953 without a hearing (ibid., p. 215), and the chairman 
of the House judiciary committee concluded in 1959 that 
the tariffs on overseas services "are fixed by the com­ 
pany itself." (Ibid.) Moreover, as former FCC chief 
economist Dallas Smythe pointed out, the willingness of 
a carrier to waive its right, to due process before the 
Commission would practically depend upon its not ending 
up with a level of earnings below that which it consi­ 
ders reasonable and, "in all probability...higher than 
what the commission and court would determine as the 
result of a contested formal rate proceeding." (Ibid.)
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22. Averch and Johnson, op. cit.
23. Ibid., pp. 1052, 1058.
24- Kahn, pp. cit. t p. 222, notes this problem with regard 
to day and night phone service.
25. L. L. Johnson, "Technological advance and market struc­ 
ture in domestic telecommunications," RAND Corp., mimeo, 
1909. .
26. FCC common carrier bureau chief Strassburg has said:
Certainly the carriers would have had a greater 
incentive to deploy satellites, or at least as 
much incentive to deploy satellites as they do 
cables, if they had an ownership interest in them, 
if their so-called rate base inducements to invest­ 
ment and Use [were the same]~-whereas there isn't 
the same incentive today.
(Interview, March 27, 1976, Washington.)
27- Kinsley, op. cit., p. 33- As H. Schwartz has written: 
"...[EJven if the carriers own earth stations and have 
some satellite rate base, they wi1 I still be biased to­ 
ward their own [cable] facilities, representing a much 
larger investment." As of 1963 world cable investment 
was estimated at $600m, and was forecast to rise to 
$l,000m by 197U. (Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 451, 453-)
28. Telecomm. Repts. , October 9, 1967.
29. Ibid., September 12, 1966.
30. The ruling was nevertheless a blow to Comsat, since it 
disallowed a considerable part of the compjany' s alleged 
rate base; the FCC also imputed a 45 percent debt com­ 
ponent to reduce the book cost of Comsat's expensive 
all-equity capital structure--a legacy of the 1964 
stock issuance. Comsat claimed the decision would, if 
applied to its 1975 earnings, have reduced them by 60 
percent. (Satellite Pathways, January-February 1976; 
see also: "Comsat: out of the crib, into the cold," 
Business Week, May 29, 1971.)
31. Irwin, op. cit., p. 37-
32. Testimony of Dr. W. H. Mellody, Senate Committee on 
Government Operations, Hearings, Regulatory Refonn-- 
1974. November 21, 22 and 25, 1974. 93rd Cong. 2nd 
Session. Part I. Washington: GPO 1974- P- 274. (here­ 
inafter: Reg. Reform Hearings 1974- )
33. James Martin, Future Developments in Telecommunications.
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Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1971, p. 30. 
The remaining 17 percent was the long lines, which satel­ 
lites did threaten.
34- Communications News. August 1967. To prepare for battle 
AT&T went to the financial market twice in 1967 and 
raised a total of $500m. The second time Bell was 
obliged to offer the highest interest rate it had offered 
since 1919. (Te.lecomm. Repts. , August 7, 1967.)
35- Bagdikian, op. cit.. p. 243j Wiring the World: The
Explosion in Communications. U.S. News and World Report 
Books, Washington 1971, p. 43. By 1968 the total was 
3.511 homes, which suggests that the rate of increase was 
increasing.
36. Seven of nine points in the final consent agreement were 
later revealed to have been authored by AT&T's lawyers. 
(Goulden, op. cit., pp. 78-81.)
37« Wi ri ng t he Wo rid, p. 46.
38. R. L. Smith, The Wired Nation; Cable TV—The Electronic 
Communications Highway. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 65.
39• See Ibid., Ch. 5, passim.
40. L. Johnson, op. cit. 1969, p. 3j A. D. Hall 111, "Trends 
in switched services," in Gerbner et. al., (eds.), op^ 
pit., p. 16.
41. Bell's plant was at that time almost entirely analogic, 
encoding intelligence in a continuous fashion rather 
than in the discrete, yes-no pulses that digital com­ 
puters require: computer connections therefore re­ 
quired translation and waste. The phone network, fur­ 
thermore, offered a single bandwidth of 200-3,000 Hz, 
corresponding in digital terms to around 2,000 bits per 
second (bps); higher computer capacity needs had to 
be assembled from that unit. Some data services (en­ 
vironmental sensors, e.g.) have mucli more modest re­ 
quirements than 2,000 bps, while others need much higher 
speeds than the phone system can economically provide. 
The network was also poorly equipped to match the con­ 
nection speeds potential customers required, and the 
error rates some computer applications needed. (See: 
Hall, op. cit., p. 17j Maddox, op. cit., p. 238.)
42. Between 1946 and 1948 broadcasters had asked for appro­ 
val to create their own intercity microwave connections. 
Although a number of lines were permitted, in 1948 the 
FCC made it clear they would not be allowed to inter­ 
connect with Bell's network, and were to be considered
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temporary expedients until Bell finished its own wide­ 
band network of microwave and coaxial cable. Also in 
1948 the Commission upheld Bell's refusal to intercon­ 
nect the domestic telegraph monopoly's microwave net­ 
work. (Irwin, op. cit. , pp. 69-70.)
43- L. Johnson, op. cit. 1969, pp. 3-4.
44• Ibid. Telpak offered bandwidths equivalent to from 12 
to 240.voice circuits.
45« While conventional switched phone service was found to 
be earning Bell more than 10 percent, teletype was re­ 
turning 2.9 percent, private line telegraph 0.4 percent 
and Telpak 0.3 percent. The latter three were each 
a service subject to competition. (See Irwin, op. cit., 
Ch. 5•)
46. A. T. Demaree, "The age of anxiety at AT&T," Fortune. 
May 1970; Hall, op. cit.. p. 17.
47- Demaree, op - cit.; Maddox, op. cit.., p. 237-
4$ • See: Chapter Two, note 9$ supra. for references.
49- Sen. Antitrust. Hearings 1962. Part 1, p. 205-
50. The FCC supported a merger of the record carriers, but 
the Eisenhower Administration's Justice Department was 
opposed. As of 1959 the seven overseas record companies 
had a combined rate base of less than $82m, while the 
long lines division of AT&T alone was credited with 
$l,750m. (Ibid.; A. Ende, op. cit. 1969, p. 413-)
51. 1967 Presidential Policy Statement, p. 8.
52. Ibid.
53. See Rostow Report, Ch. 2, p. 8 and passim.
54- Herring and Gross, op. cit., pp. 210, 385-
CHAPTER 10: THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SATELLITE SYSTEM
1. House Kept.... on Goyt. Satellite Use 1966; N. Y. Times, 
September 18,1966T
2. Binghamton (N.Y.) Press, September 22, I960.
3. Having more than one antenna at a ground station served 
one of three purposes: providing connection to a sate] 
lite located in a different region (e.g. several Euro-
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pean station thereby have access to Indian, as well as 
Atlantic Ocean spacecraft); furnishing back-up flexi­ 
bility, if the second antenna is aimed at an in-orbit 
spare; or, after 1973, when a second 'major path' sat­ 
ellite was put over the Atlantic to handle heavy traf­ 
fic volumes among big users, second antennas permitted 
more economic use of satellite capacity in the region. 
(Comsat Ann. Rept. 1972. p. 42; W. L. Geddes, Interview, 
January 20, 1978, London.)
* *
4- Comsat Ann. Rept. 1972. pp. 40-1, 92-102; Ann. Kept.. 
1974, PP- 36-7-
5- Tel e c o mm. Ke p t s . , May 1O and 17, lor. 5.
6. For AT&T's views see: Wash. Post , May 29, J"(>5; also 
_1.9jj4 Satellite Hearings Part I, p. 27*'. Tests found 
that the number of users who objected when a delay 
equivalent to one satellite hop was introduced was 
only slightly higher than the 10 percent who complained 
when no delay was introduced. (J. Martin, op• cit . , 
p. 223.) lor discussion of delay and echo ^cc: I louse • 
•Sp a c e Co mm i 11 e e Hearings 19 6 1 , p .
7- Te 1 e comm . Re p t s. , February 28, 196(>; L c-rvite Commerce 
Committee subcommittee on communjcat ions, Meat ings, 
Progress Report on Space Cominun.i c at i ons. August 10, 
17, 18 and 23, 196b. 89th Congress 2nd Session. Wash­ 
ington: GPO 19^t». p. 9« (Hereinafter: Sen. Commerce 
Rept. 1966.)
8. See: Colin Cherry, On Human Communi cat ion 2nd cd. , Lon­ 
don: MIT Press, 1966. pp. 42-9; UNESCO Meeting on 
International Arrangements in Space Communication, Broad­ 
casting from Space. Reports and Papers on Mass Communi­ 
cations, No. bO. Paris 1970: ITU contribution, "The 
International Telecommunications Union and space" ; 
Testimony of Wilbur Pritchard in Sat. Broadcasting 
Hearings 1^69.
9. Louis Pollack, Interview, March 31, 19/6, Clarksburg, Md; 
Comsat Ann. Rept. 1968, pp. 12-15.
10. The first two Intelsat satellite generations were equipped 
with antennas that radiated their energies over a 2O deg. 
by 360 deg. sector, while the earth lies in a 17 deg. by 
17 deg. sector. (Hinchman, op. clt. 1971* p- 3-•)
11. W. L. Geddes, Interview, January 20, 197*; L. Pollack, 
interview, March 31, 1976; Comsat Ann. Rept. 1968.
The gains in capacity--!,200 circuits versus 240 of 
previous generations—were not wholly attributable to 
antenna designs: with the antennas, which were twice 
as efficient as hitherto, went greater on-board power 
supplies and a three-fold increase in bandwidth.
-435-
NOTES: CHAPTER 10. CONTINUED
12. Simultaneous frequency re-use enabled the IVs, with
only slightly larger utilised bandwidths than the Ills, 
to offer more than four times the Ills' capacities. 
(L. Pollack, Interview, March 3, 1976; also Comsat 
Ann. Rept. 1972. p. 23.) For discussion of IVs, see: 
Ibid.. pp. 23-7; Dr. F. P. Adler, "Broadcasting from 
satellite," Address at 6th International Television 
Symposium, Montreux, May 19, 1969, reprinted in Sat. 
Broadcasting Hearings 1969. pp. 271-2; Hinchman, op. 
cit. 1971, p. 32) W. L. Pritchard and P. L. Bargel- 
lini, "Communications satellites," in Gerbner et al. , 
(eels.), op. cit. , p. 64.
13- Testimony of Joseph Charyk, in Sen. Space Committee 
Heari ngs 1966. p. 46.
14- For information on multiple access and SPADE, see:
T_el_ecQmrn. Rept.s. , January 25 and March 3, 1969; Com­ 
sat Corp., "TDMA: time-division multiple access," 
(undated brochure); "Multiple access techniques add 
flexibility," Aviation.. Week, August 23, 1971; Prit­ 
chard and Bargellini, op. cit., p. 65; Comsat Ann. 
Repts. 1972, pp. 59-60; 1974. p. 11.
15. B. I. Edelson, H. W. Wood, C. J. Rebcr, "Cost effec­ 
tiveness in global satellite communication^." F''or 
presentation at the International Astronautical Fede­ 
ration XXVi Congress, Lisbon, September 21-27, 1975- 
pp. 7-8, 17-
16. Steven A. Levy, "Intelsat: technology, politics and
the transformation of a regime," International Organi­ 
zation, Vol. XXIX No. 3, 1975- P- 666.
17. Comsat Ann. Rept. 1974> P- 5-
IS. Kinsley, op. cit., pp. 65-6.
19. Comsat Ann. Rept. 1974> p. 7-
20. W. Geddes, in an interview with the author (January 20, 
1978, London), contended that Intelsat had been fortu­ 
nate to keep up with traffic growth. Geddes, a former 
UK representative on Intelsat's governing board and 
then Intelsat's director of operations, noted that the 
failure of the first Intelsat 111 launch in September 
1968 left the system without capacity to relay TV cover­ 
age of the Tokyo Olympics, and obliged Intelsat to use 
a NASA satellite.
21. Passell and Ross found that as of May 1970—even before 
the high-capacity Intelsat IVs were deployed—the Atlan­ 
tic satellites were operating at 55 percent of capacity, 
and they write of "the high level of excess capacity" in
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the system. (P. Passell and L. Ross, Communications 
Satellite Tariffs for Television, 1B1 Monograph 3• 
London: International Broadcasting Institute, 1972, 
p. 23«) Even M. Snow, a former Comsat employee, ac­ 
knowledges "some evidence of chronic excess capacity" 
during Intelsat's first decade. (Snow, op. cit., p. 133-)
22. Satellite technology concentrates a good deal of capa­ 
city in a small number of potentially vulnerable compo­ 
nents', " which means in-orbit spare capacity is advisable. 
Excess capacity also enables occasional services--TV 
relay, cable restoration, etc.--to be offered at virtu­ 
ally no additional capital outlay.
23. Snow, op. cit., p. 18 Table 2.1. Snow's figures are pro­ 
bably more accurate than our own, since he had access to 
monthly records of space segment operations. It is, 
however, gratifying that the two sets of figures, and 
the conclusions drawn, are so close.
24. Ibid., p. 134.
25. Comsat Ann. Rept. 1975, P- 9- There were, lioi.ever, some 
serious cable mishaps, like the April 19'71 breakage of 
two cables at the same time, which required 033 satel­ 
lite circuits for restoration.
26. See Kinsley, op. cit., Ch. 4 passim.
27. Mainland-Alaska traffic went onto an RCA satellite system 
by FCC order in December 1973, and Hawaii traffic was in 
1974 transferred to a leased Intelsat transponder, re­ 
sulting in a corresponding decline in circuit lease to­ 
tals. (Comsat Ann. Rept. 1974, P- 7, 1975, P- 9.)
28. See Schwartz, op. cit., p. 472; and Kinsley, op. cit., 
p. 59.
29. The pricing sequence is as follows: Intelsat sets a
half-circuit charge for national telecommunications en­ 
tities, in this case Comsat. Comsat's tariff to the 
carriers includes that Intelsat charge, an earth sta­ 
tion factor (in which the carriers ultimately share 
thanks to their part ownerships of the U.S. earth sta­ 
tions) and an overhead factor. The carriers then 
charge their customers on the basis of their payments 
to Comsat, a domestic service factor covering use of 
interstate and local links, an international overland 
factor covering connections to and from the national 
grid and transmission points for overseas traffic, and 
an overhead factor for the international carriers. 
(Passell & Ross, op- cit., p. 11.) 
Intelsat's space segment charges are thus submerged. As
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of August 1971, Intelsat charged Comsat $1,250 per monlh 
for a voice half-circuit; Comsat got $2,850 from the 
carriers for the half-circuit, and the carriers collected 
$4,025 from ultimate users. (Edelson et . al., op. cit • , 
p. 7; Comsat Ann. Rept. 1975, p. 9.)
30. lor discussion of pi-ice inelasticity of demand see
Passell & Ross, op. cit.. p. 16, and hnow, op. cit., 
p. 135- Note, however, that ue are here talking about 
tiie HHilast i city of overall demand lor j nl erna t.i ona 1 
circuits, and arguing that tiie general increases or 
decreases in composite — cable and satellite—charges 
would have little impact on aggregate demand. If eable 
and satellite prices were set independently of one 
another, however, the specific demand lor satellite 
Circuits would unquestionably be price sensitive.
31. Interview with intelsat official uho wished not to be 
identified, April 12, 1970, Washington.
32. NASA was instrumental in the construction of Australia's 
first station capable of commercial service, vshich 
opened in October 1900 to serve the Apollo system. (T. 
A. Houseley, " "Vppl ica t ion of satell Me.-, to tin- commu­ 
nications scene," in Papers, IQOb I ; N' 'z.paee_font 'e n nee , 
p. 1 5£> • ) 1)01) v»as especial 1 y intere-.tc I in tin- rapid 
creation of satellite facil itios in .'_.'<> u( hear, t \sia ' <•> 
support the U.S. uar effort there: in 1<>ot> the c t.it" 
Department helped Comsat negotiate dov\n-l inks to I IK. 
r'egion, and in 1970 Thailand beeani-' the I'j.rst countr-y 
in tiie at't-a uiLh antennas beamed 1 <j both Pacific arid 
Indian Ocean satellites. ( T e 1 e e o imn . !•'. e p t s • , , < ptembor 
0, 1906.)
In regard to the aid apparatus, although legislation 
uas enacted to authorise official assistance to coun­ 
tries interested in building ground slat ions, the role 
of the official Agency for International Development 
seems Lo have concerned itself mainly uitli assisting 
Uomestic telecommunications modernisat Lon~~vvi t h the ex­ 
ception of Indonesia, vvhere AID provided investment 
guarantees to ITT, which built the country's first sta­ 
tion. (A. Ilotvedt, telecommunications engineer', AID, 
Interview, April 1, 1970, Washington; Telecomm. Repts., 
March lb, 1908.) The commercial Export -Import Dank 
played a much more extensive role in helping finance 
purchase of American, goods, and services for foreign 
ground stations. Among countries receiving such assis­ 
tance were: Lebanon, Iran, Chile, Thailand, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Pakistan and Cameroon. The list is partial, 
because Bank officials do not disclose all its opera­ 
tions. (C. Cass, chief engineer, Export-Import Bank, 
Interview, April 1, 1970, Washington.) Sources are: 
Telecomm. Repts., March l8 and July 22, 190«; March 
3 and 17, November 10, 1909; April 0, June 8 and Nov­ 
ember 13, 1970; and T. 0. Elias, "The contribution of
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telecommunications and direct satellite broadcasting 
to technical assistance and nation-building," in E. 
McWhinney, ed., op. cit., p. 131.
33- 1967 Presidential Policy Statement, p. 4.
34- Stephen Smoke, Interview, April 7, 1976, Washington.
35- H. T. Simmons, pp. cit.
36. Passell and Ross, op. cit., p. b; House Appropriations 
Hearings 1971, p. 703.
37 • House Appropriations Hearings 197.1 > P • 703 .
38. Col. D. McMillan, in 1966 Parliamentary Kept, on ELDO, 
p. 68.
39- ST&C advertisement, "What everyone who uses a telephone
should know about telecommunications," Sunday Times (Lon- 
February 27, 1977.
40 Telecomm. Repts., June 20, 1966, August 28, 1967, June 
9, 1969.
41- Frutkin, op . cit . , in Gerbner et . al . (eds.), op - ci i • , 
p. 372.
42. S. Smoke, Interview, April 7, 1976, Washington.
43- Kinsley, op . cit . , pp. 114-15-
44- Among the countries to which Comsat gave technical
assistance were Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Kuwait, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela and Peru. The sta­ 
tions in Chile, the Philippines and Thailand were sub­ 
sequently built by GT&E, and ITT built those of Colom­ 
bia and Peru. (Comsat Ann. Rept. 1967, p. 15; Elias, 
op . cit . , p. 131; Telecomm. Repts., April 10 and Nov­ 
ember 13, 1967, November 10, 1969, and April 6, 1970.)
Other earth station contracts abroad awarded to U.S. 
carriers or affiliated companies included: ITT, tor 
Indonesia, Greece, Zaire and part-interest in a second 
Spanish station; GT&E and AT&T jointly for a Nigerian 
station; RCA-Canada for an Indian station; WU1 parti­ 
cipation in stations, in Spain and Italy. (Frutkin, op • 
cit. , p. 372; Telecomm. Repts., March 18, 1968, April 
7, April 14 and May 19, 1969, May H, 1970 and November 
2, 1970.)
45. Elias, op. cit^j p. 134. It is true that as of 1975 
only six former French colonj.es had Intel sat earth 
stations—although in addition France herself had 
caused stations to be built in three other departemenl s .
46. See below, Chapter 19.
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47. In May 1961, for instance, AT&T announced that the U.S. 
would be needing l£,000 circuits worldwide by 1980. 
(J. Dingman in House Space Committee Hearings 1961, p. 
306.) That autumn the Ad Hoc Carriers Committee raised 
the estimate to 14,000 circuits, forecasting that 4,650 
would be needed by 1970 and 8,000 by 1975- (See Report, 
reprinted in Sen. Antitrust Hearings 1962, Partll, p. 
IS-) When, however, in August 1966 Bell submitted pro- 
jecti.ons of its satellite circuit requirements, its to­ 
tal 1980 forecast was 3,225—and only 640 would be 
needed by 1970, with 1,525 by 1975. (Telecomm. Repts., 
August 19, 1966.) Hence, either AT&T was proposing 
to use around four times more cable than satellite 
circuits—a policy it never publicly acknowledged-- 
or the overall forecast of traffic requirements had 
fallen, with virtually no public announcement.
48. There is a "direct relationship" between satellite ra­ 
diating power and the size and complexity of earth sta­ 
tions. (UNESCO, A Guide to Satellite Communication. 
Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 66. ParisJ 
1972. p. 9.) Intelsat selected an 85-foot diameter an­ 
tenna size as its ground station standard, and deployed 
satellites with low power outputs--even the Ills had, 
for example, 127 watts of radiated strength, the equiva­ 
lent of a couple of lightbulbs. (H. Goldhamer, "The 
social effects of communications technology," in Schramm 
and Roberts,(eds), op. cit., p. 913-)
49« Power levels of up to 50 kilowatts were said to be 
available. (L. Lessing, op. cit.) The Atlas-Agena 
rocket in use in 1964 was capable of a 900-lb. pay- 
load, and was due to be replaced in 1966 by the Titan 
III, which could put 5,000 pounds into orbit at only 
20 percent greater cost. (1964 Satellite Hearings, 
Part I, pp. 467-8.)
50. Italy's first station at Fucino, for instance, which 
was one of four served by Early Bird, was of substan­ 
dard size. As of 1966 Intelsat charged $20,000 per 
year for a voice-equivalent half-circuit derived by a 
standard antenna; the 72-foot antenna then used by 
Japan paid $30,000 for the same capacity unit, and 
NASA—with 42-foot mobile ground units--was charged 
$130,000. (House Rept. on Govt. SatelliteUse 19M>, 
p. 59.) Technically', communicating capacity—for a 
given power level — varies with the square ol" the an­ 
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52. J. McDonald, op. cit.
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designed for the global system." (In Simmons, op. cit.) 
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ferred to the Indian Ocean region.
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50. Galloway, op. cit., p. 116. The view that the Apollo 
contract represented assistance to Comsat was also ex­ 
pressed in the House subcommittee report:
The Government is supporting Comsat as a business 
entity in the most direct way possible—by order­ 
ing sufficient services to enable Comsat to estab­ 
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ITT acknowledged that it knew before the January 21 
board meeting, though "only indirectly from Comsat." 
RCA and WUI were especially unhappy, and proposed in 
April that a liaison committee be formed so they too 
could be kept abreast of Comsat's intentions. (Tele­ 
comm s. Kepts., April 11, 1966.)
60. Telecomm. Repts., May 16, 1966.
61. House Rept._ on Govt. Satellite Use 1966, p. 26.
62. Authorised Users Decision, p. 24.
63. In Telecomm. Repts., July 25. 1966.
64. Authorised Users Decision, p. 27.
65. Ibid., pp. 27-8.
66. House Kept, on Govt. Satellite Use 1966, p. 37.
67. Authorised Users Decision, pp. 29-30.
68. Ibid., p. 29; Telecomm. Repts., July 5 and 26, 1966.
68a. Only RCA submitted a new bid, offering $3,690 per cir­ 
cuit per month, premised on its getting sole ownership 
of the Hawaii earth'station; otherwise the price would 
be $4,868, a rate proposed after DOD said it could not 
accept conditions on the bid. At the end of June RCA 
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ficient to invalidate the contract award. (See: House 
Kept*. pn.Govt. Satellite Use 1966. pp. 4l-2, 46 ,• also 
Note 58 > supra.)
69. Ibid., p. 32.
69a. Telecomm. Repts., August 22, 1966.
?0 ( Ibid., September 19, 1966, in which the record carriers' 
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71. Ibid., August 1, 1966.
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with the Thai government, RCA was assigned the 10 Hawaii- 
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86. Stephen Smoke, Interview, April 1, 1976, Washington.
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it could then be argued that Comsat had lost very 
little as a result of the decision, since the company 
was getting most of the leased-line traffic anyway. 
That outcome too, however, would be indefensible: 
to the degree that record carrier services and satel­ 
lite operations were becoming identical, the practical 
value of the carriers' continued role would be nulli­ 
fied.
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-457- 
NOTESi CHAPTER 13, CONTINUED
3-5 percent. Cable circuits were assigned: 200 to 
AT&T, 447 jointly to ITT and AT&T, 32 to ITT, 16 to 
RCA and 25 to WUI. (Telecomm. Repts., January 9, 
1967.)
6? • Ibid., January 20 and March 2k, 1969. ITT and RCA 
were using one satellite circuit between them, and 
20 cable circuits.
68. Ibid. .
69. I bid., July 7, 1969.
70. Ibid., January 2, 1970.
71. N.Y. Times, September 18, 1966. For details of TAT-4 
ownership and operations, see Telecomm. Rep,ts., Sep­ 
tember 20, 1965.
72. Western Electric was to be completing work on the 
Caribbean cable in April 1968, leaving 400 workers 
to be redeployed. ("Atlantic cable shaping amid 
•Nays'," Electronic News, October 30, 196?.)
73. ITT's ST&C was very much involved on the European side 
of these projects. In November 1966 3T,'-C got an ;|;11. .9m 
contract from the British Post Office to build the first 
long-distance transistorised cable 1,000 miles from 
Cornwall to Lisbon? the link was to be finished by 
early 1969 as the first phase of a Britain-South Afri­ 
ca phone cable. In April 1967 ST&C and another ITT 
subsidiary, American Cable & Radio, were awarded the 
$61.6m contract for the 6,000-mile Portugal-South Afri­ 
ca segment. Finally, in August 196? ST&C received 
$16.8m in assorted contracts for cable systems in Europe 
and the Mediterranean, including Spain-Italy, Italy- 
Sardinia, Sicily-Libya, and the first Baltic phone 
cable, Germany-Sweden. (Telecomm. Repts., November 21, 
1966; May 1 and August 28, 1967;February 24, 1969.)
74. ibid., September 11, 1967.
75. "Atlantic cable shaping...," Electronic News, October 
30, 1967.
76. Ibid. Spain currently had four satellite and four
cable circuits to the U.S., all via France. With the 
expected opening in 1968 of the Madrid earth station, 
Spain planned to activate 32 satellite circuits co 
the U.S. while using 40 cable circuits, thus producing 
a rough parity. The Italians were using 16 cable and 
15 satellite circuits, and expected to need a total of 
50 transatlantic circuits; they intended to take ano­ 
ther 10 satellite circuits and nine from the new cable, 
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98. IbidN, May 2^, 1971.
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CHAPTER 14s KEEPING SATELLITES OUT OF THE UNITED STATES
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costs themselves. (Telecomm. Repts., September 27, 
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2. Letter to ABC, March 2, 1966, reprinted in Sen. Commerce 
Rept. 1966» p. 15.
3. Telecomm. Repts., May 31, 1969? J. McCormack, "Commu­ 
nications Satellite Corporation," Address by the 
chairman of Comsat Corp. to the Washington Society of 
Investment Analysts* May 31» 1966. Reprinted in Wall 
Street Transcript, July 18, 1966,
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10 multi-use stations, 12 lower capacity terminals and 
another 100 for reception-only of TV programmes. (Broad­ 
casting Magazine, August 25, 1969; Lessing, op. citT)
5. Testimony of James McCormack, Sen. Commerce Rept. 1966, 
p. 119-
6. Ibid., p. 125.
7. Leland Johnson, "Technological advance and market struc­ 
ture in domestic telecommunications." RAND Corp., mimeo, 
1969. Forecasts were of six billion interstate tele­ 
phone calls as against 96m international.
8. Simmons, op. cit.; Kinsley, op. cit., p
9. Lessing, op. cit. ; Kinsley op. cit., p.
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10. NEC's plan involved six satellites and 18 TV channels, 
costing &37'5m initially for the space segment. For 
another $6.6m, each network would have fixed transmit­ 
ters in N.Y., Los Angeles and Washington, plus a motile 
unit. Affiliated TV and radio stations would furnish 
their own receive-only equipment, at $55,000 for TV and 
$11,000 for radio. (Broadcasting Magazine, August 25, 1969.) —————————
11. McGeqrge Bundy, Sen. Commerce Kept. 1966, pp. 79-80.
12. Only 116 of the total 632 TV channels reserved for
educational broadcasting were then being used. (Sen. 
Commerce Rept. 1966, p. 109.) For the origins of the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting and of the public 
Broadcasting System the CPB oversaw, see: .John ivacy 
Jr., Tj?^Irrglj;atea Wasteland; The Struggle to Shape 
a Public Television System in the United Statejs. Lon­ 
don: University of California PresiT iy6k\ pp. 18, 
19, 22-3 and passim.) By July 1967 congressional sup­ 
porters of noncommercial broadcasting were afraid that 
any continued linkages with the domestic satellite con­ 
troversies would endanger passage of the Cl-'B bill. (Telo- 
communications Repts., July 17, 1967.)
13. See, e.g., the comments of Sen. Pastore in Sen. Commerce 
Rept. Ig66j pp. 152-3, and in Tolecomm. Rep_t_s_._, Augus t 
"22, 1966. McGeorge Bundy, Ford Foundation president, 
similarly testified in the Senate in August 1966:
There should be a national decision that the 
savings in broadcasting costs which the American 
people have earned from their investment in space 
should be dedicated mainly to the strengthening 
of noncommercial television. (Sen. Commerce^lepJ^ 
1966, p. 79.)
1>4. Hughes had the support of two other manufacturers, RCA 
and TRW, and all three were likely aware than an AT&T- 
dominated system might mean preferential procurement 
from Western Electric. The direct broadcast proposals 
envisioned high-powered satellites (up to 10 kilowatts, 
as against 500-600 watts for the Intelsat IVs) which 
would broadcast to home TV sets augmented, at a cost, 
of around $100 each, with four-foot antennas, ampli­ 
fiers and converters. It was estimated that due to 
chronic underutilisation of UHF broadcasting bands, up 
to 30 channels could be given over to direct satellite 
broadcasting without interference or re-assignment; 
the Hughes satellites would provide 12 channels nation­ 
ally.
The explosive implications for the structure of U.S. 
broadcasting—doing away with the networks' need for 
local transmitting affiliates, and with any obligation 
to share national advertising revenues with them—made 
congressional approval for NASA R&D in the field diffi­ 
cult to obtain. NASA had had initially favourable
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results from preliminary experiments in !965--the work 
was conducted by RCA and GE — but the agency's requests 
for additional funding were rejected in spring 196?. 
Direct broadcasting was not attempted in the U.S. until 
1974-, when a NASA ATS satellite beamed educational pro­ 
gramming to deprived areas of Alaska, Appalachia and 
the Rocky Mountains. (See: Lessing, op. cit.; also, 
for background on direct satellite broadcasting, sees 
D. B. Spencer and K. G. Freeman, "Television broad­ 
casting from satellites," Wireless World, two-part 
series. Vol. LXXIX No. 14-58, December 1973, pp. 607- 
610; Vol. LXXX No. 14-61, March 1974-, pp. 39-44.)
Hughes 1 interest in interconnecting cable TV systems 
via satellite was doubtless related to its 17 percent 
stake in TelePrompTer Inc., the biggest U.S. cable TV 
outfit. Hughes later submitted a joint scheme with 
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systems and GT&E's phone systems. ( Tele c omm . Repts . , 
January 4-, 1971.)
15« "Comsat keeps sending them up," Business Week, October 
14-, 1967; also Kinsley, pp. cit. , p. 14-6T.
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and appeared unconvinced that even a multipurpose sys­ 
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July 24-, 1967.) Later it was noted that satellites 
would, at best, only replace the long-lines component 
of long distance phone service, which accounted for 20 
percent of total system costs. (Ibi_d. , November 6, 
1971.)
17. A Ford Foundation submission to the FCC in April
Not all the parties to this proceeding are equally 
interested in the rapid adaptation of the communi­ 
cations satellite to domestic uses. Except for 
those of us who seek a broadcast satellite service, 
Comsat is almost alone in its desire to move for­ 
ward with a domestic satellite system as quickly 
as possible, but even Comsat must be sensitive to 
the interests of the carriers. .. (who) are natural­ 
ly inclined to relegate the satellite to a supple­ 
mentary role. (Schwartz, op. cit., p. 4-84-.)
18. Rumours cited, along with urging by John Pastore, chair­ 
man of the Senate communications subcommittee, not to 
"procrastinate," in Telecomm. Repts. , May 1, 1967.
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19. Although not formally obliged to await the group's
report, the FCC did so, and its chairman later acknow­ 
ledged that the Commission did "defer reaching any 
policy decisions" while the studies were conducted. 
(Telecomm. Repts.. March 10, 1969.) The Rostow Report 
was^finished in December 1968, but the outgoing Johnson 
Administration had other concerns, and the report was 
only released in May 1969 under pressure from a congres­ 
sional committee, which had called Rostow to testify. 
(Eugene Rostow, Interview, March 3, 1976, New Haven, 
Conn;)-
20. Rostow Rept.. Ch. I p. 14. The Report stipulated that 
if the overseas carriers were merged, the new entity 
would be barred from a domestic role except as "trustee 
or steward" of a pilot satellite programme. (Ibid., 
Chap. II p. J|4.)
21. "Indications are that the FCC will provide for a three- 
year experimental pilot or interim program, with the 
Communications Satellite Corporation operating the 
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various entities." (Te1e c omm. Repts., June 30, 1969.)
22. Ibid., June 16 and July 14, 1969.
23. This contention appears in Kinsley, op. cit., p. 151» 
and seems creditable.
24. Memo, dated July 22, to FCC Chairman Hyde, quoted in 
Telecomm. Repta., July 28, 1969.
25. ""It is vital," the FCC chairman wrote to the White House, 
"to proceed without further undue delays..." (Quoted 
in Ibid., August 4, 1969.)
26. Ibid_._. August 18, 1969.
2?. On October 15, CBS revived the TV distribution scheme, 
and drew immediate support for a network consortium to 
own the system from CPB, Comsat and the Ford Foundation. 
Comsat began negotiating to build and operate the sys­ 
tem. (Sees CBS Press Release, October 15. 1969; Tele- 
comms. Repts., October 20, October 2? and November 3, 
1~969"; T. P. Murphy, "Technology and political change: 
the public interest impact of Comsat," Review of Poli­ 
tics., Vol. XXXIII No. 3, July 1971. pp. 421-27)
28. Telecomm. Repts., October 27, 1969-
29. Quoted, Ibid., October 20, 1969.
30. U.S. News and World Report, May 18, 1970; Telecomm. 
Repts., January 19, 1970.
31. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secre­ 
tary, January 23, 1970.
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32. The memorandum asserted that the pertinent section of the orbital band could accommodate 15-20 satellites, while no more than'10-12 were anticipated. As Chayes has observed, there was at least a trace of arrogance in this assertion, since it took no note of foreign intentions and did not adduce evidence to support its orbital capacity estimates. (See: Chayes, op. cit. 1971. pp. 48-9.) Although the orbital band is vast and frequency re-use techniques reduce the likelihood of interference, a premium may nevertheless exist on certain locations} for instance, a satellite connec­ ting London and Tokyo may not deviate by more than one degree from its designated spot if one city is not to be lost. (See: Walter R. Hinchman, "Issues in spec­ trum resource allocation," in 20th Century Task Force on International Satellite Communication, j'he Future of Satellite Communications, Second report. NYi 1970 j Electric Design, October 25, 1967.) Hence, a unila­ teral determination to claim as many spots as neces­ sary—not even to further a national policy, but in­ deed to compensate for the absence of one--was not likely to win international acclaim.
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tions and raise legal and policy problems." Comsat acccordingly tried to separate its domestic plans from its Intelsat role: "Intelsat would not be involved directly in any U.S. domestic satellite system," said Wilbur Pritchard, director of Comsat Laboratories. 
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the Intelsat renegotiations, stated:
If Comsat does not build a profit-protected dom­ 
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CHAPTER 15: TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND THE 'SIMOLE' SY3TEP."
Term used by Intelsat official who wished to remain 
anonymous. '(Interview, April 12, 1976, Washington.)
Nevertheless, an Intelsat whose sphere of competence was restricted might offer advantages to Comsat, since 
the company would be able to enter and compete indepen­ dently in new satellite fields, without compromising a principal commitment to Intelsat. A Fortune article 
in 1965 commented:
...The biggest single block to expansion of Com­ 
sat 's services is the limitation to a single glo­ 
bal commercial system, which the U.S. built into 
the consortium agreement...If the limitation_to 
a. single global system is frozen as U.S. national 
policy, Comsat's services will be severely con­ 
fined, and it will be denied the opportunity to exploit many of the capabilities of the satellite. 
(J. McDonald, op. cit.)
The fact that this observation was made in 1965 is im­ portant, since Comsat's domestic prerogatives had not 
yet been whittled down. By the time of the renegona­ 
tions, it was clear that Comsat's surest access to new 
satellite fields was via an expanded Intelsat—where 
Comsat's entitlement to participate would be unquestion­ 
able, and its voting strength would enable it to secure 
satisfactory terms for that participation.
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ating position also owed something to the fact that 
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domp' of^the Intelsat system; irrespective, therefore, 
of its ties to U.S. resources Comsat remained a valu­ 
able entity in and of itself. This, however, only made 
Comsat convenient—not essential—to Intelsat. The 
benefits of retaining Comsat for those reasons could 
equally be obtained by providing for a transition, 
during which necessary experience and skills could be 
developed by a new managerial entity—which is, in 
fact, what happened.
4. Quoted in Telecomm. Repts.. May 2k, 1971. President 
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forth U.S. support for the single global system and 
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Intelsat, was really the last clear expression of White 
House interest in Comsat and Intelsat. Johnson had 
followed through on his own interest in the field by 
appointing Leonard Marks—formerly a lawyer for Mrs. 
Johnson's broadcasting interests, a director of the 
U.S. Information Agency and an original Comsat incor- 
porator--to head the U.S. delegation to the 1969 Tn- 
telsat conference. Nixon, however, appointed a former 
political rival, Gov. William Scranton, to succeed 
Marks. Scranton knew practically nothing about the 
field, as he later acknowledged in his introduction to 
what he called a "layman's primer":
Upon accepting President Nixon's invitation to take 
over responsibility for the negotiations, I sought 
in vain for a simple, single source reference of­ 
fering a quick overall introduction to this chal­ 
lenging field. (W. D. Hickman, Talking Moons; 
The Story of Communications Satellites. N.Y.: 
World Publishing Company, 1970. p. 10.)
Congressional review of the renegotiations was also 
limited, and what attention the conference received 
focussed upon—and quite probably was provoked by-- 
Comsat. The House commerce committee did question the 
FCC chairman in November 1970 on recent conference 
sessions. "There have been rumours," said the commit­ 
tee's chairman, "that the American interests might be 
traded off for political reasons." After having been 
reassured by the FCC chairman that every effort would 
be made to ensure "the protection of developments in 
which we have made such a tremendous contribution," the 
committee's chairman replied: "I am happy to hear that 
because there have been some rumors that perhaps the 
Comsat managership might be traded off," thus making 
clear the object of his concern. (House Appropriations 
Hearings 1971. p.16.) Earlier, legislators had opined 
that they "just don't want the United States to be sold 
short," and they "hope this won't develop into a foreign 
aid program," but the volume and tone of review was far 
removed from the passion that informed the 1962 debates.
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